



MACROECONOMICS,  
TRADE AND  
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MACROECONOMICS, TRADE AND INVESTMENT

**EQUITABLE GROWTH, FINANCE & INSTITUTIONS INSIGHT**

# A Review of Fiscal Policy Responses to COVID-19

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Joseph Massad  
Robert Utz



WORLD BANK GROUP



GOODYEAR

Pourquoi  
choisir ?

Venez découvrir  
le nouveau Rav 4



Exclusivité chez SICAM  
Distributeur officiel à Madagascar

TOYOTA  
sicam



The background of the page is a teal-tinted photograph of a street scene. On the left, there are several tall utility poles with many power lines. A road with white dashed lines curves into the distance. On the right side of the road, there are some small buildings and a billboard. In the foreground on the right, two people are walking away from the camera. The overall tone is somber and urban.

# ABSTRACT

**Countries around the world adopted a wide range of fiscal measures in 2020 to mitigate the health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.**

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*At the beginning of 2021, the outlook on the evolution of the pandemic remains uncertain. COVID-19 cases are at high levels in many countries, but effective vaccines have been approved and are being rolled out. The occurrence of new variants of the virus that spread more easily and more quickly and that may be associated with an increased risk of death adds to the uncertainty as to how quickly the pandemic can be brought under control.*

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# MTI INSIGHT

# 7





# A Review of Fiscal Policy Responses to COVID-19

## >> INTRODUCTION

Countries around the world adopted a wide range of fiscal measures in 2020 to mitigate the health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the beginning of 2021, the outlook on the evolution of the pandemic remains uncertain. COVID-19 cases are at high levels in many countries, but effective vaccines have been approved and are being rolled out. The occurrence of new variants of the virus that spread more easily and more quickly and that may be associated with an increased risk of death<sup>1</sup> adds to the uncertainty as to how quickly the pandemic can be brought under control.

Policymakers face difficult choices in an environment where fiscal space may be narrowing and additional spending requirements emerge, including for the purchase and distribution of vaccines as well as for measures to support an economic recovery. Which of the policy measures already in place need to be maintained and extended and which ones can be phased out? Which new measures need to be added? Where are opportunities for greater efficiency and better targeting? What needs to be done to recover funds from measures such as tax deferrals and loans?

This note and the associated COVID-19 fiscal policy measures dashboard are intended to help inform answers to these questions by providing analysis of the countries' portfolios of fiscal policy measures adopted in 2020 and their key characteristics such as reversibility of policy measures, possibility of cost recovery, or targetability. This note allows policymakers to better understand which policies and types of policies follow international best practice and which measures should be carefully monitored in the implementation or closure phases. In all, about 4000 policy actions adopted by 203 economies have been grouped into seven categories and 47 sub-categories. About half of these policy actions have been judged as to whether they met the criteria across nine dimensions, including targetability, speed, abuse resistance, affordability, predictability and cost control, scalability, reversibility, administrative complexity, and feasibility considering social distancing and contagion risks.

The dashboard offers a flexible tool to analyze country portfolios of fiscal policy measures by categories, sub-categories, and characteristics of measures and it allows comparison with other country or country groupings.

1. CDC. 2021. New Variants of the Virus that Causes COVID-19. Updated Feb. 2, 2021. <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/transmission/variant.html>. Accessed on Feb. 14, 2021.



## >>> ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

The paper consists of three parts. The first part provides an overview of the fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic from its onset until September 2020. We look at the different types of interventions that countries have adopted to mitigate the health impacts of the pandemic and to support households and businesses. The second part of the paper reviews the characteristics of fiscal policy interventions, using the policy assessment framework from Fiscal Impact and Policy Response to COVID-19 (World Bank 2020) as a guide. The third part of the paper concludes by drawing lessons for continued efforts to mitigate the health and economic impacts of the pandemic and the implications for transitioning from the current set of crisis response measures to support for economic recovery and fiscal stabilization. Six annexes describe the methodology used to assess fiscal policy interventions and offer a deep look into topics that are referenced throughout the paper, including a post-scoring diagnostic of the scoring methodology, a list of country-level scores on the nine policy dimensions of the policy assessment framework, ANOVA statistical analysis of variance of scores across country groups, logistic regression analysis assessing the marginal impact of policies and country characteristics on policy dimension scores, pairwise correlation tables of policy scores, and the full table of Assessment Options for Fiscal Policy Measures from the fiscal policy paper.

## >> OVERVIEW OF FISCAL POLICY INTERVENTIONS

### >>> A FAST AND SIZABLE RESPONSE

On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic. Most countries followed the advice of health experts and quickly introduced strict containment measures to mitigate the spread and adverse health impact of the virus. The Oxford Stringency Index captures the combined restrictiveness of measures such as business closures and travel restrictions for each country for each day of calendar year 2020. Between March 9, 2020 and April 1, 2020, the world became serious about controlling the spread of the virus (Figure 1). Although these containment measures were necessary from a health perspective, they contributed to a sudden reduction of income for many businesses and individuals, led to a sharp increase in unemployment worldwide, and raised serious concerns not just about the short-term liquidity of businesses, but their long-term solvency. The need for measures to protect livelihoods and secure business assets was clear.

Most governments quickly introduced fiscal policy measures to provide financial support to businesses and households, and to improve the capacity of the health sector to respond to the pandemic. The magnitude of the fiscal response and the type of instruments differs significantly by country groupings (Figure 2). Advanced economies' (AEs) crisis response amounted to more than 9 percent of GDP in expenditure and revenue measures and another 11 percent in support through equity and loans, guarantees, and quasi-fiscal activities. Emerging markets and middle-income economies' (EMMIEs) response is more muted, but they also deployed all instruments for the fiscal response, with about 3.4 percent of GDP in expenditure

and revenue measures and 2.5 percent of GDP in support through other instruments. Low income developing countries (LIDCs) had the smallest fiscal response at about 1.8 percent of GDP which was almost entirely in the form of expenditure and revenue measures (1.6 percent of GDP).

> > >

**FIGURE 1 - Global Average Oxford Stringency Index by Day**




Source: University of Oxford<sup>2</sup>, December 2020.

2. Hale, Thomas, Noam Angrist, Emily Cameron-Blake, Laura Hallas, Beatriz Kira, Saptarshi Majumdar, Anna Petherick, Toby Phillips, Helen Tatlow, Samuel Webster (2020). Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, Blavatnik School of Government.



> > >

**FIGURE 2 - Breakdown of Fiscal Support, by Type  
(As of September 11, 2020, percent of GDP)**



Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor (October 2020).

The number of policies<sup>3</sup> introduced by each country varies widely, with most countries introducing anywhere from eight to twenty measures as of September 1, 2020. Many recently introduced measures have been revisions or additions to earlier policies.<sup>4</sup> Most countries adopted between one to three interventions in support of their health sector, two to five interventions targeted at supporting households, and two to five interventions to support businesses.

The total cost of the fiscal package has only a weak relationship with the number of policies that make up the fiscal package (Figure 4, panel A). Although, on average, having more policies is associated with a higher overall cost, the variation in policies only explains 22 percent of the variation in cost. In some cases, a stand-alone measure can account

for nearly all of the fiscal response to the crisis. For example, Guatemala's cash transfers alone account for a third of its fiscal package at 1.2 percent of GDP, while Eswatini's relief fund for laid-off workers costs 0.04 percent of GDP, or about 1.5 percent of the total cost of its fiscal policy response at 2.8 percent of GDP.<sup>5</sup> Larger and higher-income economies tended to adopt more policies (Figure 4, panels B and C). This may reflect, inter alia, greater resource availability and more sophisticated economies that require complex responses.

There appears to be a weak yet significant relationship between the cumulative number of cases per 100,000 and the cumulative number of fiscal policies implemented (Figure 4, panel D), indicating that the number of fiscal policy interventions tended to be slightly higher in countries with more infections. However, the relationship between these two indicators is complex. High numbers of cases could prompt a stringent lockdown, requiring a robust fiscal policy response to support households and businesses. Alternatively, low numbers of cases could reveal that a strict response is working, which also requires a robust fiscal policy response. Furthermore, economies can be quite different, and the way that the health crisis exacerbates the economic crisis can vary by country, as well as the response deemed appropriate by authorities.


The data show no relationship between the gross government debt stock and the number of fiscal policies implemented (Figure 4, panel E). However, countries with greater government effectiveness tended to adopt a higher number of fiscal measures (Figure 4, panel F). Seeing some alignment between the number of policies adopted and countries capacity is important, especially since a plethora of policies could also reflect divided governments and competing bureaucratic forces.

3. The data on policy responses to COVID-19 used in this report were taken from the Fiscal Policy and Sustainable Growth Unit's (FPU) Fiscal Policy Matrix, last updated on September 1, 2020. The data cover 203 economies and comprise nearly 4,000 fiscal policy measures launched or announced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The policies were gathered in two waves: from the onset of the pandemic through May 1, 2020 (amounting to 2,400 policies), and then from May 1, 2020 until September 1, 2020 (totaling 1,591 policies). The main sources referenced to compile our dataset were the IMF, OECD, IBDF, and the Doing Business policy tracker databases. Other data featured in this report are from the World Development Indicators, the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset, the World Health Organization, the University of Oxford, and the October 2020 IMF Fiscal Monitor.

4. About 1,500 of the nearly 4,000 fiscal measures accounted for in our database were of the exact same type as measures previously implemented by the same country. Some of these measures were not exactly repeats; rather, they were benefits which had been previously offered to one demographic extended to new demographics. Many were revisions to early policies, extending benefits beyond the originally planned end date, or scaling up spending on health measures as need evolved further.

5. IMF policy tracker and IMF Fiscal Monitor (October, 2020).


**FIGURE 3 - Number of Fiscal Policy Actions per Country**



Source: World Bank Fiscal Policy data base, January – September 2020.



**FIGURE 4 - Scatters of the Number of Fiscal Measures Against Selected Indicators**



Source<sup>6</sup>: WB Fiscal Measures Database (2020), IMF Fiscal Monitor (October 2020), WDI (2020), WHO (2020), WB Fiscal Space Database (2020), WGI (2020).

6. Data show cumulative cases as of September 1, population in 2019, cumulative cases per 100,000 as of September 1, GDP per capita in 2019 (constant 2010 USD), and government debt in 2019.

## >>> A CORE SET OF FISCAL POLICY RESPONSES WAS ADOPTED BY MOST COUNTRIES

The objectives of fiscal policy actions adopted by countries fall into three broad groups: (a) to deal with the health pandemic, (b) to support households and (c) to bolster businesses. Governments pursue these objectives by using the whole range of fiscal instruments, including tax and expenditure measures, credits, and guarantees, according to which we group policy actions into seven broad categories and 47 sub-categories.

> > >

**TABLE 1 - Classification of Fiscal Measures<sup>7</sup>**

	FISCAL MEASURES TO SUPPORT BUSINESSES	FISCAL MEASURES TO SUPPORT HOUSEHOLDS	FISCAL MEASURES TO SUPPORT THE HEALTH SECTOR
REVENUE	<b>Revenue measures to protect businesses</b> Accelerated asset depreciation (CIT) Extend loss carry-forward for losses incurred during the crisis (CIT) Broaden tax deductibility (e.g., to all business expenses related to COVID-19) Introduce tax credits Deferral of tax filing (CIT, PIT for self-employed, VAT, other business taxes) Deferral of tax and/or interest and penalty payments Tax rate reduction (CIT, PIT for self-employed) Tax amnesty Accelerating refunds (VAT) Lower advance payment (CIT, PIT for self-employed) Suspend debt collection activities Suspend audit activities Tax exemptions/waiver/suspension Other	<b>Revenue measures to protect individuals</b> Deferral of tax filing (PIT, payroll taxes, property tax, etc.) Deferral of tax payments (PIT, payroll taxes, property tax, etc.) and/or interest and penalty payments Tax rate reduction (PIT, payroll taxes, property tax, etc.) Tax amnesty (including for overdue taxes and penalties) Broaden tax deductibility (e.g., for contributions to health care) (PIT) Introduce tax credits Tax exemptions/waiver/suspension Other	<b>Revenue measures to promote availability of medical items</b> Lower tax rates for medical items (import duties, VAT and other indirect taxes) Tax exemptions/waiver/suspension Other
	<b>Direct support to businesses</b> One-off grants to industries in distress Income support	<b>Revenue measures to boost consumption / demand</b> Lower tax rates (import duties, VAT and other indirect taxes and levies) Tax exemptions/waiver/suspension Other	
EXPENDITURE		<b>Expenditure measures for individuals</b> Direct cash transfers for individuals Expansion of unemployment benefits both in terms of compensation and length Temporary expansion of existing benefits such as pensions and health insurance Supplementary ad hoc programs (feeding programs, utility waivers) Wage compensation subsidies and enhanced paid/sick leave allowances Other	<b>Health expenditure measures</b> Supply of low-cost medical items (masks, gloves, testing kits, gowns, face shields, etc.) Supply of high-cost medical items (ventilators, etc.) Targeted infrastructure investments to expand health care capacity Expansion of human resources General
CREDIT/ EQUITY	Preferential loans to firms (and industries) in distress Other (includes support measures for households and businesses)	Preferential loans to households	
OTHER	Revenue increase Other revenue increase measures Other measures not falling into any of the categories nobit voluptae		

Source: World Bank


7. Note the three objectives (each column), the seven categories of measure (color coding), and the 47 distinct sub-categories.



Figure 5 shows the number of categories addressed by each country's fiscal policy response. Some high- and upper-middle income countries stand out for their multi-dimensional responses, engaging multiple of the following categories: revenue measures for businesses, revenue measures for the health system, revenue measures for households, expenditure measures for businesses, expenditure measures for the health system, expenditure measures for households, and credit and equity measures. Europe, North and South America, and Oceanic Southeast Asia demonstrate a tendency to approach the fiscal response from multiple angles. Sub-Saharan Africa and Central America favored generally narrow approaches, with the notable exceptions of Niger and South Africa. Readers will notice a pronounced but imperfect relationship between income and the multi-dimensionality of the fiscal policy response.

> > >

**FIGURE 5 - Multi-dimensionality<sup>8</sup> of the Fiscal Policy Reponse as of September 1, 2020**



Source: World Bank Fiscal Policy data base, January – September 2020.

8. The seven categories correspond to the seven identified in Table 2.

**TABLE 2 - The Five Most Frequent Fiscal Interventions by Country Groupings and Regions (% of Countries Implementing Measure in Category)**

Source: All		LIC/LMIC		FCV		<15% T/GDP	
General Health Exp.	76%	General Health Exp.	96%	General Health Exp.	97%	General Health Exp.	91%
Deferral of tax payments	73%	Supplementary ad hoc programs	71%	Supplementary ad hoc programs	63%	Deferral of tax payments	75%
Supplementary ad hoc programs	71%	Direct cash transfers for individuals	67%	Deferral of tax payments	53%	Supplementary ad hoc programs	73%
Preferential loans to firms	64%	Deferral of tax payments	65%	Direct cash transfers for individuals	53%	Direct cash transfers for individuals	71%
Direct cash transfers for individuals	63%	Preferential loans to firms	54%	Preferential loans to firms	27%	Preferential loans to firms	63%

EAP		ECA		LAC		MENA		SAR		SSA	
General Health Exp.	77%	Deferral of tax payments	89%	Deferral of tax payments	71%	Deferral of tax payments	72%	Supplementary ad hoc programs	100%	General Health Exp.	94%
Supplementary ad hoc programs	71%	Preferential loans to firms	81%	Supplementary ad hoc programs	69%	Supplementary ad hoc programs	67%	General Health Exp.	100%	Supplementary ad hoc programs	70%
Direct cash transfers for individuals	61%	Wage compensation/enhanced paid leave	77%	Direct cash transfers for individuals	62%	General Health Exp.	67%	Direct cash transfers for individuals	100%	Deferral of tax payments	64%
Preferential loans to firms	55%	General Health Exp.	74%	General Health Exp.	57%	Direct cash transfers for individuals	56%	Preferential loans to firms	100%	Preferential loans to firms	55%
Tax exemption/waiver/suspension	55%	Direct cash transfers for individuals	68%	Preferential loans to firms	52%	Preferential loans to firms	56%	Deferral of tax payments	75%	Direct cash transfers for individuals	53%

Key: blue - businesses, green - households, yellow - health

Source: Original calculations for this publication.

Of the 47 different types of fiscal policy measures identified in this study, most countries and country groups implemented 8-12 types of measures, and often a similar mix. The most common measures were typically found in all country groups and include general health spending, loans and deferral of tax payments for businesses, and direct cash transfers and supplementary ad-hoc programs for households (Table 2).

Readers may also wish to consider Table 3, which shows detailed information on the share of countries implementing each type of policy by country group. Some country groups gravitate strongly toward particular policies more than other country groups do. For instance, low- and lower-middle income countries, FCVs, countries collecting tax revenue below 15 percent of GDP, and Sub-Saharan Africa favored health expenditure measures far more than other measures. This was likely an effort to prioritize capacity building in the health sector. Although necessary given the nature of the crisis, such measures have significant implications for fiscal space. There is also considerable variation across individual countries. The reader is invited to look up details on policy implementation for any country or country group using the “Assessment of Fiscal Policy Responses to COVID-19 Dashboard.”



