The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) 2010

Measuring citizens' experiences

Policy Making

Policy Implementation

Policy Monitoring

CECODES

Centre for Community Support
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Viet Nam
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THE VIET NAM PROVINCIAL GOVERNANCE AND

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

PERFORMANCE INDEX (PAPI) 2010

Measuring citizens' experiences

Centre for Community Support & Development Studies (CECODES)

Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF)

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FOREWORD

"The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) 2010: Measuring citizens' experiences" provides objective and evidence-based measures of provincial performance of the public administration system and public service delivery agencies at the provincial level. Based on the experiences of 5,568 randomly selected citizens from different demographic backgrounds in 30 selected provinces, it is expected PAPI will play an important role as social feedback that informs policy makers and executers at the central and provincial levels, of the current performance of local government.

Given the increasing demand for objective information, improved transparency and accountability in policy making and implementation, and more equal access to corruption-free public services, non-state actors are encouraged to play a more active role in monitoring the performance of local government. The philosophy behind PAPI is to consider citizens to be "public administrative services end-users" who are capable of monitoring and assessing governance and public administration at their local levels. Based on citizens' knowledge and experience, PAPI provides a set of objective indicators that help assess the performance of governance and public administration, and gives a leverage for provinces to improve their performance over time.

PAPI also contributes to the fulfillment of the policy cycle that involves policy making, policy implementing, and monitoring of implementation. Pursuing a multi-dimensional approach, PAPI looks at six dimensions:

(i) participation at local levels, (ii) transparency, (iii) vertical accountability, (iv) control of corruption, (v) public administrative procedures, and (vi) public service delivery. PAPI can thus be seen as a combination of six different pieces in a bigger puzzle of governance and public administration performance.

The scientific nature and orientation towards beneficiaries, as well as the sustainability of PAPI as a set of indicators measuring performance of governance and public administration, are ensured thanks to a close and effective coordination between national counterparts (Viet Nam Fatherland Front-VFF and the Centre for Community Support and Development Studies-CECODES) and international partners (United Nations Development Programme - UNDP). It is also ensured due to close coordination between the central level (i.e. the Central Committee of VFF) and provinces (VFF committees from provincial to grass-roots levels), and through the substantive support from the National Advisory Board. The latter is comprised of senior national experts with a wide range of expertise and knowledge from relevant state agencies and the research community.

As such, the findings and analysis in this PAPI 2010 report will contribute to the process of improving the performance of governance and public administration at the provincial level. With its robust and objective data and information, this report will serve as a useful reference for policy makers, policy executers, mass organisations and the academia in Viet Nam.

Viet Nam Fatherland Front	United Nations Development Programme	Centre for Community Support and Development Studies

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Note: The list is arranged in alphabetical order.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) provides objective and evidence-based measures, based on citizens' experiences and direct interactions, of the standards of provincial level governance, public administration, and public services performance. PAPI is developed in the context of increasing demands for engaging citizens in monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation to feed evidence for subsequent policymaking.

Three key considerations are the foundational pillars upon which PAPI's philosophy and spirit are sustained. First, in the transition towards a prosperous democratic society and a thriving market economy, Viet Nam's public administration system will have to play a key role in narrowing the rich-poor gap and ensuring just provision of services to all citizens beyond the alleviation brought about directly by economic growth itself. Second, a plausible way to improve Viet Nam's governance and public administration is to create opportunities for citizens to engage more effectively in the implementation and monitoring of the performance of the public administration system. Third, national and provincial level reform efforts are supported by providing data and information to be used by interested parties. PAPI is a diagnostics instrument that in the short and medium-term supports an evidence-based policy making processes in Viet Nam. With the data and information generated, public officials/authorities are provided with a tool for monitoring performance in provision of governance and public administration in different arenas and levels of government.

PAPI is the first large-scale exercise of its kind in Viet Nam measuring the standards of governance and public administration drawn from citizens' experiences when interacting with governmental authorities at different levels. Having grown out of a 2009 pilot in three provinces, in 2010 PAPI was implemented in 30 provinces and reflects on the direct experiences of 5,568 randomly selected citizens across the country on various aspects of local governance and public administration. Through a range of indicators, similar to a dashboard instrument, the findings present a comprehensive and evidence-based assessment of performance levels of provincial authorities on six dimensions of governance and public administration.

PAPI provides objective information. This helps provincial and national policy makers to understand the impact of their decisions and draw concrete lessons, in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of governance and citizen satisfaction with public administration.

PAPI is jointly conducted by the Center for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES), the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The methodology

Covering almost half of the country's provinces, PAPI 2010 relies upon international methodological standards. It offers an opportunity to observe the effects of transparency in research. It follows an objective, and rigorous methodology that includes: (i) selection of 30 provinces using propensity matching score methods; (ii) objective selection of 90 districts, 180 communes/wards and 360 villages using both probability to population size procedures and purposively certainty units; (iii) a meticulous fieldwork process undertaken in which citizens were interviewed face-to-face between June 18th and October 20th, 2010, and (iv) a methodological construction of the dimensions, sub-dimensions and overall PAPI aggregate indices.

Care has been taken to ensure the survey's accuracy and objectivity. When comparing the distribution of key demographic variables between the PAPI sample (after applying the post-stratification weights) and available data from the 2009 Census, it shows, with reasonable confidence, that the survey is representative of the underlying population. Also, it shows that the design effects are small enough to allow meaningful comparisons across groups and provinces.

The conceptualization and dimensions

Governance and public administration are understood by referring to three mutually reinforcing processes: policy-making, policy-implementation and policy-monitoring. There are two complementary ways of measuring government's performance: from the perspective of service providers (or the supply-side), and from the assessment of end-users (or the demand-side). PAPI, by design, belongs to the latter type of governance measuring since it evaluates outputs and outcomes of governance and public administration that are directly experienced by citizens. Drawing from international academic literature and specific reflections in the national context, PAPI captures performance levels in six dimensions:

    (i)   Participation at Local Levels,

    (ii) Transparency,

    (iii) Vertical Accountability,

    (iv) Control of Corruption,

    v)   Public Administrative Procedures, and

    (vi) Public Service Delivery.

Each dimension consists of several sub-dimensions that reflect some of the most relevant areas of contemporary Viet Nam.

Initial reflections on policy implications

PAPI is not only a single index but also a dashboard that aims to address existing information gaps in measures of public sector performance provided by the end-users of those services. Through its collection of experiential data from citizens' experiences, PAPI aims to identify pathways for movements and improvements in several policy-making and policy-implementation processes.

PAPI is concerned with what is happening at the aggregate level of governance and public administration. It also examines what is happening on individual aspects of public administration, as provinces may excel on one dimension but require improvements on others. With the use of a dashboard, local leaders may be better off monitoring an array of indicators that illustrate separate facets of governance rather than an aggregate measure that melds them together and obscures understanding. Moreover, it is not only the present performance of provinces that matters, but also their long-term effectiveness is just as relevant. Disaggregating the measurement of governance is also helpful for seeing connections between and drawing conclusions about specific institutional or policy reforms, and improvements in public service delivery.

The results and findings from this survey can be used as a reference for provinces, as they reflect upon their reform efforts to improve the quality of governance and public service delivery. Provincial authorities can observe their performance through the eyes of users, which should help them identify practical solutions to problems or issues in public administration.

Dimension 1: Participation at Local Levels

This dimension deals with the participation of citizens at the local level. In the concept of governance and public administration, participation is important as it allows citizens, who are the beneficiaries of policies and their implementation, to bring their views into the perspective of policy making processes and to impact on the objectives and design of policies to better meet their demands. In Viet Nam, citizen's participation is

manifested in the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (GRDO), which institutionalizes the involvement of citizens in local affairs through the legal embodiment of the slogan "*People know, people discuss, people do and people verify*".

This dimension is broken down into four sub-dimensions that are regarded as the most relevant in the local context. They include: (i) civic knowledge, (ii) democratic participation opportunities, (iii) quality of village elections and (iv) voluntary contributions. Civic knowledge relates to the knowledge of official posts that are subject to elections as well as term-limits of particular offices. The sub-dimension on participation opportunities investigates turnout rates for the most recent grassroots leadership elections, as well as legislatures at all levels of government. The third sub-dimension studies the actual implementation of village/residential group head elections. The last sub-dimension looks at the level of individual financial contributions to community projects and the ways they are monitored. Overall, in this dimension, Hai Duong stands out as the best performing province with a score significantly greater than the three provinces which follow (Binh Dinh, Ha Tinh and Ho Chi Minh City). At the low end, Quang Tri, Lai Chau, Kon Tum and Lang Son, are all peripheral border and rural provinces, demonstrate significantly lower levels of participation than their peers.

Yet, behind this overall performance levels, significant differences are noted at the indicator level. For example in terms of "civic knowledge" Da Nang's highest score of 2.4 is significantly greater than Lai Chau's 0.51, implying a great deal of room for improvement. Citizens in Da Nang seem to be much more informed about the grassroots democracy regulation (71%) than, say, Hanoians (16%). Moreover, while 65% of respondents contributed voluntarily to village level projects nationally, differences at the local level are quite large: 93.5% of respondents reported contributions in Phu Tho, compared to 29% in Vinh Long.

Dimension 2: Transparency

Transparency is about knowing what governments are doing, as well as the justifications for their actions. Citizens require valid and timely information, so that they can participate in policy-making and policy-evaluation processes in meaningful ways. This, in turn, will enable the public administration system to respond better to suggestions and opinions, better serving the interests of users of public services. Improved transparency will also help reduce incentives for bureaucrats and politicians to be corrupt, as their actions will be immediately identifiable. In the Vietnamese context, transparency is expressed at length in the GRDO's "people know," which includes provisions requiring commune level governments to inform their citizens.

This dimension explores three sub-dimensions related to the transparency, disclosure and knowledge of (i) poor household lists; (ii) communes/wards' budgets; and (iii) land use plans. These areas are selected as they are thought to be of interest to most citizens across the country. Findings from the study show that compared to other dimensions, the variance between provinces is not so large. Ho Chi Minh City, Da Nang and Thua Thien-Hue are the top three performers, with Ho Chi Minh City performing significantly higher. At the bottom of the dashboard are Dak Lak, Quang Tri, Lai Chau and Kon Tum, which are border and mountainous provinces. There seems to be no clear regional pattern as mountainous provinces in the North (Lai Chau, Yen Bai, Dien Bien, Lang Son) with similar socio-economic conditions see large variation in their scores. Similarly, Ha Noi and Hai Phong rank significantly lower than other centrally administered municipalities.

When disaggregating dimensional performance levels a set of policy actions becomes evident. For example, at the national level, 68% of respondents are not aware (22%) or do not know (46%) about the publication of commune budgets, compared with those who are aware (30%). In terms of publication of poor household lists, 64.7% of citizens across the country are aware of them. Nevertheless, Kon Tum (20%) and Tien Giang (30%) lag far behind the level of knowledge in Da Nang (88%). In Quang Tri, 70% of respondents also believe poverty lists miss poor households, casting doubts on their quality. In terms of land use plans the great majority of citizens are not informed (72%), with the numbers of whom are informed ranging from 43% of citizens in Da Nang to only 6.3% in Kon Tum.

Dimension 3: Vertical Accountability

Vertical Accountability is another key attribute of governance and public administration. It is particularly important to anti-corruption efforts, as well as the

efficiency and availability of public services. The concept ensures that citizens, state and non-state organizations have both the legal framework and the ability to sanction public sector agencies and officials for their actions or the lack of actions taken. PAPI focuses on vertical accountability, which, in the Vietnamese context, is expressed to some extent by the GRDO's expression of "… people verify" and focuses on the People's Inspection Boards (PIB) and the Community Investment Supervision Boards (CISB), as they are the most institutionalized and wide-reaching accountability mechanisms at the local level. The two Boards represent two of three sub-dimensions of Dimension 3. The last sub-dimension investigates interactions of citizens with local authorities as a measure of accountability.

On the aggregate score, the best performing province is Ha Tinh, followed by Hai Duong and Ho Chi Minh City. At the low end are Yen Bai and Lang Son, which are significantly lower than their neighbouring provinces of Cao Bang and Lai Chau. Among the centrally administered municipalities, Ho Chi Minh City and Da Nang perform in the top group, significantly above Hai Phong and Ha Noi. At the 90% confidence interval levels, Ha Noi performs significantly better than the three provinces at the end of the scale (i.e. Nam Dinh, Yen Bai and Lang Son). There is no regional pattern to be seen, and socio-geographical conditions do not seem to play a role either. Among the top ten performers, there is a mix of urban and rural provinces from North, Central and South Viet Nam. Mountainous provinces are scattered across the lower half of the ranking.

The overall picture suggests PIBs and CISBs have not yet lived up to their mandates as society's oversight bodies. Although almost every province has established PIBs in each of their communes/wards, on average only 36.8% of respondents are aware of their existence (from only 9.5% in Kien Giang, to 69.5% in Hai Duong). In terms of CISBs, on average only 19% of citizens are aware of their existence (ranging from 2% in Kien Giang up to 42.5% in Ha Tinh). These results suggest the visibility and impact of these institutions need to be improved, alerting the provinces to where efforts can be made by pointing to examples of the good practices by their higher-ranked peers.

Dimension 4: Control of Corruption

Corruption is perhaps one of the biggest challenges in governance and public administration in Viet Nam today, as it has become embedded in the overall administrative system and serves as a major obstacle to the success of reform. Drawing from international and Vietnamese literature, PAPI breaks down the measure of corruption into four sub-dimensions. The first three sub-dimensions explore the types of corruption that are most likely to be experienced directly by Vietnamese citizens: (i) limits to corruption by public servants (e.g. diverting public funds or accepting bribes in regulatory applications); (ii) limits to corruption in public service delivery (e.g. giving bribes in hospitals and schools); and (iii) equity in public sector employment. In addition, the fourth sub-dimension measures the willingness of local governments to combat corruption, manifested in citizen's awareness and readiness to denounce corrupt activities when encountered.

Control of Corruption has the highest variance of all dimensions, both across individuals and provinces. Distinct tiers of selected provinces can be seen. For example, Thua Thien-Hue (ranked 11th) is significantly different from Binh Phuoc (ranked 6th). At the lower end of the scale, Nam Dinh is significantly worse than Ha Noi. It is notable that in general Southern provinces perform better. An unmistakable regional pattern is reflected in the fact that the top eight performing provinces and 12 out of the 15 best performing provinces are from the South. Potential lessons can certainly be learned from these top performers.

Dimension 5: Public Administrative Procedures

Regarding administrative procedures provision, international literature considers elements such as convenience, security, reliability, fairness and responsibility. In Viet Nam, through more than a decade of implementation of public administration reform (PAR), the Government has made renewed calls to reform administrative procedures in particular. The renewed efforts aim at elimination of bureaucratic, cumbersome, and inconvenient procedures. PAPI measures the demand-side view of public administrative procedures by investigating a reduced

but significantly valued group of procedures that are considered universal and important to citizens' lives. The three sub-dimensions investigate the quality of (i) public notary services, (ii) application procedures for land use rights certificates (LURCs) and (iii) application procedures for construction permits.

On the aggregated dimension, Binh Phuoc stands out as the best performing province, while Ca Mau is at the bottom of the scale. The dimension has the lowest variation across provinces (i.e. less than half of the standard deviation found in Control of Corruption), which can be interpreted as depicting more uniformity across and between provinces in dealing with the three selected administrative procedures. It is also noticeable that except for notary service, relatively few citizens actually use these procedures: 24% have applied for LURCs, and only 7% have applied for construction permits. These two procedures are more frequently requested by more well-off citizens.

Dimension 6: Public Service Delivery

This dimension gauges perhaps the most immediate output of good governance. International comparisons show that there are direct correlations between good governance and socio-economic development. PAPI looks at four sub-dimensions which represent the most important public services for the average citizen: (i) public health care (in the form of coverage of health insurance and quality of district hospitals), (ii) public primary education (measured by quality of school infrastructure and distance between home and schools), (iii) basic infrastructure (access to electricity, quality of nearest road, garbage pick-up service and quality of drinking water), and (iv) law and order (residence safety and the level of various types of crime experienced by citizens).

Overall, centrally administered municipalities tend to perform better in public service delivery, with Hai Phong, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City among the top provinces. Noticeably, Ha Noi lags significantly behind its peers. Poor provinces and those far from Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City tend to rank lower, mainly due to weak basic infrastructure of services, such as tap water or garbage collection. There seems to be little

difference between regions, and performance differences are more visible when comparing provinces that are similar in terms of economic and geographical conditions, such as the Northern mountainous provinces of Lang Son, Cao Bang, Yen Bai and Lai Chau. The large difference between the top and bottom provinces is attributed to the variance in the scores on sub-dimensions of infrastructure and law and order.

The overall provincial performance levels

A rich amount of data and information is provided by each of the dimensions analyzed under PAPI. In addition to the dimensional level disaggregation, the six dimensions can also be aggregated into a composite index to assess overall provincial performance. A composite index can help to identify good performing provinces, and learn from their good-practices. It also helps to inform poorer performers with similar socio-economic conditions of their good practices. Provincial comparisons may create competition among provinces to improve their performance.

To sum up, while the dimension-level analysis highlights varying degrees of performance, the following four tiers of provinces can be observed with clarity in the aggregate performance index using a scale from 6 to 60 points (only a few provinces do not fit cleanly into these four categories, because their confidence intervals are especially large):

1. Top performing provinces significantly above the 75th percentile: **Ho Chi Minh City, Ha Tinh, Da Nang, Binh Dinh, Thua Thien-Hue.**

2. Good performing provinces not significantly different from the 75th percentile, but significantly greater than a score of 35: **Long An, Binh Phuoc, Dong Nai, Hau Giang, Hai Phong, Phu Yen.**

3. Average performing provinces which are significantly above the 25th percentile, but lower than a score of 35: **Ha Nam, Phu Tho, Vinh Long, Bac Giang, Ha Noi.**

4. Bottom provinces which significantly perform below the 25th percentile: **Yen Bai, Kon Tum.**

INTRODUCTION

The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (herein thereafter referred as PAPI) is an incipient and ongoing joint collaboration partnership between the Center for Community Support Development Studies (CECODES, a Vietnamese NGO under the Viet Nam Union of Science and Technology Association, VUSTA), the Department of Democracy and Law and the Center for Theory Works at the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Fieldwork was possible thanks to the facilitation and collaboration of the VFF district, commune/ward and local level chapters[1].

In 2009, PAPI was piloted in three provinces, including Phu Tho, Da Nang and Dong Thap. Key findings were presented and discussed with senior local government officials, Communist Party leaders, VFF representatives, government agencies, as well as media from the involved provinces. With the endorsement and useful feedback provided by these stakeholders, the methodology was further improved in order to formulate a rigorous and objective PAPI. In 2010, it was rolled out in 30 provinces selected on an objective and scientific methodology. It is expected that from 2011 onwards PAPI will be implemented in all 63 provinces in Viet Nam on an annual basis (see Box 1).

PAPI is an ongoing effort aimed to provide objective and evidence-based measures of the standards of provincial level governance, public administration and public services performance from the perspective of end-users. In a nutshell, PAPI is a diagnostics tool collecting evidence and data at the provincial level that can be aggregated at national level. It is also a social feedback mechanism that supports people's experiences and a policy instrument to gauge the opinions of users of public administrative services regarding the levels of satisfaction, effectiveness and efficiency of the public administration at the provincial level.

Three key considerations are the foundational pillars upon which PAPI's philosophy and spirit are sustained. Firstly, in its transition towards a prosperous democratic society and a thriving market economy, Viet Nam's public administration system will have to play a key role in reducing poverty that is not fulfilled by economic growth itself. The objective of reforming Viet Nam's public administration is among other development priorities about bringing socio-economic development through delivering better quality public and administrative services to citizens, especially the poor.

Secondly, a plausible way to improve Viet Nam's governance and public administration is to create opportunities for citizens to engage more effectively in the implementation and monitoring of the performance levels in the public administration system. PAPI is about citizen's experiences and their direct interactions about government performance; it is about the demand side of governance and public administration.

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1. See Dang Ngoc Dinh (2010).

Thirdly, PAPI aims to support national and provincial level efforts by providing data and information to be used in different ways by interested parties. PAPI is a diagnostics instrument that in the short and medium-term supports evidence-based policy making processes in Viet Nam. With the data and information generated, public officials/authorities are provided with a tool for monitoring performance in provision of governance and public administration at different areas and levels.

BOX 1. WHAT IS PAPI?

What	A Governance Public Administration Performance Index which monitors and measures the performance of public administration and the provision of public services at the provincial level in Viet Nam

Where	• Three provinces for piloting PAPI in 2009 (Phu Tho, Da Nang, Dong Thap);
	• 30 provinces in 2010 (provinces were randomly selected using propensity score matching)
	   o 30 districts, 30 communes, 30 villages (capital seats as certainty units)
	   o 60 districts, 150 communes, 330 villages (randomly selected using the Probability Proportion to Size method)
	• 63 provinces from 2011 onwards (expectedly)

How	Public surveys (face-to-face) of citizens about public administration performance in their localities (random selection) Citizens (randomly selected)
Who	• 5,568 citizens (2,648 female and 2,920 male) • Average of 185.6 respondents per province (with a response rate of 77.3%)
How many Key dimensions assessed	1. Participation at Local Levels 2. Transparency 3. Vertical Accountability 4. Control of Corruption 5. Public Administrative Procedures 6. Public Service Delivery
Implementing agencies	• Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES) • Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF) • United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

The objective is to develop a policy instrument able to diagnose the performance of different elements of provincial governance and public administration. The intention is to build an action-able set of indicators, allowing provincial governments to improve their governance, administration and public services based on feedback and experiences from citizens as end-users.

PAPI therefore reflects on a wide diversity of issues in Viet Nam and aims to apply a rigorous and objective methodology. PAPI is to be considered an alternative way to monitor the performance of the public sector at different levels and degrees of governance. Through the implementation of this objective and demand-driven assessment, PAPI aims to complement, support and enhance the Government of Viet Nam's ongoing efforts of *"building a **democratic, strong, clean, professionalized, modernized, effective and efficient public administration system**… able to respond to the requirements of the cause of national building and development"*.[2]

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2. PAR Master Programme (2001-2010) overall objective.).

This report is structured in three main chapters. It starts with an explanation of the rationale and context in which PAPI is being developed. The second chapter is about the contextualization and operationalization of governance and public administration in Viet Nam that falls within the scope of this research. The third chapter details and explains at length the objective and rigorous methodology applied.

The Rationale and Context

The first chapter of this report includes a discussion on the rationale and context in which PAPI is being developed. The chapter discusses the importance to pay attention to measurement issues and the significance of turning from supply side (inputs) to demand side (outputs) approaches to understand governance and public administration performance. In doing so, the chapter lays out both the fundamental normative framework being applied and the importance of evidence-based mechanisms for data collection.

The chapter starts from the premise that Viet Nam's governance and public sector in general have made progress in provincial-level reforms and governmental efforts are largely based on internal feedback mechanisms. However, it argues that due to the country's fast economic growth, achievements have left little room for objective feedback mechanisms from citizens to help national authorities and provincial governments understand where and how to improve governance, public administration and public services.

Contextualization and Operationalization of Governance and Public Administration in Viet Nam

The second chapter is the core of the report in terms of findings and data analysis. This chapter discusses the six dimensions individually, as well as the potential uses of the overall aggregated index itself. This section details the conceptual elements, as well as the empirical evidence from each dimension and the aggregate structure. Metrics and objective measurement tools are becoming more relevant and frequent in Viet Nam as it progresses towards a performance-oriented society. Considering governance and public administration as mutually reinforcing, PAPI builds a metrics based on six dimensions, including: (i) participation at local levels;

(ii) transparency; (iii) vertical accountability; (iv) control of corruption; (v) public administrative procedures; and (vi) public service delivery.

These six dimensions are tailored to Viet Nam's context and ongoing governance and public administration reform processes. For example, participation is interpreted largely within the framework of the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance that enables citizens to take part in local-level policy making. Similarly, accountability and transparency dimensions are tailored to the existing and emerging legal normative framework and look at issues on which citizens are seen as drivers for implementation. The Dimension on control of corruption investigates the implementation of the Law on Prevention and Combating of Corruption[3], the Anti-Corruption Strategy towards 2020,[4] and Decree No. 47/2007/ND-CP of the Government providing for detail regulations and guidance on the implementation of some articles of the Law on Corruption Prevention and Combating on role of society and mass organizations in anti-corruption. In addition, the Dimension of public administrative procedures reflects on a selected sample of relevant and strategic procedures for which reforms are seen as relevant for Viet Nam's development stage (i.e. public notary services, construction permits and land use right certificates), while the Dimension on public service delivery pinpoints key areas for enlarging citizens' opportunities and wellbeing (i.e. education, health, infrastructure and safety).

This chapter details how PAPI provides multiple measurements (dashboard type[5]) for these mutually inclusive and multidimensional processes. Moreover, it discusses how the measures can be used by different parties and stakeholders to take and digest information that affects them most directly. Dimensions can be disaggregated and taken as stand-alone measures. While the dimensions are presented separately for ease of asssessment, they are both mutually inclusive and complementary.

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3. Law No 55/2005 ratified by the National Assembly on 29 November 2005

4. Resolution No. 21/2009/NQ-CP of the Government dated 12 May 2009 on promulgating the National Strategy on Prevention and Combating of Corruption towards 2020 (herein referred to as Anti-corruption Strategy).

5. The dashboard notion is understood as a car's dashboard instrument that shows information of the vehicle in operation for the driver to make decisions.

An Objective and Rigorous Methodology

The third chapter includes a detailed and necessary explanation of the methodology applied. The analysis includes an explanation of the scientific, objective and rigorous processes followed in order to select 30 provinces using propensity matching score methods; as well as 90 districts, 180 communes/wards[6] and 360 villages using both probability to population size procedures and purposive certainty units (i.e. capital seats). In addition, the chapter explains the meticulous fieldwork undertaken in which 5,568 randomly selected citizens were interviewed face-to-face between June 18 and October 20, 2010 (with a response rate of 77.3%). It also presents the methodological construction of the dimensions, sub-dimensions and overall PAPI dashboards.

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6. Viet Nam's administrative division is structured in a four tier base, with (i) provinces, (ii) districts, (iii) communes in rural areas or wards in urban centers, and (iv) villages in rural places or residential groups in urban zones. While PAPI takes into account this consideration, for the sake of simplification, administrative units (iii) and (iv) are referred to indistinctively in this report.

