
Development Policy

Lecture 14

Industrialization Strategy in Vietnam


James Riedel



Should Vietnam follow the Trail of the Tigers?

My first paper on VN's economy (published in 1993) asked the following question: Were the initial conditions in Vietnam in 1990 similar to those of other countries when they launched and succeeded with the Export-Oriented-Industrialization (EOI) Strategy?

<u>Answer:</u> Yes, the starting point in terms of per capita income was similar—all started from a low per capita income level.



Riedel, 1993, "Vietnam on the Trail of the Tigers," World Economy

Should Vietnam follow the Trail of the Tigers?

Was Vietnam's **human resource endowment** comparable to the other countries when they launched EOI?

<u>Answer:</u> Yes, VN's <u>human resource endowment</u> was as strong or stronger than the other countries

	Taiwan 25-30 Years Ago	Thailand 15–20 Years Ago	China 15–20 Years Ago	Vietnam Most Recent
Population mn.	11	41	916	66
Pop. Density pop./sq. km.	300	108	96	195
Population Growth Rate %	3.1	2.7	1.8	2.4
Age Dependency Ratio	0.92	0.92	0.78	0.79
Urban Pop. Growth Rate %	5.7	5.2	2.3	3.9
Rural Pop. Growth Rate %	1.5	2.2	-6.0	2.0

Source: IBRD, Social and Economic Indicators; Taiwan Statistical Data Book (1989).

Riedel, 1993, "Vietnam on the Trail of the Tigers," World Economy

Should Vietnam follow the Trail of the Tigers?

Were Vietnam's **human development indicators** comparable to other countries when they launched EOI?

<u>Answer:</u> Yes, VN's <u>human development indicators</u> were as strong or stronger than the other countries

	Taiwan 25–30 Years Ago	Thailand 15–20 Years Ago	China 15–20 Years Ago	Vietnam Most Recent
Infant Mortality Rate	_	55	46	42
Life Expectancy	63	60	65	67
Calories per capita	2390	2285	2070	2233
Enrollment Rate ^a				
Primary	97	83	135	102
Secondary	30	26	47	42
Tertiary	3	12		_
Illiteracy Rate ^b	30	7	27	16

Riedel, 1993, "Vietnam on the Trail of the Tigers," World Economy

Should Vietnam follow the Trail of the Tigers?

Was Vietnam's **natural resource endowment** comparable to other countries when they launched EOI?

<u>Answer:</u> Yes, like the other countries, VN's <u>natural resource</u> <u>endowment</u> was modest relative the size of its population

Indicators of Natural Resource Endowment

•	Taiwan 25—30 Years Ago	Thailand 15–20 Years Ago	China 15–20 Years Ago	Vietnam Most Recent
Area thous. sq. km.	36	513	9561	332
Ag. Land/Total Area %	24	45	44	21
Ag. Pop. Density pop./sq. km.	629	240	219	934
Rice paddy yield kg./ha.	2495	3029	1910	3002
Forests thous. sq. km.	21	142	1389	98

Source: IBRD, Social and Economic Indicators; FAO, Production Yearbook (1990). Data for Thailand and China are for 1978-81 and for Vietnam are for 1990.

Growth of Rice Production, Yields and Area of Cultivation in Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam

	Production	Area under Cultivation	Yield
Taiwan (1952-70)	2.5	-0.1	2.6
Thailand (1970-90)	1.7	1.7	0.0
Vietnam (1970-90)	3.1	0.9	2.2

Source: FAO Yearbook; Taiwan Statistical Data Book (1989).

Riedel, 1993, "Vietnam on the Trail of the Tigers," World Economy

Should Vietnam follow the Trail of the Tigers?

Was the structure of the economy in terms of **dependence on agriculture** similar to that of the other countries when they launched EOI?

<u>Answer:</u> Yes, similar, but VN's dependence on agriculture was somewhat greater than the other countries.

The Share of Agriculture in Employment, GDP and Exports

	Taiwan		Thailand		China		Vietnam	
	1960	1970	1970	1980	1980	1990	1985	1990
Employment	50.2	36.1	77.8	71.1	74.0	_	72.3	71.5
Value Added	32.9	18.0	28.3	25.4	37.1	27.2	37.4	32.5
Exports	12.0	8.6	67.0	41.0	25.4	7.2		75.0
Processed Ag.	(55.7)	(12.8)						

Sources: Taiwan Statistical Data Book (1989); Vietnam GSO (1991); IBRD, World Tables (computer files).