**FIGURE 3 - Fiscal Measures, Percentage<sup>9</sup> of Countries Implementing as of September 1<sup>st</sup>**

MEASURE	ALL	LIC/ LMIC	EAP	ECA	LAC	MENA	SAR	SSA	FCV	<15% T/ GDP
<b>REVENUE MEASURES TO PROTECT BUSINESSES</b>										
Accelerated asset depreciation (CIT)	5%	0%	13%	5%	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%
Extend loss carry-forward (CIT)	9%	7%	10%	14%	7%	0%	0%	6%	3%	7%
Broaden tax deductibility	17%	7%	35%	24%	7%	0%	13%	9%	0%	11%
Tax credits	9%	7%	6%	14%	10%	0%	13%	6%	7%	4%
Deferral of Tax Filing	33%	29%	19%	33%	45%	39%	50%	23%	23%	39%
Deferral of Tax Payments	73%	65%	52%	89%	71%	72%	75%	64%	53%	75%
Tax Rate Reduction	27%	18%	42%	37%	19%	22%	13%	19%	17%	21%
Tax Amnesty	16%	17%	16%	19%	12%	17%	0%	19%	17%	21%
Accelerating Refunds	24%	21%	26%	25%	14%	22%	13%	30%	10%	27%
Lower Advance Payment	15%	8%	13%	28%	14%	0%	13%	6%	7%	9%
Suspend Debt Collection	14%	15%	0%	16%	19%	17%	13%	13%	0%	16%
Suspend Audit Activities	16%	24%	6%	18%	10%	11%	13%	23%	20%	13%
Tax Exemption/Waiver/Suspension	44%	38%	55%	54%	40%	44%	25%	30%	17%	41%
Other	39%	35%	32%	49%	29%	56%	38%	34%	30%	36%
<b>REVENUE MEASURES TO PROTECT INDIVIDUALS</b>										
Deferral of Tax Filing	13%	10%	10%	14%	24%	0%	25%	4%	7%	11%
Deferral of Tax Payments	27%	21%	29%	40%	26%	33%	38%	4%	10%	21%
Tax Rate Reduction	6%	4%	6%	12%	2%	0%	0%	4%	0%	5%
Tax Amnesty	3%	1%	0%	5%	7%	0%	0%	2%	0%	4%
Broaden Tax Deductability	5%	4%	10%	11%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	4%
Tax Credits	2%	1%	0%	4%	2%	6%	0%	2%	0%	0%
Tax Exemption/Waiver/Suspension	23%	26%	26%	26%	21%	11%	0%	26%	10%	25%
Other	16%	10%	13%	23%	21%	11%	0%	9%	7%	11%
<b>REVENUE MEASURES TO PROMOTE AVAILABILITY OF MEDICAL ITEMS</b>										
Lower Tax Rates for Medical Items	14%	8%	16%	21%	14%	11%	13%	4%	3%	11%
Tax Exemption/Waiver/Suspension	41%	46%	35%	51%	38%	11%	38%	47%	23%	43%
Other	18%	25%	13%	18%	10%	22%	0%	30%	17%	18%
<b>REVENUE MEASURES TO BOOST CONSUMPTION/DEMAND</b>										
Lower Tax Rates	20%	17%	6%	33%	21%	17%	13%	15%	13%	14%
Tax Exemption/Waiver/Suspension	15%	17%	16%	16%	14%	11%	0%	17%	17%	14%
Other	11%	6%	13%	16%	10%	6%	13%	6%	7%	5%

9. Percentages show the share of countries in the country group (column head) implementing the measure indicated (row head).

MEASURE	ALL	LIC/ LMIC	EAP	ECA	LAC	MENA	SAR	SSA	FCV	<15% T/ GDP
<b>HEALTH EXPENDITURE MEASURES</b>										
Supply of Low Cost Medical Items	3%	6%	3%	2%	0%	6%	0%	6%	13%	4%
Supply of High Cost Medical Items	6%	11%	0%	2%	12%	6%	0%	13%	13%	9%
Targeted Infrastructure Investments	11%	13%	10%	12%	12%	0%	13%	13%	17%	13%
Expansion of Human Resources	9%	14%	6%	9%	5%	0%	0%	19%	7%	7%
General	76%	96%	77%	74%	57%	67%	100%	94%	97%	91%
<b>EXPENDITURE MEASURES FOR INDIVIDUALS</b>										
Direct Cash Transfers for Individuals	63%	67%	61%	68%	62%	56%	100%	53%	53%	71%
Expansion of Unemployment Benefits	31%	17%	29%	47%	33%	44%	25%	4%	10%	20%
Temporary Expansion of Existing Benefits	33%	38%	39%	37%	26%	33%	38%	28%	10%	34%
Supplementary Ad Hoc Programs	71%	71%	71%	67%	69%	67%	100%	70%	63%	73%
Wage Compensation/Enhanced Paid Leave	49%	29%	42%	77%	36%	56%	50%	23%	20%	32%
Other	15%	14%	19%	23%	12%	11%	0%	9%	7%	13%
<b>CREDIT AND EQUITY MEASURES</b>										
Preferential Loans to Firms	64%	54%	55%	81%	52%	56%	100%	55%	27%	63%
Preferential Loans to Households	13%	13%	13%	11%	19%	11%	13%	6%	0%	11%
Other	25%	17%	26%	35%	19%	28%	13%	15%	10%	20%
<b>REVENUE MEASURES TO RAISE REVENUE</b>										
Revenue Increase	6%	6%	0%	7%	7%	11%	13%	6%	7%	11%
Other	2%	3%	0%	2%	2%	0%	0%	4%	3%	2%
<b>EXPENDITURE MEASURES FOR BUSINESSES</b>										
Income Support	41%	32%	39%	54%	43%	28%	13%	34%	23%	25%
One-Off Grants	17%	6%	13%	33%	14%	6%	0%	4%	7%	4%
<b>OTHER</b>										
Other	37%	35%	35%	51%	24%	22%	63%	32%	27%	38%

Source: Original calculations for this publication.



## >> CHARACTERISTICS OF FISCAL INTERVENTIONS

### >>> THE FISCAL POLICY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

We assess a sample of about 2000 policies introduced by countries against nine dimensions (Box 1), based on inherent qualities of policies themselves and stipulations outlined by those who design the policies. The assessment focuses on fiscal interventions aimed to support businesses and households and revenue measures to support the health response. We do not assess expenditure measures aimed at controlling the pandemic, where the medical rationale will typically be the main driver in addition to economic considerations. These scores, as well as trends, are discussed in the following section.

The assessment criteria for each policy dimension are discussed in detail in Annex A. Policy dimensions were scored with either a 0 (indicating the policy does not meet the criteria) or a 1 (meets the criteria). The policy assessment does not account for country context in any way. It simply provides information on the characteristics of a policy action, while the appropriateness of a specific action can only be assessed by considering the country context. In this way, a score of 1 does not necessarily indicate that a particular policy action is better.

Some of the dimensions are in tension with one another. For instance, devoting time to differentiate which populations to target may make policies more abuse resistant; however, this comes at a cost of then needing to validate beneficiary status, which may slow disbursements, especially in countries with weak PFM systems, low quality of governance, and low transparency and accountability arrangements. Again, policy evaluation is more fully understood in light of the country context. Nonetheless, aggregating these ratings for a particular country or region does allow an assessment of overall tendencies and variations across countries and regions. Regional and income-group averages presented in this report are flat averages of all policies across samples, which is essentially an average at the country level weighted by policy number. This is to avoid cases where a country picks a single policy and influences sample averages as much as countries in the same sample that implemented 30 policies. It also offers a convenient interpretation: each dimension score of a country group is the share of that group's policies that met the criteria of the given dimension. For example, the score on the "abuse resistance" policy dimension for the whole world (pictured in Figure 6) is .61, which means that 61 percent of all policies met the criteria of the abuse resistance dimension.

## >>> BOX 1: FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING FISCAL POLICY MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19

Fiscal policy measures in this report are assessed in a framework that derives from the traditional *timely-targeted-temporary* model for assessing responses to crisis situations, with a focus on the following aspects:

**Efficiency.** The efficiency of a specific fiscal instrument to achieve particular objectives in a cost-effective way will be influenced by:

- *Targetability* – the extent to which the instrument allows to directly target specific business or population groups or activities
- *Speed* – the time elapsed between the adoption of the instrument and the desired impact
- *Abuse resistance* – the ease with which abuse by eligible beneficiaries and other parties involved with the measure can be controlled

**Cost and fiscal sustainability.** Containing the cost of fiscal measures is another important aspect of the fiscal response. This will also involve consideration of costs and benefits of specific instruments and their interactions. For example, measures that aim at reducing lay-offs may generate benefits in terms of reduced unemployment and social security payments.

- *Affordability* – the extent to which the use of the instrument impacts on fiscal stability. For example, instruments that provide support in the form of credits or through the deferral of payments will have lower cost implications than instruments in the form of outright grants and expenditure.
- *Predictability and control of cost* – the extent to which upper limits for the cost of a program can be established and can the actual cost be reasonably well predicted.

**Flexibility.** The high uncertainty regarding the duration of the pandemic and the intensity with which individual countries will be affected puts a premium on the flexibility with which an instrument can be deployed, including the ability to scale up the instrument or to stop its use as needed.

- *Scalability* – the extent to which the instrument can be expanded or replicated for additional groups of beneficiaries in accordance with needs
- *Reversibility* – the ease with which the response can be withdrawn, without causing economic and behavioral distortions

**Feasibility.** Measures may not have their intended effect if they are difficult to implement because of administrative constraints or impact is blunted by health measures, such as social distancing and lockdowns.

- *Administrative ease* – the extent to which the instrument can be implemented within existing administrative capabilities
- *Impacts of the pandemic and containment measures\** – the COVID-19 pandemic has direct impacts on the deployment of fiscal instruments. For example, scaling up of health expenditure may be constrained by a lack of qualified personnel; measures that involve human contact, especially in groups, will be less desirable than instruments that limit such exposure; and scaling up of consumption and investment may face supply side constraints as suppliers and contractors may be in lockdown mode

\*This paper will refer to this dimension by its name in the April 2020 Fiscal Policy Note: “Resilience to Health Measures.”

Our findings come with two caveats. First, information on policy actions differed widely across countries with respect to detail and specificity, which in some cases may reflect some vagueness of the policies themselves, while in others it may be a matter of limited reporting. Consequently, the categorizing and rating of individual policy actions required some judgment and assumptions, described in detail in Annex A. Second, we assess policies against our framework in a vacuum, divorced from important factors that often determine the appropriateness of a fiscal policy, such as fiscal space, implementation capacity, pre-existing spending and coverage gaps, and the cost of the policy. This was a deliberate choice that allows us to standardize and compare policy scores across countries, but it comes with a tradeoff. We can only offer a one-dimensional look at how policies perform against our framework, and this information must be paired with familiarity with each country context in order to determine whether policies are appropriate. Our findings are not the final word on the quality of a country's fiscal response to COVID-19, rather they offer policymakers a previously unavailable benchmark against which to make their own assessment. For instance, learning that a country's fiscal policy response to the crisis was ranked 150th on cost recoverability may raise a red flag and lead to a closer assessment that would not otherwise occur. A country's performance will also depend on other factors, such as administrative capacity, political commitment, and procurement bottlenecks, yet the design and choice of policies remain an important consideration.

### >>> OVERALL ASSESSMENT

In response to COVID-19, it was common to select policies that did not conflict with social distancing requirements, brought relatively fast relief, were scalable in terms of time, magnitude, or targeted beneficiaries, and where possible to discontinue at the intended time (reversibility). On the other hand, most countries chose policies for which the benefit felt by beneficiaries constituted an unrecoverable cost. Additionally, performance on targetability, administrative complexity, abuse resistance, and predictability and cost control varied significantly by country.










> > >  
**FIGURE 6 - Global Average Performance on Fiscal Policy Dimensions**



Source: Original calculations for this publication.




**TABLE 4 - Descriptive Statistics Table with Kernel Densities at the Country Level**

Dimension	Countries	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Median	Max	Kernel Density
Targetability	196	0.65	0.22	0	0.67	1	
Speed	196	0.99	0.03	0.83	1	1	
Abuse Resistance	195	0.64	0.23	0	0.63	1	
Recoverability	195	0.36	0.21	0	0.33	1	
Predictability and Cost Control	195	0.66	0.22	0	0.67	1	
Reversibility	195	0.81	0.18	0	0.83	1	
Scalability	196	0.86	0.14	0.20	0.86	1	
Administrative Complexity	195	0.72	0.20	0	0.75	1	
Resilience to Health Measures	196	0.97	0.12	0	1	1	

Source: Original calculations for this publication.

Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of policy dimension scores at the country level. On each dimension, a country's score reflects the share of its policies that met the criteria, from 0 to 1 (indicating 100 percent). The kernel density distributions give a sense of how countries fared on each policy dimension. Targetability, abuse resistance, and predictability and cost control have broad distributions centered slightly above 50 percent, showing that it was common for countries to have slightly more targeted, abuse resistant, and predictable policies, with moderate numbers of countries having country scores slightly above and below the average. Most other dimensions had high average country scores, with gradual tapers toward 0, indicating that most countries have a high share of policies which meet the criteria of those dimensions and only a few countries that do not. Speed and Resilience to Health Measures were concentrated around 1, indicating that most countries had every policy meeting the criteria of these dimensions. Recoverability is the only dimension with country scores distributed around low averages, indicating most countries had a low share of policies that had recoverable costs, although the distribution shows a fair number of countries with very low shares of cost-recoverable policies, and fair numbers of countries with moderate shares of cost-recoverable policies. Countries with country scores that fall below one standard deviation from the mean on any dimension may want to examine what they did differently from peers. See Annex B for each country's score on each dimension, as well as its world rank.

**FIGURE 7 - Policy Assessment Scores of Selected Countries**



Source: Original calculations for this publication.

Figure 7 demonstrates that countries can vary significantly in scoring profiles. Venezuela had considerably more targeted policies than Brazil, but all relief was direct and unrecoverable. Rwanda's policies were generally consistent with WB advice on fiscal policy, with the strong exception of recoverability and partial exception of reversibility and predictability. Chad had a below-average share of policies on all but one dimension. Mozambique implemented many quick and resilient to health measures policies (two dimensions that had high average scores for the whole world), and excelled on recoverability (tied with Monaco and Suriname for the highest score in the world), while Niger chose only policies with no prospect of recovering the cost, such as tax exemptions. Mozambique's score can be explained by several "low cost" policies, including tax deferrals, accelerated VAT refunds, and other activities designed to alleviate the tax compliance burden without permanently foregoing revenue.

The UAE and Switzerland are not typical Bank clients, but their scoring profiles offer a lesson. The UAE favored practical, straightforward policies that largely benefited all citizens and/or businesses, and above half of its policies had recoverable costs. Switzerland chose more complicated policies on nearly all dimensions: it targeted more carefully, had more complex measures which were more prone to abuse, and chose more policies for which the long-run costs are difficult to predict and difficult to recover. However, with exceptional governance and a positive fiscal balance, Switzerland is a case that shows complicated and pricy policies may be appropriate in the right context. However, as indicated earlier, high scores on policy dimensions are not necessarily indicative of ideal policy design for all contexts. Rather, the fiscal space and implementation capacity of each country may determine its optimal policy design. The Policy Assessment Dashboard offers figures on fiscal space and implementation capacity for all selectable samples that may inform interpretation of policy dimension scores.

A list of country scores (aggregates of policy scores at the country level) across all nine policy dimensions can be found in Annex B. Aggregate scores of income levels, lending categories, regions, and FCV status, along with ANOVA analysis of variance across categories, can be found in Annex C. Annex D presents country- and policy-level pairwise correlations. There is preliminary evidence at both the country- and policy-levels that as targeting increased, responses were more administratively complex with no pattern emerging for abuse resistance at the country-level. The next section discusses notable findings.

## >>> CHARACTERISTICS OF FISCAL INTERVENTION BY COUNTRY GROUPINGS


This section discusses characteristics of fiscal interventions for different country groupings, including lending categories, income groups, regions, and between FCV and non-FCV countries. The section highlights notable differences and attempts to attribute the differences to either policy choice or policy design. Significant differences across groups that are due to policy choice arise because different groups favored policies that are inherently more likely to meet criteria along certain policy dimensions. For instance, cash transfers have unrecoverable costs since beneficiaries are not expected to reimburse their governments once the crisis has ended. Many countries have lower average scores for recoverability simply because they concentrated on direct cash transfers. Policy choice is usually the strongest determining factor in a country or country group's average score along policy dimensions. The second consideration is policy design. Here, policy design refers to specific stipulations of policies that determine their score along the policy dimensions, independent of any intrinsic characteristic of the policy. For instance, cash transfers are not inherently well-targeted—they can be universal or available to specific vulnerable groups. A cash transfer measure can only be well-targeted if specifically stipulated in the policy. See Annex E for a detailed discussion on the logistic regressions as well as a table of results. Through logistic regression analysis, we hold policy choice (among other relevant factors, e.g., GDP per capita) constant, in order to determine whether there is a relationship between country characteristics and policy dimension scores that are independent of the particular policy mix a country or country group chose.



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> > >

FIGURE 8 - Targetability by Region



Source: Original calculations for this publication.

### >>> TARGETABILITY

The Middle East and North Africa stood out with lower average targetability scores than the rest of the world, due to policy design. Holding income and policy choice constant, countries in this region are significantly less likely to target their policies than the rest of the world. On the other end of the spectrum, countries in Europe and Central Asia were significantly more likely than the rest of the world to design targeted policies, often making benefits available only to affected companies and sectors, MSMEs, the unemployed, and other vulnerable groups.

### >>> SPEED

There was little to no variation in speed scores across country groups, largely due to limitations in the scoring team’s ability to assess speed based on brief policy descriptions, with no data on follow-through. Our methodology shows acceptable potential for adequately fast implementation for countries with moderate implementation capacity, although many factors could still cause delays.


### >>> ABUSE RESISTANCE

About three quarters of South Asia’s policies were abuse resistant, while only about half of Sub-Saharan Africa’s policies were (see Figure 9). Some of these differences can be explained by particular country groups favoring abuse-prone policies, such as tax exemptions, non-uniform tax rate reductions, the introduction of cash transfers to new groups of beneficiaries, suspended tax debt collection, and suspended audit activities. Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, tends to favor such policies in slightly higher shares than do other regions.