This chapter will discuss the different steps undertaken in this large scale survey, including the detailed and thorough fieldwork preparation, the quality of interaction with interviewers and interviewee biases. The chapter discusses how the sample takes into account key demographic characteristics of Viet Nam's population structure to ensure their representativeness. Based on comparison with known census data and estimation of design effects, this chapter explains how the final number of randomly selected and interviewed respondents, including their gender ethnic, educational and occupational characteristics, remarkably resemble current demographic and economic conditions in the country.

In the appendices, readers can browse and explore key descriptive statistics (Appendix A), see the main complementarities and differences of PAPI with the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI), another governance survey but for businesses (Appendix B), as well as read the questionnaire applied for the PAPI survey (Appendix C). For additional data and information, readers are encouraged to visit the website www.papi.vn.

CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERFORMANCE

1.1. ON METRICS AND MEASUREMENT: THE RATIONALE FOR PAPI

In increasingly performance-oriented societies, metrics become relevant and matter as they allow for monitoring, assessing and evaluating results. What is measured therefore becomes a driving force to understand performance effects and how they influence future policy decisions. However, a single metric designed for one purpose may be ill-suited when dealing with broader governance and public administration systems. There is no single indicator that can capture something as complex as governance and public administration. Thus, rather than a single metric, a dashboard might be better suited.[7]

Viet Nam's fast and impressive economic development is credited to an array of economic growth policies as well as ongoing plethora of governance and public administration reform processes. These reforms, as in many other developing nations, take place in scattered areas with their explicit monitoring. Usually the implementation of the former macro-economic policies is well monitored with hard data and statistics. However, for the implementation of the latter governance and the performance of the public administration, monitoring becomes harder to assess and measure. Furthermore, there are often missing connections with ultimate beneficiaries of the reform process in the Vietnamese context.

Ongoing efforts at different levels are led by the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF) through its central role of supporting implementation of public policies and monitoring of public sector performance at local level.[8] In addition, different policy instruments mention the importance to monitor and measure governance and public administration reform, including, but not limited to, Decision No. 136/2001/QD-TTg on September 17, 2001 on Overall Program on State Administration Reform in the 2001-2010 period, Resolution No. 17/2007/NQ-TW on August 1, 2007 on the Acceleration of Administrative Reform and increase of the effect and effectiveness of the State Management; the Ministry of Planning and Investment's (MPI) Decision No. 555/2007/QD-BKH on issuing the results-based M&E framework for 2006-2010 SEDP, Resolution No. 21/2009/NQ-CP on May 12, 2009 on National Anti-Corruption Strategy towards 2020 and the supplementary governmental decisions on building criteria for monitoring corruption and anti-corruption work. As well as the current Socio-Economic Development Strategy (2011-2020) on people's mastery of development process and draft Proposal on State Administration Reform in the 2011-2020 period.

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7. This line of argumentation is analogously borrowed from Stiglitz et al (2010) when referring to the importance to measure well-being.

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8. In particular the Viet Nam Fatherland Front Law (June 12, 1999) states in article 12 that the supervision by VFF "aims to contribute to safeguarding and building the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam into a clean and strong one operating effectively and efficiently, and to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the people." In addition, see Government and Central VFF Committee Inter-agency Resolution No. 05/2006/NQLT-CP-UBTWMTTQVN dated April 21, 2006 on the issuance of Regulation on VFF's oversight of cadres, civil servants and Party members at their respective residential places.

The intention of the above reference policy framework is noted, yet implementation still remains problematic and the following questions could be raised: How far has Viet Nam progressed in its public sector reforms? What is the current situation? How are Viet Nam's governance and public administration systems performing at the provincial level and how much still needs to be further reformed? What are some recommendations on how to continue addressing these reforms effectively, and what options are worth considering regarding future directions?

The answers to these questions are more manifold than is often assumed, as they encompass a comprehensive and inclusive process of change across a broad range of areas. And while it is important to observe and understand the "aggregate" universe of governance and public administration reform, it is also relevant and important to care about what is happening at the provincial level in areas or dimensions that directly affect and influence governance and public administration performance. Public sector reform is a complex process aimed at improving the public administration system and the provision of public services. In the current Vietnamese context, the objective is to reform the public administration system to be able to satisfy the requirements of a regulated market economy as the country graduates to middle-income status. It is relevant, therefore, to analyze to what extent, at the provincial level of analysis, certain dimensions of Viet Nam's governance and public administration system have been reforming towards a *"democratic, clean, strong, professionalized, modernized, effective and efficient public administration system which operates in line with the principle of the socialist State ruled-of-law under the leadership of the Party; public cadres and civil servants will have appropriate capacities and ethical qualities able to respond to the requirements of the cause of national building and development."* [9]

In that regard, a key challenge for the next stage of governance and public sector reforms in Viet Nam is to move towards modernizing its public administration system. To address this challenge, Viet Nam could afford to strengthen the public sector's responsibilities by implementing policies and ensuring a more active monitoring role for non-State actors in the evaluation of public administration performance. [10]

To solve this challenge, instruments that gather feedback from citizens on the quality of provincial-level policy making, administration, and service delivery, as well as motivates provincial governments to improve in all of these areas are relevant. Although a number of internationally-designed tools, such as World Bank's Worldwide Governance indicators and Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, [11] assess the performance of public administration and enables comparisons between countries, these instruments are often too high-level, do not reflect representative perceptions of end-users, and do not involve major local stakeholders in the assessment. An exception in Viet Nam is the ongoing efforts of measuring economic governance for private sector development through the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI). [12] Thus, in order to achieve political impact, it is essential to move beyond these international instruments to ones that provide provincial governments with more objective and detailed information. This is where PAPI fits in, along with complementing PCI, to make necessary improvements. Appendix B provides a comparison of PAPI with the PCI methodology. The substantial difference between these two methodologies is that PAPI measures citizens' experiences with governance and public administration systems, while PCI measures economic governance for private sector development.

International experiences from countries that have made the transition to middle-income status, confirm a shift in the relationship between government agencies, the private sector and citizens, in terms of the way they interact with each other. Wealthier and better educated citizens demand better and more efficient administrative services from their government, as well as less bureaucracy, corruption, patronage, nepotism, and diversion or theft of public funds. They demand a public administration system that promotes development, equity and allows more participation in the decision-making processes and the implementation and monitoring of public policies. In its transition towards a more prosperous, democratic society and a thriving market economy, Viet Nam's public administration system will have to play a key role in poverty reduction which is not fulfilled by economic growth itself.

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9. The overall objective of the PAR Master Plan as stipulated in Decision 136/2001/QD-TTg (September 17, 2001) Overall Program on State Administrative Reform in the 2001-2010 period.

10. See Acuña-Alfaro (2009a), p.40.

11. See www.govindicators.org/ and www.transparency.org respectively.

12. The Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) is the result of a major collaborative effort of the Viet Nam Competitiveness Initiative (VNCI) and the Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI). For information see www.pcivietnam.org/ and Malesky (2009). Appendix B also provides a comparative table of differences and similarities between PAPI and PCI.

One way to improve Viet Nam's public administration is to create opportunities for citizens to engage more effectively in the implementation and monitoring of governance and public administration issues.[13] Sub-national information, reflecting citizens' experiences about government performance, could provide incentives for provincial leaders to improve their policies and institutions. These experiences can be transformed into indicators, which gauge performance over time, and thereby increase accountability between local governments and their citizens. Based on the information people could demand concrete improvements. This evidence derived from end users' experiences could also increase upward accountability to the national government, as it allows provincial decision makers to demonstrate the quality of their leadership to superiors. Furthermore, the indicators could impact the migration of labour and capital between regions and provinces, as workers and businesses tend to shift to areas with better governance and public service delivery.

In line with the above motivations, PAPI measures governance and public administration performance at the provincial level from the perspective of citizens as end-users of public and administrative services. PAPI highlights how citizens experience the outputs provided by public administration agencies in their localities. Apart from measuring the level of citizens' own experiences in participating in policy making, implementation and oversight as their rights, PAPI looks into different aspects of citizens' accessibility to public and administrative services such as health care and education. While the government-led reviews and monitoring processes look more at the supply side (i.e. institutions that shape the environment for and provide public services for citizens), PAPI provides insights from the demand side: how are citizens participating and interacting with the public administration system and how are they being able to enhance their potentials and capabilities by doing so. Practical experience and empirical perspectives of citizens provide snapshots of what the public administration system in Viet Nam has or has not done for their end-users, who have too often been absent in most of policy-implementation reviews.

When referring to governance and public administration performance, the analysis revolves around three mutually reinforcing processes: policy making, policy implementation, and policy monitoring (see Figure 1).

Policy making is key within governance and public administration, as it is the process by which the rules of the game are defined in a way that affect the operation and implementation of public services. Policy decisions can influence behaviours and therefore improve or decrease the quality and reliability of public services. Moreover, when the policy-making processes involve joint decision-making and dialogue, better results can be expected. In addition, the process of policy making at the provincial level is important and crucial, not only to ensure a consistent and correct interpretation of national policies, but also as it is most likely at this level that opinions and suggestions by end-users and beneficiaries of public services can be considered.

FIGURE 1. THE VIRTUOUS CIRCLE OF POLICY PROCESSES

I.
Policy Making
- **Policies** by relevant agencies and political actors: Communist Party, Government (Prime Minister and line ministries), National Assembly, Vietnam Fatherland Front, Mass Organizations

III.
Policy Monitoring
- **Outputs, outcomes** delivered to society groups and beneficiaries (including businesses and citizens)

II.
Policy Implementation
- **Inputs** for implementation by State / Governmental agencies (organisational, personnel, budget, resources)

Once a policy decision has been made, there is a shift from intention (the attainment of a desirable outcome) towards implementation (the realization of the output). In that regards, *policy implementation* refers to the required inputs, mechanisms, resources and capabilities of the public sector to ensure conditions to deliver public and private services. This process requires constant performance monitoring in a particular thematic area or sector. During implementation, monitoring is useful as it helps determine achievements and deficiencies as per previously defined criteria and objectives.

The third process, *policy monitoring* is directly related to the implementation process. In this particular area, there are usually two ways to assess performance. The first one is from the perspective of service provided, in the form of self-assessments for example, which simply requires management to supply with opinions on what inputs and efforts have been put in place. The second one comes in the form of user-satisfaction mechanisms, which question citizens on their views and experiences, reflecting the availability and quality of the services. In other words, the former way focuses on the supply side, while the latter focuses the demand side.

PAPI refers to the latter approach, using a methodology that recognizes ongoing governance and public sector reform processes in Viet Nam. In doing so, PAPI builds upon different dimensions that allow diverse understandings of these reform processes. PAPI captures the multidimensionality of reform processes and aims to understand individual citizens' experiences from a wide spectrum of changes in governance and public administration services that are affecting their lives.

PAPI is neither a single metric that captures the complexity of governance and public administration reform efforts, nor one that aims to become the answers to all problems. Rather, PAPI is a dashboard with objective information from ordinary citizens. It aims to fill in existing information and data gaps regarding measures of public sector performance. Through its collection of experiential data from citizens' experiences, PAPI aims to identify pathways for movements and improvements in several policy-making and policy-implementation processes.

PAPI cares about what is happening at the aggregate level of governance and public administration. It also cares about what is happening on individual aspects of public administration, as provinces may excel on one dimension but require improvements on others. As illustrated earlier by the dashboard analogy, local leaders may be better off monitoring an array of indicators that illustrate separate facets of governance than an aggregate measure that melds them together

and obscures understanding. Think of a driver, who is given only an aggregate measure of the instruments on his dashboard. Is it helpful to know that the driver is performing at the average level of a combined measure of speed and fuel usage? Or would the driver benefit more from knowing that he is going at an extremely high speed and quickly running out of gas? Moreover, it is not only the present performance of provinces that matters, but their long-term effectiveness is as much relevant. Disaggregating the measurement of governance is also helpful for drawing connections between specific institutional or policy reforms, and improvements in public service delivery. To this end, PAPI sub-divides the measurement of governance and public administration into six dimensions that reflect theoretical differences in governance drawn from the international academic literature and their specific reflections in the Vietnamese context.

A concern in PAPI is the shift from inputs or policy implementation (box II in Figure 1) towards outputs and outcomes as directly experienced by citizens (box III in Figure 1). With the data and information generated, knowledge is gained to further refine the next round of policy making (box I in Figure 1). This is just a first step in what should be an ongoing reform effort. Even if PAPI had succeeded in constructing a robust set of metrics of governance and public administration performance for today, changes in the Vietnamese economy towards higher development standards would imply a constant revision and iteration of these issues.

The goal is then to contract a parsimonious set of metrics that captures most of central concerns. PAPI does this by moving away from inputs and focusing on outputs. When examining governance and public performance, PAPI evaluates direct experiences rather than perceptions, emphasizes on the citizens' individual experiences, considers governance and public administration as complementary, and, complements current measures of public administration performance.

1.2. A SIX DIMENSIONAL DASHBOARD OF GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERFORMANCE

The Viet Nam Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) gives a metric to inherently multidimensional and mutually reinforcing processes of governance and public administration. It also allows different parties and stakeholders to take and digest information that affect them most directly in their everyday governance, since dimensions can be

disentangled. Considering that governance and public administration reforms also involves the provision of public services in more efficient and effective ways, PAPI looks at six different dimensions of provincial governance and public administration.

In particular, PAPI examines the performance from six dimensions, including: (i) participation at local levels; (ii) transparency; (iii) vertical accountability; (iv) control of corruption; (v) public administrative procedures, and (vi) public service delivery. Table 1 provides a snapshot of the main areas of performance under assessment for each dimension as well a sample of questions asked. While the dimensions are presented separately for ease of asssessment, they are both mutually inclusive and complementary.

Dimension one is about citizens' participation at local level. It assesses the different mechanisms for citizens to take part in governance and public administration processes. The main issues addressed include citizens' knowledge of their opportunities for participation, experience in direct elections and satisfaction with village heads, the quality of elections, and citizens' contributions to the development of communes/wards' public works and projects.

Dimension two is about transparency and assesses the flow of timely and reliable information (of economic, social and public nature) about government services provision. In particular, this Dimension focuses on citizens awareness and levels of information in social policies for the poor; legislation that affects citizens' everyday life; budget and expenditure by communes/wards' public administration agencies; and land plans and land compensation.

Dimension three is on vertical accountability issues and assesses the extent to which those who act on behalf of the government are answerable for what they do. This Dimension looks into levels of contacting public officials and civil servants at different levels to settle personal, household or village matters; citizens'

complaints and denouncements; and citizens' mechanisms in keeping the local governments accountable for public investment projects (e.g. people's inspection boards and community investment supervision boards).

Dimension four is about a systemic and extended problem in Viet Nam: corruption. It examines the current problem of corruption and the extent to which citizens are motivated in denouncing corrupt activities. While corruption is an endemic issue, for the purposes of this analysis, the focus is on diversion of state funds for personal benefits, bribery, abuse of public property for vested interests, nepotism, abuses in handling public administrative procedures, health care and education, citizens' awareness of legislation on anti-corruption and perceptions of the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts by relevant state bodies.

A selected group of public administrative procedures is the focus of Dimension five. This Dimension evaluates the implementation and performance of selected but relevant public administrative procedures in terms of intensity of use and efficiency of services rendered. In particular, the Dimension looks at citizens' experiences in getting public administrative procedures when applying for new or renewed construction permits, land use rights certificates at the commune/wards and district levels, and about citizens' satisfaction of services received from public notary services.

The sixth dimension on the other hand is about the performance of public service delivery. In this dimension, a selection of public services, considered key in terms of improving citizens wellbeing, (i.e. health care, education, water supply and citizens' safety) are examined. In particular, this Dimension looks into citizens' access to health care, citizens' experiences in and satisfaction with health care and primary education services provided at the commune/ward level, and citizens' access to basic water and sanitation services, as well as safety conditions at local levels.

TABLE 1. COMPOSITION OF PAPI: 6 DIMENSIONS, 21 SUB-DIMENSIONS AND 82 INDICATORS

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSIONS	COMPONENT INDICATORS
Participation at Local Level	Civic Knowledge	• Correct knowledge of village head term limit (%) • Knowledge of which local offices are electable (0 to 4)
	Opportunities for Participation	• Voted in Last Commune People's Council Election (%) • Voted in Last Village Head Election (%) • Voted in Last National Assembly Election (%) • Aware of Grassroots Democracy Decree (%) • Aware of Slogan "People Know, Discuss, Do, Verify" (%) • In my village, the chief is selected by an election (%)

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSIONS	COMPONENT INDICATORS
Participation at Local Level	Elections Quality	• Election has more than one candidate (%) • Respondent was invited to participate (%) • Paper ballot was used (%) • Votes counted publicly (%) • Candidate was suggested by authorities (%) • Respondent voted for winner (%)
	Voluntary Contributions	• Respondent made voluntary contribution (%) • Voluntary contributions monitored by community board (%)
Transparency	List of poor households	• Local Households with income < 360,000 VND receive support (% agree) • Poverty List Published in Last 12 Months (% agree) • Households are missing from poverty list (%) • Non-Poor included on poverty list (%)
	Commune's budgets	• Budget is made available (% agree) • Respondent read communal budget if available (%) • If respondent read, they believe it has adequate information (%)
	Land use plans	• Respondent is aware of communal land use plan (%) • Respondent provided comment on plan(%) • If provided, Land Use Plan acknowledges concerns (% agree) • Respondent DID NOT lose land as a result of new plan (%) • Compensation for lost land is close to market value (% agree) • Respondent knows where to go to get land information (%) • Impact of land plan on family (1 Hurt; 2 Nothing; 3 Benefit)
Vertical accountability (citizens monitoring)	Interactions with local authorities	• Contact village head to sort out personal/community issues (%) • Contact commune officials to sort out personal/community problems (%) • Meeting with village head was useful (%) • Meeting with commune official was useful (%) • Made proposal to local authorities (%) • Making proposal was useful (%)
	People's Inspections Boards	• Respondent is aware of village PIB (%) • PIB selected by vote (% of those aware) • PIB is effective at its job(% of those aware)
	Community Investment Supervision Boards	• Respondent is aware of Commune CISB (%) • CISB is effective at its job(% of those aware)

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSIONS	COMPONENT INDICATORS
Control of corruption	Limits on Public Sector Corruption	• Officials divert state funds for personal use (% disagree) • Bribes are necessary to obtain land title (% disagree) • Bribes are necessary to obtain construction permit (% disagree) • Individuals paying informal charges at notary (%)
	Limits on Corruption in Public Service Delivery	• Bribes are necessary at hospital (% disagree) • Parents at communal primary school give bribes to teachers for favouritism (% disagree) • Parents bribe teachers in school (from experience) (% disagree) • Teachers favor students who attend after-school study sessions in performance evaluations (% disagree) • Corruption has no effect on you or family (%) • Individuals paying informal charges at hospital (%)
	Equity in Public Employment	• Bribes are necessary for public employment (% disagree) • Number of government positions for which relationships are NOT necessary (1 to 5)
	Willingness to Fight Corruption	• Respondent is aware of Anti-Corruption Law (%) • Province is serious about fighting corruption when it occurs (%) • Respondent was a victim of a corruption, but chose not to denounce (%) • How high a bribe would need to be paid to a Police Officer before you reported it (1000 VND)? • How high a bribe would need to be paid to a People's Committee Official before you reported it (1000 VND)?
Public administrative procedures	Public Notary Services	• Respondent used notary service (%) • Total notary quality score (Sum of 8 items)
	Procedures for Construction Permits	• Respondent, who improved house in last 3 years, applied for construction permit (%) • Total construction application quality score (Sum of 8 items) • If he/she applied for construction permit, respondent did not go to more than one window (%) • If he/she applied for construction permit, respondent did not go to more than one window (%)
	Procedures for Land Use Rights Certificates	• Percentage of respondents who applied for new LURC in last 3 years (%) • Total LURC application process quality (Sum of 8 items) • If he/she applied for LURC, respondent did not go to more than one window (%) • LURC application process has been simplified in past 3 year (% agree)

DIMENSIONS	SUB-DIMENSIONS	COMPONENT INDICATORS
Public service delivery	Public Primary Education	• Total quality of public primary education (Sum of 8 items) • Distance from home to nearest primary school (km)
	Public Health Care	• Total quality of hospitals (Sum of 7 items) • Respondents with health insurance (%) • Do poor households receive subsidized health insurance? (% Yes) • Are medical checks for children under 6 free? (% Yes)?
	Infrastructure	• Households with electricity (%) • Quality of road nearest to house (1. Dirt; 2. Gravel; 3. Concrete; 4. Paved) • Frequency of garbage pick-up (0. Never to 5. Every Day) • Tap water in home as primary drinking water (%) • Respondents drinking rain or river water as primary source (%)
	Law and Order	• Crimes experienced in last year by respondents (% vehicle theft, pick-pocket, break-in, violence) • Assessment of safety in village (0 Very Unsafe; 3 Very Safe) • Safety improvement in past 3 years (% Agree)

Note: See Appendix C for the questionnaire.

CHAPTER 2

A DASHBOARD OF GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERFORMANCE

2.1. DIMENSION 1: PARTICIPATION AT LOCAL LEVELS

Participation is at the heart of governance processes and from a human development perspective. It means that people have a say in decisions that affect their lives, are directly involved in the selection of their government leaders and can hold decision-makers accountable.[14] Therefore, in modern public administration systems there are usually tensions between better responsiveness to citizens as users/clients and effective collaboration with them as beneficiaries and partners.[15]

The concept of participation starts with the basic assumption that citizens are at the core of public policymaking. Citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of policies, and consequently, they should have a detailed understanding of how those policies can more effectively meet their needs.[16] Participation is the process by which citizens' views are brought into the policy-making sphere, allowing them to influence the goals and design of legislation and implementation. It also enables different mechanisms for monitoring and oversight of public policies, investments and programmes.[17]

In theory and practice, participation takes on a broad number of forms. Citizens can participate as individuals (through voting, letters to newspapers, public speeches, blogs, etc.) or as members of associations (such as Chambers of Commerce, unions, political parties), which may engage in public forums, lobbying, voter mobilization, and financing drives. Participation can take place at the national level, through public comments on legislation, national-level elections, participation in drafting committees or lobby organizations. It can also take place at the local level, where citizens may select local leaders or have a hand in the design and implementation of local initiatives and public projects. This is especially true at the village level, where participation may include financial contributions to public projects, such as water wells, theatres, roads, recreation parks or community centers. The bottom line is that participation allows citizens to help choose the leaders, design the policies that affect their lives and monitor their implementation.

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14. For more detailed discussed see UNDP (2002); and Kaufmann et al (1999).

15. On these tensions see Vigoda (2002).

16. For example, when local people are consulted about the location of a new health clinic or school, there is a better chance they will be built in the right place.

17. In the international political science literature, perhaps the most frequently cited definition of political participation comes from Huntington and Nelson (1976), who consider political participation as a citizen's activity in the attempt to influence the government's decision-making. They define political participation as follows: "1) political participation is about activities rather than attitudes; 2) political participation is the political activity of the ordinary people, or more precisely, the activity of those who act as ordinary people; 3) political participation is the activity that aims at influencing the government's decision-making; and 4) political participation is about all the activities attempting to influence the government, regardless whether these activities achieve their intended aims or not."

There is some debate about the relationship between participation and accountability—the idea that leaders are responsive to and can be sanctioned by the citizens from whom they derive their authority. Where elections play a meaningful role in the selection of leaders, the two concepts are directly related. Participation in elections allows citizens to remove leaders who behave in ways that do not meet their approval, whether this is individually corrupt behaviour in office, lack of performance in public service delivery, or simply the selection of programs and policies that citizens do not want nor need. Politicians who want to continue in office must take into account the demands of their citizens or face electoral defeat. In other cases, plebiscites may not have direct electoral consequences, but they can help leaders better understand the needs and demands of their citizens, which allows them to better tailor their policies, if they choose so. For instance, it has been suggested that plebiscites in Indonesian villages have generated more trust and satisfaction with governments,[18] and in extension to PAPI's spirit, helped enhance performance levels by public administrators.

The academic literature on participation has identified an important number of benefits. First, participation allows for the tailoring of initiatives that better meet citizens' demands. This is especially true at the local level, as leaders in a national capital may have little idea about the specific demands of constituents in a far flung rural village. Secondly, citizen participation can improve compliance with legislation. Because citizens participate in the creation of the legislation itself, they have ownership of the policy, believe in its goals, and understand the trade-offs and compromises necessary to ensure passage. As a result, they are more likely to abide by the terms of the policy, which enhances implementation, sustainability, and ultimately the effectiveness of the initiative. For example, citizens, who believe that their views were taken into account, are far more likely to abide by restrictions on throwing waste into a local river, than if the policy were simply passed down from above.

2.1.1. CONTEXTUALIZING PARTICIPATION IN VIET NAM

It is for the above reasons that Viet Nam began experimenting with initiatives that allow citizens to participate more directly in policymaking. Public comment on draft legislations from the National Assembly has a long history in Viet Nam, but has become far more frequent with a range of citizens and associations offering ideas. Citizens in Viet Nam also participate in a variety of elections for their delegates to local (Provincial, District, and Communal People's Councils) and national legislatures (the Vietnamese National Assembly, VNA).[19] Nevertheless, participation in Viet Nam has specific characteristic and is somewhat restricted by the nomination procedures, which place restrictions on the full range of candidates available, and the level of authority these legislatures have in the ultimate shape of policy.[20]

For the vast majority of citizens, the greatest advance forward in improving participation in Viet Nam has been what has come to be known as Grassroots Democracy, which was (GRD) originally issued in 1998 (Decree No. 29/1998/ND-CP), later amended in 2003 (Decree No. 79/2003/ND-CP) and then upgraded into an ordinance in 2007 (GRDO)[21] with the goal of institutionalizing the participation of citizens in village and communal affairs. In many ways, the GRDO is the legislative embodiment of a Vietnamese mass slogan that has existed since the revolutionary battles against the French, "People know, people discuss, people do and people verify" (Dan biet, dan ban, dan lam, dan kiem tra).

For participation, the cornerstone of GRDO is the local elections, where villagers are able to elect their village heads. This election differs fundamentally from the People's Council election, where citizens only elect the legislature, which in turn choose the People's Committee Chairmen, and the local executive. With village elections, citizens have a direct say in the village head who will implement local initiatives that affect them directly. Importantly, the village head is not viewed as an official position in the Vietnamese administrative hierarchy, which begins at the commune/ward level. Nevertheless, the village head does have a role to play in terms of village infrastructure and cultural projects, so the election is meaningful in terms of selecting leaders that will administer local public administration works.