Riedel, 1993, "Vietnam on the Trail of the Tigers," World Economy

Should Vietnam follow the Trail of the Tigers?

Was the **level of industrialization** in VN comparable to the other countries that succeeded with EOI?

<u>Answer</u>: No, measured in terms of per capita production, Vietnam's manufacturing sector was much less developed. But this may have been an advantage since industrial development under ISI was generally inefficient. It certainly was no disadvantage since EIO is very foot loose.

Per Capita Production of Selected Manufactured Goods

	Vietnam 1990	Taiwan 1960	China 1980
Steel (kg)	1.5	28.3	37.8
Machine tools (10 ⁻⁴ units)	11.1	210.8	136.6
Chemical fertilizer (kg)	4.9	34.4	125.6
Elect. motors (10 ⁻³ units)	0.1	1.5	na
Elect. Fans (10 ⁻³ units)	2.8	18.5	7.4
Paper (kg)	1.2	7.5	na
Cotton Fabrics (metres)	4.7	16.0	7.6

Sources: Vietnam GSO (p.20); Taiwan Statistical Data Book (1989); IBRD, China: Country Economic Memorandum (1989).

Riedel, 1993, "Vietnam on the Trail of the Tigers," World Economy


Should Vietnam follow the Trail of the Tigers?

My conclusion in 1993:

- Did Vietnam have initial conditions comparable to other countries that succeeded with EOI? Yes, at least as favorable or more favorable
- 2. Should Vietnam, in 1990, have taken the trail of the tigers? Yes, It leads to prosperity and there is no other known way that works better.
- 3. Did Vietnam subsequently follow the trail of the Tigers?
- 4. If so, did Vietnam enjoy comparable success?
- 5. If not, why not?


Growth: Vietnam's growth under EOI was strong, but fell short compared to other countries during the take-off period of EOI. All (except Vietnam) experienced double-digit growth for a period of time.

Average Annual Real GDP Growth Rates



How did Vietnam do under EOI?

Openness: Measured as **(exports+imports)/GDP** the data indicate that openness in Vietnam, as in the other countries, increased under the EOI, and is even higher in Vietnam. This measure suffers from failing to account for country size and the role of imported intermediate inputs.



Domestic v. Imported Value Added: I made an attempt to measure the domestic and foreign value in Vietnam manufactured exports using Vietnam's input-output tables. The direct and indirect domestic value added was computed to be 50% of the gross value of manufactured exports.

Direct domestic value added is value added at the final stage of production plus the value of domestic intermediate inputs

Total domestic value added is direct domestic valued minus the foreign input content of domestic intermediate inputs.

Direct and Total Value Added Shares in VN Manufactured Exports (2007) %

	Foreign value-added share			Domestic value-added share				
	Direct		Total		Direct		Total	
Total exports	25.8		39.5		74.2		60.5	
Manufactured exports	31.3		48.2		68.7		51.8	

Source: Own calculations


How did Vietnam do under EOI?

Highly export-oriented firms and those foreign-owned rely relatively more on imported input than less export-oriented and domestic firms

		As a	As a percent of total sales				
	Number	·	Domestic	Imported	Imported to		
	of firms	Value-	Intermediate	Intermediate	Domestic		
	sampled	added	Inputs	Inputs	Inputs		
	Export	s as a percent o	f sales greater	than 75%			
Textile	13	49.0	14.3	36.7	2.57		
Garment	69	58.0	13.7	28.6	2.08		
Plastic	9	39.3	19.3	41.3	2.14		
Food process.	19	26.0	72.2	1.8	0.02		
	Expo	rts as a percent	of sales less th	an 25%			
Textile	4	49.6	46.2	4.2	0.09		
Garment	11	65.7	18.6	15.7	0.84		
Plastic	52	32.5	33.3	34.2	1.03		
Food process.	5	32.5	67.5	0.0	0.00		
		100% Foreig	n-owned firms				
Textile	14	44.9	22.9	32.2	1.40		
Garment	23	55.7	11.2	34.9	3.13		
Plastic	7	39.4	11.8	48.8	4.14		
Food process.	3	24.7	64.0	11.3	0.18		
		Domesticall	y-owned firms				
Textile	15	53.5	26.2	18.1	0.69		
Garment	71	61.7	15.7	22.4	1.43		
Plastic	56	31.0	35.8	32.8	0.92		
Food process.	28	28.0	71.6	0.4	0.01		
Source: ILSSA surv	Source: ILSSA survey conducted for USAID/STAR, 2008						