After accounting for policy choice, IDA/Blends were no more likely than IBRDs or non-IDA/IBRDs to adopt abuse-prone policies. Regionally, a few differences remained significant after introducing controls. Holding policy choice and income constant, East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia were more likely to make their policies abuse-resistant than the rest of the world, and Sub-Saharan African countries were less likely to make their policies abuse-resistant than the rest of the world.

> > >

FIGURE 9 - Abuse Resistance by Region



Source: Original calculations for this publication.


## >>> COST RECOVERABILITY

Recoverability scores generally improve as incomes rise (Figure 10), although some regions with many high-income countries (North America and East Asia and the Pacific) had the lowest average scores, while Europe and Central Asia had the highest share of cost-recoverable policies.

The significant variation in recoverability scores across categories is almost completely determined by policy choice. LICs and IDA/Blends have lower recoverability scores simply because they choose a greater share of policies with inherently unrecoverable costs. This can be substantiated by looking at the most popular policies which generally have recoverable costs — deferral of tax payments and preferential loans for firms. Although neither of these policies has completely recoverable costs (tax deferrals forego the collection of interest on delayed payments, for instance), most of the cost can be ultimately recovered. For IDA/Blends, these two policies only made up 17 percent of the total policy mix. For IBRDs, that figure is 21 percent. For non-IDA/IBRDs, that figure is 26 percent. For regions which scored poorly on cost recoverability relative to other regions, these policies made up only 14 percent (EAP), 19 percent (NA), and 17 percent (SSA) of all policies. Other cost-recoverable policies explain the rest of the variation in recoverability.

> > >

**FIGURE 10 - Recoverability by Income Group**



Source: Original calculations for this publication.

## >>> PREDICTABILITY AND COST CONTROL

Predictability and cost control scores (Figure 11) have the opposite tendency of policy dimension scores discussed so far, with low-income countries presenting a higher share of policies meeting the criteria than high-income countries. The


regions with the lowest shares of policies that had predictable costs were North America and Europe and Central Asia.

Holding policy choice constant, IDA/Blends are more likely than IBRDs and non-IDA/IBRDs to have predictable costs. This is in large part a result of how countries designed their cash transfer programs. Many IBRD cash transfer measures tied the duration of the policy, its eligible beneficiaries, or the magnitude of the transfers to the impact of the pandemic. This impact was considered inherently unpredictable, causing policies that scale with it to be scored as having an unpredictable cost. IDA/Blends chose more policies with inherently unpredictable costs but where possible, designed their policies to have more predictable and controllable costs. The net effect on scores caused IDA/Blends to have similar scores to other countries, despite having more predictable policies when holding policy choice constant. In this case, policy choice and policy design were factors countervailing against each other.

For similar reasons, countries in East Asia and the Pacific tended to have a higher share of predictable policies than the rest of the world, holding policy choice and log of GDP per capita constant, despite average scores that did not deviate from other regions. Conversely, countries in Europe and Central Asia tended to implement more unpredictable policies than the rest of the world.

> > >

**FIGURE 11 - Predictability and Cost Control by Lending Category**



Source: Original calculations for this publication.


## >>> REVERSIBILITY

As a broad average, shares of reversible policies in IDA/Blend countries and LMICs are significantly lower than in non-IDA/IBRD countries and HICs. Sub-Saharan Africa also stands out with average reversibility scores significantly below those of other regions, such as Europe and Central Asia or North America. However, holding policy choice constant, IDA/Blends and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do not design less reversible policies than do other regions and categories, although a slight relationship emerged from regression analysis between GDP per capita and reversibility scores. The difference in average reversibility scores is mostly a function of policy choice, and partly a function of policy design.

Lower-middle income countries did not shy from reversible policies but simply chose them in smaller shares than other income groups. LMICs chose policies, which together make up about 22 percent of policies, that are more likely to be reversible (tax payment deferrals for businesses, preferential loans to firms in distress, and enhanced paid leave). In high-income countries, a total of 36 percent of policies were dedicated to tax deferrals, preferential loans, and enhanced paid leave, which explains their better reversibility scores overall.

> > >

**FIGURE 12 - Reversibility Scores by Income Group**



Source: Original calculations for this publication.

## >>> SCALABILITY

Variation along scalability was minor, with no income group or lending group scoring differently from other groups, on average. South Asia stands well above the world average in scalability scores and has a performance statistically distinct

from Sub-Saharan Africa's, with a greater share of scalable policies. However, this is not necessarily due to particular attention to scalability on the part of South Asia (controlling for policy choice, South Asian countries did not score better than other regions); rather, it is due to South Asian countries gravitating toward inherently scalable policies.

## >>> ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEXITY

Administrative complexity of fiscal policy interventions is lowest for IDA/Blends among the lending categories, for Middle East and North Africa among the regions, and for FCVs compared to non-FCVs. Despite the high share of measures meeting the criteria among IDA/Blends, LICs scores were not significantly different from those of other income groups.

This was not determined by policy choice alone; IDA/Blends were more likely than IBRDs and non-IDA/IBRDs to make their policies simpler, holding policy choice constant. For cash transfers in particular, policy language reined in the sophistication level of policies by targeting beneficiaries of existing systems, targeting easy-to-distinguish beneficiaries, or by not targeting at all.

The Middle East and North Africa was a standout among the regions for being significantly more likely to make policies administratively simple than the rest of the world, holding policy choice and GDP per capita constant. Israel, Lebanon, Qatar, the UAE, and the West Bank and Gaza all ranked among the top 50 countries on administrative simplicity, with almost three-quarters of countries in the region ranking among the top half of countries in the world with respect to this policy dimension. To some extent, this is due to choosing inherently simple policies, such as the suspension of audits and tax deferrals. But even among policies that all regions were prone to choose, Middle Eastern and North African countries tended to simplify their policies, with a strong tendency to leave policies untargeted.



## >>> RESILIENCE TO HEALTH MEASURES

Nearly every policy scored well on this policy dimension, and as a result, the average scores of all lending categories, income groups, and regions are above 0.9 out of 1. Still, some significant differences emerge, with IDA/Blends, LICs, and developing regions scoring statistically significantly lower than other categories. All variation can be attributed to a single policy: supplementary ad hoc programs. Most policies saw no variation in scores (were all scored “1”), and several saw some variation but only supplementary ad hoc programs were significantly less likely to meet the criteria for resiliency to health measures than other policies. LICs scored worse than other income groups on this dimension because supplementary ad hoc programs were their favorite policy (16 percent of total), while LMICs only chose them 8 percent of the time, UMICs chose them 8 percent of the time, and HICs chose them 5 percent of the time.

## >> A LOOK FORWARD

Even with the rollout of effective vaccines, the COVID-19 crisis is far from over and fiscal policy instruments will remain critical to deal with the pandemic and support an economic recovery. The World Bank (2021) projects that economic growth in EMDEs will recover to 5 percent in 2021, mostly driven by a strong recovery in China. However, aggregate EMDE output is projected to still be 6 percent below its pre-pandemic projection in 2022. These projections are underpinned by the assumption that in advanced economies and major EMDEs pandemic control measures will reduce the daily numbers of infections in the first half of 2021 and widespread vaccination will be achieved by the end of 2021. Progress in the control of the pandemic in other EMDEs and LICs is projected to follow with a lag of two to four quarters, partly because of delayed vaccine distribution. Such progress will rely on continued adequate fiscal policy interventions and comes with large downside risks. These include uncertainties with respect to the progression of the pandemic and the deployment of vaccines as well as the risk of widespread corporate and sovereign defaults if financial stress persists.

Under this macro-economic outlook, fiscal challenges will remain significant at a time where extraordinary fiscal and monetary policy efforts in 2020 have left many countries with reduced fiscal space. Even though growth is projected to recover in 2021, real GDP in EMDEs will be lower at the end of 2021 than it was at the end of 2019 in all regions except East Asia and the Pacific and Europe and Central Asia. For LICs the pandemic represented a particularly severe setback with projections of rising poverty and economic activity at levels 5.2 percent below the pre-pandemic trend.

While real GDP remains below pre-pandemic levels in many countries, government revenue has fallen even lower, and will recover more slowly.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, public expenditure requirements due to the pandemic remain elevated. Key fiscal


policy challenges in dealing with the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic include the following:

- Sustaining and adjusting fiscal policy measures to mitigate the health and economic impacts of the crisis;
- Transitioning to fiscal policy measures in support of economic recovery;
- Phasing out fiscal policy measures and recovering funds; and
- Introducing reforms aimed at fiscal sustainability.

In the following, we briefly discuss the first three challenges and how the present stocktaking and assessment of fiscal policy measures can help inform policy choices. Issues related to funding options and fiscal sustainability will be discussed in a separate note.

> > >

**FIGURE 13 - Key Fiscal Policy Challenges in Dealing with the COVID-19 Pandemic**



Source: World Bank

10. Empirical work on short-term tax buoyancy and elasticity (Dudine P. and J. Tovar Jalles, 2017) suggests that short-term buoyancy tends to be larger during contractions than during times of expansions, which would imply that recovery of government tax revenue will be slower than the recovery of GDP. However, country specific tax buoyancy depends on a range of structural, demographic, and institutional factors and macro-economic conditions.

## >>> SUSTAINING AND ADJUSTING FISCAL POLICY MEASURES TO MITIGATE THE HEALTH AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE CRISIS

Many of the measures adopted to contain the pandemic and mitigate its economic impacts will remain relevant as long as the pandemic is not sufficiently contained. As vaccines are becoming available, countries will increase expenditure for their procurement and distribution.

Since the outbreak of the pandemic, a large amount of experience and knowledge on the effectiveness of fiscal policy interventions has been accumulated. It is beyond the scope of this note to summarize this literature. However, from a fiscal perspective the policy assessment framework can provide some indications as to how intervention approaches can be strengthened.

The policy scores presented in this paper are not the final say on whether a policy is fit for purpose and should be sustained or not. Some countries may deliberately adopt complex policies, which are prone to abuse, with costs that are unrecoverable and difficult to predict, if the support the policy provides is worthwhile. Individual country fiscal policy scores – both aggregated at the country level (Annex B) and at the policy level (available upon request) – can be used to assess how policies performed against objective standards of fiscal policy design. If a country performed below benchmark or worse than anticipated, perhaps a closer look with a new lens could reveal areas of improvement. These scores must be combined with knowledge of the country context in order to draw appropriate conclusions.

After controlling for policy choice (which was the major determining factor in dimension scores) and GDP per capita, some country groups demonstrated a strong, statistically significant tendency to perform differently from the rest of the world on certain policy dimensions. For instance, countries in the Middle East and North Africa are significantly less likely to target their measures than the rest of the world. If this comes as a surprise, policy makers may wish to reevaluate their policies, looking carefully for ways to improve targeting. Additionally, Sub-Saharan African countries are significantly less likely to make their policies abuse-resistant than the rest of the world and less likely to make their policies affordable than the rest of the world. Countries in Europe and Central Asia are significantly less likely to design policies which have

predictable costs. Just as informative are cases in which countries which probably *should* perform above average but do not. IDA/Blend countries should probably aim to design measures that are more abuse-resistant and affordable than measures designed by IBRD and non-IDA/IBRD countries, but there is no evidence that this is done. Shining a light on these tendencies can help give the attention necessary to improve policy design and highlight measures that need to be carefully managed.

## >>> TRANSITIONING TO FISCAL POLICY MEASURES IN SUPPORT OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY

The design principles and fiscal policy assessment framework were established with emergency response in mind. A new set of desirable characteristics is needed as countries pivot from crisis response to economic recovery. During the recovery phase, there will be a greater focus on investment spending. Regular public investment management approaches will be appropriate for the assessment and prioritization of investment proposals. The impact of fiscal intervention on stimulating economic activity, employment, and expanding the government revenue base becomes central. The contribution of an intervention in supporting the green recovery and mitigating climate risks would be another important design characteristic against which to assess fiscal policy interventions. Work on fiscal policy interventions to support a sustainable green recovery is underway, with a focus on fiscal policy interventions that help advance the transition to a low carbon economy.

However, it is important to note that even during the recovery phase, interventions to support households and businesses will still be necessary in many countries to prevent excessive hardship. The World Bank (2021) suggests that the crisis may result in a permanently lower trajectory of economic activity compared to the pre-crisis trajectory. In addition, recovery from the crisis will be accompanied by structural change as some businesses and some jobs will not be preserved or restored, while others may emerge. The speed and extent of recovery will also show some regional and sectoral heterogeneity, with some sectors, such as tourism, expected to recover more slowly than others. Social protection measures to support people who lose incomes and employment in this transition together with investments in retraining will thus need to be an important element of recovery spending.

## >>> PHASING OUT FISCAL POLICY MEASURES AND RECOVERY OF FUNDS

As the pandemic is being brought under control and economies recover, many of the fiscal emergency measures adopted during the crisis will need to be phased out. In addition, deferred payments, short term loans, and other recoverable interventions will need to be recouped. The assessment of reversibility and cost recoverability of fiscal interventions provides some insights into the challenges individual countries will face and also highlights countries that are likely to face the biggest challenges in this area.

Our analysis indicates that while for LICs about 77 percent of actions are reversible, for high HICs this percentage increases to 85 percent. While well-designed policy actions have inbuilt expiry dates, many actions lack such provisions and will thus require attention by the authorities to terminate such actions at the right time, against likely resistance from beneficiaries and other stakeholders.

## >> SUMMARY

Countries around the world have adopted numerous fiscal policy actions to mitigate the health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our fiscal policy data base covers 203 economies and contains nearly 4000 policy actions, adopted between the outbreak of the pandemic and September 1, 2020. The number of individual actions adopted by countries is as high as 58, although the average number is 20 and the median is 17. This note groups these actions into 47 different types. However, there is a small number of interventions that have been adopted by a large majority of countries. These include general health expenditures, loans and deferred tax payments for businesses, and direct cash transfers and ad-hoc interventions for the benefit of individuals and households. Country size, income, the number of COVID-19 cases and the overall size of the fiscal response to the pandemic are positively correlated with the number of policy actions adopted. Country indebtedness, on the other hand, shows no correlation with the number of actions adopted.

The note then reviews a subset of these policy actions against a set of design characteristics (targetability, speed, abuse resistance, cost recoverability, predictability and control of cost, scalability, reversibility, administrative ease, and resilience to health measures). These characteristics were set forth at the onset of the pandemic and have proven to be a useful metric to assess policy responses. In the future, they can

With respect to the potential for recovery of funds, data on the magnitude of the fiscal response (Figure 2) show that for advanced economies, interventions through loans, equity amounted to about 8 percent of GDP, i.e., about half of their fiscal response. However, for Low Income Countries, such interventions amount only to 0.2 percent of GDP, i.e., just over 10 percent of their fiscal response. In addition to loans, deferred tax payments for businesses were among the most frequent policy interventions by all country groups. Other measures such as deferred tax filing for businesses and individuals, deferred tax payment for individuals, and suspended debt collection also will require action to recover funds. Here it is important to note that the recovery of funds is by no means automatic or simple but will entail in most cases significant administrative and political effort.

be used to inform countries' policy designs. The assessment in this note is carried out for individual policy actions as well as for the entire "policy package" adopted by a country. In the assessment, an important distinction between policy choice (i.e., relating to the "inherent" or "typical" characteristics associated with a policy actions) and policy design (i.e., the specific formulation of a policy action by the authorities) is discussed. The analysis reveals significant differences in the design characteristics of policy packages adopted by countries, where most of these differences are due to policy choice and to a much lesser extent due to policy design.

The findings on the types of interventions and their characteristics can help inform key policy decisions in the next stages of the fiscal policy response, which include the continuation of fiscal policy measures to mitigate the health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic (which will have to be augmented with measures to fund the procurement and deployment of vaccines), the transition of measures to support economic recovery, and finally, the phasing out of measures and recovery of deferred payments and loaned funds.



## >> APPENDIXES

### >>> APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

#### >>> SCORING

To ensure transparency, the assessment team developed a systematic scoring process and documented the criteria necessary to score each policy along each dimension. These are listed in table A1 below. The further discussion section features the scoring team's assessment of its own ability to score consistently as well as further analysis of groups of policies that tend to be unscored or to be scored as "likely meets/does not meet the criteria" or "missing" rather than be scored with a score of "certainty."

Each policy was assessed on the basis of the inherent qualities of the policy itself (for example, tax deferrals have an inherently recoverable cost for tax administrations of moderate capacity), as well as details stipulated in the policy

description (for example, a measure can state an intended demographic of MSMEs, making it targeted). In order to apply the same standard to all countries, country context was not considered. This has a serious implication for learning from these scores: the final assessment of whether policy actions are fit for purpose will require considering the country context.

Although health sector measures have scoring guidelines in table A1, they were excluded from analysis, as policy choices are primarily driven by medical requirements. This paper focuses thus primarily on fiscal policy measures to mitigate the economic impact of the pandemic, where policymakers could choose among a wide range of measures. Additionally, some health measures come with significant additional health management costs which may or may not have been presented as part of the response packages.