Viet Nam's village elections, in many ways, mirror a similar set of experiments in China, beginning in 1987. These elections have been shown to have some impact on the provision of public services and citizen satisfaction.[22] More recently, semi-competitive elections

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18. See Olken (2010).

19. Law on the Elections of Members to the National Assembly (April 15, 1997); Law on the Elections of the People's Council (November 26, 2003).

20. See for instance Malesky and Schuler (2011).

21. Ordinance No. 34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 of the National Standing Committee dated April 20, 2007 on the implementation of Grass-Roots Democracy at the commune, ward and townlet level (GRDO).

22. See Manion (1996), Tsai (2007), and Birney (2007).

have also been tried at the township level, China's lowest official administrative unit.[23] Similarly, communal level executive elections are also being considered in Viet Nam.[24]

Some work has been done on the evaluation of the implementation of grassroots democracy and village elections. The Ho Chi Minh National Political Sciences School studied communal reporting on their implementation, judging implementation on three dimensions: (i) whether the commune/ward had implemented the full range of activities described in the GRDO; (ii) whether communal officials understood the decree's intent; and (iii) whether there was evidence that local officials had worked with citizens when implementing policy. The study concluded that, five years after the promulgation of the first legislation of the GRD, only 18-20% of communes/wards had successfully implemented the Decree and another 60-70% demonstrated average implementation.[25]

Another study on the extent of the implementation of the GRDO, jointly published by the Viet Nam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS) and UNDP in 2006, observes that "although democracy [and participation] has been deepening in some areas, for many people the system remains inaccessible. These people tend to be poor, female, ethnic minorities, socially excluded, rural or lacking connections in government"[26]. Another work argues that village elections have reduced local-level conflict and improved development in policymaking.

While most analysts agree there is a great deal of variation in the quality of local-level participation throughout the country, there remains no comprehensive and systematic analysis of this variance across Viet Nam, and there is a gaping paucity of information on village level elections. Furthermore, there is a striking lack of current evaluations of grassroots participation in the country. Most of the evaluations were completed shortly after the GRDO's promulgation, so long-term evidence on the implementation and downstream effects of the initiative is lacking. Dimension one of PAPI attempts to capture the relative progress towards achieving the ideals of participation expressed in the GRDO by national policy-makers.

2.1.2. PAPI'S OPERATIONALIZATION OF LOCAL LEVEL PARTICIPATION IN VIET NAM

Figure 2.1 provides a visual picture of aggregate provincial performance regarding PAPI's Dimension one on local level participation. Hai Duong stands out as the best overall performing province with a score of 6.5. The 90% confidence interval around the previous score ranges from 6.19 to 6.83, which is significantly greater than the two following provinces (Ha Tinh, and Ho Chi Minh City). Consequently, those two have higher scores than all provinces that stands at Long An's level (the first provinces that lies outside the confidence interval) and lower. In this case, significance means there is reasonable confidence that another random sample would yield similar performance levels of provinces at the top portion of the distribution. At the other end of the scale, Quang Tri, Lai Chau, Kon Tum, and Lang Son (all peripheral border and rural provinces) stand out as provinces with significantly lower levels of participation than their peers.

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23. See Manion (2000) and Lai (2008).

24. For instance, in the 4th meeting of National Assembly XII in November 2009, there was a discussion on direct election of chairpersons of commune-level people's committees. However, by the end of the fall meeting session, the initiative was held off and it was reported more time was needed to discuss further. See summary of discussion as reported by the Ministry of Home Affairs: "Initiative on direct election of commune-level chairpersons of people's committee postponed at the last minute"[Phút cuối, hoãn thí điểm dân bầu trực tiếp chủ tịch xã] available at http://caicachhanhchinh.gov.vn/PortalPlus.aspx?/vi-VN/News/71//1033/0/3019/

25. See Nguyen Van Sau and Ho Van Thong (2003). In addition, s study by Oxfam and the National Centre for Social Sciences & Humanities concluded that 89% of citizens were aware of the GRDO and 75% of households participated in local village meetings (see NCSSH, 2003).

26. See VASS and UNDP (2006), p.39

27. See Catford (2006).

28. An exception is an internal self-assessment type of review conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) in 2009. See report "Review of 10 year implementation of Directive 30-CT/TW of the Political Bureau (8th tenure) on establishing and implementing Grassroots Democracy" No: 2267/BC-BNV of July 17, 2009.

FIGURE 2.1: PERFORMANCE LEVELS ON PAPI DIMENSION 1: PARTICIPATION AT LOCAL LEVELS

Yet, PAPI also provides a unique richness of information beyond the overall aggregate indicators which is much more relevant and informative to policy making. To help aid the analysis, the larger concept of participation is broken down into four sub-dimensions that are directly relevant to the Vietnamese context. These sub-dimensions are shown in Figure 2.1.

Accordingly, each sub-dimension is comprised of individual indicators as shown in Table 2.1, which also lists the questions from which they are drawn and descriptive statistics. In particular, the table highlights the aggregate score and the minimum, median, and maximum provincial scores, to provide a sense of the best and worst performers on each dimension. This will be useful for those who hope to identify local good practices and possible information sharing exchanges between provinces to improve performance.

Each of the indicators in Table 2.1 were normalized to a 1-10 scale, with '10' representing the most participatory outcome observed in a Vietnamese

province, and '1' representing the least participatory outcome (see Chapter 3 for more details). Each sub-dimension score represents the average score across the indicators which comprise it. Finally, the four sub-dimensions were averaged into an aggregate measure of participation, so that each sub-dimension represents 25% of the final score.

Table 2.1 also shows the 90% confidence intervals around the national score for each indicator. The confidence interval recognizes that these scores are drawn from a sample of 5,568 citizens and not a census of the entire population. The confidence interval provides the range of answers that would occur at least 90 times, if we were to sample a 100 times, while the mean score represents the most likely score.

The first column of Table 2.1 displays the four sub-dimensions of Dimension one. First, PAPI considers the civic knowledge of the respondents. Opportunities for participation are meaningless if citizens are not aware of how to take advantage of

them in order to influence the decisions made by different public administrators. Here, PAPI asks whether citizens are knowledgeable about which offices in Viet Nam are subject to elections, and whether they know the term-limits of particular offices so that they can exercise their right to vote out disappointing officials. Second, PAPI analyzes the variance in the level of take-up of participation opportunities. Turnout rates for the most recent village leadership elections, as well as legislatures at all levels of government are looked upon. Participation opportunities also give analysts, public administrators and policy makers the opportunity to know whether citizens know about their rights and obligations expressed under the GRDO. Third, PAPI studies the actual implementation of elections of village/residential area heads to determine its overall

quality and closeness to the participatory ideals of GRDO.[29] Finally, PAPI looks at another form of community participation - the level of individual financial contributions to community projects. PAPI does not only examine whether or not a citizen contributes to the projects, but also studies whether or not there is any proper mechanisms in place to monitor these contributions to ensure that they comply with citizens' demands and aspirations.

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29. According to the implementing documents following the GRDO, elections are meant to have more than one candidate and employ a confidential paper ballot. Votes in the elections should be announced publically. Beyond the specific regulations, it is also important to study whether the elections live up to democratic ideals. For instance, did local officials coerce a particular vote by suggesting a winner? Did the citizens have a real opportunity to decide the fate of their village through a competitive election? Was the second candidate merely a stand-in as 'paper participant' to fulfill the technical formality of two participants, although s/he has no real chance of victory.

TABLE 2.1: INDICATORS USED TO GENERATE DIMENSION 1: PARTICIPATION AT LOCAL LEVELS

DIMENSION	NAME OF INDICATOR	PAPI QUESTION	NATIONAL MEAN	NATIONAL 90% CI		PROVINCIAL SCORES	SCORE	PROVINCE
1) Civic Knowledge	Correct knowledge of village head term limit (%)	D108	10.10%	(8.79%	11.40%)	Minimum	0.00%	Vinh Long
						Median	4.48%	Kien Giang/Ha Tinh
						Maximum	50.08%	Da Nang
1) Civic Knowledge	Knowledge of which local offices are electable (0 to 4)	D101a1, D101b1, D101c1, D101d1	2.00	(1.96	2.03)	Minimum	1.13	Kon Tum
						Median	1.85	Ca Mau/Yen Bai
						Maximum	2.64	Nam Dinh
2) Participation Opportunities	Voted in Last Commune People's Council Election (%)	D101b2	28.46%	(27.15%	29.76%)	Minimum	4.24%	Da Nang
						Median	24.14%	Lai Chau/Nam Dinh
						Maximum	44.16%	HCMC
2) Participation Opportunities	Voted in Last Village Head Election (%)	D101a2	52.55%	(51.17%	53.93%)	Minimum	19.32%	Lang Son
						Median	51.29%	Cao Bang/HCMC
						Maximum	71.25%	Dien Bien
2) Participation Opportunities	Voted in Last National Assembly Election (%)	D101d2	26.37%	(24.23%	28.51%)	Minimum	5.14%	Ha Tinh
						Median	18.84%	Lai Chau/Dong Nai
						Maximum	53.52%	HCMC
2) Participation Opportunities	Aware of Grassroots Democracy Decree (%)	D102a (Form A)	33.08%	(31.99%	34.17%)	Minimum	16.27%	Ha Noi
						Median	29.14%	Vinh Long/Dien Bien
						Maximum	70.66%	Da Nang
2) Participation Opportunities	Aware of Slogan "People Know, People Discuss, People Decide" (%)	D102a (Form B)	70.95%	(69.64%	72.26%)	Minimum	28.43%	Lai Chau
						Median	65.78%	Long An/TT-Hue
						Maximum	91.12%	Da Nang
2) Participation Opportunities	In my village, the chief is selected by an election (%)	D103a	80.22%	(79.28%	81.15%)	Minimum	56.09%	Lai Chau
						Median	82.23%	Hai Phong/Yen Bai
						Maximum	93.89%	Hai Duong

DIMENSION	NAME OF INDICATOR	PAPI QUESTION	NATIONAL MEAN	NATIONAL 90% CI		PROVINCIAL SCORES	SCORE	PROVINCE
3) Election Quality	Election has more than one candidate (%)	D105	65.71%	(64.37%	67.05%)	Minimum	27.53%	Phu Tho
						Median	65.30%	Hung Yen/Hau Giang
						Maximum	83.98%	Vinh Long
3) Election Quality	Respondent was invited to participate (%)	D106	72.57%	(71.23%	73.91%)	Minimum	35.47%	Lang Son
						Median	71.21%	Hung Yen/Dien Bien
						Maximum	90.88%	Kien Giang
3) Election Quality	Paper ballot was used (%)	D107a	72.06%	(70.40%	73.71%)	Minimum	10.85%	Da Nang
						Median	76.43%	Kon Tum/Cao Bang
						Maximum	100.00%	Ca Mau
3) Election Quality	Votes counted publicly (%)	D107d	77.13%	(75.69%	78.58%)	Minimum	34.58%	Vinh Long
						Median	80.84%	Hai Phong/Lai Chau
						Maximum	99.81%	Nam Dinh
3) Election Quality	Candiate was suggested by authorities (%)	D107b	24.97%	(24.23%	25.71%)	Minimum	0.13%	HCMC
						Median	27.80%	Bac Giang/Dien Bien
						Maximum	100.00%	Hau Giang
3) Election Quality	Respondent voted for winner (%)	D107c	86.06%	(85.10%	87.01%)	Minimum	56.44%	Kien Giang
						Median	86.74%	TT-Hue/Long An
						Maximum	100.00%	Yen Bai
4) Voluntary Contributions	Respondent made voluntary contribution (%)	D109aa	92.95%	(91.53%	94.37%)	Minimum	70.55%	Vinh Long
						Median	94.08%	Ha Tinh/Bac Giang
						Maximum	99.52%	Phu Tho
4) Voluntary Contributions	Voluntary contributions monitered by community monitoring board (%)	D109ac	14.67%	(13.92%	15.48%)	Minimum	0.00%	Kon Tum
						Median	10.93%	Phu Yen/HCMC
						Maximum	56.30%	Hai Duong

Civic Knowledge

Question D101 of the PAPI survey posed a simple question to respondents: which of the following government positions are chosen by popular election (Chairperson of the Commune/Ward People's Committee, Members of the Commune/Ward People's Council, the Village or Residential Group Head, and the National Assembly Representative)? The correct answer is that only the Chairperson of the Commune/Ward People's Committee is not selected by direct popular election. To add a bit more nuance, two versions of the survey were administered. One group saw the question without a timeframe (Form A, see Appendix C); the other was asked which positions were subject to election in the last three years (Form B). For Form B, only the village head is subject to election in the delineated timeframe. The number of correct responses given by respondents gives a very clear sense about how well they understand their electoral opportunities for participation. The results were enlightening. On average, respondents were able to identify only two out of these positions. Only six percent of respondents were

able to correctly identify all four elected positions with scores unsurprisingly lower for respondents receiving the three-year time limit. Variation across the country was extensive, ranging from about 1 correct answer in Kon Tum to 2.6 in the national-level city of Da Nang.

A second indicator of civic knowledge was whether respondents know the term limits of the village or ward residential group head (question D108). This is important knowledge that allows citizens to understand the duration of village positions, as well as when they will have the next opportunity to unseat a village head with whom they are disappointed. By the letter of law, the term limit is 2.5 years.[30] This information was known by a surprising small number of respondents (10%). Da Nang citizens once

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30. See Ministry of Home Affairs Decision 13 (December, 2002) on the administrative organization and activities of villages and city administrative units [Quyết định của Bộ Nội Vụ số 13/2002/QĐ-BNV ngày 06 tháng 12 năm 2002 về việc ban hành quy chế tổ chức và hoạt Động của thôn và tổ dân phố].

again proved the most informed, with 50% of respondents able to recall the correct date, compared with 0% in Vinh Long.

Opportunities for Participation

Few people took advantage of the opportunities for participation given to them in Viet Nam. Only 52.5% of respondents voted in the most recent village election, 28.5% participated in the last commune/ward People's Council election, and only 26.4% voted in the 2006 VNA elections. Dien Bien citizens participated in the highest numbers in village elections (71.25%), while the lowest level of participation experienced was by its mountainous neighbor in Lang Son (19.32%). Ho Chi Minh City citizens were dramatically more likely to participate in elections for higher offices, particularly the selection of VNA delegates where 53.2% of citizens voted. Ironically, in Da Nang, where the citizens were most highly informed about People's Council elections, they were the least likely to actually vote in them (4.24%). Overall, PAPI turnout numbers differ noticeably from turnout rates reported by the Vietnamese government, which was officially 99.6% for the 2007 VNA.[31] Because participation in elections is mandatory, and many families take advantage of technically illegal, but unofficially condoned, proxy voting to fulfil their obligations, it is likely that some respondents had votes cast for them without themselves participating. Having a family elder vote for you, however, falls short of the democratic ideal of "one person, one vote," as the choices of household heads may not reflect correctly the demands and needs of their dependents.

A second finding was that only 33% of respondents nationally were aware of the GRDO (question D102a, Form A, Appendix C), a finding that diverges quite dramatically from earlier analyses. While such low level of awareness has unfortunate implications for the availability of citizens to take advantage of the stipulations of the law, readers should not be too disheartened. Form B of the survey substituted the name of the decree for the mass slogan, "People Know…" and found that 71% were aware of the norms of democratic participation expressed in Vietnamese revolutionary ideals (question D102a, Form B). Once again, Da Nang citizens topped the charts for awareness with 71% aware of the GRDO and 91% aware of the mass slogan. Citizens of Ha Noi, perhaps because of its capital status where ward decisions play very little role in local well-being, were the least aware of the GRDO (16.2%).

Election Quality

For the citizens that voted, how close did the quality of village elections approximate the participatory ideals enshrined in the GRDO? In the country as a whole, the answer is quite well. On average, 73% of respondents, who took part, were notified and invited to participate in the election, 72% voted using paper ballots, 66% had more than one candidate to choose from, and 77% observed public counting of the ballots. Although 100% of respondents answering positively on these features would be ideal, these are quite respectable results. Furthermore, only 25% of respondents had a particular candidate suggested to them, indicating a relatively low-level of coercion. Once again, we would like to observe 0% suggestion, but PAPI's finding is clearly an important step forwards. More worryingly, however, is that there is a high degree of variance throughout the country and some localities display systematic deficiencies. In Phu Tho province in the Red River Delta, for instance, only 27% of respondents took part in elections with more than one candidate. Da Nang was notable for its high quality of elections in other areas, but had very poor performance on paper balloting (11%). The vast majority of Da Nang respondents remembered voting by hand in village elections. Mekong Delta provinces, Vinh Long and

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31. See Viet Nam's 12th National Assembly Election Commission – Subcommittee 2 for Media Reporting. [Hội Đồng Bầu Cử DBQH Khóa XII Tiểu Ban Tuyên Truyền Thông Cáo Báo Chí Số 2]. "Theo số liệu báo cáo của Ủy ban bầu cử các tỉnh, thành phố trực thuộc trung ương, đến 19 giờ ngày 20/5/2007, tỷ lệ cử tri đi bầu như sau." [According to the data from the Electoral Committees of all cities and provinces under central governance, at 7pm on May 20, 2007 the percentages of voters are as follows]. May 20, 2007; Hội Đồng Bầu Cử DBQH Khóa XII Tiểu Ban Tuyên Truyền Thông Cáo Báo Chí Số 2 [National Assembly 12 Election Commission – Subcommittee 2 for Media Reporting]. "Theo báo cáo nhanh của các tỉnh, thành phố trực thuộc trung ương, tình hình, tiến độ bầu cử của các địa phương từ 14 giờ đến 17 giờ ngày 20/5/2007 như sau.]" [According to the immediate reports from cities and provinces under central government, the election situation and election progress of each location between 2 and 5 pm were as follows]. May 20, 2007.

Hau Giang, demonstrated low quality elections in other areas. Vinh Long stood out for the low portion of publicly counted votes (35%), while Hau Giang respondents remembered local leaders suggesting candidates 100% of the time.

Although a more detailed analysis is necessary, a cursory glance does appear to demonstrate evidence of regionalized variations. Only three provinces excelled on every indicator of electoral quality. Some provinces, like Vinh Long, are faithful to the rule of more than one candidate, but do not appear to adhere to the role of public counting of returns. Alternatively, Phu Tho province had a limited number of elections with more than one candidate, but publicly counted the non-contested returns 97% of the time. Figure 2.1a demonstrates this process graphically.

The first panel of Figure 2.1a includes a scatter plot of provinces on two dimensions of electoral quality. The percentage of respondents who voted in elections with more than one candidate is on the y-axis, while the percentage of respondents who remembered a public counting of votes is on the x-axis. Dashed red lines represent the median performing province on these two indicators. The provinces in the Southwest Quadrant are those that perform below average on both measures. Provinces in the Northwest Quadrant allow multiple candidates, but do not count votes publicly. Provinces in the Southeast Quadrant have public counting of votes in predominantly non-contested elections. Only a handful of provinces (Hai Duong, Thua Thien-Hue, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, and Ha Tinh) perform well on both dimensions. When a third dimension of electoral quality is added (the percentage of respondents who used paper ballots) in the second panel, another trade-off is seen. Both Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City favoured hand-voting over confidential ballots. Hand voting is inferior, as the open nature of the exercise may frighten particular individuals into voting against their true preference, because they fear suffering social stigmatization or perhaps direct reprisals. These patterns of various trade-offs likely demonstrate different ways of managing elections that allow for some local participation, while still maintaining control and guaranteeing the objectives of local leaders.

FIGURE 2.1A: PROVINCIAL TRADE-OFFS IN ELECTORAL QUALITY

Perhaps the most illustrative indicator of electoral quality is the question of whether the respondent voted for the winner (question D107c). Of course, it is certainly possible to imagine a situation where very popular policy-makers dominate the polls, but as a general rule, the lower the winner's vote share, the more competitive the election is. Competitive elections are closer to the theoretical ideal of participation, because they indicate that the incumbent faced a real threat of defeat. This threat indicates that electoral sanctioning is possible and that politicians will be forced to alter their behaviour to better adhere to the demands of their constituencies. Two different mechanisms link competitive elections to a better performance from the local officials. First, the threat of electoral sanctioning will create an incentive for an incumbent politician to do the bidding of his/her citizenry, if they wish to be re-elected (the incentive mechanism). Alternatively, voters can replace a non-responsive incumbent with one that is more likely to listen to voters (the selection mechanism).

In the country as a whole, competition in village elections is limited: 86% of respondents believe they voted for the winner in village elections. A portion of this percentage results from some highly popular winners. Another portion results from respondents altering their vote choice post-hoc to impress an interviewer. The largest factor behind this number, however, results from the fact that the second candidate in most village elections was not a viable choice and never stood a legitimate chance of victory. This fact was confirmed by our focus groups in a number of provinces, where the question of second candidates was raised. It was commonly asserted that a second candidate was usually selected to meet the formal requirements of the GRDO, but s/he was never expected to pose an electoral threat. A common term used to describe this intentionally selected loser was "quan xanh, quan do", meaning "ghost participants" or "paper participants".

As long as village-level elections remain uncompetitive on this measure, participation will be constrained in Viet Nam. A non-viable challenger for village leadership positions obviates both the incentive and selection mechanisms, linking participation to improved leadership performance. In short, while they may vote in high numbers, citizens have a limited ability to affect the choices made in their localities that impact their lives. Elections are least competitive in Yen Bai province, where 100% of respondents voted for the

winner. By contrast, they appear to be highly competitive in Kien Giang, where only 56% of respondents recalled voting for the winner. More work is necessary to understand exactly what is happening in the Southern province of Kien Giang, however, it can be hypothesized that village leadership performance and public service delivery are probably higher there than in similarly endowed places where leaders face no electoral threat at all.

Voluntary Contributions

The final sub-dimension of participation shifts the analysis away from electoral participation to the shaping of local living standards through voluntary contributions. Assuming that these payments are truly voluntary and do not represent a form of informal taxation nor coercion from local authorities, this form of participation is extraordinarily high in Viet Nam.[32] An estimate of 93% of respondents nationally offered a voluntary contribution to a local public works project (question D109aa). In Phu Tho, almost 100% of respondents financially contributed to the village infrastructure and cultural projects. The lowest observed was Vinh Long, where 70% of respondents made payments, is still a remarkable high number.

More variation was demonstrated in response to a follow-on question about who decided the size of the contribution. Of the total respondents, 58% answered that they chose the amount themselves, 15% claimed the contribution size was selected in communal discussions with neighbors, and 26% answered that local authorities chose the amount. There is no reason to believe that any of these decision-making rules is normatively inferior or less participatory, so this question was not included in the index. Delegating the selection of the amount to local authorities or community leaders allows for less independence, but helps solve a collective action problem, whereby some villagers do not contribute to a public good, but still benefit from its construction. Nevertheless, delegating the power to raise funds to a locally elected leader is closer to informal taxation than simply donating a small amount to help fund a local festival. Phu Yen

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32. See for instance MoHA (2009) for examples of in-kind forms of contributions.

(67%), Hai Phong (60%), and Kon Tum (59%) are the provinces who rely most strongly on local leadership decisions, while Phu Tho, Kien Giang, Ha Noi, and Ho Chi Minh City are much more likely to allow citizens to choose their own amounts. Less than 15% of respondents said local authorities determine amounts in the locations.

Finally, PAPI measures whether the village had established proper procedures for monitoring the use of voluntarily collected funds, regardless of who determines the amount. Accordingly, the Community Investment Supervision Boards (CISB),[33] which involves a group of local elites selected through elections at the village level, is mandated with observing that funding is properly accounted for and disbursed. CISBs were only cited by respondents 14.7% of the time, and some provinces, such as Kon Tum, did not have a single respondent check them. The most common response (28%) was that the respondents either did not know who monitored implementation or thought citizens monitored it on their own without an institutional structure. The second most common response (26%) was to attribute the responsibility to the village/residential group head. In addition, 8% of respondents believed the higher-level commune/ward authorities should monitor implementation.

In the spirit of PAPI, understanding which institution ensures that these funds are appropriately spent is important for creating confidence in the government.[34] In simple terms, donors to community projects who believe their funds were miss-used will not volunteer money in the future. In this regard, Hai Duong (56%) and Ha Tinh (54%) stand out as locations where citizens are able to identify the guardian of their allocations.

2.2. DIMENSION 2: TRANSPARENCY

Transparency, or the disclosure and dissemination of public information, is important for a country's development and is another key pillar for governance and greater access from citizens to public administration agencies. Transparency is about knowing what governments are doing, as well as the justifications for their actions. From a demand-side point of view, citizens require valid and timely information so that they can participate in policy making and policy evaluation in qualified and meaningful ways. This, in turn, will enable the administrative system to respond better to suggestions and opinions, serving better the interest of users of public services.

Transparency is directly linked to the provision of public information and on extension to accountability, governance and public administration. Considering that "information is a public good",[35] the academic literature has placed a great deal of emphasis on enhancing transparency for greater development.[36] It has also been suggested that "transparency reforms and accountability reforms would increase the probability of punishment and therefore reduce the incentives for bureaucrats and politicians to be corrupt".[37]

Conversely, opacity, or the inability of government agencies to provide information about their policies and implementation aspects, leads to rent-seeking opportunities.[38] These typically arise as government officials hold information so they can make decisions that primarily will serve interests of special groups. For instance, the process of decision making in areas such as land use planning and large scale commercial

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33. CISB have been established by Prime Minister's Decision 80/2005/QD-TTg dated April 18, 2005 under the supervision of community investments.

34. This clarification is relevant, since some readers may dismiss these particular results as inconsequential, and on the grounds that they simply reflect the ignorance of respondents, many of whom might be poorly educated, rather than a failure to implement the law. However, this conclusion would be short-sighted. It is important to remember that these are the contributions by individual citizens of their hard-earned money to projects that they believe will better their life economically, culturally, or spiritually. And also, as will be explained in chapter 3, PAPI's informants are representative of the overall population in Viet Nam, not necessarily less educated or ignorant.

35. See Stiglitz (2002), p.28

36. See for example Kaufmann et al (2002); Kaufmann and Vishwanath (1999), Stiglitz (2002); OECD (2006); Anderson and Gray (2006). In relation to the importance of transparency for governance and anti-corruption, it has been suggested that in Hong Kong, emphasis on reducing opportunities for corruption have accomplished a great deal, mainly through ensuring transparency and accountability in all government business (see Kwok, 2008).