Composition of Exports and Imports: Vietnam's revealed comparative advantage is labor-intensive light manufacturing. The VN-US BTA opened the US market and led to a big expansion of manufactured exports.

Figure 6: The Composition of Non-Oil (% share in total) Figure 7: The Composition of Imports (% share in total)




Source: Vietnam, GSO

How did Vietnam do under EOI?

Recall the advantage of East Asian labor-surplus economies in the transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy. They could draw on surplus labor in the rural sector to build a new export-oriented industrial sector without having to tear down (or privatize) SOEs. **They could have it both ways!**

Firgure 3: Taiwan: Industrial Output (NTD bn) Figure 4: China Industrial Output (RMB bn) 1983-03




Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2008

Source: China Statistical Yearbook, selected issues.

The transition to non-SOE industrial sector in Vietnam has not advanced as rapidly or as far as in those countries that preceded Vietnam

Industrial Output in Constant Prices (trillions of dong)




Why EOI has not worked (as well) in Vietnam?

Possible explanations

- 1. Strategic shift back to SOEs after 2006 (See previous slide)
- 2. Restructuring in favor of export-oriented private firms was stopped


Ratio of State to Non-State Industrial Investment



Why EOI has not worked (as well) in Vietnam?

Possible explanations

3. WTO euphoria led to macro instability and asset bubble after 2006



Why EOI has not worked (as well) in Vietnam?

Possible explanations

4. FDI shifted from manufacturing to property development

Figure 8: Registered FDI by Sector of Destination: 2003-2009

100%

80%

40%

20%

2003

2004

2005


2006

2007

2008

2009

Manufacturing
Real estate & hotels
Other



Where does Vietnam stand today?

To what extent has the manufacturing sector been restructured in favor of labor-intensive branches in which Vietnam presumably has a strong comparative advantage?

I tried to answer this question by computing the weighted average capital-labor ratio in manufacturing k_{MFG} using as weights the share of each manufacturing branch (i) in value-added (VA), capital stock (K) and employment (L), respectively for separate years (2000 and 2008)

$$k_{MFG} = \sum_{i} w_i \cdot k_i$$
 where k_i is the capita/labor ratio in branch i

and w_i is the share of sector i in alternatively VA, K, and L.

Weighted average capital-labor ratio (million dong per worker)

			Ratio
	2000	2008	2008/2000
Value-added	215.4	206.1	0.96
Capital	230.9	230.2	1.00
Labor	168.8	155.1	0.92

Source: own calculations

This exercise suggest that the reallocation of labor and capital in favor of labor-intensive branches has been very modest so far.


So what should Vietnam do?

- 1. Abandon EOI in favor of a new strategy
 - Adopt a strategy that will create industrial clusters and raise national competitiveness (CIEM, Vietnam Competitiveness Report, 2010)
 - Adopt a strategy to strengthen the "domestic value chain" and increase domestic value-added, especially in exports
 - Adopt a strategy favoring production of "high tech" products instead of low-tech labor intensive manufactures
 - Adopt a strategy that favors production of "high value goods"
 - Adopt a strategy that will transform Vietnam from a "factory economy" to a "knowledge economy"
- 2. Adopt reforms that will make EOI a more effective strategy

Quiz


- 1. Low per capita income reflects the fact that labor productivity in Vietnam is low. So, should investment be directed to industries where labor productivity is relatively high?
- 2. Since the domestic value-added of exports is relatively low, should the nation invest more in intermediate input industries and less in producing final products for export?
- 3. If Vietnam needs a new growth model, then what should be the guiding principles of a new growth model?
- 4. If Vietnam should take measures to make EOI more effective, then what measures should be taken?






Source: Pham and Riedel, 2010

Some facts about relative productivity across 1200 Manufacturing Firms





Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 2005