> > >

**TABLE A1 - Fiscal Policy Scoring Criteria**

POLICY DIMENSION	CASE	SCORING KEY: [L] - LIKELY M - MEETS THE CRITERIA N - DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA A - TOO AMBIGUOUS TO SCORE
TARGETING	Explicit statement that a policy is universal	N
	No mention of intended beneficiaries.	[L] N
	No mention of details on how beneficiaries will be identified. Example: "for businesses affected."	[L] M
	Strong details about targeting criteria.	M
	Targeted population is vulnerable during the pandemic (the homeless, the jobless, the elderly, people with health conditions, businesses in distress, SMEs, etc.)	M
	When the intended beneficiary is a resilient population (example: taxpayers receiving dividends from other countries).	N
	"Unincorporated businesses" and the self-employed will be considered SMEs.	M
	Targeting the elderly, even if they are well-off.	M
	Ambiguity. Example: "Special arrangements to support taxpayers who are in the process of settling overdue taxes." It is unclear whether the intended beneficiaries are low-income or simply non-compliant	A

SPEED	Actual benefit is months into the future but understood and internalized at policy announcement. Beneficiaries can budget accordingly, freeing up cash. Example: tax payment deferrals that delay a payment already due months into the future	[L] M
	Benefit realized within 1 month. Example: "Unemployment benefits equal to at least minimum wage for three months starting in April."	M
	Benefit realized in a few months or sooner.	[L] M
	Benefit realized over six months.	[L] N
	Benefit realized in more than one year. Example: extended loss carry-forward.	N
	Hospital procurement, low- and high-cost.	N
	Expanding manufacturing capacity and infrastructure.	[L] N
ABUSE RESISTANCE	Expanding human resources (health expenditures); labor market considered inflexible as health workers are in high demand worldwide.	[L] M
	Targeted tax rate cuts where taxpayers do not have distinct tax regimes (potentially inviting arbitrage). Example: rate cuts for health companies.	[L] N
	Targeted tax rate cuts where taxpayers do have distinct tax regimes (identifying to whom the rate applies is easier). Example: rate cuts for SMEs.	[L] M <sup>11</sup>
	Tax rate cuts which apply evenly across taxpayers.	[L] M <sup>12</sup>
	Tax exemptions.	N
	New benefits programs.	N
	Increasing the benefits to known beneficiaries under existing programs.	[L] M
	Adding beneficiaries to an existing program (changing the definition of who is eligible).	[L] N
	Supplementary ad hoc programs which distribute physical goods.	N <sup>13</sup>
	Broadened tax deductability: new deduction options create new opportunities for abuse.	[L] N
COST RECOVERABILITY	Tax credits. Distinguishing eligible beneficiaries requires above-average enforcement capability.	[L] N
	Suspending audit and debt collection activities compromises enforcement.	N
	Large-scale procurement, including low- and high-cost medical items and for health-sector related infrastructure spending (vulnerable to leakages and corruption).	[L] N
COST RECOVERABILITY	Policy has a prospect of repayment on the part of beneficiaries or is revenue neutral. Examples: tax deferrals, deferred payments, flexible payment arrangements, credit programs, loan guarantees, accelerated VAT refunds, etc.	M
	Partial prospect of repayment on the part of beneficiaries. Example: lost interest from tax deferrals.	[L] M

11. This is a new assumption that will be applied in the update. The previous assumption ruled that all targeted tax rate cuts (non-uniform) invited arbitrage. Scoring still reflects this.

12. During scoring, these circumstances were treated as not meeting the criteria of the abuse resistance dimension, and current scores reflect this. This new guideline will apply going forward.

13. This is a new guideline which we will apply going forward. Current scoring reflects the old assumption that physical goods had less scope for abuse.

PREDICTABILITY AND COST CONTROL	No prospect of repayment on the part of beneficiaries. Examples include cancelled tax debt, tax exemptions, cash transfers, broadened tax deductibility, extended loss carry forward, and expansion of benefits.	N
	Suspended audit and enforcement activities. Unclear whether foregone revenue will be recoverable later or if retroactive auditing will be less effective once activities resume and uncollected revenue will stay uncollected.	A <sup>14</sup>
	Tax amnesty would likely be “unrecoverable” without the policy anyway.	N
	Ambiguity. Example: Extension of the seasonal suspension of evictions, where it is unclear who bears the cost.	A
	Predicting full cost of policy requires estimating number of beneficiaries – case: ultimate beneficiaries easy to estimate. Example: benefits for college students.	M
	Predicting full cost of policy requires estimating number of beneficiaries – case: ultimate beneficiaries hard to estimate. Example: benefits for laid off workers.	[L] N
	No specific detail on unit cost. Assume this was known by implementers but not stated.	Ignore - judge other factors
	Benefits tied to outcomes of the pandemic (such as unemployment, increase in childcare needs, spike in beneficiaries, and duration of the pandemic) have costs as unpredictable as those outcomes.	N
	Aggregate expenditure cap explicitly stated. Example: upper spending limits for preferential loan program.	[L] M
	Aggregate expenditure cap exception: existence of political pressure likely to force government to spend past its aggregate expenditure cap. Example: health spending to increase capacity of health sector. As the pandemic evolves, health emergencies could develop (which governments cannot predict), and governments will be forced to spend further in response. Related and unpredictable: low- and high-cost medical procurement.	[L] N
	Any policy that undermines enforcement, facilitation, or trust hurts tax compliance and therefore future collections, which has an ultimately unknowable impact on revenues. Examples include exemptions, unbalanced rate reductions, audit activity suspensions, and debt forgiveness.	[L] N
	Expanding existing pandemic-response measures, revealing them to have been poorly predicted and poorly controlled. Ruling: treat as new measure and judge based on its characteristics, not implications based on earlier version of the measure. Example: a one-off cash transfer followed by another one-off cash transfer to the same beneficiary group.	Ignore - judge other factors
	Large-scale infrastructure spending (including health infrastructure and public works programs); typically affected by time delays and cost over-runs.	N
	Expansion of human resources in medical sector – it is considered easier to plan intended expenditures and predict costs than medical procurement.	[L] M

14. Current scoring reflects ambiguity (no score); however, this policy will be considered [L] N going forward, as consequently tax arrears tend to increase, and this in practice is what has often led to large political pressures for tax amnesties.

REVERSIBILITY	Policy includes a sunset date and is not salient or popular enough to expect resistance as the end date approaches. Example: tax filing and payment deferral for six months.	M
	Policy includes an end or sunset date but is salient and popular among citizens and may face resistance as the end date approaches. Example: cash transfers to households for two months. Ruling: give them credit for establishing an end date.	[L] M
	Policy does not explicitly include an end or sunset date and is not salient or popular enough to expect resistance in the event that policymakers would like to discontinue it. Example: suspension of audit activities. Ruling: will not face much resistance.	[L] M
	Policy does not explicitly include an end or sunset date and is salient and popular among citizens and may face resistance in the event that policymakers would like to discontinue it. Example: indefinite increase in pension payouts.	[L] N
	Ad hoc programs and preferential loans to businesses and individuals (these policies are assumed to have strong implicit end dates).	[L] M
SCALABILITY	Policy cost is listed and could be increased. Example: unemployment benefits increased from \$200/mo to \$250/mo.	M
	Policy cost is not listed (neither aggregate nor unit cost) but could likely be increased. Example: Expansion of social safety net programs.	[L] M
	Policy has an unknown cost of benefit (e.g., exemptions).	Ignore - judge other factors
	Policy duration is stated and could be extended.	M
	Policy duration could not be extended (e.g., a one-off cash transfer).	N (unless cost or beneficiaries can be scaled)
	Policy could be replicated to different group of beneficiaries (e.g., from unemployed individuals to other vulnerable populations) or products and retain its essence.	[L] M
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEXITY	Policy's expansion to a different group of beneficiaries or products would fundamentally change its essence (e.g., from supporting SMEs to targeting all firms); effectively making it a new policy, not a scaled-up version of a current policy.	[L] N (unless cost or duration can be scaled)
	Policy would be relatively easy to identify the targeted beneficiaries. Example: universal benefit to all businesses.	[L] M
	Policy would be relatively difficult to identify the targeted beneficiaries. Example: transfers to informal workers.	[L] N
	Policy would be relatively easy to enforce. Example: universal tax rate cuts.	[L] M
	Policy would be relatively difficult to enforce. Example: tax rate reductions for which eligibility is hard to distinguish.	[L] N
	Policy eligibility is determined using an impartial metric (e.g., poverty line, employment status, etc.), is intentionally widespread, or is a blanket exemption. Example: Moratorium on pension contributions for the hospitality sector; one-off payment to income support recipients.	[L] M
	Eligibility is determined on a case-by-case basis and is therefore subject to discretion. Example: banks providing flexible solutions to customers on an individual basis.	[L] N
	Policy adds a new business line (non-blanket exemptions). Example: A new program to compensate entrepreneurs and their employees.	[L] N



	Requesting funds/lending from multi-lateral institutions.	[L] M
	Implementing ad hoc programs.	M
	Re-introducing an old program.	M
	Ambiguity. Example: housing scheme for the homeless.	A
RESILIENCE TO HEALTH MEASURES	Policy explicitly reduces in-person contact.	M
	Policy does not state whether face-to-face contact is required.	[L] M
	Policy requires person-to-person contact (complicating factor: this may obviate the need for the beneficiary to subject themselves to other transmission risks). Example: delivery of in-kind goods.	N
CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES AND MISCELLANEOUS	If a policy has multiple components, the assessment is based on the single lowest-performing score for each dimension. Example: "Creation of the 'Stay at Home' program with different elements, including (i) top-up to safety net of 5,000 pesos (USD 92) for two months to 811,000 beneficiary families that have the Solidarity payment card to purchase food and basic necessities; (ii) horizontal expansion at the same amount 5,000 pesos (USD 92) to 690,000 nonpoor and vulnerable non-beneficiary families in the social registry."	For each dimension, the worst-performing score was recorded
	Distinct occurrences of the same policy. Example: one-off cash transfer to civil servants and taxi drivers; and a (second) one-off cash transfer to taxi, tourist, and rickshaw drivers and tourist guides.	Judge each independently
	State guarantees for private companies. This type of policy called was considered a preferential loan as it increases the company's access to financing, while the government bears the risk of default. It was scored as if it were a standard credit and equity measure.	-
	Policies beyond the framework. It would not be appropriate to judge policies designed to raise revenue with this framework and were therefore exempted from scoring along the dimensions. Example: Creation of a solidarity tax of relatively unaffected public officials.	A
	Sub-national responses. Provincial and local policy responses tended to be grouped together and lacked the same depth as national government responses. Example: "State and Territory governments also announced fiscal stimulus packages, together amounting to A\$11.5 billion (0.6 percent of GDP), including payroll tax relief for businesses and relief for households, such as discount utility bills, cash payments to vulnerable households, and support for health spending."	A

Source: World Bank.

## >>> FROM FRAMEWORK TO REAL POLICIES

The assessment team applied reasoning featured in the COVID-19 fiscal policy note (World Bank 2020) whenever possible. However, there were some areas of the original framework that needed to be changed when applying it to real-world policies as they appear in the compiled database. This was necessary partly to make the scoring exercise feasible—not all of information necessary to assess the criteria discussed in the original framework was available to the assessment team. This was also necessary in order to create a cross-sectional dataset. The original framework assessed policies against the country context, which is a standard that varies by country. In order to create a consistent standard, policies were scored in a vacuum. Finally, it is also worth noting that some policies may have lost detail when copied over in the data collection stage, and some assumptions about missing detail were necessary to score them. This section summarizes the judgment calls made in converting a conceptual framework for practical application.

*Targetability* – The original definition of targetability emphasized the ability of a policy to directly target specific businesses or populations. Analysts revised the criteria of this dimension to only consider a targeted demographic that is in any way vulnerable during the pandemic. For example, targeting SMEs counts as good targeting, but targeting investors with foreign-earned income from capital investments does not. Furthermore, analysts did not score follow-through but rather a declaration to target. Regardless of capacity to target, countries which stipulated that their policies were for specific groups received credit for targeting.

*Speed* – The concept of speed was changed to include benefits that a beneficiary can anticipate and therefore budget for, effectively realizing a benefit earlier than it is received.

*Abuse Resistance* – Policies were judged in a vacuum, ignoring government capacity so that in-depth country knowledge would not be necessary. This creates a consistent standard across countries, allowing for meaningful comparison.

*Cost Recoverability* – The Fiscal Policy Assessment Framework, as written, defines affordability as “the extent to which the use of the instrument impacts on fiscal stability.” Unfortunately, assessing the impact on fiscal stability is a resource-intensive exercise, which requires more detail than was available for both the policies and the countries implementing them, as well as post-hoc estimation of the

full cost of each policy. Additionally, judging each policy against the country context means that each policy is judged against a different standard. This is ideal for tailoring a policy to the country context but not ideal for building a standardized, cross-sectional dataset. Instead, the scoring team replaced the concept of “Affordability” described in the framework with “Cost Recoverability.” This switch allowed the researchers to ask: “Was the government able to provide a benefit to beneficiaries and later recoup some of the cost of the benefit?”<sup>15</sup> In this manner, “cost recoverability” can be assessed across countries by an objective standard, allowing for meaningful comparison. Consequently, some of the full meaning of “affordability” is lost. Individual policies did not leave a lot of room for customization with respect to whether the benefit will be repaid by beneficiaries. Measures either provide a benefit that will not be repaid, as with a cash transfer, or repayment is implicit, as with a subsidized loan. As a result, regression analysis attributed no tendency to making policies with recoverable costs to any particular country characteristic, when controlling for policy choice and GDP per capita.

*Predictability and Cost Control* – Similar to the issue of abuse resistance above, policies were judged against an objective standard (independently of government capacity), since it would be difficult to gather and apply data on the forecasting capabilities of each country. This makes policies more convenient to score and standardized across countries.

*Reversibility* – The policy summaries in the database may not have included a specified end-date, which could be by design, mistake, or omission. For consistency, analysts followed the breakdown described in Table A1, which assumes that countries without an end-date do not have one.

*Scalability* – The most persistent issue for this dimension was the question of at which point a policy is scaled beyond the scope of the original policy, and therefore does not qualify as a scaled-up version of itself but rather a new policy altogether. The analysts decided that when a policy's expansion to a new group of beneficiaries would fundamentally change the nature of the policy, it would not be considered “scalable” (e.g., cash transfers to unemployed workers could not be scaled up to include employed workers), unless some other characteristic of the policy (duration, amount) could be scaled.

*Administrative Complexity* – The assessment of administrative complexity required the same approach as for “Abuse Resistance.” Policies would be judged without considering the country's implementation capacity in order

15. Example: tax deferrals usually involve waiving interest on tax owed. This is costly, but is a small cost relative to the full value of the tax payment that taxpayers can hold on to during the deferral period. Therefore, such policies are considered “cost-recoverable.”

to make them more convenient to score and standardized across countries.

*Resilience to Health Measures* – This policy called for judging whether the policy measure itself required in-person contact. The feasibility of business continuity would be another appropriate concept of “resilience,” and one that future research teams should consider.

*Further considerations* – Ambiguity that stemmed from a lack of detail or clarity in how policies are worded were more likely to be scored “missing” or “likely” than “certain.” In general, the assessment team was unsure whether a policy lacking detail was due to 1) the policy itself being light on detail as written in official documents in the implementing country, 2) the policy’s summarization at the time of publication, either by government spokespersons or newspapers, or 3) summarization of the policy at the time of transcription into the database. Three dimensions were severely affected by this uncertainty: “Targetability,” “Predictability and Cost Control,” and “Reversibility.” Meeting the criteria of these dimensions requires that policies specify beneficiaries, indicate an aggregate spending cap, or indicate a sunset date. All may be casualties of incomplete transcription, since there are seemingly minor details that might be trimmed when trying to reduce word count that may have strong implications for the policy assessment.

**>>> POST-SCORING ASSESSMENT OF METHODOLOGY**

Ensuring a consistent scoring system was the priority of the assessment team. After deciding on the criteria for scoring dimensions, the reviewers independently scored the same samples of policy measures, compared results, and created further guidelines. The first iteration of this self-assessment produced a similarity of 82 percent across all policy dimension scores. Each of the scores of the approximately 130 policies were discussed, and a second testing sample was selected. Scoring consistency improved to 84 percent across all dimensions.

Policies’ detail ranged immensely. At one end, some policies were vague (e.g., Australia’s “State and Territory governments also announced fiscal stimulus packages, together amounting to A\$11.5 billion (0.6 percent of GDP), including payroll tax relief for businesses and relief for households, such as discount utility bills, cash payments to vulnerable households, and support for health spending”), while others were specific

(e.g., Albania’s “Lk11bn (0.6 percent of GDP) sovereign guarantee fund for companies to access overdrafts in the banking system to pay wages for their employees for up to three months with an interest rate capped at 2.85 percent for a maturity of up to two years”). The discrepancy in policy detail necessitated a consistent framework, for certain, likely, and missing data points.

A comparison of the likelihood that a policy went unscored or was flagged as “likely meets the criteria” or “likely does not meet the criteria” across each of the policy dimensions is presented in table A2 below. By reviewing the number of missing scores for the policy dimensions, it is apparent that most were close to the sample-wide average of 4.8 percent. The average number of missing scores for “Speed” and “Resilience to Health Measures” are both two or more percentage points below the average, while the average number of missing for “Administrative Complexity” is well above the sample average at almost 12 percent of measures, indicating a high level of ambiguity with respect to this dimension. The inherently qualitative aspect of “Administrative Complexity” caused analysts to create more scoring guidelines for this dimension than for any other, and it still had significantly more missing values.

**TABLE A2 - Policy Dimension by Missing and Likely/Unlikely Score**

POLICY DIMENSION	MISSING # (%)	LIKELY # (%)
TARGETABILITY	118 (4.9%)	1241 (51.7%)
SPEED	54 (2.3%)	1374 (57.3%)
ABUSE RESISTANCE	101 (4.2%)	2170 (90.4%)
RECOVERABILITY	135 (5.6%)	569 (23.7%)
PREDICTABILITY	124 (5.2%)	2075 (86.5%)
REVERSIBILITY	101 (4.2%)	1830 (76.3%)
SCALABILITY	78 (3.3%)	629 (26.2%)
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEXITY	286 (11.9%)	1924 (80.2%)
RESILIENCE TO HEALTH MEASURES	48 (2.0%)	41 (1.7%)
AVERAGE	116 (4.8%)	1317 (54.9%)

Source: Original calculations for this publication.