37. Khan (2009), p.13

38. For instance, Khan (2009), p.15 concedes that "transparency and accountability may sometimes help if both the rents and the rent seeking can be potentially legalized".

investment, in many countries in the world, usually do not involve elements of transparency and provision of information and on extension favouring the interests of those few involved in the processes. Citizens usually find out about their interest not being served at a fairly late stage. The lack of transparency may lead to public outcry, diminished trust in government agencies and distorted policies that create economic and political damages.[39]

Without valid and timely information, citizens and institutions of accountability can hardly exercise their role of monitoring government agencies, nor check and correct potentially damaging abuses of power. Lack of transparency would allow government officials to hide their mistakes and failures, protecting them from being accused of not achieving the desired outcomes. With information being undisclosed, it will take longer for failures to be recognized by the citizens.

In summary, the lack of transparency provides opportunities for corrupt public officials and serves for the interests of special groups, which potentially damages the society at large. Contrariwise, transparency and the provision of information encourages citizens to take part in the governance processes, thus heightening the quality of the decision making process and upgrading monitoring and overseeing work of citizens and civil organizations. More transparency will make it more difficult for government agencies to ignore the needs and interests of the public. When citizens receive sufficient information, they will have greater incentives to participate in political and development processes, which, in turn, will benefit the government as it deepens people's trust in them.

2.2.1. CONTEXTUALIZATION OF TRANSPARENCY IN VIET NAM

As Viet Nam's market economy continues to expand and the country advances its integration on the international stage, there has been growing pressure from citizens, domestic business sectors, international investors and development partners to create greater transparency in the realm of governance and public administration. The government of Viet Nam, with support of international donors, has made significant efforts in this regard. Over the last 10 years, the government has worked to make the legal environment more transparent, introducing various legal documents including the Law on State Budget (2002), the State Audit Law (2005), the Accounting Law (2003). It has also set up different strategies such as the Tax Administration Reform Strategy and Customs Modernization Strategy. One consistent aim of such laws and strategies is to increase transparency in the specific sector, offering stronger check and balance mechanisms. More specifically, the Anti-Corruption Law (2005), the Anti-Corruption Strategy towards 2020 (2010) and the GRDO all address transparency as an important means to keep corruption under control and aim at creating a legal space required to support it.

Despite these efforts, the lack of transparency in governance and public administration in Viet Nam continues to be a burning issue at all levels. The National Assembly frequently claims that the government does not provide sufficient information for it to be in the position to debate and make decisions.[40] This lack of transparency is considered to be among the major reasons leading to the problem of systemic corruption and "transparency roadmaps" have been suggested in different contexts.[41] At the local level, transparency is weak in areas with the greatest

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39. Stiglitz (1999) even argues that using information for private purpose should be considered a serious offense like using any other public property for personal gain.

40. A recent example was the discussions held in 2010 on the Ministry of Transportation's plans to build a high-speed train project. See Dan Tri, "Dự án đường sắt cao tốc: "Quốc hội sẽ cân nhắc kỹ" ["The high-speed train project: National Assembly will have to consider carefully"] available at http://dantri.com.vn/c21/s20-397751/du-an-duong-sat-cao-toc-quoc-hoi-se-can-nhac-ky.htm, where members of the National Assembly complained that even the NA doesn't have sufficient information to meaningfully discuss the case. 35. See for example Kaufmann et al (2002); Kaufmann and Vishwanath (1999), Stiglitz (2002); OECD (2006); Anderson and Gray (2006). In relation to the importance of transparency for governance and anti-corruption, it has been suggested that in Hong Kong, emphasis on reducing opportunities for corruption have accomplished a great deal, mainly through ensuring transparency and accountability in all government business (see Kwok, 2008).

41. The first group of solutions of the AC strategy towards 2020 is about "to strengthen openness and transparency in the performance of official functions and duties, to minimize conditions and opportunities that give rise to corruption in policy-making, development and enforcement of laws". See also Gainsborough et al, 2009 for a discussion on the importance of a "transparency roadmap" in Viet Nam.

potential of rent seeking, for example land management.[42] In other areas such as construction, information is not available, or available but too complex for the non-expert to understand, turning the work of vertical accountability bodies such as People's Inspection Board into a formalistic act.

Similarly, budget transparency at the national level, including financial information from many state owned enterprises is still weak or non existent. Several cases in Viet Nam pointed out a critical need for transparency in economic management, if economic and political damages resulting from large scale, unchecked failures are to be avoided.[43] These cases, while indirectly affecting citizens in their daily life, capture their attention and interest, and potentially influence their perception of the public administration system. In this area, PAPI choose to investigate budget transparency at the commune level, as it can be directly experienced by citizens.

The concept of transparency is understood differently by different actors, and neither the government nor citizens and businesses are used to it in the Vietnamese context[44]. As argued in the context of private business environment: "measuring transparency in Viet Nam can be additionally troublesome, because the term *(minh bach)* is not obvious to many respondents. It can take on different meanings across geographical boundaries and across firms with different relationships to the provincial government".[45]

2.2.2. PAPI'S OPERATIONALISATION OF TRANSPARENCY IN VIET NAM

In Viet Nam's context, transparency in local governance is expressed in the GRDO's "people know", which includes decisions that the commune/ward level governments must communicate to their citizens. These commonly include resolutions from the People's Council and People's Committee, policies and legal instruments of the state, administrative fees, taxes or government charges, and annual financial records of the commune/ward. These are usually displayed in the form of photocopies on blackboards at the entrance of most communal offices.

In respect to transparency of local governments, PAPI investigates three measures (sub-dimensions) related to the publication and knowledge of (i) poor households lists; (ii) communes' budgets; and (iii) the land use plans. These are areas of universal interest to most citizens and of equal importance across the country. Figure 2.2 shows the performance of provinces along this Dimension, with each sub-dimension represented by a color. As an initial observation, it can be noted that the variances of the provinces in this Dimension are not large, compared to other dimensions. The scores range from 4.4 to 6.3. Ho Chi Minh City, Da Nang and Thua Thien-Hue are at the top, with Ho Chi Minh City scoring significantly higher than the immediate followers. At the bottom are Dak Lak, Quang Tri, Lai Chau and Kon Tom, all border and mountainous provinces. However, there seems to be no clear regional pattern. Mountainous provinces in the North (Lai Chau, Yen Bai, Dien Bien, Lang Son), with similar socio-economic conditions, have very different scores. Similarly, Ha Noi and Hai Phong rank significantly lower than other big cities. Potentially the four top provinces (Ho Chi Minh City, Da Nang, Thua Thien-Hue and Lang Son) can offer valuable lessons on how transparency can be improved at local levels.

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42. According to a qualitative research (CECODES, 2009), the highest corruption rate is found in land management. In addition, another recent research notes that there is a serious lack of information across the completed value chain of land management, from land use planning, to land recovery, compensation and resettlement scheme (World Bank, et al, 2010). A third research, on disclosure of land management regulation, found that even information prescribed to be disclosed by law, automatic transparency of that information is not guaranteed and its implementation at the provincial level is uneven (see DEPOCEN, 2010).

43. Perhaps the most recent case is that of Vinashin, in particular see Diễn đàn Kinh Tế Việt Nam (04/11/2010): "Vinashin cũ và mới: Trách nhiệm và minh bạch hoá" [Vietnam Economic Forum: "New and old Vinashin: Responsibility and Transparency"]. Available at http://vef.vn/2010-11-04-vinashin-cu-va-moi-trach-nhiem-va-minh-bach-hoa.

44. See Gainsborough, et al (2009).

45. Malesky (2008), p.83, footnote 64.

FIGURE 2.2: PERFORMANCE LEVELS ON DIMENSION 2: TRANSPARENCY

The individual indicators comprising each sub-dimension are shown in Table 2.2 below, including the corresponding questions in the questionnaire and descriptive statistics. Particularly, the aggregate score of the entire nation and the minimum, median, and maximum provincial scores are highlighted in order to provide a sense of the best and worst performers on each indicator.

Consistent with the other five dimensions, each of the indicators in Table 2.2 were normalized to a 1-10 scale, with '10' representing the highest outcome in transparency observed in the provinces, and '1' the lowest outcome. Each sub-dimension score represents the average score across the indicators which comprise it. Finally, the three sub-dimensions were averaged into an aggregate measure of transparency.

TABLE 2.2: INDICATORS USED TO GENERATE DIMENSION 2: TRANSPARENCY

DIMENSION	NAME OF INDICATOR	PAPI QUESTION	NATIONAL MEAN	NATIONAL 90% CI		PROVINCIAL SCORES	SCORE	PROVINCE
1) Poverty List	Local Households with income < 360,000 VND receive support (% agree)	D201	79.48%	(78.54%	80.43%)	Minimum	44.15%	Lai Chau
						Median	75.90%	Tien Giang/Nam Dinh
						Maximum	96.02%	Da Nang
1) Poverty List	Poverty List Published in Last 12 Months (% agree)	D202	64.77%	(63.71%	65.82%)	Minimum	20.40%	Kon Tum
						Median	62.41%	Kien Giang/Yen Bai
						Maximum	88.48%	Da Nang
1) Poverty List	Households are missing from poverty list (%)	D202a	34.58%	(32.74%	36.42%)	Minimum	17.02%	HCMC
						Median	38.21%	Hai Duong/Long An
						Maximum	69.51%	Quang Tri
1) Poverty List	Non-Poor included on poverty list (%)	D202b	27.47%	(26.31%	28.63%)	Minimum	9.34%	Cao Bang
						Median	26.64%	Kon Tum/Ca Mau
						Maximum	56.17%	Quang Tri
2) Communal Budget	Budget is made available (% agree)	D203	29.46%	(28.20%	30.72%)	Minimum	10.68%	Lai Chau
						Median	26.13%	Da Nang/Binh Dinh
						Maximum	46.90%	Ha Noi
2) Communal Budget	Respondent read communal budget if available (%)	D203a	51.44%	(49.31%	53.56%)	Minimum	9.20%	Phu Tho
						Median	49.76%	Ha Nam/Quang Tri
						Maximum	80.56%	TT-Hue
2) Communal Budget	If respondent read, they believe it has adequate information (%)	D203b	77.52%	(76.32%	78.72%)	Minimum	52.23%	Ha Nam
						Median	72.98%	Dien Bien/Binh Phuoc
						Maximum	95.65%	HCMC
3) Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Respondent is aware of communal land-use plan (%)	D204	24.45%	(22.41%	26.48%)	Minimum	6.32%	Kon Tum
						Median	22.05%	Ca Mau/Hung Yen
						Maximum	43.18%	Da Nang
3) Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Respondent provided comment on plan(%)	D205	8.41%	(7.76%	9.05%)	Minimum	0.38%	Hai Phong
						Median	7.28%	Hung Yen/Binh Phuoc
						Maximum	16.98%	Vinh Long
3) Land-Use Plan/Pricing	If you provided, Land Plan acknowledges concerns (% agree)	D205a	10.38%	(9.67%	11.10%)	Minimum	0.00%	Lau Chau
						Median	10.76%	Phu Tho/TT-Hue
						Maximum	67.52%	Hai Phong
3) Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Respondent DID NOT lose land as a result of new plan (%)	D207	68.17%	(66.86%	69.48%)	Minimum	29.11%	Kon Tum
						Median	63.61%	Hung Yen/Phu Tho
						Maximum	87.90%	HCMC
3) Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Compensation for lost land is close to market value (% agree)	D207a & D207b	17.74%	(16.73%	18.76%)	Minimum	0.00%	Cao Bang
						Median	16.80%	Hai Phong/Ha Tinh
						Maximum	42.36%	Yen Bai
3) Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Respondent knows where to go to get land information (%)	D208	39.42%	(37.82%	41.02%)	Minimum	5.11%	Lang Son
						Median	30.64%	Long An/Quang Tri
						Maximum	56.17%	Phu Yen
3) Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Impact of land plan on family (1 Hurt; 2 Nothing; 3 Benefit)	D206	2.04	(2.022	2.054)	Minimum	1.84	Hung Yen
						Median	2.01	Lang Son/Yen Bai
						Maximum	2.47	HCMC

List of Poor Households

In this sub-dimension, PAPI examines the transparency of poor households lists. During the course of questionnaire development, the acute poverty threshold of 360,000 VND per person per month was used upon consultation with different options proposed by the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) in early 2009.[46]

In normative terms, if recognized as acutely poor, the household is entitled to enjoy a range of social benefits, such as receiving free medical insurance, access to micro-credit programs, children receiving stipendium or tuition waivers when attending schools, among others.[47] The process of identifying acute poor households is multi-staged. MOLISA, acting as the lead government agency, provides guidelines and technical assistance to authorities at provincial, district and commune levels to identify and quantify the number of poor households in their locality. At the village level, the village head works together with representatives of mass associations to prepare the list of poor households using these guidelines. Next, the village head organizes a village meeting for representatives of all households to discuss and agree upon the list. The list, once agreed upon by over 50% of the household representatives, is then made into two copies, with one being submitted to the commune

authority for consolidation with other village lists, and the other one being kept by the village head.[48] The commune list is also posted in a public place for feedback. Then, the commune list is sent to the district authority, where it is further scrutinized and checked. Finally, the district submits the consolidated list to the province, which finally approves it and is sent to MOLISA.

Over the past years, the lack of accuracy on lists of poor households and misusage linked with them has been publicly discussed. For instance, the media has reported cases where non-poor relatives of local public officials have found ways onto the list.[49] Therefore, given the relevance of these lists in most communities in Viet Nam, PAPI considers the assembling process of the poor households list in the communes, and its quality to be a key indicator for levels of transparency of the local governments.

The first indicator used in this sub-dimension, measures the percentage of respondents who correctly know the poverty threshold. Question D201 asks respondents, if according to their knowledge, a household with an income of less than 360,000 VND can be considered by current policies as a poor household. The more people know about this threshold for receiving assistance, the more difficult it would be for local government officials to manipulate the list and exclude people who would be otherwise entitled. In most provinces, between 60% and 80% of respondents correctly know this policy regulation. Most of the cities, especially Da Nang (96%) and Ho Chi Minh City (94%),[50] seem to disseminate this information better to their citizens. Lang Son (92%) also belongs to

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46. See Ministry of Finance website (17/08/2008). Adjusting Poverty Thresholds in Correspondence with CPI 2008, available at http://www.mof.gov.vn/portal/pls/portal/SHARED_APP.UTILS.p r i n t _ p r e v i e w ? p _ p a g e _ u r l =http://www.mof.gov.vn/portal/page/portal/mof_vn/1370586 &p_itemid=2633791&p_siteid=33&p_persid=2177079&p_lang uage=vi. This is also the information consulted with MOLISA during questionnaire development. However, by the end of 2010, the acute poverty thresholds of 200,000VND per person per month for rural households and 260,000VND per person per month for urban households remained regulated by Decision 170/2005/QD-TTg dated July 8, 2005. The current acute thresholds are 400,000VND per person per month for rural households and 500,000VND per person per month for urban households as provided for in Directive 1752/CT-TTg of the Prime Minister for a national census on poor households to facilitate implementation of social security policy for the period of 2011-2015.

47. It is important also to note that, while there is a national poverty line for rural and urban areas, in practice many areas, particularly better off municipal areas, have their own poverty lines according to local circumstances. Being on the poor list is the trigger for accessing benefits, though some schemes have different 'targeting' formulas, i.e. including the 'near poor' or universalising provision for certain ethnic minority groups. Generally though, appearing on the poverty list is the trigger for most benefits. An inventory of poverty reduction programmes in Viet Nam, in 2009, found 41 national poverty reduction oriented programmes or policies. See National Assembly Committee for Social Affairs and UNDP (2009).

48. See MOLISA Circular No. 04/2007/TT-BLDTBXH dated February 28, 2007 guiding the process of annual review of lists of poor households.

49. As examples of media coverage, see Tien Phong Online (06/03/2009). Bình bầu hộ nghèo: Giàu chen bật nghèo [Shortlisting poor households: The rich enlisted, the poor out-listed] available at http://www.tienphong.vn/Thoi-Su/154264/Binh-bau-ho-ngheo-Giau-chen-bat-ngheo.html and VnExpress (21/02/2009). 'Sáng tác' danh sách hộ nghèo để tư lợi tiền Tết ['Making up' poor household lists for personal vested interests] available at http://vnexpress.net/GL/Xa-hoi/2009/02/3BA0B8A6/. [Both accessed on 13/12/2010]

50. It should be noted that Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City are using higher thresholds for poverty lines. Where, the thresholds are set higher at 400,000VND for rural areas and 500,000VND for urban areas in Da Nang, and at 1,000,000VND a day in Ho Chi Minh City for both urban and rural areas respectively. (See The Phap Luat TP HCM (27/02/2010). Da Nang: Tang ho ngheo do nang chuan ngheo. URL: http://phapluattp.vn/20100227121255593p0c1013/da-nang-tang-ho-ngheo-do-nang-chuan-ngheo.htm. and Dan Tri (31/03/2010). Chuan ngheo TPHCM tuong duong chuan ngheo the gioi. Available at http://dantri.com.vn/c21/s20-387847/chuan-ngheo-tphcm-tuong-duong-chuan-ngheo-the-gioi.htm. [Both accessed on 01/12/2010].

the top group, while a province of similar social-economic condition, Lai Chau, has the last position, with only 44% knowing the threshold.

The next indicator (D202) asks if respondents are aware that the list of poor households of their commune has been publicised in the last 12 months. Not publicising the list violates the regulations and the lack of information facilitates potential misusage. Compared to theoretical knowledge, fewer respondents confirmed that the list has been published in their locality. Numbers are as low as around 20% of the respondents in Kon Tum and 30% in Tien Giang. The median value is only around 62.4% (Kien Giang, Yen Bai). Da Nang performs particularly well in this indicator, where 88.5% of the respondents said they had seen the list.

The quality of the list of poor household has often been problematic, an issue featured in the media in the last years.[51] Thus, the next two indicators measure the quality of the list. Question D202a assesses the issue of accuracy that sometimes poor households do not make it into the list, either due to bureaucracy or intentional misusage. Poor households are overlooked due to careless assessment, or they are re-classified as "having overcome poverty" in order to boost the locality's statistics. The results show that there are large variations. Almost 70% of respondents in Quang Tri suggested their lists miss out poor households who should be included, while the number is below 20% in four provinces including Thue Thien-Hue, Yen Bai, Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City. A significant 34.5% of respondents said that their communal list has this type of inaccuracies.

Other quality checks were used to assess if the list includes non-poor households (question D206). In order to enjoy certain social support (such as schooling fee waivers), some non-poor households, often through personal contact, make themselves enlisted, crowding out genuinely poor households. The results from PAPI's survey suggests that this type of inaccuracy, where any non-poor household is in reality enlisted as a poor household that needs state subsidy, has a similar variance, with around 10% in Cao Bang and Da Nang, but as much as 50% and more in Ha Nam and Quang Tri. On the national level, 27.5% say they encounter this problem in their locality.

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51.   See *VietNamNet* (17/03/2009). Tiền Tết cho người nghèo: Biết không đúng đối tượng vẫn cấp [Lunar New Year (Tet) subsidy for the poor: Intentional allocation to wrong recipients]. Available at http://vnn.vietnamnet.vn/xahoi/2009/03/836453/ [Accessed on 13/12/2010]

The Commune's Budget

Although somewhat less empowered than the province or district levels, the commune level has been the focus of considerable experimentation with vertical accountability systems. The exposure of the commune's budget has been one of these experimentations and a key element related to transparency at the local level. According to the 2002 Budget Law (articles 13 and 35), the annual budget of a commune, has to be prepared by the Accounting Department of the commune, and must be sent to the commune's People's Committee, the commune's People's Council, and the District's Accounting Department. In addition, it must be displayed publicly at grass-roots level people's committees and detail all income sources, especially contributions of people, as well as expenditures, such as the operation of the PC, and for economic development.

The GRDO also places special importance to the transparency of communal budget, which is in the group of people's "right to know". Transparent information on sources of income and expenses at the commune level will help to make it more difficult for officials to misuse public funds, prevent corruption, and increase people's trust that public funds are used in a sensible and meaningful way.

In this context, question D203 asks if respondents are aware of the communal budget being publicized within the last 12 months. As requested by both the Budget Law and the GRDO (article 5), annual budget information has to be displayed in places easily accessible for people, such as outside the grass-roots PC's office. Alternatively the content can be read on the loudspeaker system (in this case, it should be announced on three consecutive days). Despite being one of the most important measures of transparency at the grass-roots level, at the top of the scale, only between 40% and 50% of respondents confirmed that they knew about last year's communal budget being published (Ha Noi 46%, Phu Tho 44.5%). The number drops drastically and is as low as around 10% for Lai Chau, Kon Tum, Vinh Long and Lang Son. The average score is 29.5% for all selected provinces. Clearly there is a strong need for communes to follow the regulation and communicate its annual budget to their population.

Publicising communal budgets alone will not bring benefits if people, for whatever reason, do not read them. Question D203a goes further than the formal request in the GRDO, to expose the communal budget, and asks respondents who are aware of the budget's publication if they have actually read it at some point. The results show valuable differences. On aggregate, one in two respondents have read them, but province-

wise, in Phu To only one in ten have read them, followed by Ha Noi, Hau Giang, Kon Tum (around 30%). This suggests the reasons for not-reading the budget's publication are probably not due to a high level of illiteracy or long travelling distance to the commune's PC. Similarly, provinces at the top end with 60-70% are a diverse mix of cities including Thua Thien-Hue and Ho Chi Minh City, low land provinces in the South like Ca Mau, but also provinces in the North as Ha Tinh and the mountainous Lang Son province. For the majority of provinces (25), the share is 60% or less, while the mean of the whole sample size is 51%. Clearly there is a need for the provinces to provide better access and motivate people to inform themselves about the commune's budget.

The final indicator of sub-dimension (D203b) checks the quality of the information provided in the exposed budget and asks respondents if they believe this content is adequate and accurate. This will help to differentiate communes who publicise their budget just as a formality from the others. The provincial differences in this indicator are not as large as in the two previous indicators. At the lower end are the provinces of Ha Nam, Yen Bai, Ha Tinh and Lai Chau, where around 60% of people having read the budget believed that the information is adequate. The number is greater than 80% for one fourths of the selected provinces, including cities in the Central and Southern regions (Thua Thien-Hue, Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City), but also in rural provinces such as Long An, Bac Giang and Binh Dinh. The national average score is 77.5%. A similar indicator was used in the VHLSS 2008, where it asked respondents who read the communal budget if the information provided in the budget about various items (such as the use of people's voluntary contribution, the infrastructure development plan, etc.) met their needs. Between 40% and 50% answered positively.[52]

Transparency of Land Use Plans

Articles 5 and 6 of the GRDO requests local governments to be responsible for providing information concerning land-use plans, as well as policies, laws, long-term and annual socio-economic development plans and annual budgets of the commune. PAPI chose the land-use plan to be an indicator due to its importance and potential impact to people's life. Over the last decades, land-use planning, and related to it, land recovery, compensation and resettlement schemes have been sources of social tension and people's dissatisfaction in terms of how local governments manage these matters. Non-transparent land use planning is believed to be the main driver for land-related corruption, which, as more and more residential and agricultural land has been converted for economic development, has been growing significantly.[53]

The first indicator of this sub-dimension is question D204, which asks respondents if they are aware of the land use plan of their commune. This is a straightforward indicator informing about the extent to which the land use plan is exposed and ultimately reached by people. In general, the numbers are fairly low. In two thirds of the provinces, less than 25% of the respondents were informed about the land use plan. Even in the best performing provinces (Da Nang, Vinh Long, Ho Chi Minh City), the numbers are only between 30% and 45%. In the low end of the scale, Kien Giang, Cao Bang, Dien Bien only scored 10%, and Kon Tum, 6.3%. On average, 24.45% of respondents have been informed or are aware about this plan.

Regarding the land use plans, the GRDO requests that citizens should have the opportunity to comment on the drafts of the plan before its final version gets approved by the respective authorities. The next indicator (question D205) asks respondents if they were given the opportunity to provide comments on their communal land use plan before it is published. Expectedly, the percentage of people who had an opportunity to comment is also very low. At the national level, only 8.4% of respondents answered positively. Vinh Long and Ha Tinh do best with almost 17%, while it is as low as 0.4% in Hai Phong. This situation clearly undermines people's participation in the development process as well as their trust in the government, and potentially increases their perception that information is hidden so that individuals in the government and business sectors who are driving land use planning processes would get personal benefits out of it.

The next indicator assesses to what extent the "right to comment", as manifested in the GRDO, is not just a

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52. See World Bank (2009).

53. See World Bank et al (2010) and DEPOCEN (2010).

formality in its implementation. Question D205a asks respondents who said to have provided comments to the land use drafts, if their comments are acknowledged in the final approved land use plan. Of the total respondents, 10.4% said their comments were taken into account. In eight provinces, including Dong Nai, Yen Bai, Lai Chau, Ha Nam, Nam Dinh, Ha Tinh, Phu Yen, Tien Giang, nobody (0%) considered their comments were being taken into account. In other 7 provinces, including Phu Tho, Hung Yen, Dak Lak, Ca Mau, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, Dien Bien, the response was nearly 10%. The province of Hai Phong had the largest respondents' agreement with 67.5%.[54]

In the next indicator (question D207), respondents are asked if they did not lose land as a result of land use plans. This indicator investigates the sensibility and awareness of land-use planning in terms of minimizing its negative impact on people's livelihood. This measure shows wide variation, from between 60 – 70% respondents having lost land due to the most recent land use plans (Long An, Ha Tinh, Kon Tum), to between 10-20% in Ho Chi Minh City and Vinh Long. Almost 70% of the respondents interviewed reported not having lost land recently.

Another indicator assessing the impact of land use plans on the community is question D206. The question asks respondents whether the plan benefits or hurts their households. The value '1' is assigned to the respondent whose household was hurt, the value '2' is assigned to the household with no impact, and the value '3' is assigned to families who get benefits from the plan. The higher the average value for a commune is, the more positive impact its land use plan has for the people. Results show that the national average score is 2, meaning in most provinces, respondents were not impacted, either negatively or positively, by the latest land use plan. This is also reflected by the minimum and maximum values: the lowest score is in Hung Yen with 1.8. Most beneficiaries are in Ho Chi Minh City with a score of 2.47.