The percentage of data scored as “likely meets the criteria” or “likely does not meet the criteria” (uncertain) was more varied across the dimensions: “Abuse Resistance,” “Predictability,” “Reversibility,” and “Administrative Complexity” all had many more instances of assumed data than the overall average. It should also be noted that almost 55 percent of scores were marked as “likely meets the criteria” or “likely does not meet the criteria,” reflecting various sources of ambiguity previously discussed.

The second lens of analysis for missing data and data scored with uncertainty across lending groups. There are three cuts for the purposes of this analysis: IDA/Blend countries, IBRD countries, and neither. Table A3 below presents missing and uncertain data by these lending categories.

**TABLE A3 - Total of Lending Category by Missing and Uncertain Scores**

LENDING CATEGORY - TOTAL	MISSING # (%)	LIKELY # (%)
IDA/BLEND - TOTAL	322 (6.6%)	2607 (53.6%)
IBRD - TOTAL	418 (4.9%)	4666 (55.0%)
NEITHER - TOTAL	305 (3.7%)	4580 (55.5%)

Source: Original calculations for this publication.

Examining policy dimensions through the lens of lending category reveals that the proportion of missing and uncertain data does not statistically significantly differ among World Bank lending categories. This suggests the policies that are scored are not a misrepresentative sample, making for meaningful comparison across categories.

The slight variation in missing and uncertain scores is related to types of policies chosen by lending category (see Analysis of Significance Difference for more detail). In general, some policy types which are more likely to be scored as missing or assumed are also disproportionately favored by IDA/Blend countries, relative to IBRDs and others. For example, IDA/Blend countries introduced “Supplementary ad hoc programs (feeding programs, utility waivers)” for about 11 percent of all policy measures while IBRDs and others only introduced such policies about 6.5 percent of the time. Consider also that this policy measure was significantly more likely to receive a missing score (2.3 percent) than other policy types (0.8 percent) for the dimension “Resilience to Health Measures.” Since this type of policy measure is more likely to receive a missing score in this category and IDA/Blend countries rely relatively more on this policy, it results in a higher number of scores marked “missing” for IDA/Blends, on average.



## >>> APPENDIX B: COUNTRY-LEVEL POLICY DIMENSION SCORES

### >>> INTRODUCTION

Before using or reporting these scores, please carefully read the methodology and findings sections of this report, which discuss limitations in data quality and availability, as well as trends behind the scores. For a full dataset of scores (at the policy level, 2,400 policies, certain and likely scores flagged), please contact Eric Lacey ([elacey@worldbank.org](mailto:elacey@worldbank.org)) and Joseph Massad ([jmassad1@worldbank.org](mailto:jmassad1@worldbank.org)), who compiled the dataset. Finally, please find the Policy Assessment Dashboard (an excel file circulated with this report), which features visuals, analysis, and sample-selection tools in a point-and-click format.

### >>> A NOTE ON SCORE INTERPRETATION

These scores are best understood by reading the methodology section and findings section of this report. In summary, scores for any policy are either 0 (does not meet the criteria of the policy dimension listed) or 1 (meets the criteria). The scores listed here are flat averages of each listed country's policy scores. Effectively, the scores represent the share of a country's policies that met the criteria of each dimension. This reporting does not disaggregate scores that were flagged as likely from those that had a higher degree of confidence. Please see the accompanying report and dashboard for more information. Finally, note that the following country-level scores exclude scores on health expenditures.

> > >

**TABLE A4 - Country-level Policy Dimension Scores and World Ranking**

Country	Targetability		Speed		Abuse Resistance		Cost Recoverability		Predictability and Cost Control		Reversibility		Scalability		Administrative Complexity		Resilience to Health Measures	
	World		World		World		World		World		World		World		World		World	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
East Asia and the Pacific																		
Australia	0.81	44	0.94	179	0.63	89	0.18	157	0.82	38	0.67	158	0.94	66	0.50	160	0.94	169
Brunei Darussalam	0.00	190	1.00	1	0.67	71	0.67	7	0.67	86	0.67	158	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
Cambodia	0.87	29	1.00	1	0.38	169	0.24	145	0.59	122	0.79	120	0.82	121	0.36	182	1.00	1
China	0.78	53	0.89	189	0.47	152	0.32	119	0.53	137	0.68	156	0.39	192	0.57	151	0.95	168
Cook Islands	0.75	56	1.00	1	0.63	89	0.38	85	0.63	103	0.75	132	0.63	183	0.50	160	1.00	1
Fiji	0.69	89	0.93	182	0.15	189	0.21	149	0.38	173	0.57	176	0.71	163	0.27	189	1.00	1
Hong Kong, China	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.83	37	0.33	96	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.83	50	1.00	1
Indonesia	0.72	68	1.00	1	0.48	151	0.20	152	0.62	111	0.67	158	0.84	110	0.88	37	1.00	1
Japan	0.83	37	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.50	36	0.50	141	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.50	160	1.00	1
Korea, Republic of	0.90	20	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.19	156	0.50	141	0.85	85	0.90	80	0.65	133	1.00	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.40	162	0.20	152	0.40	169	1.00	1	0.80	128	1.00	1	1.00	1
Macao, China	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.75	57	0.11	167	0.78	54	0.78	124	0.78	144	0.29	187	1.00	1
Malaysia	0.70	87	1.00	1	0.74	62	0.38	85	0.63	103	0.71	151	0.83	113	0.55	155	1.00	1
Marshall Islands	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"
Mongolia	0.75	56	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.25	134	0.38	174	0.75	132	0.75	150	0.75	88	1.00	1
Myanmar	0.70	81	1.00	1	0.70	69	0.40	76	0.70	80	0.90	66	0.90	80	0.89	34	1.00	1

Country	Targetability		Speed		Abuse Resistance		Cost Recoverability		Predictability and Cost Control		Reversibility		Scalability		Administrative Complexity		Resilience to Health Measures	
	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank
Nauru	1.00	1	1.00	1	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	1.00	1	"No data"	"No data"	1.00	1
New Zealand	0.84	35	1.00	1	0.56	121	0.11	167	0.53	139	0.68	156	0.74	160	0.65	134	1.00	1
Palau	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.67	71	0.67	7	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.67	113	1.00	1
Papua New Guinea	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.50	36	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.33	184	1.00	1
Philippines	0.82	41	1.00	1	0.71	68	0.24	145	0.53	137	1.00	1	0.81	126	0.47	173	1.00	1
Samoa	0.83	37	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.17	158	0.50	141	0.50	179	0.83	113	1.00	1	1.00	1
Singapore	0.55	140	1.00	1	0.88	27	0.32	117	0.80	39	1.00	1	0.96	60	0.68	111	1.00	1
Solomon Islands	0.33	179	1.00	1	0.67	71	0.33	96	0.67	86	0.67	158	1.00	1	0.67	113	1.00	1
Taiwan	0.38	175	1.00	1	0.38	167	0.29	127	0.46	163	0.85	88	0.85	104	0.82	58	1.00	1
Thailand	0.35	178	0.95	177	0.47	153	0.33	96	0.76	59	0.67	158	0.94	66	0.80	61	1.00	1
Timor-Leste	0.17	186	0.83	192	0.60	102	0.00	170	0.83	34	0.83	90	0.67	172	1.00	1	1.00	1
Tonga	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.00	170	1.00	1	0.00	191	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
Tuvalu	0.00	190	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.00	170	0.00	191	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
Vanuatu	0.67	91	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.33	96	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.67	172	1.00	1	1.00	1
Vietnam	0.60	121	0.90	188	0.50	129	0.40	76	0.80	39	0.80	107	0.80	128	0.89	34	1.00	1
Europe and Central Asia																		
Albania	0.62	118	1.00	1	0.85	34	0.54	32	0.69	82	0.69	152	1.00	1	0.77	83	1.00	1
Armenia	0.79	51	1.00	1	0.69	70	0.14	163	0.77	56	0.85	88	1.00	1	0.36	182	0.85	182
Austria	0.53	143	1.00	1	0.57	112	0.38	85	0.53	136	0.75	132	0.81	126	0.55	156	1.00	1
Azerbaijan	0.80	45	1.00	1	0.40	162	0.00	170	0.80	39	0.40	186	1.00	1	0.50	160	1.00	1
Belarus	0.38	176	1.00	1	0.71	66	0.50	36	0.75	61	0.75	132	0.75	150	0.88	37	1.00	1
Belgium	0.50	145	0.92	183	0.56	119	0.39	81	0.63	103	0.69	152	0.76	149	0.54	158	1.00	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.64	109	1.00	1	0.62	99	0.21	149	0.64	102	0.71	147	0.71	163	0.62	138	1.00	1
Bulgaria	0.64	111	1.00	1	0.83	37	0.58	23	0.75	61	1.00	1	0.92	74	0.45	174	0.92	173
Croatia	0.75	56	1.00	1	0.58	110	0.50	36	0.67	86	1.00	1	0.58	188	0.64	135	1.00	1
Cyprus	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.63	89	0.29	127	0.71	75	1.00	1	0.88	87	0.83	50	1.00	1
Czechia	0.71	73	1.00	1	0.29	179	0.36	94	0.36	176	0.93	59	0.86	93	0.45	174	1.00	1
Denmark	0.62	118	1.00	1	0.77	53	0.62	19	0.54	134	1.00	1	0.62	184	0.67	113	1.00	1
Estonia	0.65	108	1.00	1	0.28	181	0.24	145	0.18	190	0.94	54	0.95	63	0.47	172	1.00	1
Finland	0.75	56	1.00	1	0.75	57	0.50	36	0.75	61	0.82	101	0.58	188	0.50	160	1.00	1

Country	Targetability		Speed		Abuse Resistance		Cost Recoverability		Predictability and Cost Control		Reversibility		Scalability		Administrative Complexity		Resilience to Health Measures	
	World		World		World		World		World		World		World		World		World	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
France	0.75	56	1.00	1	0.58	111	0.33	96	0.47	161	0.95	51	0.76	148	0.59	149	1.00	1
Georgia	0.89	22	1.00	1	0.83	37	0.47	60	0.68	84	0.94	52	0.95	63	0.63	137	1.00	1
Germany	0.70	81	1.00	1	0.62	98	0.43	69	0.48	160	0.76	130	0.71	163	0.39	181	1.00	1
Greece	0.67	91	1.00	1	0.57	112	0.33	96	0.43	165	0.85	85	0.71	163	0.67	113	1.00	1
Guernsey	0.43	170	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.38	85	0.50	141	0.88	75	0.75	150	0.57	151	1.00	1
Hungary	0.72	70	0.96	174	0.42	160	0.27	132	0.33	177	0.80	107	0.84	112	0.75	88	1.00	1
Iceland	0.73	67	1.00	1	0.57	112	0.47	62	0.60	114	0.80	107	0.87	92	0.31	186	1.00	1
Ireland	0.75	56	1.00	1	0.63	89	0.36	94	0.40	169	0.73	144	0.73	161	0.87	42	1.00	1
Isle of Man	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.50	36	0.50	141	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
Italy	0.95	19	0.96	175	0.61	101	0.36	91	0.60	114	0.91	65	0.95	61	0.52	159	1.00	1
Jersey	0.83	37	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.50	36	0.50	141	0.83	90	0.80	128	0.40	180	1.00	1
Kazakhstan	0.88	23	0.94	179	0.41	161	0.29	126	0.29	183	0.81	105	0.88	86	0.80	61	0.94	170
Kosovo	0.64	111	1.00	1	0.91	26	0.64	14	0.73	72	0.64	171	0.64	181	0.90	31	1.00	1
Kyrgyzstan	0.43	170	1.00	1	0.86	31	0.43	69	0.86	30	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.83	50	1.00	1
Latvia	0.71	73	1.00	1	0.71	66	0.57	26	0.71	75	0.83	90	0.86	93	0.86	44	0.86	180
Lithuania	0.72	68	1.00	1	0.83	37	0.39	82	0.33	177	0.83	90	0.83	113	0.50	160	1.00	1
Luxembourg	0.56	136	1.00	1	0.73	64	0.67	7	0.88	29	0.88	75	0.94	68	0.80	61	1.00	1
Malta	0.64	111	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.54	32	0.62	112	0.92	62	0.92	72	0.69	109	1.00	1
Moldova	0.70	81	1.00	1	0.60	102	0.30	123	0.56	129	0.90	66	0.70	170	0.60	141	1.00	1
Monaco	0.50	145	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
Montenegro	0.87	29	1.00	1	0.87	30	0.33	96	0.67	86	0.87	81	0.93	69	0.71	103	1.00	1
Netherlands	0.67	91	0.95	176	0.38	168	0.33	96	0.30	182	0.94	54	0.75	150	0.88	36	1.00	1
North Macedonia	0.88	23	1.00	1	0.88	27	0.50	36	0.38	174	0.88	75	0.88	87	0.43	176	1.00	1
Norway	0.70	81	1.00	1	0.67	71	0.33	96	0.53	139	0.90	66	0.90	79	0.60	141	1.00	1
Poland	0.66	107	1.00	1	0.72	65	0.53	34	0.72	74	0.93	57	0.73	161	0.59	147	1.00	1
Portugal	0.64	110	1.00	1	0.84	36	0.67	7	0.71	78	0.96	48	0.92	73	0.75	88	1.00	1
Romania	0.71	73	1.00	1	0.57	112	0.42	74	0.50	141	0.69	152	0.86	93	0.71	103	1.00	1
Russian Federation	0.84	36	1.00	1	0.63	88	0.52	35	0.59	120	0.81	104	0.85	103	0.68	111	1.00	1
San Marino	0.45	168	0.91	186	0.64	86	0.45	65	0.73	72	0.73	145	0.82	122	0.73	99	1.00	1
Serbia	0.62	118	1.00	1	0.77	53	0.46	63	0.77	56	1.00	1	0.85	104	0.73	99	1.00	1
Slovakia	0.68	90	0.95	177	0.56	121	0.56	28	0.79	49	0.89	71	0.89	83	0.76	87	1.00	1

Country	Targetability		Speed		Abuse Resistance		Cost Recoverability		Predictability and Cost Control		Reversibility		Scalability		Administrative Complexity		Resilience to Health Measures	
	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank
Slovenia	0.67	91	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.50	36	0.79	51	0.92	62	0.93	71	0.71	103	1.00	1
Spain	0.86	32	1.00	1	0.54	128	0.46	64	0.57	124	0.94	53	0.89	85	0.84	49	1.00	1
Sweden	0.80	45	1.00	1	0.47	154	0.33	96	0.47	162	0.79	120	0.80	128	0.73	98	1.00	1
Switzerland	0.80	45	1.00	1	0.57	112	0.42	73	0.50	141	0.76	130	0.86	93	0.67	113	1.00	1
Tajikistan	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.00	170	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
Turkey	0.77	55	1.00	1	0.65	83	0.48	59	0.78	53	0.77	127	0.91	77	0.86	43	1.00	1
Ukraine	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.36	170	0.16	162	0.60	114	0.82	101	0.82	122	0.71	103	1.00	1
United Kingdom	0.86	31	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.32	118	0.41	167	0.82	101	0.77	147	0.67	113	1.00	1
Uzbekistan	0.64	111	0.91	186	0.50	129	0.36	91	0.55	131	0.55	178	0.68	171	0.79	77	1.00	1
Latin America and the Caribbean																		
Anguilla	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.33	171	0.40	76	0.80	39	0.33	187	0.67	172	0.67	113	1.00	1
Antigua and Barbuda	0.50	145	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.00	170	0.75	61	0.75	132	1.00	1	0.75	88	0.50	190
Argentina	0.88	23	0.94	181	0.47	154	0.31	121	0.63	103	0.63	172	0.88	87	0.80	61	0.87	179
Aruba	0.40	173	1.00	1	0.60	102	0.60	20	0.60	114	0.80	107	0.80	128	0.80	61	1.00	1
Bahamas, The	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.33	171	0.25	134	1.00	1	0.75	132	1.00	1	0.25	190	1.00	1
Barbados	0.67	91	0.83	192	0.50	129	0.33	96	0.67	86	0.50	179	0.83	113	0.83	50	0.67	189
Belize	0.25	185	1.00	1	0.60	102	0.50	36	0.75	61	0.80	107	0.60	185	0.80	61	1.00	1
Bermuda	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.50	36	0.50	141	0.50	179	1.00	1	0.50	160	1.00	1
Bolivia	0.82	42	1.00	1	0.62	99	0.17	158	0.54	134	0.77	128	0.85	104	0.42	179	0.92	171
Brazil	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.55	125	0.45	65	0.59	121	0.73	145	0.95	61	0.61	140	1.00	1
British Virgin Islands	0.50	145	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.00	170	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
Cayman Islands	0.80	45	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.20	152	0.80	39	0.80	107	1.00	1	0.80	61	0.80	186
Chile	0.71	79	1.00	1	0.65	84	0.65	13	0.76	59	0.88	74	0.65	179	0.77	83	1.00	1
Colombia	0.72	70	1.00	1	0.56	119	0.36	93	0.68	85	0.79	119	0.79	142	0.60	141	1.00	1
Costa Rica	0.58	130	1.00	1	0.82	44	0.44	67	0.67	86	0.83	90	0.92	74	0.55	156	1.00	1
Dominica	0.50	145	0.86	190	0.33	171	0.29	127	0.40	169	0.80	107	0.83	113	0.75	88	1.00	1
Dominican Republic	0.44	169	1.00	1	0.75	57	0.63	15	0.94	26	0.94	56	0.80	128	0.80	61	1.00	1
Ecuador	0.67	91	1.00	1	0.80	45	0.67	7	0.80	39	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.67	113	0.83	183
El Salvador	0.90	21	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.33	96	0.44	164	0.89	71	0.90	80	0.29	187	1.00	1
Grenada	0.67	91	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.50	36	0.80	39	0.83	90	1.00	1	0.80	61	1.00	1



Country	Targetability		Speed		Abuse Resistance		Cost Recoverability		Predictability and Cost Control		Reversibility		Scalability		Administrative Complexity		Resilience to Health Measures	
	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank
Guatemala	0.64	111	1.00	1	0.85	34	0.50	36	0.69	82	0.69	152	0.85	104	0.77	83	1.00	1
Guyana	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.63	89	0.63	15	0.71	75	0.88	75	0.71	163	0.83	50	1.00	1
Haiti	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.67	71	0.00	170	0.33	177	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.67	113	1.00	1
Honduras	0.75	56	1.00	1	0.67	71	0.33	96	0.67	86	0.92	64	0.67	172	0.70	107	1.00	1
Jamaica	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.60	102	0.00	170	0.00	191	0.75	132	0.80	128	0.50	160	1.00	1
Mexico	0.42	172	1.00	1	0.77	53	0.77	5	0.86	30	0.93	59	0.85	104	0.77	83	1.00	1
Montserrat	0.88	23	1.00	1	0.75	57	0.13	165	0.57	124	0.75	132	1.00	1	0.88	37	0.88	177
Nicaragua	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.00	170	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
Panama	0.56	137	1.00	1	0.78	52	0.63	15	0.67	86	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.88	37	1.00	1
Paraguay	0.58	130	1.00	1	0.67	71	0.44	67	0.75	61	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.82	58	0.92	173
Peru	0.70	81	1.00	1	0.85	33	0.47	60	0.80	39	0.95	50	0.95	63	0.74	97	0.95	167
Puerto Rico	0.14	189	1.00	1	0.25	182	0.29	127	0.25	186	0.88	75	0.88	87	0.86	44	1.00	1
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.71	73	1.00	1	0.77	53	0.38	83	0.50	141	0.93	59	0.86	93	0.83	50	1.00	1
Saint Lucia	0.17	186	1.00	1	0.67	71	0.56	29	1.00	1	0.86	82	0.89	84	0.67	113	1.00	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.67	91	1.00	1	0.75	57	0.33	96	0.75	61	0.67	158	0.88	87	0.86	44	1.00	1
St Maarten	0.56	137	1.00	1	0.67	71	0.50	36	0.67	86	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.78	78	1.00	1
Suriname	0.00	190	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
Trinidad and Tobago	0.78	53	1.00	1	0.56	121	0.09	169	0.60	114	0.80	107	0.64	181	0.78	78	1.00	1
Turks and Caicos	0.60	121	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.00	170	0.67	86	0.60	174	0.80	128	0.50	160	1.00	1
Uruguay	0.55	140	1.00	1	0.55	125	0.55	31	0.55	131	0.80	107	0.91	78	0.90	31	1.00	1
Venezuela	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.57	112	0.00	170	0.57	124	0.71	147	0.71	163	0.67	113	0.86	180
Middle East and North Africa																		
Algeria	0.56	137	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.56	29	0.89	28	0.78	124	0.67	172	0.78	78	0.89	176
Bahrain	0.33	179	1.00	1	0.67	71	0.00	170	0.67	86	0.67	158	0.67	172	0.67	113	1.00	1
Egypt	0.55	140	0.86	190	0.45	156	0.31	122	0.58	123	0.50	179	1.00	1	0.78	78	1.00	1
Iran	0.71	73	1.00	1	0.57	112	0.50	36	1.00	1	0.83	90	0.83	113	0.80	61	1.00	1
Iraq	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.33	171	0.33	96	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.67	113	1.00	1
Israel	0.60	121	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.50	36	0.70	80	0.80	107	1.00	1	0.90	31	1.00	1
Jordan	0.70	81	1.00	1	0.80	45	0.40	76	0.50	141	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.80	61	1.00	1

Country	Targetability		Speed		Abuse Resistance		Cost Recoverability		Predictability and Cost Control		Reversibility		Scalability		Administrative Complexity		Resilience to Health Measures	
	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank
	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank
Kuwait	0.60	121	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.60	20	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.80	61	1.00	1
Lebanon	0.67	91	1.00	1	0.83	37	0.50	36	0.50	141	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.83	50	1.00	1
Libya	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"
Morocco	0.75	56	1.00	1	0.63	89	0.38	85	0.63	103	0.75	132	0.75	150	0.57	151	1.00	1
Oman	0.57	134	1.00	1	0.43	158	0.43	69	0.67	86	0.86	82	0.86	93	0.80	61	1.00	1
Qatar	0.60	121	1.00	1	0.20	187	0.25	134	0.20	188	1.00	1	0.80	128	1.00	1	1.00	1
Saudi Arabia	0.40	173	1.00	1	0.67	71	0.38	83	0.77	56	0.93	57	0.93	69	0.80	61	1.00	1
Tunisia	0.53	144	1.00	1	0.30	178	0.33	96	0.55	130	0.75	132	0.80	128	0.78	78	1.00	1
United Arab Emirates	0.36	177	0.92	185	0.83	37	0.58	23	0.83	34	0.83	90	0.92	74	0.92	30	1.00	1
West Bank and Gaza	0.33	179	1.00	1	0.33	171	0.50	36	0.67	86	0.67	158	0.67	172	1.00	1	1.00	1
Yemen	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"
North America																		
Canada	0.72	70	1.00	1	0.60	102	0.25	134	0.41	167	0.96	49	0.80	128	0.43	176	1.00	1
United States	0.71	79	0.97	173	0.59	109	0.25	134	0.66	101	0.76	129	0.85	102	0.69	110	1.00	1
South Asia																		
Afghanistan	0.67	91	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.67	7	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.67	113	1.00	1
Bangladesh	0.75	56	1.00	1	0.63	89	0.13	165	0.63	103	0.50	179	1.00	1	0.67	113	1.00	1
Bhutan	0.50	145	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.50	36	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
India	0.80	45	1.00	1	0.79	51	0.37	90	0.79	49	0.85	85	1.00	1	0.72	101	1.00	1
Maldives	0.86	32	1.00	1	0.86	31	0.57	26	0.57	124	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.43	176	1.00	1
Nepal	0.67	91	1.00	1	0.88	27	0.22	148	0.50	141	0.89	71	1.00	1	0.86	44	1.00	1
Pakistan	0.58	132	1.00	1	0.63	87	0.32	119	0.84	33	0.81	106	0.86	93	0.60	141	1.00	1
Sri Lanka	0.60	121	1.00	1	0.80	45	0.60	20	0.90	27	0.80	107	0.80	128	0.67	113	1.00	1
Sub-Saharan Africa																		
Angola	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.50	36	0.50	141	0.50	179	0.50	190	1.00	1	1.00	1
Benin	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"
Botswana	0.33	179	1.00	1	0.83	37	0.50	36	0.83	34	0.83	90	0.83	113	0.67	113	0.83	183
Burkina Faso	0.57	134	1.00	1	0.14	190	0.17	158	0.27	185	0.64	170	0.64	180	0.82	58	1.00	1

Country	Targetability		Speed		Abuse Resistance		Cost Recoverability		Predictability and Cost Control		Reversibility		Scalability		Administrative Complexity		Resilience to Health Measures	
	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank
Cameroon	0.00	190	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.00	170	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
Cape Verde	0.64	111	1.00	1	0.55	125	0.27	132	0.55	131	0.57	176	0.82	122	0.64	135	1.00	1
Central African Republic	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"	"No data"
Chad	0.82	42	0.92	183	0.25	182	0.25	134	0.62	112	0.50	179	0.46	191	0.58	150	0.92	171
Comoros	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.00	170	0.67	86	0.33	187	1.00	1	0.67	113	1.00	1
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.00	191	0.14	163	0.43	165	0.86	82	0.71	163	0.75	88	1.00	1
Congo, Republic of the	0.29	184	1.00	1	0.43	158	0.58	23	0.50	141	0.79	120	0.85	104	1.00	1	1.00	1
Cote d'Ivoire	0.67	91	1.00	1	0.33	171	0.33	96	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
Equatorial Guinea	0.75	56	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.25	134	0.25	186	0.75	132	1.00	1	0.50	160	1.00	1
Eswatini	0.63	117	1.00	1	0.63	89	0.29	127	0.63	103	0.63	172	0.75	150	0.50	160	0.88	177
Ethiopia	0.79	51	1.00	1	0.64	85	0.21	149	0.79	51	0.79	120	0.79	143	0.62	138	0.80	186
Gabon	0.50	145	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.50	36	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.00	192	1.00	1
Gambia, The	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.50	36	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
Ghana	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.40	162	0.30	123	0.50	141	0.90	66	0.60	185	0.70	107	1.00	1
Guinea	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.25	182	0.00	170	0.75	61	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.75	188
Guinea-Bissau	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.00	170	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.00	192
Kenya	0.58	132	1.00	1	0.32	177	0.17	158	0.50	141	0.26	190	0.84	110	0.72	101	1.00	1
Lesotho	0.67	91	1.00	1	0.67	71	0.33	96	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1
Liberia	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.25	134	0.50	141	0.75	132	0.75	150	1.00	1	0.50	190
Madagascar	0.60	121	1.00	1	0.40	162	0.20	152	0.40	169	0.60	174	1.00	1	0.60	141	1.00	1
Malawi	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.75	6	0.75	61	1.00	1	0.75	150	0.33	184	1.00	1
Mali	0.83	37	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.33	96	0.50	141	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.75	88	1.00	1
Mauritania	0.67	91	1.00	1	0.40	162	0.00	170	0.33	177	0.67	158	0.83	113	0.67	113	1.00	1
Mauritius	0.88	23	1.00	1	0.56	121	0.25	134	0.78	54	0.78	124	0.78	144	0.25	190	1.00	1
Mozambique	0.17	186	1.00	1	0.80	45	1.00	1	0.80	39	0.67	158	0.60	185	1.00	1	1.00	1
Namibia	0.80	45	1.00	1	0.80	45	0.30	123	0.60	114	0.90	66	0.80	128	0.56	154	1.00	1
Niger	0.88	23	1.00	1	0.25	182	0.00	170	0.29	184	1.00	1	0.78	144	0.80	61	1.00	1
Nigeria	0.60	121	1.00	1	0.80	45	0.78	4	0.80	39	1.00	1	0.80	128	0.60	141	1.00	1
Rwanda	0.86	32	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.43	69	0.86	30	0.71	147	0.86	93	0.86	44	1.00	1

Country	Targetability		Speed		Abuse Resistance		Cost Recoverability		Predictability and Cost Control		Reversibility		Scalability		Administrative Complexity		Resilience to Health Measures	
	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank	Score	World Rank
Sao Tome and Principe	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.25	134	1.00	1	0.67	158	1.00	1	0.75	88	1.00	1
Senegal	0.60	121	1.00	1	0.45	156	0.40	76	0.75	61	0.83	90	0.82	122	0.75	88	0.92	173
Seychelles	0.50	145	1.00	1	0.63	89	0.63	15	0.63	103	0.88	75	1.00	1	0.88	37	1.00	1
Sierra Leone	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.00	170	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.00	192
Somalia	1.00	1	1.00	1	0.00	191	0.00	170	0.33	177	0.67	158	1.00	1	0.50	160	1.00	1
South Africa	0.70	87	1.00	1	0.74	62	0.41	75	0.71	78	0.83	90	0.74	159	0.59	148	1.00	1
Sudan	0.67	91	1.00	1	0.50	129	0.00	170	0.67	86	0.33	187	1.00	1	0.67	113	1.00	1
Togo	0.71	73	1.00	1	0.29	179	0.33	96	0.57	124	0.71	147	0.86	93	0.83	50	1.00	1
Uganda	0.67	91	1.00	1	0.60	102	0.33	96	0.83	34	0.80	107	1.00	1	0.80	61	0.83	183
Zambia	0.33	179	1.00	1	0.20	187	0.00	170	0.20	188	0.00	191	0.20	193	1.00	1	1.00	1
Zimbabwe	0.75	56	1.00	1	0.25	182	0.25	134	0.75	61	1.00	1	0.75	150	1.00	1	1.00	1

Source: Original calculations for this publication.




>>> APPENDIX C: COUNTRY GROUP SCORES

>>> INTRODUCTION

This section presents policy scores aggregated across income levels, regions, lending categories, and FCV status. For brevity, this annex omits a discussion of scores and significant differences across categories (see “findings” in the main body of the report for that discussion). For statistical analysis that controls for relevant factors (logistic regression analysis), see Annex E. For a list of country-level scores, see Annex B. For a discussion of how scores were derived, see methodology in the main body of the report. For more detail on the original assessment framework, see Annex F. Additionally, the full list of policies assessed, the original fiscal policy framework, the database of scores at the policy level, and a dashboard for easy navigation of visuals and analysis can be requested (see Annex B).

> > >

FIGURE A1 - Policy Scores Across Income Groups




Note: Stars show results of ANOVA test of variation among samples (\*\*\*  $p<0.01$ , \*\*  $p<0.05$ , \*  $p<0.1$ ).

Source: Original calculations for this publication.

> > >

**FIGURE A2 - Policy Scores by Region**




Note: Stars show results of ANOVA test of variation among samples (\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ ).

Source: Original calculations for this publication.

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
**FIGURE A3 - Policy Scores by Lending Category**



Note: Stars show results of ANOVA test of variation among samples (\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ ).

Source: Original calculations for this publication.

**FIGURE A4 - Policy Scores by FCV Status**



*Note: Stars show results of ANOVA test of variation among samples (\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ ).*

*Source: Original calculations for this publication.*

## >>> APPENDIX D: PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS OF POLICY DIMENSIONS

\* denotes significance at the 1% level

> > >

**TABLE A5 - Country-level Dimension Pairwise Correlations (194 < n < 197)**

		[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]
TARGETABILITY	[1]	1.00								
SPEED	[2]	0.09	1.00							
ABUSE RESISTANCE	[3]	-0.04	0.20*	1.00						
RECOVERABILITY	[4]	-0.29*	0.07	0.29*	1.00					
PREDICTABILITY	[5]	-0.09	0.05	0.54*	0.28*	1.00				
REVERSIBILITY	[6]	0.07	0.21*	0.34*	0.30*	0.20*	1.00			
SCALABILITY	[7]	0.05	0.16	0.35*	0.01	0.30*	0.30*	1.00		
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEXITY	[8]	-0.30*	-0.05	0.09	0.02	0.16	0.05	0.07	1.00	
RESILIENCE TO HEALTH MEASURES	[9]	-0.16	0.04	-0.16	0.23*	-0.17	-0.05	-0.11	-0.16	1.00

Source: Original calculations for this publication.

> > >

**TABLE A6 - Policy-level Dimension Pairwise Correlations (1818 < n < 2127)**

		[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]
TARGETABILITY	[1]	1.00								
SPEED	[2]	0.02	1.00							
ABUSE RESISTANCE	[3]	-0.08*	0.08*	1.00						
RECOVERABILITY	[4]	-0.31*	0.07*	0.48*	1.00					
PREDICTABILITY	[5]	-0.16*	0.03	0.59*	0.56*	1.00				
REVERSIBILITY	[6]	0.00	0.08*	0.22*	0.20*	0.17*	1.00			
SCALABILITY	[7]	-0.05	-0.02	0.27*	0.13*	0.24*	0.35*	1.00		
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEXITY	[8]	-0.36*	-0.01	0.21*	0.24*	0.20*	-0.03	0.03	1.00	
RESILIENCE TO HEALTH MEASURES	[9]	-0.05	0.13*	-0.05	0.09*	-0.06*	0.00	-0.05	-0.04	1.00

Source: Original calculations for this publication.



## >>> APPENDIX E: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS

The following table (A7) show the results of logistic regressions attempting to disaggregate the marginal effects of policy choice and policy chooser. That is to ask, to what extent are policy dimension scores determined by the type of policy a country favored (which often inherently perform well or poorly along policy dimensions) and to what extent are scores determined by design tendencies common among country groups?

### >>> PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

Conventionally, regression results are presented with one regression per column in a table. In this annex, in order to make the presentation concise, each cell of the table represents the results of a unique regression, with the cells in each column sharing the policy dimension featured at the top of that column as the dependent variable. Most regressions control for the same factors but feature a different isolated variable in order to test its performance relative to the entire rest of the sample (not relative to a base case that may not be relevant for each category). The IDA/Blend variable's results come from regressions that control for policy choice (fixed effects created using dummy variables for each policy) and regional dummies, and show the performance of IDA/Blend countries compared to a base case of IBRDs and non-IDA/IBRDs. The results in the rows of regional variables each come from a separate regression in which there is a control for the log of GDP per capita and policy choice (fixed effects for each policy); in each separate regression, the single regional variable captures the intangible quality associated with policies that come from the given region, as compared with the rest of the world (the default, as no other regional dummies are included). This means the standard is slightly different for each region (the definition of the "rest of the world" depends on the region being excluded), but results are intuitive to interpret (example: countries in the Middle East and North Africa are about 17 percent less likely to target their policies than the rest of the world, controlling for policy choice and GDP per capita). Finally, the results for each policy variable come from separate regressions that control for all regional fixed effects and the log of GDP per capita in order to assess whether a policy is generally associated with a score of 1 (indicating that it meets the criteria of the given policy dimension), after accounting for the marginal effects of GDP per capita and regional tendencies. Results for Speed and Resilience to Health Measures are presented, although many

variables were automatically dropped in these regressions because they did not explain any variation (most policies met the criteria of these two dimensions). Thus, sample sizes for the Speed and Resilience to Health Measures regressions are too small to be robust.