One of the most common complaints of people, whose land is revoked, is that the compensation price set by the local government is too low compared to the market price. In most cases, this favours investors and opens doors to corruption where public officials and investors could potentially share the difference between the compensation price and the market price. The next indicator (question D207) asks respondents if the people who lost land due to the latest land-use plan received compensation close to the market level or not. The results strongly resonates the situation voiced in other studies.[55] Even in the best performing provinces, only between 30-43% respondents say the received compensation is close to the market level. Yen Bai has the highest score with 42.6%. For a number of provinces, the number is below 5%, with none of the respondents in Cao Bang sharing the view. At the national average, only about 18% of people provided a positive answer. This is perhaps one of the main reasons for citizens' dissatisfaction and the exploding numbers of land-related complaints in recent years: from 2004 to 2007, the land-related complaints sent to Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment rose from 4,000 to 12,000.[56]

The last indicator of this sub-dimension is a strong and direct measure of transparency. Question D208 asks respondents what they would do if they want to find out the official compensation price as approved by the local authority (see Appendix C for exact wording and answer options). There are a number of potential ways to get access to the land price frame of a certain locality, including for example the "*công báo*" gazette, provincial websites or archives in the people's committee offices. This indicator did not specifically check whether a respondent's action was correct or not, but rather measures the percentage of respondents who are confident enough to know where to go if they want to find out the compensation prices. On average, 39.4% of respondents knew where to go for the information. The number is highest in Phu Yen, Ho Chi Minh City, Nam Dinh and Ha Noi (over 50%), and drops gradually to 20%, with the exception of Lang Son, with just 5%. The lack of transparency in this matter is a fertile ground for abuse where a public official could impose an incorrect compensation price to the uninformed land owners who do not know how to equip themselves with the information.

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54. This number should be taken with caution, as Hai Phong had the lowest number of respondents who provided comments. And as discussed in the previous indicator, given the low level of participation, it was probably easier to accommodate them.

55. See World Bank et al (2010).

56. See World Bank (2010).

2.3. DIMENSION 3: VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability is a key attribute of governance and public administration. It is particularly important to anti-corruption and it enhances efficiency and availability of public goods. Accountability is an inherently difficult concept to explain, as it has different translations and interpretations. It is also highly difficult to ascertain how it can be enforced. In a nutshell, the concept of accountability basically ensures that citizens, state and non-state organizations, have both the legal framework and the ability to make public sector agencies and officials account for the actions and inactions they take while exercising their public authorities. It includes overseeing the work of government agencies and public officials, as well as monitoring effective performance.

Accountability also refers to spaces for participation in the decision-making process, the formulation of policies and their subsequent implementation processes. In addition, it refers to the execution and monitoring of government activities. It takes place within a process of checks and balances, which prevents governments from wrongdoings, and provides individuals and organizations with the tools and mechanisms to make their demands known and actively contribute and participate in governance and public administration processes.[57]

It is widely believed that effectively functioning accountability is required, so that government policies reach their aimed objectives and meet the needs of those policies' beneficiaries. The academic literature has recognized two distinct aspects of the concept of accountability: answerability and enforcement.[58] The former indicates that being accountable to somebody implies being obliged to respond to questions. On the other hand, holding somebody accountable implies being able to ask questions. Thus, answerability as part of accountability means the obligation of government agencies and public officials to provide information about their actions and decisions. The public and institutions of accountability can demand the government to provide reliable facts to inform, or valid reasons to justify government policies. The latter aspect of accountability enforcement means that accountability actors have the ability to reward good behaviours, punish bad ones, and impose sanctions.

This suggests that government agencies and public officials should bear the consequences of their actions and inactions. Enforcement is essential as accountability mechanisms, which only expose wrong behaviours but are not able to imply that direct consequences will not be effective. Different institutions might be responsible for either one or both of these aspects.[59]

Although the notion of accountability is elusive and contested regarding its definitions and forms, two main types of accountability are distinguished in the academic and international development communities: horizontal and vertical accountability. Horizontal accountability is basically a concept that refers to the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered to take actions when other state agencies or officials engage in wrongdoings. Forms of actions can range from routine oversight to sanction or impeachment.[60] Typical institutions of horizontal accountability are the parliament (or national assembly) and the judiciary. These institutions mainly perform checks on the powers and implementation of policies from the executive branches of the government. Furthermore, there are other institutions such as supreme audit institutions, ombudsmen or anti-corruption commissions, which are relatively independent of the government and can report to parliament or be parts of the judiciary.[61]

On the other hand, vertical accountability offers forms for citizens and non-state actors to have a greater role in holding governments accountable. This type of accountability mechanisms relies on civic engagement, whereby ordinary citizens and civil organizations participate in the accountability process. As discussed earlier under Dimension one, elections are perhaps the most formal channel of vertical accountability, where citizens have the ability to vote down ineffective or corrupt leaders. There are also informal processes where citizens organize themselves into associations (or make use of the media) to lobby for change, to monitor public officials' conduct, demand explanations and perform non-formal sanctions such as negative publicity.[62] Citizens and civil associations can also engage with horizontal

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57. See Acuña-Alfaro and González de Asís (2003), p.125-126, and in the same volume a compilation of case studies on Social Accountability in Latin America, including mechanisms of participatory monitoring and evaluation.

58. See Schedler et al (1999) for a more detailed discussion on these two definitions.

59. See Stapenhurst and O'Brien (undated) for a discussion on accountability governance.

60. It can be argued that the concept of horizontal accountability was pioneered by O'Donnell (1973) seminal work on "Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism" in the early 1970s in South America. For a later, revised version see O'Donnell (1999).

61. For a discussion on the importance of these types of institutions for horizontal accountability see Stapenhurst and O'Brien (undated)

62. For example see paper by Diamond (undated).

accountability institutions. This can be done by way of seeking support from members of parliament to express concerns and send complaints, who can then raise the concern in the query sessions in the parliament or request information directly from a government agency. Vertical accountability is sometimes referred to as "societal accountability" and is society driven. Common mechanisms of vertical accountability include participatory budgeting, social audits, and citizen report cards, among others. Although the mechanisms can be initiated and supported both by the state or citizens alike, they always operate from bottom-up.[63]

2.3.1. CONTEXTUALIZATION OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN VIET NAM

A tailored discussion about accountability needs to consider Viet Nam's specific political characteristics and the nature of a one-party system. Yet, setting aside political dimensions of existing accountability mechanisms between the Communist Party of Viet Nam and the operation of governance and public administration, several gradual changes can be discussed. On the one hand, it has been argued that the institutional reform agenda within the PAR process includes a component of refining existing and new mechanisms of direct accountability of public administrators to citizens. This has been done in an attempt for public officials and civil servants to be more responsive, but also for public services to be more "customer oriented".[64]

In terms of horizontal accountability, the National Assembly of Viet Nam has been exercising a more assertive role, and in the past few years, it has increased its activity and advanced its role as representative of citizens. In particular, the 1992 Constitution gave the National Assembly more independence with the establishment of the Standing Committee as a fully independent body from the government. In 2001, with the Law on the Organization of the National Assembly, it has gained additional oversight powers, such as the right to cast votes of no-confidence, the right to monitor anti-corruption policies,

and the right to approve the allocation of the budget among sectors, programs and provinces.[65] The National Assembly's role in revision and rejection of draft laws proposed by the government has been also growing greater.[66] Vietnamese members of parliament have also started to display more disapproval of certain cabinet nominees by giving them significant less votes compared to past periods[67], and there have been growing signs of willingness to put into operation key accountability mechanisms at their disposal, including requests for votes of no-confidence for controversial matters and a more active role in the query session to challenge government ministers.[68]

In regards to vertical accountability, Viet Nam has experimented with various common tools mentioned above, such as participatory budgeting, social audits or citizen report cards, often with technical assistance of international donors and NGOs.[69] Yet, perhaps, the most institutionalized and wide-reaching vertical accountability mechanism at the local level is through the two community-base organizations: the People's Inspection Boards (PIB) and the Community Investment Supervision Board (CISB). The legal space for the two boards for implementation and operation is given by the 2007 GRDO. The PIB mandate is to supervise the implementation of all regulations and policies by the commune People's Committees. On the other hand, the CISB focuses on the supervision of investment projects and programs that directly affect the community in communes, regardless of the source of capital. This

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63. See Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2003) for a discussion on bottom-up accountability.

64. See Painter et al (2009), p.358 he argues "the OSS becomes a focal point for communication and contact between local leaders and citizens, providing concrete mechanisms for enhancing their accountability to the public".

65. See World Bank (2010).

66. For example, d'Auriac and Huong Lan (2004) examine the back and forth process of political discussion between the legislative and the executive regarding the approval process for the 2005 Competition Law, and how it involved a revision process of more than ten drafts.

67. See Malesky and Schuler (2010).

68. For example, in 2004 a group of members of parliament requested for no-confidence vote on four ministers (see Tu Giang, 2004), and more recently, in 2010 Lang Son's representative formally requested a non-confidence vote during the discussion around problems of lack of transparency and mismanagement in one of the largest state owned enterprises in the country, the shipbuilding Vinashin.

69. See CECODES, VFF and UNDP (2010) for a selection of examples in Viet Nam.

includes both projects invested by the commune-level government, and investment projects implemented in the commune but decided and managed by central, provincial or district-level governments. It monitors various aspects of investment project, such as efficiency and waste in use of capital, compliance with technical processes and regulations, procurement, land use planning, resettlement schemes, and social and environment impacts, among others.

In 2007, Decree No. 47/2007/ND-CP[70] expanded the accountability mandate of PIBs and CISBs to include anti-corruption work. The PIB was given the responsibility to oversee the implementation of the Anti-corruption Law at the commune level, in state agencies, and state own enterprises, including detection of corruption cases. In addition, the GRDO give powers to the boards to participate in the votes of confidence at the commune level and to supervise all government activities at the commune level that are subject to grassroots democracy: commune budgets, commune socioeconomic development plans, land use plans and drafts, compensation and resettlement draft plans. These activities can be initiated and managed by the commune-level government, and by the government at a higher level. In practice, the CISB is much less frequently established, and in many locations, it is a common practice for the PIB to overtake the tasks normally assigned to a CISB.

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70. See Government Decree No. 47/2007/ND-CP dated March 23, 2007, detailing and guiding the implementation of a number of articles of the anti-corruption law, regarding the role and responsibility of the society in corruption prevention and fighting.

2.3.2. PAPI'S OPERATIONALISATION OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN VIET NAM

In the Vietnamese context, vertical accountability is perhaps best expressed in the GRDO's as "... people verify". Therefore, being a citizen survey, it is natural that PAPI focuses on mechanism of vertical accountability. Dimension three includes three sub-dimensions which are relevant in this context, namely interactions of citizens with local authorities, on the one hand, and the operation and experiences with PIBs and CISBs. Figure 2.3 below shows the three sub-dimensions, represented by three colours in the bar graph.

Each of the indicators in Table 2.3 were normalized to a 1-10 scale, with '10' representing the most accountability outcome, and '1' representing the least accountability outcome observed in a Vietnamese province (see Chapter 3 for more details). Each sub-dimension score represents the average score across the indicators which comprise it. Finally, the three sub-dimensions were averaged into an aggregate measure of accountability, so that each sub-dimension represents one third of the final score. This can be observed in Figure 2.3.

On the aggregate score of accountability, the best performing province is Ha Tinh with 6.4 and a confidence interval of 6.1 to 6.6, followed by Hai Duong and Ho Chi Minh City, both having a mean score of 6.1. At the low end are Yen Bai and Lang Son with a score of 4.5, significantly lower than their peers Cao Bang (4.7) and Lai Chau (5.0). Among the big cities, Ho Chi Minh City and Da Nang (5.7) belong to the top group, significantly above Hai Phong (5.3) and Ha Noi (4.9). Ha Noi has the 90% confidence interval between 4.7 and 5.0, making it only significantly above the three least performing provinces. There is no regional pattern to be seen, and socio-geographical conditions do not seem to play a role as well: among the top ten, there is a mix of urban and rural provinces from both North, Central and South Viet Nam. Mountainous provinces are scattered across the lower half of the performance levels.

FIGURE 2.3: PERFORMANCE LEVELS ON PAPI DIMENSION 3: VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Table 2.3 summarizes the main findings for each sub-dimension and their respective indicators. The first sub-dimension examines the frequency and quality of people's interaction with the government levels closest to them: the villages and communes. It also looks at how often citizens make proposals to the local authorities. The assumption is that a more open, democratic environment will create a lower threshold for people to approach authorities looking for help when they have issues of various natures and actors, be it someone in the household or community or with an official. Similarly, public officials with more transparent and accountable ways of working will likely provide more satisfactory outcomes when

citizens seek to contact them for their problems or suggestions. Also, they will create a more supportive environment where people feel that they are heard, and therefore encouraged to make proposals to improve their community.

The People's Inspection Board (PIB) and the Community Investment Supervising Board (CISB) are two grass-roots level institutions with oversight functions. As mentioned earlier, the operation and mandates of these institutions of accountability comes from the grassroots democracy legislation. In this context, PAPI investigates various aspects of the implementation and performance of these two boards which can be observed and experienced by ordinary citizens.

TABLE 2.3: INDICATORS USED TO GENERATE DIMENSION 3: VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

DIMENSION	NAME OF INDICATOR	PAPI QUESTION	NATIONAL MEAN	NATIONAL 90% CI		PROVINCIAL SCORES	SCORE	PROVINCE
1) Interactions with local authorities	Contacted village head (%)	D301a1	29.28%	28.04%	30.52%)	Minimum	11.92%	Ha Noi
						Median	27.04%	Phu Yen/Yen Bai
						Maximum	53.90%	Ha Tinh
1) Interactions with local authorities	Contacted commune official (%)	D301b1	17.05%	(16.09%	18.02%)	Minimum	3.85%	Ha Noi
						Median	15.34%	Binh Dinh/Lai Chau
						Maximum	46.85%	Hau Giang
1) Interactions with local authorities	Meeting with village head was useful (%)	D301a2	88.42%	(87.35%	89.49%)	Minimum	71.27%	Phu Yen
						Median	89.09%	Bac Giang/Binh Dinh
						Maximum	99.45%	Kon Tum
1) Interactions with local authorities	Meeting with commune official was useful (%)	D301b2	85.63%	(84.92%	86.35%)	Minimum	45.74%	Phu Tho
						Median	83.95%	Quang Tri/Ha Nam
						Maximum	100.00%	Lang Son
1) Interactions with local authorities	Made proposal to local authorities (%)	D302a1	18.62%	(16.93%	20.31%)	Minimum	5.03%	Tien Giang
						Median	18.80%	Binh Dinh/Cao Bang
						Maximum	35.24%	Da Nang
1) Interactions with local authorities	Making proposal was useful (%)	D301a2	91.82%	(91.01%	92.62%)	Minimum	60.14%	Da Nang
						Median	89.49%	Vinh Long/Hai Phong
						Maximum	100.00%	Hai Duong
2) People's Inspection Board (PIB)	Respondent aware of village PIB (%)	D303	36.81%	(35.16%	38.46%)	Minimum	9.50%	Kien Giang
						Median	30.20%	Cao Bang/Vinh Long
						Maximum	69.49%	Hai Duong
2) People's Inspection Board (PIB)	PIB selected by vote (% of those aware)	D303a	19.06%	(17.87%	20.24%)	Minimum	4.41%	Bac Giang
						Median	12.70%	Hai Phong/Long An
						Maximum	50.31%	Hai Duong
2) People's Inspection Board (PIB)	PIB is effective at its job(% of those aware)	D304c	75.20%	(74.08%	76.32%)	Minimum	45.76%	Phu Tho
						Median	73.87%	Kien Giang/Yen Bai
						Maximum	92.62%	Ca Mau
3) Community Inspection Supervision Board	Respondent aware of Commune CISB (%)	D304a	19.35%	(18.02%	20.69%)	Minimum	2.07%	Kien Giang
						Median	16.13%	Ha Nam/Lai Chau
						Maximum	42.58%	Ha Tinh
3) Community Inspection Supervision Board	CISB is effective at its job(% of those aware	D304b	89.30%	(88.65%	89.95%)	Minimum	32.50%	Lang Son
						Median	86.09%	Quang Tri/Hai Phong
						Maximum	100.00%	Phu Tho

Interaction with Local Authorities

Question D301 asked about how citizens have interacted with the public administration system in the last three years if they want to seek help to address problems either of a private or administrative nature. The data shows that 29.3% of respondents from the 30 selected provinces have contacted their village heads during the last 3 years. The numbers vary widely from province to province. Only 12% of the respondents in

Ha Noi have interacted with the village head during that time frame. The number goes up to 53% in Ha Nam and 54% in Ha Tinh. It seems that the village head is the first address for the citizens to go to. Among the whole population from the 30 selected provinces, only 17% of respondents have contacted commune officials during the last three years. At the provincial level, the difference between village heads and commune's officials varies, but in no province

commune officials were contacted more than village heads. The lowest interaction with commune's level is again Ha Noi with only 3.9%, less than one tenth of the highest, which is Hau Giang with 46.8%.

Respondents judged the quality of their meetings with village heads and commune officials similarly. When asked if the meeting with either of these two actors was useful, on average 88.4% of the respondents who met their village head answered positively, compared to 85.6% for positive interaction with commune level officials. The quality of meetings with village heads seems to be fairly consistent across all provinces (from 71.3% in Phu Yen to 99.5% in Kon Tum). When it comes to meeting a commune's official, in Phu Tho only 45.7% of respondents found the meeting to be useful, while at the top end 100% in Lang Son found the meeting helpful. It is useful to note that although Lang Son did well on this indicator, it did less so in other sub-dimension, resulting in a low overall performance in the whole Dimension.

The next two indicators of this sub-dimension deal with the possibility for citizens to make proposals to government agencies. Question D302a1 asked if the respondent had made a proposal to the government in the last year. The assumption is that unlike filing a complaint (which may or may not be a signal for living in a fair and encouraging environment), making a proposal can be interpreted as a sign that citizens feel their voices are heard and is worth the effort to suggest some changes to the local authorities. Overall, almost one fifth of respondents said that they had made a proposal during the last year. Participants seem to be more active in making proposals to the government in Da Nang, Thua Thien-Hue (both 35%) and Ha Tinh (32%), and less bothered to make a difference via a proposal in Tien Giang, Lang Son, Yen Bai, Nam Dinh and Ha Noi (from 5% to 9%). The next question (D302a2) asked respondents who have made a proposal, whether the action was helpful or not. As high as 91.8% of the proposal making people said the act was useful. It is possible that as these citizens are active, educated and articulated people so the success rate in their action is higher. The lowest success rate (60%) goes to Da Nang, which is one of the provinces with the highest share of proposal making respondents. All other provinces have success rates of 75% to 100%.

People's Inspection Board (PIB)

The first indicator (question D303) of this sub-dimension is straight-forward. Respondents were asked if they are aware of the existence of the PIB in their commune. The implementation of PIB has been going on for more than six years under the 2004 Law on Inspections, and on a nationwide scale there are 11,102 PIBs in existence out of 11,116 communes/wards.[71] Despite this large number of PIBs, 36.7% of the respondents in all selected provinces said that their commune has a PIB. In many provinces the board is known only to very few respondents: Kien Giang (9%), Dak Lak (14%) and Tien Giang (14%). At the top end, 59% in Dong Nai and 69% in Hai Duong were aware of the board's existence.

Furthermore, although the GRDO requests the PIB to be formed in a grass-root democratic process, few citizens are aware of this process. The next indicator (question D303a) asked respondents who are aware of their local PIB how the board is supposed to be established and offered four choices: (1) voted by the people, recognized by VFF; (2) established by commune's PC; (3) established by commune's People's Council; and (4) established by VFF. The right answer is (1), 50% of respondents in Hai Duong answered correctly and 33% in Ho Chi Minh City (the best provinces). At the other end, only 4-5% of respondents in Dak Lak, Bac Giang and Tien Giang know about the correct mechanism to establish a PIB. Only 19% of respondents from the selected provinces know that citizens have the right and should be the ones forming this monitoring body.

These results resonate with some other research about the challenges the PIBs face in their operation: local people do not consider it their right and responsibility to establish and support the Board. Combined with the lack of cooperation from the local authorities who are supposed to be monitored, many of the boards have disappeared just shortly after being formed.[72]

The last indicator of the sub-dimension (question D304c) asked respondents who know about the board's existence if they think the board functions effectively. A surprising 75% said their board is effective

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71. See Communist Party of Viet Nam Online Newspaper (13/12/2010). "Cả nước thành lập được hơn 11.100 Ban Thanh tra nhân dân" [More than 11,100 People's Inspection Boards set up nation-wide], available at www.cpv.org.vn/Ca-nuoc-thanh-lap-duoc-hon-11100-Ban-Thanh-tra-nhan-dan/5368992.epi [Accessed on 26/12/2010].

72. See VUFO-NGO, et al (2008).

at its job. In the best province, Ca Mau, 93% gave a positive answer, whereas it is 46% in Phu Tho. A note of caution is appropriate here, as 8.3% of respondents from Ca Mau could not name the role that the PIB actually played in their community, even though they answered that the PIB was effective.

Community Investment Supervision Board (CISB)

Similar to the sub-dimension about PIBs, the first indicator for this sub-dimension (question D304a) asked respondents if they were aware of a CISB in their commune. According to an official source of news, 5,915 CISBs have been established at the commune level.[73] Of the number of respondents to this question, 19.4% mentioned there are CISBs in their communes. This is not unexpected, as according to internal VFF's assessments, the implementation of the CISB has been even slower than PIB, and it is a common practice in many communities for the PIB to function as a CISB as well, turning these two boards into one.[74] In Ha Tinh, the best scoring province for this Dimension, 43% of the respondents are aware about the CISB. On the other extreme, probably because of lack of knowledge, the number is as low as 2% in Southern provinces like Tien Giang and Hau Giang.

Question D303c asked respondents, who are aware of the board's existence, if it is effective at doing its job. Again, the overall score is very high, on average 89% of respondents confirmed its effectiveness. On the other hand, the variations are larger than with PIB. While 100% in Phu Tho answered positively, only 32.5% in Lang Son did so.

The overall picture shows that, as indicated in some VFF's evaluations,[75] PIBs and CISBs have not yet lived up to their roles as society's oversight bodies, fulfilling their important mandates such as overseeing the legal compliance of land use planning and investment projects in the locality. Despite being charged with complex oversight activities, in most of the cases, the board members lack the skills and knowledge to

perform, and they have to work with a very limited budget. Although many provinces reported to have established a PIB in each commune of their territory,[76] the fact that on average only one third of the respondents are aware of their existence, suggests their visibility and impact need to be improved significantly. Further study is needed to review which provinces are more advanced in the board implementation and draw lessons learned from their experiences on how they utilize the legal space given to these institutions to improve vertical accountability.

2.4. DIMENSION 4: CONTROL OF CORRUPTION

Corruption is now talked about openly in many countries, and few will deny they suffer from its social, political and economic consequences. Yet, agreeing on what is corruption is more controversial as some practices and norms differ between societies and culture. Even, perhaps the most widely used definition of corruption, the "use of public office for private gain," may err on the side of oversimplification. In fact, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) does not provide an exact definition of corruption, but rather a normative framework to deal with different manifestations of corruption. While countries have been shown to be less affected than others, elements of corruption can be identified throughout the world, in rich states and poor ones.[77] It has been shown that corruption can impede foreign and domestic investment,[78] lead to inefficient allocation of public resources, exacerbate economic inequality, drive economic activity into the informal sector,[79] and ultimately damage prospects for economic growth and the welfare of citizens.[80] Even more perniciously, corruption undermines public trust in government, and, if unchecked, may lead to regime instability.

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73. See Communist Party of Viet Nam Online Newspaper (13/12/2010). "Cả nước thành lập được hơn 11.100 Ban Thanh tra nhân dân" [More than 11,100 People's Inspection Boards set up nation-wide], available at www.cpv.org.vn/Ca-nuoc-thanh-lap-duoc-hon-11100-Ban-Thanh-tra-nhan-dan/5368992.epi [Accessed on 26/12/2010].

74. See Cuc (2009).

75. See Cuc (2009).

76. See The Thanh Tra [Government Inspectorate] (14/12/2010). Nghe An: Don thu giam nho thanh tra nhan dan [Nghe An: Petitions on decrease thanks to the active work by People's Inspection Boards]. Available at www.thanhtra.com.vn/Default.aspx?tabid=55&newsid=35148 and Thanh Tra (13/01/2011) Thanh tra nhan dan Ha Noi: Da khang dinh duoc vai tro, vi the. [People's Inspection Boards in Hanoi: Their roles and statuses affirmed]. Available at www.thanhtra.com.vn/Default.aspx?tabid=55&newsid=36162.

77. See Johnston (2005).

78. See Smarzynska and Wei (2000).

79. See Johnson et al (1997).

80. See Bardhan (1997).

In the academic literature analyzing corruption, scholars distinguish between two general forms of corruption.[81] On the one hand, there are corrupt practices that takes place at the highest levels of governmental hierarchies (these practices are usually referred to as macro-corruption), and consists mainly of activities that are not directly observed by average citizens, although they certainly have an impact on general welfare and typically involve large amount of money. Macro-corruption commonly includes such activities as: (i) the acceptance of kick-backs on the issuance of government procurement contracts (for construction, equipment, technical services, etc.); (ii) the reception of bribes for policies which favour particular economic actors; (iii) the allocation of limited resources (including natural resources, telecommunications spectrum, export or production quota, or high-performing levels) on a non-market basis that benefits households, friends, or those with close relationships to the policy-makers; (iv) the exploitation of inside information regarding economic planning in infrastructure, land use, or regulatory policy, that allows the policy-maker of those close to him/her to benefit at the expense of the uninformed average investor; and (v) participation in sweetheart investment deals to which general investors do not have access and are meant to curry favour.[82]

On the other hand, the second major form of corruption consists primarily of small bribes and informal fees incurred by individual citizens as they go about their normal activities and interaction with the public sector. Within these forms of corrupt practices two additional sub-types can be distinguished. The first sub-type, referred to as public sector corruption occurs when corrupt actions are committed by an officer of the state. This sub-type of corruption can occur within public offices, as citizens try to fulfil requisite government procedures. Bribes to receive driver's licenses, construction permits, land titles, business registration, or customs approvals all fit under this category. It also may occur at a courthouse, if a citizen must pay an official to have their case heard, or can sway the ultimate decision with a bribe to an influential judge. Public sector petty corruption can occur in law enforcement when citizens might pay an informal fee to avoid a traffic citation, or bribe an environmental inspector to not report a violation in their household business. Public sector corruption has also been known to take place among tax officials, who might lower the overall tax burden, in exchange for a small gift or payment.