### >>> DATA NOTE

All medical sector expenditure policies were removed from consideration. Their scores are not included in country average scores, they are not considered in the regression results below, nor are their scores included in the comparison "base case" group when considering the performance of other policies in isolation. The reason for this is that these policies are almost always necessary responses to the pandemic, and do not make sense to be included in an assessment of choices a country made as a part of its response. Furthermore, these policies tend to perform poorly against our assessment framework, strictly speaking, since they are expensive, have costs that are difficult to predict (as the pandemic's impact on the health sector is difficult to predict), slow to take effect, and prone to leakages. This means that countries with great health sector needs would score more poorly in their general fiscal response, which may not accurately reflect the care with which they supported businesses and households. The results associated with country groups below are limited in scope to policies over which governments had control.

As a robustness test conducted but not featured here, medical sector expenditure measures (225 measures) were included in logistic regression analysis. Significant tendencies among country groups (for example, IDA/Blend countries' tendency to have more administratively simple measures than those of IBRDs and non-IDA/IBRDs) were the same as those reported below, although coefficients varied a trivial amount.

### >>> INTERPRETATION

The results presented in each cell are marginal effects, which represent the increased likelihood of success with respect to the given policy dimension attributable to the variable indicated at the head of the row. For example, the "IDA" variable shows a value of -0.0177 for "Abuse Resistance"; this is not statistically significant, which means that, holding policy choice constant, IDA/Blend countries are not generally better or worse than IBRDs and non-IDA/IBRDs at designing abuse-resistant policies. Compare this result with an ANOVA test comparing the abuse resistance of lending categories, which resulted in a statistically different score for IDA/Blends (a lower score)

with a P-value below 0.05. This result is not contradictory. IDA/Blends did perform worse on abuse resistance but did so because they chose policies inherently prone to abuse, not because IDA/Blends are worse at policy design with respect to abuse resistance.

For the “IDA” variable’s coefficient under “Predictability and Cost Control,” the value is 0.137\*\*\*, which indicates that IDA/Blends are about 13.7 percent more likely than IBRDs and non-IDA/IBRDs to score well on predictability and cost control, holding region and policy choice constant.

> > >

## TABLE A7 - Logistic Regression Results

To save space in the regression results table, the following policy categories have been given an abbreviated tag.

TAG	MEANING
R FOR B	Revenue measures to protect businesses
R FOR I	Revenue measures to protect individuals
MEDICAL ITEMS	Revenue measures to promote availability of medical items
CONSUMPTION	Revenue measures to boost consumption / demand
E FOR I	Expenditure measures for cash transfers to individuals
E FOR B	Expenditure measures to protect businesses
CREDIT/EQUITY	Credit and equity measures
OTHER	Measures which do not fit into any of the above categories

VARIABLES	Targetability <i>mfx dydx</i>	Speed <i>mfx dydx</i>	Abuse Resistance <i>mfx dydx</i>	Cost Recoverability <i>mfx dydx</i>	Predictability and Cost Control <i>mfx dydx</i>	Reversibility <i>mfx dydx</i>	Scalability <i>mfx dydx</i>	Administrative Complexity <i>mfx dydx</i>	Resilience to Health Measures <i>mfx dydx</i>
IDA	-0.0309 (0.0402)	-0.00626 (1.398)	-0.0177 (0.0540)	0.00542 (0.0389)	0.137** (0.0540)	-0.0360 (0.0243)	-0.00917 (0.0369)	0.0854*** (0.0304)	0.00400 (0.0952)
EAP	-0.0184 (0.0364)	-0.00153 (0.121)	0.0758* (0.0436)	-0.0102 (0.0337)	0.144*** (0.0459)	-0.00153 (0.0186)	-0.00210 (0.0176)	0.0147 (0.0304)	0.0110 (0.307)
ECA	0.0856*** (0.0277)	-0.00663 (0.427)	-0.0376 (0.0369)	0.0329 (0.0310)	-0.103*** (0.0385)	0.000611 (0.0159)	-0.0193 (0.0807)	-0.0278 (0.0256)	0.00855 (0.242)
LAC	-0.00216 (0.0331)	-0.00673 (0.433)	0.0518 (0.0442)	0.0316 (0.0397)	0.0132 (0.0484)	0.0123 (0.0181)	0.0160 (0.0686)	-0.0396 (0.0352)	-0.0304 (0.801)
MENA	-0.173*** (0.0589)	-0.0697 (4.790)	-0.0484 (0.0620)	0.0358 (0.0560)	0.0393 (0.0661)	-0.00396 (0.0276)	0.0289 (0.124)	0.116*** (0.0292)	0.00968 (0.273)
NA	-0.0706 (0.0876)	-	-0.0524 (0.0957)	-0.0978*** (0.0350)	-0.0336 (0.0933)	0.00948 (0.0409)	-0.00517 (0.0399)	0.0282 (0.0614)	Always
SA	-0.0298 (0.0693)	Always	0.173*** (0.0666)	-0.0533 (0.0463)	0.0751 (0.0940)	-0.000978 (0.0351)	0.0575 (0.251)	0.0483 (0.0488)	Always
SSA	-0.0137 (0.0419)	Always	-0.131** (0.0561)	-0.0402 (0.0338)	-0.0532 (0.0583)	-0.0158 (0.0235)	-0.0231 (0.0963)	-0.0476 (0.0422)	-0.0129 (0.411)
[R for B] Accelerated asset depreciation (CIT)	Never	Always	Always	Never	Always	-0.151 (0.273)	-0.507* (0.274)	Always	Always

VARIABLES	Targetability	Speed	Abuse Resistance	Cost Recoverability	Predictability and Cost Control	Reversibility	Scalability	Administrative Complexity	Resilience to Health Measures
	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>
[R for B] Broaden tax deductibility	0.0342 (0.0788)	-0.0809* (0.0484)	-0.603*** (0.0284)	Never	-0.00291 (0.0823)	-0.242*** (0.0827)	0.00717 (0.0589)	-0.641*** (0.0419)	Always
[R for B] Tax credits	0.236*** (0.0888)	Always	Never	Never	-0.371*** (0.132)	-0.120 (0.144)	-0.00984 (0.110)	-0.612*** (0.0777)	Always
[R for B] Deferral of tax filing	-0.578*** (0.0473)	Always	Always	Always	0.360*** (0.0244)	Always	Always	0.298*** (0.0244)	Always
[R for B] Deferral of tax payments	-0.380*** (0.0316)	Always	0.398*** (0.0167)	Always	Always	0.206*** (0.0106)	0.172*** (0.0113)	0.357*** (0.0134)	Always
[R for B] Tax rate reduction	-0.227*** (0.0696)	-0.0203 (0.0219)	-0.617*** (0.0210)	Never	-0.626*** (0.0210)	-0.451*** (0.0680)	0.0646 (0.0419)	0.255*** (0.0372)	Always
[R for B] Tax amnesty	-0.484*** (0.122)	Always	Never	Never	-0.528*** (0.0970)	-0.431*** (0.156)	-0.385** (0.152)	0.219** (0.0907)	Always
[R for B] Accelerating refunds	-0.417*** (0.0806)	Always	0.360*** (0.0302)	Always	Always	-0.655*** (0.0708)	-0.727*** (0.0597)	Always	Always
[R for B] Lower advance payment	-0.135 (0.0907)	Always	0.322*** (0.0459)	Always	0.349*** (0.0320)	0.0834 (0.0555)	-0.172** (0.0865)	0.219*** (0.0544)	Always
[R for B] Suspend debt collection	-0.390*** (0.100)	Always	Never	0.0694 (0.139)	-0.362*** (0.103)	0.0346 (0.0800)	-0.0941 (0.0992)	0.267*** (0.0478)	Always
[R for B] Suspend audit activities	-0.632*** (0.0478)	Always	Never	Never	Never	Always	0.0759 (0.0583)	Always	Always
[R for B] Tax exemption/waiver/sus pension	-0.0566 (0.0527)	Always	-0.640*** (0.0148)	Never	-0.639*** (0.0179)	-0.00761 (0.0396)	-0.138*** (0.0454)	-0.171*** (0.0665)	Always
[R for B] Other	-0.340*** (0.0631)	-0.0316 (0.0245)	-0.228*** (0.0659)	-0.0404 (0.0702)	-0.0168 (0.0693)	-0.108* (0.0586)	-0.246*** (0.0658)	0.171*** (0.0493)	Always
[R for I] Deferral of tax payments	-0.547*** (0.0507)	Always	Always	Always	Always	Always	0.141*** (0.0227)	Always	Always
[R for I] Tax rate reduction	-0.432*** (0.151)	Always	Never	Never	Never	-0.560*** (0.159)	0.0300 (0.122)	Always	Always
[R for I] Broaden tax deductibility	-0.526*** (0.140)	-0.122 (0.137)	-0.241 (0.205)	Never	Always	-0.430** (0.208)	0.0129 (0.138)	-0.339* (0.199)	Always
[R for I] Tax exemption/waiver/sus pension	-0.174* (0.0942)	-0.0150 (0.0261)	-0.588*** (0.0387)	Never	-0.562*** (0.0508)	-0.046 (0.0787)	-0.196** (0.0884)	-0.164 (0.1156)	Always
[R for I] Other	-0.398*** (0.118)	Always	-0.157 (0.122)	0.237* (0.138)	0.141 (0.103)	-0.245** (0.122)	-0.254** (0.120)	0.168* (0.0960)	Always
[Medical Items] Lower tax rates for medical items	Always	Always	-0.548*** (0.0723)	Never	-0.482*** (0.0979)	-0.0829 (0.133)	-0.360** (0.147)	-0.0284 (0.196)	Always
[Medical Items] Tax exemption/waiver/sus pension	Always	Always	-0.630*** (0.0166)	Never	-0.641*** (0.0161)	-0.135** (0.0561)	-0.718*** (0.0429)	-0.492*** (0.1784)	Always
[Medical Items] Other	Always	Always	-0.551*** (0.0519)	-0.162** (0.0783)	0.0481 (0.0908)	-0.0396 (0.0764)	-0.654*** (0.0785)	-0.459*** (0.0866)	Always
[Consumption] Lower tax rates	0.00824 (0.100)	Always	-0.488*** (0.0734)	Never	-0.490*** (0.0768)	-0.444*** (0.101)	-0.0458 (0.0829)	0.274*** (0.0419)	Always
[Consumption] Tax exemption/waiver/sus pension	0.199** (0.086)	Always	Never	Never	Never	-0.247** (0.1145)	-0.310*** (0.1189)	Always	Always
[Consumption] Other	-0.294** (0.149)	Always	0.0631 (0.132)	0.253* (0.132)	0.218** (0.103)	-0.0860 (0.116)	-0.0561 (0.111)	0.221** (0.0889)	-0.0412 (0.0527)
[E for I] Direct cash transfers for individuals	0.247*** (0.0262)	Always	-0.0318 (0.0413)	-0.401*** (0.0132)	0.0548 (0.0399)	0.0593** (0.0274)	0.154*** (0.0137)	-0.492*** (0.0360)	Always

VARIABLES	Targetability	Speed	Abuse Resistance	Cost Recoverability	Predictability and Cost Control	Reversibility	Scalability	Administrative Complexity	Resilience to Health Measures
	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>	<i>mfx dydx</i>
[E for I] Temporary expansion of existing benefits	0.315*** (0.0201)	Always	0.286*** (0.0359)	-0.242*** (0.0412)	0.135*** (0.0502)	-0.103** (0.0523)	-0.0980** (0.0491)	0.205*** (0.0380)	0.00308 (0.00822)
[E for I] Supplementary ad hoc programs	0.0251 (0.0376)	Always	0.264*** (0.0291)	-0.297*** (0.0264)	0.159*** (0.0355)	0.0365 (0.0285)	0.137*** (0.0162)	0.202*** (0.0289)	-0.104*** (0.0285)
[E for I] Wage compensation/enhanced paid leave	0.249*** (0.0265)	Always	0.00870 (0.0412)	-0.402*** (0.0130)	-0.419*** (0.0368)	0.0678** (0.0288)	0.0460* (0.0269)	-0.245*** (0.0423)	Always
[E for I] Other	0.254*** (0.0526)	-0.0145 (0.0255)	0.188** (0.0740)	-0.186** (0.0775)	0.203*** (0.0718)	-0.0716 (0.0846)	-0.00709 (0.0692)	0.173*** (0.0668)	-0.0139 (0.0252)
[Credit/Equity] Preferential loans to firms	0.277*** (0.0223)	Always	0.327*** (0.0236)	0.616*** (0.0218)	0.315*** (0.0234)	0.124*** (0.0210)	0.159*** (0.0126)	-0.453*** (0.0352)	0.00687 (0.00531)
[Credit/Equity] Preferential loans to households	0.187** (0.0933)	-0.0479 (0.0592)	0.188* (0.103)	0.456*** (0.0951)	0.309*** (0.0658)	0.0543 (0.0857)	0.0949 (0.0638)	-0.279** (0.129)	Always
[Credit/Equity] Other	0.173*** (0.0600)	Always	0.178*** (0.0670)	0.364*** (0.0757)	0.218*** (0.0610)	0.00905 (0.0607)	0.0870** (0.0421)	0.186*** (0.0556)	Always
[E for B] Income support	0.219*** (0.0450)	-0.0239 (0.0245)	0.0310 (0.0740)	-0.362*** (0.0230)	0.151** (0.0593)	0.0833* (0.0439)	Always	-0.164** (0.0727)	-0.0209 (0.0225)
[E for B] One-off grants	Always	Always	0.139 (0.107)	Never	0.0881 (0.111)	0.121** (0.0610)	Always	0.0359 (0.108)	Always
Other	0.0353 (0.101)	-0.209** (0.0926)	0.0405 (0.107)	-0.101 (0.0961)	0.132 (0.0953)	-0.0956 (0.0912)	-0.0514 (0.0849)	0.229*** (0.0595)	-0.0558 (0.0490)
Observations	1,828	323	1,794	1,030	1,565	1,871	1,886	1,701	571

Source: GDP per capita controls are from the WDI (2020); IDA eligibility according to IDA19; Measures collected from the IMF's Policy Tracker (2020), the OECD's policy tracker (2020), IBDF (2020), and the Doing Business policy tracker database (2020).

Note: Numbers of observations are averages of all regressions in the column.

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

## >>> APPENDIX F: ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS FOR FISCAL POLICY MEASURES

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**TABLE A8 - Assessment of Options for Fiscal Policy Measures (Originally from Fiscal Impact and Policy Response to COVID-19)**

		Efficiency			Cost and Fiscal Sustainability		Flexibility		Feasibility	
		Targetability	Speed	Abuse resistance	Affordability	Predictability and cost control	Reversibility	Scalability	Administrative complexity	Resilience to health measures
Revenue measures to protect businesses (first phase)	Accelerated asset depreciation (CIT)	Partial-can be targeted at SMEs (by turnover) / affected sectors or specific investment but will only benefit businesses with current profits	Yes-provided advance income adjustment can be adjusted for the lower tax obligation	Yes-depending on effective CIT enforcement overall	Full cost spread out over time	Yes	Likely-especially when introduced with a specific sunset date	No	No	Yes-does not require direct contact
	Extend loss carry-forward for losses incurred during the crisis (CIT)	Yes-can be targeted at SMEs or affected sectors and explicitly targets businesses that post losses during the crisis (depending on their survival)	No-will reduce tax liabilities in the medium term (during the extension period)	Yes-depending on effective enforcement overall	Full cost-but only during the period during which the loss carry-forward is extended	Maybe - estimation of additional loss carry-forward in future years for losses during the crisis would be difficult	Difficult-there may not be much support for reversing this measure with uncertain future cost	Somewhat-by extending further the number of extension years	No	Yes-the measure does not require direct contact
	Broaden tax deductibility (e.g., to all business expenses related to COVID-19)	Partial-can be targeted at SMEs or affected sectors but will only benefit businesses with current profits	No-only affects taxpayer cashflow at the time of CIT/PIT filing, unless combined with advance income adjustment. But may immediately impact on incentives	? -depending on enforcement mechanisms to prevent claims of ineligible expenses	Full cost	Probably-depending on the size of additional deductions	Difficult-there may not be much support for reversing this measure with uncertain future cost	No	Moderate-tax administration needs to put in place specific requirements and perhaps enforcement measures	Yes-the measure does not require direct contact
	Introduce tax credits	Yes-can be targeted at affected and loss-making businesses, as well as SMEs	Yes-depending on the time needed for filing and processing	? -depending on the complexity of the credit and tax administration's enforcement capacity	Full cost	? -depending on the nature of the tax credit and availability of data for analysis	? -a specific sunset date would help	Yes-additional credits can be added	Likely high-the tax administration would add a new business line	? -depends on whether the measure is simple and communication clear enough so that the tax credit can be implemented without direct contact between taxpayers and tax officials



		Efficiency			Cost and Fiscal Sustainability		Flexibility		Feasibility	
		Targetability	Speed	Abuse resistance	Affordability	Predictability and cost control	Reversibility	Scalability	Administrative complexity	Resilience to health measures
Revenue measures to protect businesses (first phase), cont'd	Deferral of tax filing (CIT, PIT for self-employed, VAT, other business taxes)	Yes-can be targeted at affected businesses and SMEs	Yes	Limited-businesses may disappear before the tax assessment	Has no direct cost but also no direct cashflow benefit for taxpayers-unless payment is also deferred (these measures strengthen each other)	Yes	Yes-automatic when the deferment period ends (although can be extended)	Yes-the deferment period can be extended in time or additional taxes	No	Yes-as a stand-alone measure (without deferral of payment) its main benefit is postponing interaction between tax officials and taxpayers and reducing taxpayer compliance cost during a crisis period
	Deferral of tax and/or interest and penalty payments	Yes-can be targeted at affected and loss-making businesses (in case of indirect taxes; deferring direct taxes does not benefit loss-making businesses) as well as SMEs	Yes	Yes	Collection is delayed	Yes	Yes-automatic when the deferment period ends (although can be extended)	Yes-the deferment period can be extended in time or to cover additional taxes	No	Yes-in fact, it helps by postponing the need for direct contact between taxpayers without access to online payment methods and cashiers/bank tellers
	Tax rate reduction (CIT, PIT for self-employed)	Partial-can be targeted to linking the rate reduction to SMEs / sectors, but loss-making businesses will not benefit	Yes-if cuts are reflected in advanced payments	Somewhat-targeting of the rate cut may complicate enforcement	Full cost	Maybe-depending on the specifics of the tax relief and available data for estimation	Maybe-tax cut that are meant to be temporary can be extended or made permanent	Rate cuts can be deepened (i.e., larger cuts) and extended to other tax types / groups of taxpayers	Yes-but limited to the extent that enforcement becomes more difficult	Yes

		Efficiency			Cost and Fiscal Sustainability		Flexibility		Feasibility	
		Targetability	Speed	Abuse resistance	Affordability	Predictability and cost control	Reversibility	Scalability	Administrative complexity	Resilience to health measures
Revenue measures to protect businesses (first phase), cont'd	Tax amnesty / incentives	Partial-amnesty and incentives are targeted by design, including through rewarding behavior (e.g., by forgiving additional taxes associated with wage increases). But reductions in direct taxes will not benefit loss-making businesses (except if tax liabilities on previous years are reduced or forgiven)	? -depending on specifics of the tax-measure, including how to apply	Limited- in the case of amnesty, the risk is that taxpayers will stop filing for taxes as no tax is owed and enforcement activities lag because the opportunity to collect is low. For tax incentives, enforcement of conditions for the incentives can be a challenge. This may compromise overall enforcement and boost overall tax abuse	Full cost	Maybe-depending on the specifics of the tax relief and available data for estimation	Maybe-amnesties and incentives that are meant to be temporary can be extended or made permanent	Amnesties and incentives can be extended and applied to other tax types / groups of taxpayers	No-enforcement of the measures is difficult	? -depends on the need for direct contact to claim the amnesty or incentive
	Accelerating refunds (VAT)	Yes-a straightforward manner to target is to allow businesses (SMEs) on a quarterly VAT reporting cycle to opt into monthly reporting	Yes	Yes	VAT refunds will merely be accelerated	Maybe-depending on the ability to accurately forecast VAT refunds	Limited-taxpayers may prefer to keep reporting on a monthly cycle and get faster refunds once they are used to it	No	No	Yes-unless VAT filing and refund claims require direct contact
	Lower advance payment (CIT, PIT for self-employed)	Yes-can be targeted at SMEs or affected sectors	Yes	Limited-businesses may suppress advance payments and disappear before the annual tax assessment	Yes-to the extent that abuse is controlled lower advance collections will be offset by higher collections from final assessments	Maybe-depending on the ability to accurately forecast the change in advance payments	Likely-especially when introduced with a specific sunset date	No	Somewhat because of the need to control potential abuse	Largely-some direct contact may be needed to deal with potential abuse
	Suspend debt collection activities	No	Yes	Yes-this compromises enforcement	? -depending on the impact on tax compliance	? -depending on the impact on tax compliance	Yes	No	No	Yes-prevents direct contact

		Efficiency			Cost and Fiscal Sustainability		Flexibility		Feasibility	
		Targetability	Speed	Abuse resistance	Affordability	Predictability and cost control	Reversibility	Scalability	Administrative complexity	Resilience to health measures
Revenue measures to protect businesses (first phase), cont'd	Suspend audit activities	No	Yes	Yes-this compromises enforcement	? -depending on the impact on tax compliance-but less costly for the budget than suspending debt collection	? -depending on the impact on tax compliance	Yes	No	No	Yes-its main benefit is avoiding interaction between tax officials and taxpayers and reducing taxpayer compliance cost during a crisis period
Revenue measures to protect individuals (first phase)	Deferral of tax filing (PIT, payroll taxes, property tax, etc.)	Yes-can be targeted to specific groups (e.g. by affected sectors or income)	Yes	Yes	Has no direct cost but also no direct cashflow benefit for taxpayers-unless payment is also deferred (these measures strengthen each other)	Yes	Yes-automatic when the deferment period ends (although can be extended)	Yes-the deferment period can be extended in time or to cover additional taxes	No	Yes-in fact, it benefits health outcomes by postponing the need for direct contact between taxpayers without access to online payment methods and cashiers/bank tellers
	Deferral of tax payments (PIT, payroll taxes, property tax, etc.) and/or interest and penalty payments	Yes-can be targeted to specific groups (e.g. by affected sectors or income)	Depends on whether advance payments are reduced	Yes	Collection is delayed	Yes	Yes-automatic when the deferment period ends (although can be extended)	Yes-the deferment period can be extended in time or additional taxes	No	Yes-as a stand-alone measure (without deferral of payment) its main benefit is postponing interaction between tax officials and taxpayers and reducing taxpayer compliance cost during a crisis period

		Efficiency			Cost and Fiscal Sustainability		Flexibility		Feasibility	
		Targetability	Speed	Abuse resistance	Affordability	Predictability and cost control	Reversibility	Scalability	Administrative complexity	Resilience to health measures
Revenue measures to protect individuals (first phase), cont'd	Tax rate reduction (PIT, payroll taxes, property tax, etc.)	Partial-can be targeted (e.g., by income). But reductions in direct taxes will not benefit taxpayers whose income drops to below the tax-free allowance	Yes-if cuts are reflected in advanced payments	Somewhat- especially in the case of amnesty, the risk is that taxpayers will stop filing for taxes as no tax is owed and enforcement activities lag because the opportunity to collect is low. This may compromise overall enforcement and boost overall tax abuse	Full cost	Maybe-depending on the specifics of the tax relief and available data for estimation	Maybe-tax cut that are meant to be temporary can be extended or made permanent	Rate cuts can be deepened (i.e., larger cuts) or extended to other groups of taxpayers and tax types	Yes-but limited to the extent that enforcement becomes more difficult	Yes
	Tax amnesty / incentives (including for overdue taxes and penalties)	Partial-amnesty and incentives are targeted by design, including through rewarding behavior (e.g., by forgiving additional taxes associated with wage increases). But reductions in direct taxes will not benefit whose income drops to below the tax-free allowance	? -depending on specifics of the tax measure, including how to apply	Limited- in the case of amnesty, the risk is that taxpayers will stop filing for taxes as no tax is owed and enforcement activities lag because the opportunity to collect is low. For tax incentives, enforcement of conditions for the incentives can be a challenge. This may compromise overall enforcement and boost overall tax abuse	Full cost	Maybe-depending on the specifics of the tax relief and available data for estimation	Maybe-amnesties and incentives that are meant to be temporary can be extended or made permanent	Amnesties and incentives can be extended and applied to other groups of taxpayers	No-enforcement of the measures is difficult	Yes-unless direct contact is needed
	Broaden tax deductibility (e.g., for contributions to health care) (PIT)	Partial-deductions can be targeted. But reductions in PIT will not benefit taxpayers whose income drops to below the tax-free allowance	No-only affects taxpayer cashflow at the time of PIT filing, unless combined with advance income adjustment. But may immediately impact on incentives	? -depending on enforcement mechanisms to prevent claims of ineligible expenses	Full cost	Probably-depending on the size of additional deductions	Difficult-there may not be much support for reversing this measure with uncertain future cost	No	Moderate-tax administration needs to put in place specific requirements and perhaps enforcement measures	Yes-the measure does not require direct contact

		Efficiency			Cost and Fiscal Sustainability		Flexibility		Feasibility	
		Targetability	Speed	Abuse resistance	Affordability	Predictability and cost control	Reversibility	Scalability	Administrative complexity	Resilience to health measures
Revenue measures to protect individuals (first phase), cont'd	Introduce tax credits	Yes-can be targeted at specific taxpayers (e.g., low income earners, employees in affected sectors)	Yes-depending on the time needed for filing and processing	? -depending on the complexity of the credit and tax administration's enforcement capacity	Full cost	? -depending on the nature of the tax credit and availability of data for analysis	? -a specific sunset date would help	Yes-additional credits can be added	Likely high-the tax administration would add a new business line	? -depends on whether the measure is simple and communication clear enough so that the tax credit can be implemented without direct contact between taxpayers and tax officials
Revenue measures to promote availability of medical items	Lower tax rates for medical items (import duties, VAT and other indirect taxes)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Full cost	Yes	? -a specific sunset date would help	No	No	Yes-aimed to directly benefit health care and outcomes
Revenue measures to boost consumption / demand (first and second phase)	Lower tax rates (import duties, VAT and other indirect taxes and levies)	Yes-can be targeted at specific items (e.g., medical supplies) or transactions (e.g., online payments)	Yes	Yes	Full cost	Yes	? -a specific sunset date would help	No	No	Yes-can directly benefit health outcomes if contactless / online payment methods are favored
Health expenditures measures (first phase)	Supply of low cost medical items (masks, gloves, testing kits, gowns, face shields, etc.)	Yes-can be targeted to facilities in most need but requires effective real time monitoring and feedback loops given how quickly conditions might change	Potentially low, especially in light of limited productive capacity, trade disruption and broken supply chains	Large scale procurement can be vulnerable to leakages and corruption, as typically witnessed, requiring enhanced monitoring and transparency	Full cost	Generally low given constant evolution of needs and red zones along with production gaps and price spikes. Central procurement of these goods might help produce cost saving opportunities and more efficient allocation of resources, provided adequate supply exists	Yes, as the surge in procurement of these items is directly linked to immediate needs to contain and mitigate the health crisis and will revert to historical levels once pandemic wanes	Yes as procurement funding can be made available to continue provision of these items for consumption, based on need - however successful scalability depends mostly on ability of national production capacity to supply these good, especially in light of disrupted supply chains, export bans and trade disruptions	Low overall if financial resources are assigned to individual facilities to procure goods, which however might lead to inefficient outcomes (i.e. competition among facilities and higher prices). Complexity might arise if central procurement is established, particularly in settings with low absorptive capacity, cumbersome protocols and insufficient production capacity.	Yes

		Efficiency			Cost and Fiscal Sustainability		Flexibility		Feasibility	
		Targetability	Speed	Abuse resistance	Affordability	Predictability and cost control	Reversibility	Scalability	Administrative complexity	Resilience to health measures
Health expenditures measures (first phase), cont'd	Supply of high cost medical items (ventilators, etc.)	Yes-can be targeted to facilities in most need but requires effective real time monitoring and feedback loops given how quickly conditions might change	Potentially low, especially considering limited productive capacity, trade disruption and broken supply chains	Large scale procurement can be vulnerable to leakages and corruption, as typically witnessed, requiring enhanced monitoring and transparency	Full cost	Generally low given constant evolution of needs and red zones along with production gaps and price spikes. Central procurement of these goods might help produce cost saving opportunities and more efficient allocation of resources, provided adequate supply exists	Yes, as the surge in procurement of these items is directly linked to immediate needs to contain and mitigate the health crisis and will revert to historical levels once pandemic wanes	Yes as procurement funding can be made available to continue provision of these items for consumption, based on need - however successful scalability depends mostly on ability of national production capacity to supply these good, especially in light of disrupted supply chains, export bans and trade disruptions	Low overall if financial resources are assigned to individual facilities to procure goods, which however might lead to inefficient outcomes (i.e. competition among facilities and higher prices). Complexity might arise if central procurement is established, particularly in settings with low absorptive capacity, cumbersome protocols and insufficient production capacity.	Yes
	Targeted infrastructure investments to expand health care capacity	Yes-since investments can be targeted towards facilities with expected high demand and capacity gaps	Limited, depending on infrastructure needs and capacity, particularly at a time with limited labor supply	Large scale procurement embedded in public investments can be vulnerable to leakages and corruption, as typically witnessed, requiring enhanced monitoring and transparency	Full cost	Generally no, as investment projects are typically affected by time delay and cost over-runs	No	Yes, as these investments can be targeted to evolving needs based on outbreaks	Typical complexity embedded in these types of investments	Yes
	Expansion of human resources	Yes-can be targeted to facilities in most need but requires effective real time monitoring and feedback loops given how quickly conditions might change	Varies, depending on job market flexibility and labor supply - emergency protocols could be put in place to accelerate hiring surges	Little, with exception of potential for ghost workers particularly in those countries already plagued by these patterns	Full cost	Yes, to the extent full costing strategies and evidence-based policy allocations are in place	Unclear, it might be difficult to reduce surge especially in countries with inflexible job markets and regulations	Limited, as further hiring surges will be limited by scarcity of labor supply with required competencies	High, as mass hiring can place further burden on health systems that are already plagued by absorptive capacity, especially in low income countries.	Yes

		Efficiency			Cost and Fiscal Sustainability		Flexibility		Feasibility	
		Targetability	Speed	Abuse resistance	Affordability	Predictability and cost control	Reversibility	Scalability	Administrative complexity	Resilience to health measures
Expenditure measures for cash transfers to individuals (first and second phase)	Direct cash transfers for individuals	Yes-although conditional on targeting quality of existing social safety delivery schemes along with quality of tax, registry and related administrative data systems	Yes, these can be easily mobilized in the span of 1-2 months from approval date	Yes, particularly when they are not subject to discretion and can rely on robust systems for beneficiary identification and validation.	Full cost	Highly predictable for universal coverage. For progressive schemes (i.e. amounts based on income from tax returns) or transfer to specific segments (i.e. elderly) some measurements errors might apply but overall small impact and can still be controlled by establishing firm ceilings	Highly reversible given the one-off nature of the event and the high costs involved.	Yes, one-off cash transfers can be easily extended to subsequent rounds should economic condition warrant further extensions	Use of targeted transfers will require adequate systems in place. Most countries have some form of cash transfer mechanisms in place which should facilitate further expansion. Some challenges might be found however in lowest income countries which typically possess lower capacity, subpar administrative data and limited social safety nets	Yes, as these are either transferred electronically or by mail not requiring any direct contact between people
	Expansion of unemployment benefits both in terms of compensation and length	Yes-as long as clear eligibility criteria are established combined with strong data management systems	Yes	Somewhat, as these schemes have been historically vulnerable to fraud - with bad economic times, the chances for fraud likely will rise	Full cost	Depends on eligibility criteria, trajectory of the pandemic and associated economic hardship and available data	High if proper sunset clauses are applied (i.e. X months of extension) and clear thresholds defined (i.e. amount increase in payments)	Yes, these extraordinary transfers can be easily extended to subsequent rounds should economic conditions warrant further extensions	Limited to the extent that such mechanisms are already in place, requiring slight adaptation to proposed changes in eligibility criteria, terms and payments. Expansion of eligibility however will increase complexity.	Yes, to the extent claims can be done remotely no direct human contact is needed, as should be the case in most countries
	Temporary expansion of existing benefits such as pension, health insurance	Yes-as this builds on existing programs with no change in eligibility	Yes	Yes to the extent original programs were ringfenced	Full cost	Yes, as this only entails a percentage change of existing monthly disbursements	High if proper criteria and thresholds are applied	Yes, these extraordinary transfers can be easily extended to more months should economic conditions warrant further extensions	No, as this is a mere expansion of payment to existing schemes	Yes, no direct human contact involved

		Efficiency			Cost and Fiscal Sustainability		Flexibility		Feasibility	
		Targetability	Speed	Abuse resistance	Affordability	Predictability and cost control	Reversibility	Scalability	Administrative complexity	Resilience to health measures
Expenditure measures for cash transfers to individuals (first and second phase), cont'd	Supplementary ad hoc programs (feeding programs, utility waivers)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Full cost	Yes	Yes	Yes, these extraordinary transfers can be easily extended to more months should economic conditions warrant further extensions	Low, as feeding programs would be extension of ongoing services and utility waivers	Some risk for feeding programs which can be mitigate through free home deliveries
	Wage compensation subsidies and enhanced paid/sick leave allowances	Yes-but should have clear criteria on beneficiary profile such as SME with limited number of employees or turnover, affected sectors and/or businesses that are hiring	Yes	Low, if clear criteria are identified and little discretion is applied in awarding	Full cost	Depends on eligibility criteria and available data	Likely-especially when introduced with a specific sunset date	Yes, these extraordinary transfers can be easily extended to more months should economic conditions warrant further extensions	Depending on scale and scope of proposed measures, significant burden could be placed on their implementation - as such it is important to tailor these measures to each country capacity	Yes, no direct human contact involved
Credit and equity measures (first and second phase)	Preferential loans to firms (and industries) in distress	Yes-but conditional on clear and transparent eligibility criteria on beneficiary profile	Yes	Low, if clear criteria are identified and little discretion is applied in awarding	Partial, once loans are paid in full taking into account defaults and reduced interest	Yes, upper limits of expenditure can be established to reduce risk of overspending.	Likely-especially when introduced with a specific sunset date	Yes, these extraordinary transfers can be easily extended to more months should economic conditions warrant further extensions	Depending on scale and scope of proposed measures, significant burden could be placed on their implementation - as such it is important to tailor these measures to each country capacity	Yes, no direct human contact involved
	One-off grants to industries in distress <sup>16</sup>	Yes-but conditional on clear and transparent eligibility criteria on beneficiary profile	Yes	Low, if clear criteria are identified and little discretion is applied in awarding	Full cost	Yes, upper limits of expenditure can be established to reduce risk of overspending.	Yes, given one off nature	Unlikely given high costs involved	Depending on scale and scope of proposed measures, significant burden could be placed on their implementation - as such it is important to tailor these measures to each country capacity	Yes, no direct human contact involved

Source: World Bank.

16. This measure was later reclassified as an expenditure measure for businesses.