The second sub-type of petty corruption occurs when citizens must pay informal fees, above and beyond legally stipulated service fees, to receive access to basic public services that are guaranteed by law. Corruption in public service delivery can occur at hospitals and schools, when doctors or teachers demand extra payments in order to ensure high quality service. Alternative forms of corruption occur when doctors or teachers divert students or teachers to their more lucrative private offices, rather than serving them in public hospitals and classrooms. In education specifically, petty corruption takes place when grades and other markers of achievement can be achieved for a price, rather than as a reward of merit for classroom performance. Corruption in public service delivery also occurs when citizens pay protection payments to police officers, essentially bribing officers of the law to do their job.

A third variant of corruption cuts across both the macro and petty corruption types - nepotism, when public sector jobs are awarded based on relationships rather than merit-based recruitment. Nepotism, which is highly common in developed and developing countries alike, can be very dangerous, because it can lead to the selection of inferior leaders and civil servants.

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81. See Johnston (2008), p. 40 for a discussion on these types of corruption, and Transparency International (2006).

82. Because macro-corruption is hardly witnessed or experienced by average citizens, reliable information on it cannot be gleaned from a public opinion survey such as PAPI. While some elites, such as business leaders or local politicians included among the PAPI respondents, may have information about these activities, most respondents would simply be speculating based on rumors and innuendos. There is a great danger that respondents confuse economic inequality with evidence of corruption, concluding that the wealth of some must be due to illegal activity. A different research approach is needed to appropriately assess macro-corruption at the national level and across regional sub-units and some approaches are already employed in Viet Nam. For instance, the PCI surveys of domestic and international business leaders are helpful for gauging business experiences with corruption. Other methods include the public reporting of the assets of politicians, as has been employed in India. A third approach is called the social audit (or mystery shopper) approach, where a researchers poses as a business or government contractor, and therefore experiences the level of corruption directly.

2.4.1. CONTEXTUALIZING CORRUPTION IN VIET NAM

Research on Viet Nam has highlighted corruption as a "systemic" problem and offered explanations for different forms of corruption that map quite well onto the international typologies discussed above. These are: (i) grease or speed money to fulfil basic tasks or services; (ii) the illegal privatization of state property; and (iii) the selling of state power.[83] In addition, it has been argued that there is "a tendency in Viet Nam to view public office as a vehicle for personal enrichment; secondly, a tendency to pay attention to servicing one's patronage network rather than working for some notion of the public good".[84]

In fact, Viet Nam's Anti-Corruption Strategy towards 2020 demonstrated a high degree of awareness of these dangers and practices, acknowledging that the very survival of CPV rule is at stake, while noting: *"[Corruption is] leading to adverse effects in many ways, eroding the confidence of the people in the leadership by the Party and the management of the State, giving rise to potential conflicts of interest, social resistance, and protest, and widening the gap between the rich and the poor. Corruption has become a major obstacle for the success of Doi Moi and the fighting force of the Party, threatening the survival of the regime".*

Vietnamese leaders have long been concerned about the problems corruption posed for economic development. State efforts to combat corruption go back to the early 1990s with a first wave of official legal normative documents including Decision No. 240/HDBT (1990) and Prime Minister's Decision No. 114/TTg (1992), which discussed the dangers of corrupt activities and smuggling that were growing in Viet Nam.

A second set of legislation took a more comprehensive approach and involved multiple ministries and agencies. These included the Anti-Corruption Ordinance of 1998, the revised Anti-Corruption Ordinance of 2002, the Law on Thrift and Anti-Waste of 2005, and the Law on Corruption Prevention and Combating of 2005. The resolution of the 3rd Plenum of the Party Central Committee (10th term) in August 2006 picked up the issue again, which focused specifically on the problem of corruption, and finally led to Viet Nam's Anti-Corruption Strategy in May 2009 followed by the ratification of the UNCAC in July 2009.

In sum, the current wave of efforts to address corruption and wrongdoing in the public sector revolves around five groups of solutions included in the national Anti-Corruption Strategy. These include: (i) strengthening transparency of official functions to reduce opportunities for corruption; (ii) improving the performance of civil servants; (iii) perfecting economic management to ensure a fair and equal environment for businesses; (iv) increasing inspections, auditing, and subsequent punishment of corruption; and (v) enhancing awareness of society to prevent and combat corruption.[85]

2.4.2. PAPI'S OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONTROL OF CORRUPTION

Following the international and Vietnamese literature, PAPI divides the metric of corruption into four sub-dimensions. The first three sub-dimensions explore some types of corruption that are likely to be experienced directly by Vietnamese citizens: (i) limits to corruption by public servants; (ii) limits to corruption in public service delivery; and (iii) equity in public sector employment. In addition to these three measures of the scale of corruption, a fourth sub-dimension that measures local efforts to combat corruption is included. Here, PAPI first studies whether a respondent is aware of his/her rights in line with the 5th solution of the Anti-Corruption Strategy, and secondly studies whether the respondent took advantage of these opportunities by denouncing a corrupt activity through the letters and complaints system. In essence, are mechanisms in place to denounce corruption in Viet Nam operating at the citizen-level? In this regard, PAPI goes beyond a simple dichotomous discussion, but instead derives how much corruption a particular respondent is willing to tolerate before filing a formal denunciation.

The performance levels for Dimension four are shown in Figure 2.4 below, where the coloured bars represent the contribution of each sub-dimension to the final score. A few observations are worth noting about Figure 2.4. First, control of corruption has the highest variance of all dimensions, both across individuals and

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83. See Vasavakul (2008).

84. See Gainsborough, et al (2009), p. 20

85. For a discussion on the five groups of solutions see Gainsborough, et al (2009).

provinces. Clear tiers of provinces are obvious. For instance, statistical tests demonstrate that Thua Thien-Hue (ranked 11th) is significantly different from Binh Phuoc (ranked 6th). At the lower end of the scale, Nam Dinh is significantly worse than Ha Noi. This means that their ordering is not accidental and in repeated trials this performance would be observed. Secondly, it is striking that Southern provinces dominate this

Dimension. The top 8 provinces and 12 of the top 15 provinces are located in the southern half of the country. More research is necessary to understand the factors behind this result, but the pattern is unmistakable. This is noteworthy given national findings that find that Southerners are more likely to take advantage of the formal complaints system than Northerners.

FIGURE 2.4: PERFORMANCE LEVELS ON PAPI DIMENSION 4: CONTROL OF CORRUPTION

The individual indicators comprising each sub-dimension are shown in Table 2.4, which also lists the questions from which they are drawn in the survey and descriptive statistics. In particular, the aggregate score of the entire nation and the minimum, median, and maximum provincial scores are highlighted, to provide a sense of the best and worst performers on each dimension. This will be useful for policy makers hoping to identify local good practices.

Each of the indicators in Table 2.4 were normalized to a 1-10 scale, with '10' representing the least corrupt

outcome observed in a province, and '1' represented the most corrupt outcome (see Chapter 3 for more detail). Each sub-dimension score represents the average score across the indicators which comprise it. Finally, the four sub-dimensions were averaged into an aggregate measure of control of corruption, so that each sub-dimension represents 25% of the final score. This can be observed in Figure 2.4. On the aggregate measure of control of corruption, Ho Chi Minh City stands out as the best performing province, while respondents in Kon Tum receive the lowest scores.

TABLE 2.4: SUB-DIMENSIONS AND INDICATORS USED TO CONSTRUCT
DIMENSION 4: CONTROL OF CORRUPTION

DIMENSION	NAME OF INDICATOR	PAPI QUESTION	NATIONAL MEAN	NATIONAL 90% CI		PROVINCIAL SCORES	SCORE	PROVINCE
1) Public Officials	Officials divert state funds for personal use (% disagree)	D402a	51.02%	(49.56%	52.49%)	Minimum	13.53%	Kon Tum
						Median	44.19%	Hai Duong/Vinh Long
						Maximum	73.08%	HCMC
1) Public Officials	Bribes are necessary to obtain land title (% disagree)	D402b	42.66%	(40.93%	44.39%)	Minimum	12.45%	Dong Nai
						Median	42.45%	Vinh Long/Hung Yen
						Maximum	64.83%	Phu Tho
1) Public Officials	Bribes are necessary to obtain construction permit (% disagree)	D402e	43.98%	(42.30%	45.66%)	Minimum	13.01%	Kon Tum
						Median	41.82%	TT-Hue/Vinh Long
						Maximum	68.37%	Phu Tho
1) Public Officials	Individuals paying informal charges at notary (%)	D503b	19.98%	(14.22%	25.74%)	Minimum	0.92%	Lai Chau
						Median	19.07%	Hau Giang/Cao Bang
						Maximum	44.65%	Tien Giang
2) Public Services	Bribes are necessary at hospital (% disagree)	D402c	38.97%	(37.55%	40.39%)	Minimum	12.62%	Kon Tum
						Median	35.81%	Quang Tri/Bac Giang
						Maximum	67.02%	Long An
2) Public Services	Parents at communal primary school give bribes to teachers for favourism (% disagree)	D402d	52.46%	(51.13%	53.79%)	Minimum	14.25%	Kon Tum
						Median	51.29%	Ha Nam/TT-Hue
						Maximum	75.35%	Phu Tho
2) Public Services	Parents bribe teachers in school (from experience) (% disagree)	D607e	38.82%	(37.67%	39.97%)	Minimum	19.39%	Da Nang
						Median	42.19%	Hai Phong/Hung Yen
						Maximum	70.59%	Lang Son
2) Public Services	Teachers favor students who attend after-school study sessions in performance evaluations (% disagree)	D607f	56.77%	(55.30%	58.25%)	Minimum	19.93%	Da Nang
						Median	63.32%	Ca Mau/Hung Yen
						Maximum	87.46%	Lang Son
2) Public Services	Corruption has no effect on your or family (%)	D405	85.99%	(84.84%	87.14%)	Minimum	36.42%	
						Median	81.26%	Yen Bai
						Maximum	99.30%	Hai Phong/Ca Mau
2) Public Services	Individuals paying informal charges at hospital (%)	D606	27.64%	(21.78%	33.50%)	Minimum	0.49%	Vinh Long
						Median	28.29%	Dong Nai
						Maximum	78.46%	Phu Tho/Tien Giang
3) Equity in Employment	Bribes are necessary for public employment (% disagree)	D402f	32.97%	(31.55%	34.39%)	Minimum	5.11%	Nam Dinh
						Median	22.60%	Nam Dinh
						Maximum	67.44%	Ha Noi/Quang Tri
3) Equity in Employment	# of government positions for which relationships are NOT necessary (1 to 5)	D403a-D403f	1.01	(0.95	1.06)	Minimum	0.14	Long An
						Median	0.85	Dien Bien
						Maximum	1.99	Tien Giang/Kien Giang
4) Willingness to fight	Respondent is aware of Anti-Corruption Law (%)	D406	45.66%	(44.32%	47.00%)	Minimum	23.22%	Ca Mau
						Median	38.37%	Dien Bien
						Maximum	66.17%	Phu Tho/Lang Son
4) Willingness to fight	Province is serious about fighting corruption when it occurs (%)	D407	27.13%	(25.80%	28.46%)	Minimum	6.52%	HCMC
						Median	28.41%	Yen Bai
						Maximum	40.02%	Long An/Hau Giang
						Minimum	22.34%	Binh Phuoc

DIMENSION	NAME OF INDICATOR	PAPI QUESTION	NATIONAL MEAN	NATIONAL 90% CI		PROVINCIAL SCORES	SCORE	PROVINCE
4) Willingness to fight	Respondent was a victim of a corruption, but chose not to denounce (%)	D405b	89.99%	(89.54%	90.43%)	*Median*	92.25%	Ca Mau
						Maximum	100.00%	Dak Lak/Dong Nai
						Minimum	2950.57	Multiple Provinces
4) Willingness to fight	How high a bribe would need to be paid to a Police Officer before you reported it (1000 VND)?	D404 (Form A)	7670	(7140	8199)	*Median*	7289.18	Kon Tum
						Maximum	24137.84	Ha Tinh/Nam Dinh
						Minimum		Hau Giang
4) Willingness to fight	How high a bribe would need to be paid to a People's Committee Official before you reported it (1000 VND)?	D404 (Form B)	6851	(6510	7191)	*Median*	2152.97	Long An
						Maximum	9056.28	Dak Lak/Ca Mau
						Minimum	20033.00	Bac Giang

Limits on Public Sector Corruption

A 2005 report, by the Party Internal Affairs Committee, highlighted land administration, construction, customs, and taxation as the most problematic agencies in Viet Nam.[86] Customs and taxation are more directly experienced by the business sector, so PAPI focuses on land and construction, as these offices are more commonly visited by individual respondents. PAPI supplements these with a more speculative question, which was, whether the respondent suspected that local officials were diverting public funds for private usage.

At the national level, 51% of respondents do not believe their top official diverts state funds, 43% did not believe it was necessary to pay grease money in Land Use Rights Certificate (LURC) application, and 44% did not believe bribes were necessary to receive a construction permit. There are two things to bear in mind about these indicators. First, PAPI asked respondents about perceived corruption, and whether or not they actually visited the office. This issue was debated a great deal, because doing so is less objective than a direct experiential measure, which asked only the 1,404 respondents who obtained a LURC and the 498 respondents who obtained a construction permit in the past three years. On the other hand, one reason for the limited number of respondents who engaged in these activities, may have been the fear of paying a bribe. After all, 1,227 respondents expanded or built a new house over the same period. Why would 40% of the respondents who were legally obligated to obtain

a permit forswear it? It is possible that corruption is affecting the selection into a formal procedure itself. Consequently, gauging the perception of those who did not take part also conveys important information to policy-makers. Even if the issuance of construction permits in some communes is not corrupt, many citizens believe it is, which is causing them to engage in illegal construction-an activity that may be dangerous for themselves and others.

A second important note is that, the study was chosen to measure the proportion of respondents who deny or disagree that the activity takes place, rather than those who answer affirmatively that the activity happens. In the course of administering the survey, many respondents found the questions to be quite sensitive and refused to answer or claimed they did not know about them, when the interviewers strongly suspected that they had more information. Because of the high amount of item non-response on these questions, using only the affirmative answers would have starkly under-estimated the problem and thrown away useful data. In coding the answers this way, however, it must be recognized that miscoding cases may occur, where respondents legitimately did not possess the information to answer accurately.[87]

Figure 2.4a depicts these three indicators in a star graph, where the branches of the star, represent the percentage of people who denied that the activity takes place. Noticeably, no province is remotely close to the perfect triangle displayed in the bottom-right corner. Binh Dinh province, on the South Central Coast,

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86. See in particular, Central Committee of Internal Affairs (2005).

87. Users of this data should take this coding decision into account and this report tries to explain it as much as possible.

is the closest, because of its consistently top scores on all three measures: 67% of respondents in Binh Dinh deny the diversion of public funds, while 56% and 58% deny the use of grease money for LURCs and construction permits respectively. None of these scores were the best score in the whole sample. Phu Tho province stood out for low levels of bribery for land and construction (65% and 68% deny the activity), but had a middling level of disagreement on the diversion of public funds (44%). Ho Chi Minh City

had the highest disagreement with the diversion of public funds (73%), but less stellar scores for the two certification procedures (51% and 56% denial). At the other end of the spectrum, is the predominantly rural province of Kon Tum, which shows Binh Dinh level consistency but in the opposite direction: only 13% deny the diversion of public funds and bribes for construction, while only 15% deny the use of bribes for LURCs. On LURCs, Southern Dong Nai performs lower with a score of 12.45%.

FIGURE 2.4A: EXPERIENCE WITH PETTY CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (BY PROVINCE)
(Branch Size= % of respondents who claim type DOES NOT take place; Perfect =100%)

No Diversion of Public Funds
No Bribes for Land Title
No Bribes for Construction

While these findings are interesting, the two previously discussed provisos in presenting the above scores, demonstrate that they are insufficient for totally capturing the problem of corruption in Viet Nam. A more accurate measure is needed that captures respondent's direct experience with the problem of corruption, not their perceptions of the scale of it, as respondents could overestimate or underestimate the scale based on rumour and hearsay. On the other hand, how can respondents admit to behaviours that may lead to official retribution or inculpate them in illegal activities?

Because petty corruption and nepotism are experienced by citizens directly, they can be analyzed using a public opinion survey, such as the PAPI instrument. Researchers, however, must be very cautious about administering questions regarding these activities, as respondents may be reticent to supply accurate information. Some respondents, who may have been victims of corruption, may fear reprisal from the official or public sector employee, who committed the act. Consequently, they may downplay or deny their acquiescence. Although it is under-appreciated in most of the literature in corruption, it is

also important to note that in many cases, the "victim" of the corrupt act may have in fact initiated it. It is quite common throughout the world for individuals to offer a bribe to an official to expedite a particular service, bend the rules slightly, or look the other way at an illegal activity. This does not, of course, excuse the official, who should be able to turn down such requests or the system that tolerates such activities, but it does mean that the questionnaire design and implementation is particularly important for eliciting an accurate sense of corruption in society. In addition to ensuring the confidentiality of all respondents, the PAPI instrument is cutting edge about using shielded responses and list questions that relay information about corruption without forcing the respondent to reveal sensitive information. These techniques are discussed in more detail below.

An additional feature of the PAPI approach is that it studies some types of corruption faced by average citizens and not businesses. While the corruption experienced by businesses is important, it has dominated international and Vietnamese discussions of the problem. Both the Transparency International *"Corruption Perceptions Index"* and the World Bank's "Control of Corruption" Index draw heavily upon business surveys in their aggregation of corruption across countries.[88] In Viet Nam, perhaps the most commonly cited measure of corruption is the "Informal Charges Sub-Index" of the PCI business focused survey.[89] The PAPI approach gives a different view of corruption that may differ from that seen by

businesses. For instance, businesses are unlikely to have experience with nepotism in the selection of civil servants. When asked, they might attribute the low performance of bureaucrats to inferior capacity, rather than a corrupt selection process that favours relations over talent. Similarly, businesses may see informal charges to obtain documentation as a small nuisance, whereas similar fees could cripple the family finances of an individual. In this case, the assessment of individuals would be more useful. Alternatively, officials in some locations may have little interest for the small allotments they can gain from petty corruption toward citizens, when the rich business community poses a juicier target. In these cases, the assessment of businesses and individuals regarding corruption may be profoundly different.

The final indicator of this sub-dimension, exploits a cutting edge technique known as the Unmatched Count Technique (UCT), also informally known as the LIST question.[90] List questions are extremely easy to administer, as a respondent is simply presented with a list of activities and must only answer how many of the activities they engaged in. They are not obligated to admit to engaging in a sensitive activity in any way. As a result, the respondent can reveal critical information without fear. A series of experimental trials have shown that UCT out performs all other techniques at eliciting sensitive information and maintaining the comfort level of respondents.[91] The trick to the UCT approach is that the sample of respondents is randomly divided into two groups that are equal on all observable characteristics. One group of respondents is provided with a list of relatively infrequent, but not impossible activities, which are not sensitive in any way. The second group, however, receives an additional item, randomly placed in the list. This additional item is the sensitive activity.

Question D503B from the PAPI survey utilized this technique in regard to corruption at local, public notary offices. The notary office is particularly appropriate, because it is an important component of the judicial reforms that have taken place under the PAR program. Moreover, it is a very common procedure with 52.3% of respondents saying they used a notary service last year. In Binh Phuoc province, 80% of respondents used

88. The underlying data for the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) comes from more than 35 different sources, created by 33 institutions. The WGI method is to aggregate these up to standard measures. What is most important for this paper is that a large portion of the data comes from two sources: commercial business information providers and surveys of businesses. Together these two types of data constitute 60% of the data used in the project and 61% of the weighted scores. On some indicators, such as political stability, they constitute 82% of the final score. The reason this information is critical is because these data are provided by experts and businesses, which work and operate in the ranked countries. As a result, these measures are not totally objective measures of institutional quality, they are the assessment of business perceptions of institutional quality. See Kaufmann et al (1999).

89. The PCI Informal Charges sub-index is drawn from the annual survey of about 10,000 domestic businesses. It conceptualizes corruption as macro-corruption on government contracting, petty corruption on business registration, and the predictability of these charges, as businesses that know a provincial bribe schedule can build it into their business plans as a tax. The index is comprised solely of soft information drawn from the survey. Traditionally, Mekong Delta provinces have ranked highly, especially Ben Tre, which has ranked in the top three for each year that the PCI has been calculated.

90. Dalton et al (1994), and Couts and Jann (2009) are two useful references that provide useful methodological explanations on how to apply these techniques.

91. See Couts and Jann (2009).

the notary. In question D503b, respondents who received Form B of the survey, saw a list with three innocuous items that can take place in a notary office. Respondents, receiving Form A of the survey, saw those three innocuous items plus the sensitive item (see Appendix C for an exact format and wording of question D503b).

It is important to remember that the mean of a dichotomous variable can also be read as a percentage. For example, in a question where a respondent was asked to list their gender and female was coded as '1', while male was coded as '0', the mean of that variable is the percentage of females in the sample. Because there is a one item difference between the two groups, the same rule applies. The difference in means between the two groups is the percentage of respondents engaging in the sensitive activity.

Figure 2.4b demonstrates the results for the two UCTs employed in the PAPI survey. The first panel illustrates the results of the question about bribes in the notary office (question D503b). Respondents who received Form A answered that they took part in 2.39 activities

on average. Respondents who received from B claim they took part in 2.19 activities. The difference between the means is 0.2 or 20%, suggesting that 20% of respondents paid bribes at the notary office. As the 95% confidence intervals plotted around the mean score reveal, these means are significantly different. That is, the difference in means could not have occurred by coincidence. Repeated random samples would yield significantly sizable results, ranging from a minimum of 14.2% to 25.7%.[92]

This exercise was repeated for every province, calculating where bribes to the notary were most frequent and where they were relatively rare. By this measure, PAPI has identified that bribes at the notary were almost non-existent in Lai Chau (0.9%), Ca Mau (2.3%), and Ho Chi Minh City (3.8%). On the other hand, they are extremely common in Tien Giang (45%), and Ha Noi and Phu Tho (35%).

92. A t-test reveals a standard error of the difference of 3.6%, a t-statistic of 3.7224, and a p-value of 0.0002. In short, this difference is statistically significant at the 99.98% level.

FIGURE 2.4B: BRIBES AT NOTARY AND HOSPITAL

(Range bars represent 95% Confidence Intervals; Diamonds represent the mean number of activities for respondents receiving Form A; Triangles represent mean values for respondents receiving Form B.)

Limits on Corruption in Public Service Delivery

While bribes have been known to occur in a range of public services, PAPI follows previous research, which has highlighted health and education, as the most problematic areas for average citizens.[93]

Another question from the list (D606) is used to identify what proportion of the 2,911 respondents, who visited local hospitals in the last year (either by themselves or with household members), paid bribes when receiving the service. With this question, Form B received the sensitive item (see question D606, Appendix C). Once again, the difference between the two groups is large and statistically significant. Of the number of respondents answering the question, 28% paid bribes when receiving hospital services.[94] These results can be observed in Panel 2 of Figure 2.4b. Drilling down to a provincial level, bribes at hospitals seems to be effectively required in Nam Dinh (78%), Dien Bien (72%), and Hung Yen (71%). On the other hand, they are extremely rare in Dong Nai (0.5%), Ho Chi Minh City (3.1%), and Hau Giang (4.6%), all three Southern provinces.

In addition to this experiential question, this sub-dimension also includes four perception based

questions. These indicators are depicted in the star graph in Figure 2.4c. At the national level, 52.4% of respondents disagree with the notion that teachers favour students whose parents give them bribes, 38.8% of respondents claim that informal payments to primary education institutions are uncommon, 56.8% say paying bribes to teachers is not common, and 39% deny paying bribes at hospitals.

The final query offers an interesting opportunity to compare the results between the perception and experiential question on hospital bribes above. The perception based measure tends to over-estimate hospital bribery slightly, as respondents speculate about activities they have not personally experienced. Nevertheless, the negative reputation of hospitals gives valuable information to policy-makers as well. In fact on a national level, the reputation of hospitals as corrupt institutions is greater than the actual level of corruption.

Once again, among the thirty provinces, no province comes close to matching the perfect score of 100% denials on all indicators. Nevertheless, variance across provincial units on these questions is higher than in the previous sub-dimension. Respondents in Binh Dinh, Long An, and Binh Phuoc have over half of their respondents denying these corrupt activities on every indicator. On the other hand, Da Nang, Ha Noi, and Dien Bien have very few respondents denying informal fees when accessing health and education services. Da Nang has particularly problematic scores in the area of education, where only 20% of respondents deny paying extra to primary education institutions and give bribes to teachers.

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93. See for example Nguyen Dinh Cu (2007); Vasavakul (2008) and Acuña-Alfaro (2008) on education, and Vasavakul (2009); Towards Transparency (2009) and Acuña-Alfaro (2009c) on health issues.

94. Standard error (3.6%), t-statistic (-7.49), p-value (0.000), significant at the .001 level.

FIGURE 2.4C: EXPERIENCE WITH PETTY CORRUPTION IN ACCESSING PUBLIC SERVICES
(Branch Size= % of respondents who claim type DOES NOT take place; Perfect =100%)

Zero   Da Nang   Ha Noi   Dien Bien   Dak Lak   Ha Tinh

Nam Dinh   Quang Tri   TT-Hue   Hai Phong   Hai Duong   Kon Tum

Lai Chau   Dong Nai   Bac Giang   Kien Giang   Cao Bang   Hung Yen

HCMC   Yen Bai   Vinh Long   Hau Giang   Ha Nam   Lang Son

Phu Yen   Tien Giang   Ca Mau   Phu Tho   Binh Phuoc   Long An

Binh Dinh   Perfect

Legend:
- No Bribes at Hospital
- No Favourism in Education
- No Informal Payment in Education
- No Bribes to Teachers

Equity in Public Employment

To gauge equity in public employment, PAPI asks respondents to identify which potential careers in public service required relationships to pursue and on which ones relationships were unnecessary. These included a position in the land registry (or cadastral department), a commune justice officer, a policeman, a teacher, or a position in the Commune People's Committee (see question D403). Once again, it is important to acknowledge that not everyone may have had direct experience with applying for these positions, and will base their answers on their discussions with friends, relatives, as well as some rumour and speculation. However, these beliefs are important, as whether true or not, they influence public confidence in local leadership and commitment to the regime generally.

Figure 2.4d looks at the answers to these questions. In general, relationships appear to be critically important for obtaining high prestige and stable public sector employment. Only about 18% to 19% of respondents deny its importance for all positions except teachers, where 24.1% of respondents deny the need for relationship to get a job in this sector. The difference between teachers and other positions is statistically significant at the 95% level with a margin of error of about 1.5% when taking into account missing data.

FIGURE 2.4D: EQUITY IN EMPLOYMENT: NEED FOR RELATIONSHIPS BY JOB TYPE

Figure 2.4e shows the large variation in the need for relationships across the country. Relationships appear to matter the least in the Mekong Delta, as Ca Mau, Hau Giang, and Long An all have large percentage of respondents denying its importance. Ca Mau averaged about 40% denials across the five public sector jobs. By contrast, relationships were deemed to be of utmost importance in Dien Bien where only about 2.7% of respondents denied the importance of relationships on average.

The relationship questions were supplemented in the Equity in Public Employment sub-dimension by a final question asking whether bribes were necessary to procure public sector jobs. Among the sample from 30 provinces, only 33% of respondents denied the importance of bribes. In line with the scores for relationships, Mekong Delta provinces populated the top of the performance levels on this indicator. In Long An, 67% disagreed that bribes for public office were common, followed by Ho Chi Minh City (60%), Hau Giang (51%), Tien Giang (49%), and Ca Mau (47%). In Nam Dinh and Ha Nam of the Red River Delta, bribes for public sector jobs were deemed critically important, with only 5% of respondents denying the activity.

FIGURE 2.4E: EQUITY IN EMPLOYMENT: NEED FOR RELATIONSHIPS BY JOB TYPE & PROVINCE
(Branch Size= % of respondents who claim type DOES NOT take place; Perfect =100%)

Willingness to Fight Corruption

For the final sub-dimension, PAPI measured government and citizen efforts to combat corruption in their jurisdictions. For this, PAPI asked about awareness of the Law on Corruption Prevention and Combating of 2005, which explains the government efforts to limit corruption as well as specified some mechanisms for citizens to seek redress. Awareness stands at about 45% nationally. To put this number in perspective, it is higher than the proportion of citizens that are aware of the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (GRDO, 33%), but less than the number of citizens who are aware of the annual publication of the list of poor households in their village (65%). Certainly more can be done to publicize the law to average citizens, regardless of their social status, as corruption negatively affects everyone. In line with other measures

of awareness, citizens in Ho Chi Minh City (66%), Dong Nai (63%), and Da Nang (59%) were most aware, but the mountainous provinces of Lai Chau, Dien Bien, Yen Bai, and Bac Giang all performed poorly with less than 25% of respondents aware of their rights under the AC law.

PAPI also asked whether citizens believed their local officials were serious about combating corruption, and received a surprisingly low response given the large number of ongoing government efforts. Only 27% of respondents in the national sample thought local officials were serious about fighting corruption. Agreement was highest in Binh Phuoc (40%), which is still remarkably low, and lowest in Yen Bai with only 6.52% answering that their officials were serious.

A third indicator queried the respondents' own activities to address corruption that affected them directly (D405). The results here were once again

sobering in light of government actions to rein-in corrupt activities. Only 338 respondents, spread throughout the 30 selected provinces, admitted being materially affected by corruption, either because they were the direct victims, or because the corruption benefited somewhat at their expense (for example, in trying to procure a service from a state agency). Of these respondents, 90% chose not to denounce the corrupt act. Reasons varied for not appealing the damaging corruption, but the primary reason selected by 156 respondents was that such an action would be useless, 106 victims could not explain their inaction or refused to answer, and smaller groups of respondents said they were scared of retribution (34 respondents) or found the process burdensome (29 respondents). Only 19 respondents claimed that their inaction was due to lack of information about how to proceed. Sample sizes are small, leading to large confidence intervals, so caution is urged about interpreting the results. Nevertheless, in 11 provinces, there was not a single victim of corruption who chose to denounce the act.

Building on the third indicator, PAPI wondered about the level of tolerance in society for corrupt actions. Citizens may be willing to let small amounts of corruption take place if it is not too damaging, or if the costs of pursuing a denunciation are greater than the benefits of having the damage rectified. In this light, the PAPI team thought it would be useful to understand respondents' utility functions for combating corruption. How much corruption were individual citizens' willing to endure before taking formal action with a local inspectorate across the country? PAPI pursued this line

of questioning in D404 (see Appendix C for an exact format and wording). Each respondent was given a schedule of bribe prices and were simply asked to declare the amount that was too much for them to tolerate. Because bribe schedules could vary by the power of the official asking for the bribe, we took advantage of the different forms of the survey. Respondents receiving Form A were asked to respond to a corrupt act by a police officer, while respondents receiving Form B were asked about 'Member of the Commune People's Committee', perhaps the highest ranking official they might encounter in their daily lives. Results of the exercise are shown in Figure 2.4f below.

Figure 2.4f suggests that there is very little difference between the tolerance for bribes demanded by the policeman or the commune official. The same bribe schedule is required for both actors. This uniformity holds up throughout the country. At the province level, the bribe schedules for the two officials have a correlation coefficient of 0.57, which is significant at the 99% level. Further regression analysis reveals that men and wealthier officials tolerate more corruption, while older respondents and other government officials tolerate less. However, citizens, on average, appear to tolerate bribes up to about 100,000 VND from both actors, where only 30% of respondents are willing to appeal. A large jump takes place between 100,000 VND and 500,000 VND, where the proportion of respondents willing to appeal doubles. At 10 million VND, however, there are still 10% of the 5,568 respondents who cannot bring themselves to appeal a corrupt act.

FIGURE 2.4F: SIZE OF BRIBE REQUIRED NECESSITATING FORMAL ACTION

Bribe schedules differ throughout the country, but the variance does not seem to be determined by relative provincial wealth or other factors like ethnicity. In Kon Tum, an ethnically-mixed province in the Central Highlands, respondents will only tolerate about 2.9 million VND from police officers, but in the poor Mekong Delta province of Hau Giang, the denunciation price is 24 million VND, and in the mountainous and ethnically-mixed Lang Son, the denunciation price for police is 15 million VND. The province of Long An records the lowest denunciation price for People's Committee officials at 2.1 million VND, while prices are highest in Bac Giang at 20 million VND on average.

Figure 2.4g demonstrates that such variation has important consequences. There is a strong and positive correlation between denunciation prices for police officers and crime rates. In other words, the more tolerant a citizen is of police corruption, the higher the amount of crimes experienced by PAPI

respondents in that province. Controlling for the level of wealth, population size, and structural conditions of the province, each 1000 VND increase in the denunciation price, leads to a 1.2% increase in the number of respondents who experienced a robbery, home break-in, or assault in the past year. A less strong but similar relationship is found between denunciation price and perceived safety on the part of citizens. The higher the denunciation price, the less safe citizens feel. It is very difficult to be sure of the exact causal mechanism driving this relationship. The relationship could result from a general culture of lawlessness in some regions of the country, so that crime and corruption are correlated though not causally related. On the other hand, a more direct and damaging causal connection is possible. That is, police officers, who do not feel constrained by denunciation, do not do their core job of preventing crime, as well as they should.

FIGURE 2.4G: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DENUNCIATION PRICE AND CRIME

Average Denunciation Price for Police Bribes (Millions of VND)

Citizens' level vs. businesses' level corruption

As a final exercise, the relationship between citizen experiences with corruption as measured by PAPI, with the business experiences measured by PCI is studied. Figure 2.4h sums up the analysis, and shows a positive correlation (0.30) that is not statistically significant. Some provinces, especially those in the Mekong Delta and Binh Dinh perform well in both indices, but in other cases substantial variation is noted. For instance,

respondents in Da Nang rate corruption much worse than business, while the opposite is true in Ho Chi Minh City and Binh Phuoc. In sum, comfort should be taken in the fact that there is a general understanding of corruption that is similar in both measures, allowing for the positive correlation. On the other hand, this finding provides an important lesson about assessing governance solely from business perceptions, as the needs of citizens and businesses can differ starkly at times.

FIGURE 2.4H: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAPI'S CONTROL OF CORRUPTION AND PCI'S INFORMAL CHARGES ASSESSMENTS

2.5. DIMENSION 5: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

There is certainly no doubt that government agencies, and on extension, the public administration system, have the mandate to strive to provide the highest quality service possible, within the constraints of law and accountability. In this regards, the "New Public Service" international literature assumes that there is a complexity of issues ranging from sophisticated regulatory reform efforts, to the simplest provision of administrative services (i.e. the registration of a birth, an identity card, a driving license, or a construction permit).[95] The range of administrative services that must be provided by different government agencies varies and efforts are constantly made.

Succinctly, it is assumed that the following is a comprehensive list of elements to consider regarding administrative service provision: (i) *convenience*; referring to the extent to which public administrative procedures are easily accessible and available to citizens; (ii) *security*, referring to the degree in which administrative services are provided in a way that makes citizens feel safe and confident using them; (iii) *reliability*, understood as the extent to which public administrative procedures are provided correctly and timely; (iv) *personal attention and problem solving approaches*, regarding the extent to which civil servants provide information to citizens and work with them to help meet their demands; (v) *fairness*, referring to the degree to which citizens believe the government services are provided in a way that is equitable to all; and (vi) *fiscal responsibility*, referring to the degree to which citizens believe government agencies are providing services in a way that uses financial public resources responsibly and rationally.[96]

95. For a discussion on the "New Public Service" literature see Denhardt and Denhardt (2007) and Peters and Pierre (eds.) (2007).

96. Based on Denhardt and Denhardt (2007), p.61.

2.5.1. CONTEXTUALIZING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES IN VIET NAM

A critical element of the comprehensive objective, set forth in the 2001-2010 PAR MP for reform of the Public Administration System (PAS), is to "proactively serve the people in their everyday life". Through more than a decade of implementation, the Government of Viet Nam has made renewed calls to reform public administrative procedures, in particular related to the six elements listed above. In short, the reform can be argued to have had two key moments. The first moment started with the initial years of piloting and testing in the early 2000s and in a limited number of Southern provinces (Ho Chi Minh City in particular) embarked on an innovative reform effort called "One-Stop-Shop" (OSS). The OSS model was developed with the aim of providing citizens with a centralized place to process and acquire a wide range of administrative documents necessary for their daily lives. The OSS model was further rolled out, and is, currently, implemented on a nationwide scale. Some initial improvements were achieved. For instance, the OSS, to some extent, has greatly contributed to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public administrative services and in line with some basic principles of service provision.

Subsequently, in a continued effort to improve the provision of public administrative procedures, the Government of Viet Nam embarked on, what can be called, the second wave of reform.[97] In this second wave, or the ongoing comprehensive reform efforts to document, it carries out streamlining and simplifying public administrative procedures at the national and local levels. Having identified the places where public administrative procedures were bound to be handled physically, the reform turns towards the elimination of bureaucratic, cumbersome and inconvenient procedures.

On both reform efforts, several recent studies and reviews have been conducted that document progress and bottlenecks. For instance, reviews of implementation of the PAR MP have shown mixed results regarding these two areas.[98] Public administrative procedures that are directly related to citizens and businesses remain cumbersome, because of the subsequent re-emergence of 'sub-procedures' despite several reviews and increasing government attempts in simplification of procedures through the Project 30 since 2007.[99] Recent government stock-taking and review of existing public administrative procedures shows that more efforts are needed in the reform of public administrative procedures to ensure their simplicity, clarity and legality.[100] On OSS mechanisms, evaluated to have "initially changed" the relationship between public administrators and citizens and organizations, OSSs have been put in place "in a formalistic way" with poor coordination across and within OSSs, and poor sense of responsibility of civil servants in charge.[101] In addition, not all provinces have fully implemented OSSs at the commune level. For instance, in the case of Ca Mau, one of the 30 selected provinces, one out of 101 communes has not seen the OSS in place.[102]

Although those pitfalls have been recognized internally by the PAS, there remains a gap in information about how citizens at large, experience interacting with the system in order to get their paperwork processed. In other words, it is worthwhile reviewing the OSS model and administrative procedure reform from the demand-side point of view with the hope to have more objective assessment of what the public administration system has provided to citizens, in line with the reforms. Dimension five attempts to provide some snapshots of citizens' experience in dealing with selective public administrative procedures.

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97. Decision No. 93/2007/QĐ-TTg dated 22/6/2007 of the Prime Minister on the One Stop Shops and Decision No. 94/2006/QĐ-TTg dated 27/4/2006 of the Prime Minister on Action Plan for Public Administration Reform for the period of 2006-2010. Article 17 of Regulation on Implementation of One Stop Shop Mechanism, an enclosure to Decision 181/2003/QĐ-TTg of the Prime Minister requesting for implementation at the provincial and district levels in January 2004, and at the commune level in January 2005.

98. See MOHA (2010).

99. The Project on Simplification of Administrative Procedures in All State Management Areas for the period of 2007-2010, better known as Project 30, was approved for implementation under Decision 30/QĐ-TTg dated January 10, 2007.

100. It is reported by the Government that after the first phase of stock-taking and review of administrative procedures of the Project 30, over 5,500 administrative procedures (AP) have been checked, 453 AP have been requested to be removed, 3749 are proposed to be revised, 288 APs are proposed to be replaced so as to create more favorable conditions for citizens and enterprises. (See MOHA, 2010)

101. Painter et al. (2009), pp. 344-348 presents a discussion of the mid-term review of the implementation of the PAR Master Programme 2001-2010., Also, see MOHA (2010) most recently highlighting the same deficiencies.

102. MOHA-UNDP PAR Project & DEPOCEN (2010).

To set this Dimension in motion, PAPI looks into a selection of public administrative procedures that are considered important to citizens' lives, and how they are dealt with at the OSSs. PAPI studies citizens' direct experiences in interacting with local public administrators to see how responsive they are to demands for simpler and friendlier public administrative procedures and improved delivery of administrative services.

2.5.2. PAPI'S OPERATIONALISATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Figure 2.5 provides a visual picture of aggregate provincial performance regarding PAPI's Dimension five on public administrative procedures. This Dimension examines three types of public administrative services and procedures, including public notary services, construction permits and land use rights certificates (LURCs), and also hints to the performance level of selected provinces.

On the aggregated Dimension, the province of Binh Phuoc stands out as the best performing province with a score of 7.1 (with a 90% confidence interval between 7.0 and 7.2 points). But Binh Phuoc still has room for improvement, as very few of its citizens have used notary services or applied for construction permits. Ca Mau, with a 90% confidence interval between 5.7 and 5.9, is at the bottom of the overall performance and the attributive factors are with its minimum scores in terms of total public notary quality (1.80) and the number of respondents (3.31%) who applied for new LURC over the past three years (see Table 2.5 below).

FIGURE 2.5: PERFORMANCE LEVELS ON PAPI DIMENSION 5: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

The overall performance level suggests this Dimension has the lowest variation across provincial units. Its standard deviation is about 0.25 compared to the 0.36 of the next nearest Dimension six, regarding Public Service Delivery. By contrast, Dimension four on Control of Corruption has the highest variance across provinces with a standard deviation of 0.68, more than double that of Public Administrative Procedures. Nevertheless, there are significant differences across provinces.

The low variance on Dimension five can be interpreted as depicting uniformity across provinces in dealing with public administrative procedures in the three services selected for monitoring. Moreover, the PAPI data makes clear that very few citizens actually utilize these procedures. Of the total number of respondents, 53% used notary services, 23.8% have applied for LURCs, and only 7% have applied for construction permits if national mean values are taken into account. Construction permits and LURCs are more frequently requested by citizens from middle-class or wealthy households.

Table 2.5 displays the individual indicators used for each one of the three sub-dimensions of Dimension five. As with other dimensions, each of the indicators in Table 2.5 were normalized to a 1-10 scale, with '10' representing the best outcome, and '1' representing the worst outcome observed in a Vietnamese province (see Chapter 3 for more details). Each sub-dimension score represents the average score across the indicators which comprise it. Finally, the three sub-dimensions were averaged into an aggregate measure of public administrative procedures, so that each sub-dimension represents one third of the final score.

TABLE 2.5: DIMENSION 5 AND ITS INDICATORS

DIMENSION	NAME OF INDICATOR	PAPI QUESTION	NATIONAL MEAN	NATIONAL 90% CI		PROVINCIAL SCORES	SCORE	PROVINCE
1) Notary Services	Respondent used notary service (%)	D501	53.23%	(52.14%	54.33%)	Minimum	22.89%	Kon Tum
						Median	47.27%	Binh Dinh/Dien Bien
						Maximum	80.49%	Binh Phuoc
1) Notary Services	Total notary quality score (Sum of 8 items)	D503	6.57	(6.48	6.65)	Minimum	1.80	Ca Mau
						Median	6.81	Hau Giang/Quang Tri
						Maximum	7.59	Ha Noi
2) Construction Permit	Respondent, who improved house in last 3 years, applied for construction permit (%)	D505	6.72%	(5.48%	7.96%)	Minimum	0.29%	Cao Bang
						Median	4.25%	TT-Hue/Ca Mau
						Maximum	15.50%	Quang Tri
2) Construction Permit	Total construction application quality score (Sum of 8 items)	D506	6.00	(5.96	6.03)	Minimum	4.16	Ha Noi
						Median	5.84	Binh Dinh/Hung Yen
						Maximum	7.80	Kon Tum
2) Construction Permit	If he/she applied for construction permit, respondent did not go to more than one window (%)	D505d	78.85%	(78.18%	79.52%)	Minimum	14.52%	Lang Son
						Median	77.84%	TT-Hue/Binh Phuoc
						Maximum	100.00%	Multiple Provinces
3) Land Use Rights Certificate (LURC)	Percentage of respondents who applied for new LURC in last 3 years (%)	D507	23.76%	(22.70%	24.81%)	Minimum	3.31%	Ca Mau
						Median	20.68%	Dong Nai/Hung Yen
						Maximum	51.01%	Binh Phuoc
3) Land Use Rights Certificate (LURC)	Total LURC application process quality (Sum of 8 items)	D508	5.51	(5.43	5.59)	Minimum	4.12	Lang Son
						Median	5.26	Kien Giang/Binh Dinh
						Maximum	6.87	HCMC
3) Land Use Rights Certificate (LURC)	If he/she applied for LURC, respondent did not go to more than one window (%)	D507c	78.85%	(78.18%	79.52%)	Minimum	14.52%	Lang Son
						Median	77.84%	TT-Hue/Binh Phuoc
						Maximum	100.00%	Multiple Provinces
3) Land Use Rights Certificate (LURC)	LURC application process has been simplified in past 3 year (% agree)	D509	77.56%	(76.63%	78.50%)	Minimum	45.78%	Cao Bang
						Median	78.99%	Ca Mau/Dak Lak
						Maximum	95.94%	Lang Son

Public Notary Services

Public notary service is selected for study in order to test whether or not it has become more accessible and friendlier to citizens, given the competition from privately-provided notary services that are emerging as part of privatization[103] of notary services,[104] and given that commune/ward authorities have been delegated with a great deal of authority over this important job. As shown in Table 2.5, PAPI looks into citizens' experiences in using public notary services made available in their localities. Citizens have an opportunity to give their feedback on the accessibility and quality of the service, by giving their views based on their actual experience from visiting commune's or other public notary services, the clarity of procedures, publicity of fees, behaviour of civil servants receiving them, competence of civil servants serving them, paperwork loads, notification of deadlines, receipt of results as appointed, and their overall satisfaction level of the provided service.[105]

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103. In official documents in Viet Nam, the term "xa hoi hoa" (literally translated into English as "socialization") is coined to refer to the process of involving or mobilizing the private sector in the provision of public services like education, healthcare, vocational training, culture, sports and environment (see Decree No. 69/2008/ND-CP of the Government dated 30/05/2008 providing for policy to encourage 'socialization' in those areas).

104. "Socialisation" of notary services is underway in accordance with the Law on Notarisation of 2007 (Article 26). Privately provided notary services are available mainly in Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City. Some can be found in other centrally managed cities like Can Tho, Hai Phong and Da Nang, as well as in other provinces like Nghe An and Thanh Hoa and Son La. This initiative, however, has not been replicated across the country.

105. See questions D501 and D503 in the Questionnaire (Appendix C)

Public notary services are the most commonly used among the three services under study. Of the total surveyed respondents, 2,626 individuals used public notary services with 88.8% getting their documents notarized at the commune/ward level, and 11% going to district or provincial-level public notary services. This reflects the effect of decentralization of the services to the commune level as well as their privatization, which make them more available and accessible to citizens.

The star graphs in Figure 2.5a show the levels of agreement of respondents with statements about quality of services. Generally, public notary services are of good quality across 30 provinces with the exception of Ca Mau, Lai Chau and Dak Lak. Ca Mau is perceived as performing exceptionally poor in this service, with its provincial score being only 1.80 for all eight sub-indicators measured. Hau Giang, Ca Mau's neighbor in the Mekong Delta, and Quang Tri, are close to the median score at 6.81. Ha Noi obtains the highest score of 7.59, with its star graph coming quite close to the perfect one (Figure 2.5a). This is possibly owing to the co-existence of privately-provided notary services that makes public notary services more convenient and accessible to citizens in Ha Noi. Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh City tends to perform poorer in this service compared to Ha Noi despite the availability of private notary services. Unreasonable paperwork may have dragged Ho Chi Minh City down on the scale, making it just fare better than Ca Mau, Lai Chau and Dak Lak (Figure 2.5a). Respondents from Da Nang, Long An, Hung Yen and Thua Thien-Hue, also agreed that notary procedures are complicated in terms of paperwork. Notary fees, according to respondents from Hau Giang, are not publicly displayed.

FIGURE 2.5A: MEASURED ASPECTS OF QUALITY OF PUBLIC NOTARY SERVICES
(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100%)

Application Procedures for Construction Permits

According to the 2003 Law on Construction (No. 16/2003/QH11) and Government Decree 12/2009/ND-CP on Management of Construction Projects[106], construction permits are required from construction project owners that wish to build new housing, expand or alter their existing property in anything more than a basic way (with some exceptions for citizens in remote, unplanned areas as put in Articles 19-21 of Decree No. 12/2009/ND-CP).[107] As housing construction and renovation are common for most citizens in both urban and rural areas, PAPI studies first whether citizens who made fundamental changes in their housing applied for the requisite permit and second their assessment of the accessibility and quality of the service of handling citizens' applications for construction permits by local, public administrators.[108] The battery of questions on the procedures is also meant to show differences between urban and rural dwellers in terms of the requirements for such permits to be obtained before construction and/or renovation of houses. To facilitate memory of respondents as well as to accommodate the availability of OSSs at the local level, respondents were only asked to recall their actual experiences over the past three years in completing the procedures. On the effectiveness and efficiency of the offices where citizens go for their applications processed, respondents were queried about their views of the clarity of procedures, publicity of fees, behaviour of civil servants receiving them, competence of civil servants serving them, paperwork loads, notification of deadlines, receipt of results as appointed, and their overall satisfaction level of the provided service.

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106. See Government Decree No. 12/2009/ND-CP on Management of Construction Projects dated 12 February 2009. (Available at www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page?_pageid=578,33345598&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&docid=83485. [Accessed on 16/12/2010].)

107. Exceptions for application for construction permits are housing construction projects in remote areas, in areas where no urbanization plans are in place, housing renovation that does not cause negative impact on overall architecture and structure of the entire building, and private houses in remote, sparsely populated and unplanned areas (Articles 19-21, Government Decree 12/2009/ND-CP on Management of Construction Projects, a by-law document of Law on Construction 2003).

108. See questions D505, D505d and D506 in the Questionnaire (Appendix C)

Very few respondents (7%) said they had applied for construction permits when building or renovating their houses over the past three years. The reasons why respondents did not apply for construction permits are multi-fold. They either did not need them, for they did not build new houses or did major renovations during the time span asked, or they did not have finance to do so yet, or citizens in their localities were not required to get construction permits. More worrisome, only 35% of the 1,227 respondents who engaged in housing construction that would require a permit chose to apply for one. This implies something more problematic— that is citizens are actively avoiding using the service, either because of the complexity of the procedures, cost, waiting periods, or the limited effect of Decree No. 12/2009/ND-CP.

The star graphs in Figure 2.5b show the levels of agreement of respondents with given statements

designed for an examination of the total quality of the service. Among those who applied for construction permits, concerns were heard from big cities like Ha Noi, Hai Phong, Da Nang and Thua Thien-Hue. Ho Chi Minh City does a little better overall, but not regarding unnecessary paperwork, which was seen as highly problematic. The level of satisfaction with the overall quality is also low in rural provinces, such as Yen Bai and Dak Lak. Ca Mau again sees almost zero agreement to the statement that the paperwork for construction permits is reasonable. Contrary to Ha Noi, which scores minimum on the total quality in this service (4.16), Kon Tum gets the maximum score on this indicator (7.80), possibly because the demand for construction permits in the Central Highland province is low, and as such, quicker administrative services can be provided.

FIGURE 2.5B: ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRUCTION PERMIT APPLICATION PROCEDURES
(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100%)

Application Procedures for Land Use Rights Certificates

A LURC, by definition in the 2003 Land Law (No. 13/2003/QH11), is the certification that is issued by a competent state agency and granted to a land user in order to protect the legitimate rights and benefits of land users in the context of collective land ownership under uniform state management of land. Owners of LURCs have the right to sell, exchange, and mortgage the property for bank loans. More importantly, LURCs provide citizens with the comfort in knowing that their homes will not be taken from them without a legitimate public interest motivation, and without just compensation. As a result, international evidence has shown that citizens of any income strata with an enforceable land title are more likely to invest in home improvements, small businesses, and even in the education of their children.[109]

With their importance in definition of citizens' ability to enjoy the rights and benefit of land-use, LURCs are constantly the subject of discussion, especially in terms of how accessible they are to citizens from different geographical locations of administrative units (i.e. urban, rural and mountainous areas). First, the survey asks whether respondents who recently acquired new land filed for an LURC as a sign of their confidence in the process. Secondly, questions relating to procedures on new or renewed LURCs applications are included in the Questionnaire.[110] They are raised in order to examine the total LURC application process quality, the availability of the service at the OSSs, and the simplicity of the procedures. Finally, citizens are asked about the clarity of procedures, publicity of fees, behaviour of civil servants receiving them, the competence of civil servants serving them, paperwork

loads, notification of deadlines, receipt of results as appointed, and their overall satisfaction level of the provided service. The timeframe of three years is also set in order to facilitate respondents' memory and to accommodate the assumed national coverage of OSSs after 2006.

PAPI data shows that application for LURCs is not popular for the whole sampled population, revealing the nature of low frequency of such kinds of events to occur in one's lifetime or at the household level. The percentage of respondents who applied for new or renewed LURCs over the past three years in all 30 selected provinces, is at approximately 23.8% (see Table 2.5 above).

The total LURCs application process quality as the sum of eight items asked (see the legend in Figure 2.5c) has a slight difference between minimum, median and maximum scores. Lang Son scored the minimum at 4.12, while Ho Chi Minh City scored the maximum at 6.87. Provinces like Kien Giang and Binh Dinh performed at the median level on this indicator. When asked if they had to go to more than one window in order to apply for new LURCs, 78.85% of respondents that experienced this service, said they did not. However, there is a large variation among provinces. The number of respondents who did not have to go to more than one window ranges from 14.5% in Lang Son to 100% in Ho Chi Minh City.

The star graphs below show in a greater detail the quality of the eight aspects of the services surveyed by revealing different levels of agreement of respondents with statements about those aspects. Respondents in Lang Son, Phu Tho, Binh Phuoc, Hai Phong and Ha Noi were not satisfied with the LURC application procedures. In provinces with bigger stars, such as Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, Hai Duong, Thua Thien-Hue and Hau Giang, respondents experienced that the procedures require too much paper work. Other problems that surveyed provinces need to pay attention to, include behaviours of civil servants receiving citizens, deadlines for LURCs to be granted, and publicity of application fees.

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109. See for instance Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010).

110. See questions D507, D507d, D508 and D509 in the Questionnaire (See Appendix C)

FIGURE 2.5C: ASSESSMENT OF LURCS APPLICATION PROCEDURES
(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100%)

As a final note, it must be noted that public administrative procedures, other than construction permits and LURCs (e.g. birth certificates, death certificates, identification cards, marriage certificates, vehicle licenses, and so forth) are also critical to citizens. However, within the scope of PAPI 2010, the procedures are not included because application for such certificates rarely occurs within an individual's life, and may not take place at the frequency required to assess improved performance over time. Moreover, because long and repetitive questionnaires can damage response rates, and the quality of responses, it was important to provide a parsimonious instrument that focused primarily on a selective number of procedures. Furthermore, according to other surveys,[111]

LURCs and construction permits are commonly perceived to be more difficult for citizens at large to obtain, although the surveys are more biased towards urban dwellers. This perception has been confirmed by the results of the online survey on the Friendliest and the Most Annoying Administrative Procedures conducted by UNDP and VietNamNet in mid 2010.[112]

111. See Ho Chi Minh City People's Council (2008), and, ACVN & KAS (2009).

112. UNDP & VietNamNet (2010). Key Findings from the Online Survey on Most Annoying and Most Friendly Administrative Procedures. Draft Report. See also Viet Nam News (20/10/2010). Red tape still a major headache: poll. Printed Paper, pp. 1-2 & Viet Nam Plus (19/10/2010). Land use rights procedures cause concern. URL: http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Land-use-rights-procedures-cause-concern/201010/13176.vnplus [Accessed on 19/10/2010].

2.6. DIMENSION 6: PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

When discussing the public administration system in general, it is important to note that "the majority of employees of government are not paper-pushers one usually associates with public administration, but rather are responsible for delivering public services to the public".[113] In that sense, many civil servants and public employees at central and local levels are responsible for providing public services that go beyond policy making, regulatory public administrative procedures or implementation of legal normative documentation. The ultimate objective of the constant reform and modernization of a public sector apparatus is to provide better quality public services to citizens.

In this regards, the transition towards higher development levels in any country's governance and public administration system has to create opportunities for citizens to engage effectively in the realization of their full potential and capabilities. This implies that there are differentiated roles in economic development that go beyond simply putting efforts in reducing poverty, but enlarge citizens' potentials to play increasingly more dynamic roles that are not fulfilled by economic growth alone.

Nowadays, it is increasingly recognized that governance and public administration play major roles in enhancing development opportunities. Different governance rules and processes play an important role in whether economies grow, and how institutions evolve.[114] In addition, public administration reform aims to support and operate as the backbone to ensure that children go to school, life expectancy is raised, individuals have adequate access to basic infrastructure, citizens' security is safeguarded and human development is enlarged, among others. Promoting human development is not only a social, economic and technological challenge, but also a governance and public administration challenge.[115]

Initial international comparisons of governance and public administration indicators and aggregate measures of development suggest that successful and advanced countries tend to have higher scores on quality of governance indicators.[116] This is an indication that good governance and public administration goes hand in hand with human development and with the goal of providing public services.

The provision of public services is not only left to the public administration system. However, it has the mandate to provide the framework for the enhancement of individual and collective capabilities. While governance can be understood as the process by which authorities exercise power and enhance the framework for individuals to develop their potential, public administration must be viewed as the vehicle that provides these opportunities in fair, equal and consistent manners.

2.6.1. CONTEXTUALIZING PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY IN VIET NAM

Viet Nam, as a socialist-oriented state, has by definition mandated itself to provide basic services to its citizens. Health care, education, basic infrastructure and public security are state priorities, since they are sectors that involve the most frequent and direct interaction between the state and citizens. Since economic reforms in the early 1990s, public service providers have received increasing autonomy on finance and managerial aspects through increasing delegation of administration tasks,[117] in the hope that the equilibrium approach to provision of the public services of the central planning era would be removed to pave the way for improved service quality through increased revenues, larger savings, and stronger incentives for good performance in public service delivery agencies.[118] Although improvements resulting from the autonomy in the services have been noted,[119] they are unevenly distributed across provinces, administrative units and population from different strata.[120]

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113. Peters and Pierre (2007), p.1.

114. See UNDP (2002) and Kaufman et al (2009).

115. See UNDP (2002) and Acuna-Alfaro et al (2010).

116. On this, see Painter, et al (2009), based on Holmberg, et al (2008).

117. See Resolution No. 08/2004/NQ-CP of the Government of Viet Nam on continued delegation of state management functions from the central government to provincial government

118. See Government Decree No. 71/2003/ND-CP on delegation of tasks on administration of staffing quotas in public administration agencies and public service delivery agencies.

119. A review of delegation of management tasks by Ha Noi People's Committee shows a mixed picture of what have and have not been achieved through the exercise (See Ha Noi Moi Online (17/11/2010), Phân cấp quản lý: khắc phục bất cập, tăng đồng bộ, hiệu quả [Delegation of Administration Tasks: Resolving problems, increasing synergy and effectiveness. URL: http://www.hanoimoi.com.vn/newsdetail/Kinh-te/399693/phan-cap-quan-ly-khac-phuc-bat-cap-tang-dong-bo-hieu-qua.htm [Accessed on 01/12/2010])

120. See World Bank (2009), pp. 64-65.

In the health sector for instance, there are differences in terms of autonomy, and as a result, performance, when health facilities at different levels are compared. According to the Viet Nam Development Report 2010,[121] district-level and lower level public health facilities do not seem to benefit evenly from increasing autonomy. This has resulted in poorer performance of district facilities since they can hardly afford providing high quality services and attracting qualified healthcare staff. Healthcare takers or users prefer going to central and provincial level facilities where they expect better service and this has resulted in constant over-capacity of higher level hospitals.[122]

Greater autonomy does not seem to provide a one-size-fit-all solution to good quality education for all either. Concerns about the quality of education institutions at different levels have been noted in the current Education Development Strategy. Problematic areas include overcrowded classes, unqualified teachers, extra-curriculum classes for additional incomes, poor school infrastructure and so forth. The 2009-2020 Education Development Strategy specifically noted some of these problems, stating that education quality has failed to meet the increasing needs for learning in the population for socio-economic development and that there is discrepancy between quantity and quality in the education sector[123]. It also reports that the number of classrooms that are either temporary or are torn-out venues accounts for 11% of the total education facilities as of 2007.

Other public services like drinking water and residential safety also need to be assessed as they are basic necessities for the population. Providing clean water for drinking to citizens and guaranteeing law and order are key mandates of the state. Nonetheless, evidence on the extent of performance on these two issues is rather limited in the country and therefore, with PAPI, the aim is to fill this gap and to provide a bottom-up review of the services.

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121. Ibid.

122. A research conducted in six central level hospitals in Ha Noi, Thua Thien-Hue and Ho Chi Minh City in 2008 and found that bed occupation rates in these provinces range between 150-200% while each medical doctor in these facilities has to check from 70-130 patients a day and spends barely nine minutes for each patient on average (see Xuyen and Cuong, 2008).

123. See Government of Viet Nam (2009).

2.6.2. PAPI'S OPERATIONALISATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

Under Dimension six, PAPI examines four key public services including public health care, public primary education, basic infrastructure, and law and order at residential places. PAPI focuses on understanding citizens' experiences in using and benefiting from these services, in order to measure how authorities are responsive to citizens' most basic needs and demands. Respondents were queried regarding their experiences with accessibility and availability of basic public services in their communes, wards and/or provinces, according to the national level policy frameworks which governs these services. For instance, this Dimension measures whether or not schooling of children at public primary schools is free from tuition as required by the Law on Universalisation of Primary Education in 1991.

Public health care is selected because it is one of the critical basic services that any state must provide to their citizens. Four areas selected for analysis include overall accessibility to public health insurance; poor households' access to subsidized health insurance; availability of free medical checks for children under six years old; and, the overall quality of public hospitals at the district level. Given that social security policies are in place to facilitate delivery of those services, feedback from the society through means of media and everyday conversations reveals a mixed picture of the real effect of these policies. Public health insurance, for instance, has been frequently reflected as one of the most problematic areas in public health. The secondary source of data covered by key news outlets in 2008 and 2009 shows that the poor and the disadvantaged with health insurance tend to be more vulnerable to biased treatment at public hospitals.[124]

To explore how public health insurance works at the provincial level a battery of questions to test direct experience of citizens, was used. On the quality of public hospitals at the district level, seven 'good-practice' criterions were used, including patients not sharing beds, electric fans made available in sick-rooms, clean rest-rooms, regular check-ups, patients treated with respect, reasonable expenses, and

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124. See Acuña-Alfaro (2009c).

reasonable waiting periods. These are examined by asking respondents about their direct experience when going to district public hospitals or having beloved people go to district public hospitals for check-ups or treatment. Measurements are limited to those who had direct experience with the service, so that the indicators reflect direct experience and are most reliable. In addition, respondents were also asked if they know the policy of free healthcare for children under six years old, to accommodate concerns about whether or not this vital policy is well-known by the general public.

Based on the understanding that primary education for all has been effective in Viet Nam for over two decades,[125] this Dimension looks at the overall quality of public primary education in order to measure the minimum standards of facilities (and teaching staff) for satisfactory primary education. Because universal lower-secondary education for children between the ages of 11 to 18 years old has been effective since 2001,[126] the focus is framed within the primary school education, as not every commune/ward has its own lower-secondary school and in some localities lower secondary schools are shared by separate commune/ward units.[127] Distance from the respondent's home to nearest primary schools is another criterion selected for study in PAPI, as it provides valuable information on the equality of access.

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125. Law on Universalisation of Primary Education in 1991 regulates that primary education for all children between the ages of 6 and 14. Under this Law, children attending public primary schools do not have to pay tuitions (Article 13). Children at the age of primary education set forth above attend primary schools or classes in their residential groups or wherever convenient to them.

126. Decree No. 88/2001/NĐ-CP of the Government dated 22 November 2001 on implementation of lower secondary for all

127. Circular No. 17/2003/TT-BGDĐT dated 28 April 2003 giving guidance on Articles 3, 7 and 8 of Decree No. 88/2001/NĐ-CP with definition of who are the subjects to universal lower secondary education.

Basic infrastructure is a straightforward sub-dimension in its own right as it looks at household accessibility to electricity, the quality of roads nearest to the house, the frequency of garbage pick-ups in residential groups, and the quality of drinking water. By asking respondents about the availability and quality of those public services, PAPI seeks to understand the contribution of local government to the infrastructure which affects citizens' fundamental living conditions.

Law and order at the residential level means the level of safety that citizens experience in everyday life. In this aspect, respondents were asked if they have experienced theft of vehicles (including cars, motorbikes, canoes, etc.), pick-pocketing, house break-in's and violence committed by robbers in the past one year. This sub-dimension aims at measuring whether fears about safety affect the quality of citizens' lives.

Figure 2.6 reveals the final scores of the 30 selected provinces on the overall score and four sub-dimensions of Dimension six, while Table 2.6 shows the indicators used to make the assessment.

Figure 2.6 depicts an interesting but unsurprising finding from the collected data. Big cities tend to perform better in public service delivery, evident from national-level municipalities including Hai Phong, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City among the top ten provinces. However, from this group Ha Noi lags behind the other national-level municipalities. Its scores are significantly below its peers, implying that the difference is not the result of random chance, and therefore reveals fundamental dissatisfaction with public service delivery among its citizens. Provinces that are far from the these big urban centres tend to perform lower, mainly due to poorer basic infrastructure, suggesting that in many areas rural residents do not have access to tap water or daily garbage collection.

FIGURE 2.6: PERFORMANCE LEVELS ON DIMENSION 6: PUBLIC SERVICES DELIVERY

There seems to be little regional difference evident from the data that provinces from different regions (i.e. northern, central and southern) are distributed across the scale. The difference in performance is more visible when comparing provinces that are similar in terms of economic and geographical conditions (i.e. northern mountainous provinces like Lang Son, Cao Bang, Yen Bai and Lai Chau). The large difference between the top and bottom provinces is attributed to variance in the scores on infrastructure and law and order sub-dimensions.

In a nutshell, poorer provinces may need to make more efforts in realizing national policies and provision of better public services and facilities for their citizens.

TABLE 2.6: DIMENSION 6 AND ITS INDICATORS

DIMENSION	NAME OF INDICATOR	PAPI QUESTION	NATIONAL MEAN	NATIONAL 90% CI		PROVINCIAL SCORES	SCORE	PROVINCE
1) Public Primary Education	Total quality of public primary education (Sum of 8 items)	D607	4.63	(4.59	4.66)	Minimum	3.70	Lang Son
						Median	4.59	Tien Giang/Ha Tinh
						Maximum	5.14	Yen Bai
1) Public Primary Education	Distance from home to nearest primary school (km)	D609b	1.23	(1.19	1.27)	Minimum	0.43	Ha Tinh
						Median	1.19	Ca Mau/Dien Bien
						Maximum	4.24	Lai Chau
2) Public Health	Total quality of hospitals (Sum of 7 items)	D605	5.13	(5.07	5.19)	Minimum	4.23	Da Nang
						Median	5.17	Hung Yen/Binh Phuoc
						Maximum	5.89	Long An

DIMENSION	NAME OF INDICATOR	PAPI QUESTION	NATIONAL MEAN	NATIONAL 90% CI		PROVINCIAL SCORES	SCORE	PROVINCE
2) Public Health	Respondents with health insurance (%)	D601	53.29%	(51.76%	54.81%)	Minimum	29.82%	Ha Nam
						Median	41.94%	Phu Tho/Quang Tri
						Maximum	95.91%	Cao Bang
2) Public Health	Do poor households receive subsidized health insurance? (% Yes)	D602	74.16%	(72.84%	75.49%)	Minimum	53.57%	Kien Giang
						Median	72.63%	TT-Hue/Ca Mau
						Maximum	91.86%	Phu Tho
2) Public Health	Are medical checks for children under 6 free? (% Yes)?	D603	87.44%	(86.39%	88.49%)	Minimum	61.98%	Hau Giang
						Median	85.64%	Nam Dinh/Hung Yen
						Maximum	97.79%	Ha Tinh
3) Infrastructure	Households with electricity (%)	D610	97.05%	(96.55%	97.56%)	Minimum	33.03%	Lai Chau
						Median	98.12%	Dak Lak/Lang Son
						Maximum	100.00%	Ha Noi/HCMC/Da Nang
3) Infrastructure	Quality of road nearest to house (1. Dirt; 2. Gravel; 3. Concrete; 4. Paved)	D611	2.82	(2.78	2.87)	Minimum	1.75	Lai Chau
						Median	2.77	Ca Mau/Kien Giang
						Maximum	3.84	Hai Phong
3) Infrastructure	Frequency of garbage pick-up (0. Never to 5. Every Day)	D612b	1.97	(1.91	2.03)	Minimum	0.17	Ca Mau
						Median	1.15	Ha Nam/TT-Hue
						Maximum	3.81	Da Nang
3) Infrastructure	Respondents drinking tap water in home as primary drinking water (%)	D613	37.09%	(34.76%	39.42%)	Minimum	3.79%	Kon Tum
						Median	24.83%	Hau Giang/Ha Tinh
						Maximum	97.94%	Da Nang
3) Infrastructure	Respondents drinking rain or river water as primary source (%)	D613	6.27%	(4.92%	7.62%)	Minimum	0.00%	Multiple Provinces
						Median	2.24%	Hai Phong/Lang Son
						Maximum	33.79%	Hai Duong
4) Law & Order	Crimes experienced in last year by respondents (% vehicle theft, pick-pocket, break-in, violence)	D511a-D511d	17.42%	(15.87%	18.97%)	Minimum	1.52%	Kien Giang
						Median	18.45%	Hai Duong/Hai Phong
						Maximum	50.54%	Ha Nam
4) Law & Order	Assessment of safety in village (0 Very Unsafe; 3 Very Safe)	D510	2.19	(2.17	2.21)	Minimum	1.71	Lai Chau
						Median	2.11	Hai Duong/Hung Yen
						Maximum	2.68	Kon Tum
4) Law & Order	Safety improvement in past 3 years (% Agree)	D510-D510a	0.09	(0.08	0.10)	Minimum	-0.11	Ha Nam
						Median	0.07	Lai Chau/Phu Tho
						Maximum	0.31	Hung Yen

Public Health Care

The indicators used for measuring performance of public healthcare in the selected provinces include public health insurance for general citizens and for the poor, the overall quality of district hospitals and free medical checks for children under six. Respondents were asked about their direct experience in using the services. Results show that 52% of respondents had direct experience with a public hospital in the past

year. Of those, 64% accompanied a close household member to the hospital, while 36% were themselves treated.

Table 2.6 above shows large variation in people's access to public health insurance, with provincial scores ranging from only 29.82% (of the number of respondents asked noting they have public health insurance) in Ha Nam to as high as 95.9% in Cao Bang. As high as 74% of the sampled population, said

that poor households receive subsidised health insurance in their respective communes/wards, while there is a big difference between Kien Giang (53.57%) and Phu Tho (91.86%). Regarding under-six children's access to free health check-ups, PAPI data shows a national mean score of 87.44% with small 90% confidence intervals. More than 60% of respondents asked in Hau Giang (minimum) and more than 97% in Ha Tinh (maximum) confirmed that the policy is in effect in respective provinces.

On quality of district hospitals, Figure 2.6a below reveals that selected provinces score differently in those indicators. The diamonds show levels of agreement of respondents with above statements

when having health care in district/ward public hospitals. Municipalities (in particular Da Nang and Ha Noi) do not score high on this indicator. The province of Long An seems to fare better than other selected provinces in all criteria measured. Figure 2.6a also tends to confirm public observation that patients have to share beds at public hospitals within districts. Another common observation from respondents is that healthcare expenses in district hospitals and waiting times are not reasonable and the quality of sick-rooms remains poor. This may open up a research question for the health sector to study why sharing beds is a problem in district hospitals, even in the least expected incidences like Lai Chau, Ha Nam and Hung Yen.

FIGURE 2.6A: CITIZENS' ASSESSMENT OF DISTRICT PUBLIC HOSPITALS
(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect =100%)

Legend:
- No Shared Beds
- Electric Fans
- Restroom Clean
- Regular Check-Ups
- Treated w/Respect
- Expenses Reasonable
- Waiting Period Reasonable

Public Primary Education

When compared with the national mean at 4.63 (see Table 2.6 above), most provinces perform at a modest level in their delivery of public primary education in general. Yen Bai tends to perform the best among the 30 provinces, scoring at 5.15 at provincial scores on the overall quality of primary education, while Lang Son scored poorly, 3.70.

If examined from specific criteria selected for measuring the quality (see Figure 2.6b below),[128] there seems to be large variations in terms of performance in selected provinces. Infrastructure of public primary schools and quality of teachers in all 30 selected

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128. The diamonds show levels of agreement of respondents with above statements about public primary schools at the commune/ward level.

provinces are generally good. However, teachers tend to favour school children participating in extra classes, and classes remain crowded in general. Also, selected provinces need to look into the problems of informal payments and bribery to teachers since these phenomena are reflected in all selected provinces, regardless of them being urban, rural, or mountainous provinces.

PAPI data also shows that the mean distance from home to the nearest primary schools is at 1.23km across 30 provinces, significantly reasonable for primary school children to walk to class. However, there is a large variation between mountainous provinces and lowland ones. In Ha Tinh, public primary schools are at 0.4 km on the average in sampled communes/wards, while those in Lai Chau are at over 4km way. Geographical conditions need to be taken into account when comparing provinces regarding this indicator.

FIGURE 2.6B: CITIZENS' ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOLS
(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect =100%)

Infrastructure

Infrastructure attributes greatly to the difference across 30 selected provinces in Dimension six. The reason is that there is a large variance between urban and rural provinces in terms of access to electricity, paved roads, frequency of garbage pick-ups and access to tap water. Table 2.6, above, reveals the differences in provincial scores in these areas. For instance, on households with electricity, only 33% of respondents in Lai Chau said they have access to electricity while the percentage in Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Da Nang equals 100%. The quality of roads nearest to houses also hints difference between urban and rural provinces. In Lai Chau, there are more dirt and gravel roads, while in Hai Phong, respondents use exclusively paved roads. On the frequency of garbage collection services, Da Nang's citizens stands fare better than other selected provinces with most residents reporting garbage collection every day, compared to almost zero frequency in Ca Mau.

On drinking water, 37% of the whole sampled population said they get access to tap water in home as primary source of drinking water, as opposed to 6.27% to rain or river water. Only 3.79% of surveyed respondents in Kon Tum said they have tap water for drinking, against 97.94% in Da Nang.

Law and Order

Unsafe living environment at residential places experienced by respondents in the past one year is at a worrisome rate. As many as 17.45% of the sampled population reported being victims of theft of vehicles (including cars, motorbikes and canoes), pick-pockets, break-ins and violence committed by thefts. There seems to be a large variation across the 30 selected provinces, if examined by the four types of crime. The most common form of crime is home break-ins in border regions, especially along the Laotian boarder, which may reflect drug crimes. In urban areas, vehicle thefts is more common, but far more common in Da Nang and Ha Noi than in Ho Chi Minh City.

Figure 2.6c below shows that respondents in Lai Chau and Ha Nam tend to feel more unsafe due to more incidences of break-ins. In Ha Noi, respondents reported more cases of vehicle thefts compared with other provinces. Also, provinces with similar socio-economic conditions differ greatly in this indicator. Selected provinces in the Mekong River Delta experience the safety differently, with Kien Giang being significantly safe when compared with Hau Giang.

FIGURE 2.6C: RESPONDENTS' FEEDBACK OF RESIDENTIAL SAFETY

Respondents who were crime victimes (%)

2.7. CONCLUSIONS: A COMPOSITE PERFORMANCE DASHBOARD AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Once the six dimensions of PAPI were calculated, the process of building a final, composite performance dashboard started. Such a ranking has the advantage of efficiently disseminating to policy-makers critical information about which provinces and leaders in the country should be looked to for uncovering best-practices in governance and public administration reforms, and where there is more work to do. Head-to-head comparisons also have the advantage of generating competition among local leaders, providing an incentive for creative approaches to meeting the needs of their constituents. Furthermore, even if we did not assemble the rankings into a final index, it is likely that someone else would, perhaps by utilizing an approach to aggregation with which we deem misleading. All of these factors provide an incentive to build a final composite PAPI dashboard, however such aggregation must be well explained and the final scores properly interpreted, since the aim is not to generate a "horse race type" competition to point at good or bad performers.

This task was approached with some trepidation, as myriad controversies surround such composite measures. First, does distilling the multiple and complicated aspects of quality governance into a single measure obfuscate the key messages and handcuff policy-makers, as to exactly how they should move forward with reform?[129] In regards to measures of economic welfare, a dashboard approach where policy-makers are given a multitude of relevant governance indicators to monitor independently might be more appropriate.[130] Second, is the presentation of a ranking misleading, as measurement error in the data collection process and sampling error in the underlying survey effectively mean many provinces of different ranks are statistically indistinguishable?[131]

Third, what method is used to aggregate the six dimensions in the final index? While a straight, unweighted index is the easiest to understand, it also implies that all governance tasks are equal in their impact on core development outcomes, which is certainly not the case. In effect, choosing not to weight is to actually assume a quite severe and unrealistic form of weighting. While conceptually distinct,

measures of Accountability and Administrative Procedures do not have an equal influence on socio-economic outcomes and citizen satisfaction with governance. Yet deciding to move forward with weighting requires identifying an objective source of weights to use in the aggregation. This is a not a trivial exercise.

In this section, the results of three different aggregation exercises are presented, with the objective to allow readers to select the approach they deem to be most beneficial. First, a dashboard of the six dimensions of governance and public administration is presented. This is followed by the presentation of the unweighted ranking, taking care to calculate Confidence Intervals (CIs) around those rankings, so that readers can ascertain where there are statistically significant differences across provinces. Finally, a weighted PAPI ranking that derives the weights from a regression analysis of citizens' satisfaction in local governance is built. The six dimensions are weighted based on the strength of their correlation with how PAPI respondents judged the overall performance of their authorities. The regression approach, which is also used by the Global Competitiveness Rankings, Global Prosperity Index, and Viet Nam Provincial Competitiveness Index, has the additional benefit of controlling for other individual and provincial factors that may be associated with citizen satisfaction (wealth, age, employment, ethnicity, party membership, urbanization, and other features). Consequently, the weight represents the net association between governance and satisfaction after removing those effects.

2.7.1. THE PAPI DASHBOARD

Figure 2.7a illustrates the dashboard approach to aggregation. Each dimension is ordered on a 1 to 10-point scale, with '1' representing a province receiving the worst score on every indicator within a dimension and '10' representing a province receiving the top score on all indicators in that dimension. All provinces had the possibility of receiving a score of 10 on each dimension, which is reflected in the "Perfect" star in the bottom corner of the chart. Each branch of the star represents progress toward the perfect score of 10. The benefit of the dashboard is that it helps us identify weaknesses even in highly performing provinces, which are obscured in an additive index. For instance, Ho Chi Minh City, while the most consistently high-performing province, has room for improvement in public administrative procedures. Da Nang, another top-performing province, scores quite poorly in its control of corruption. Contrariwise, the lowest performing location, Kon Tum, scores relatively well on public service delivery.

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129. See Arndt and Oman (2008).

130. See Stiglitz et al (2010).

131. See Kaufman et al (2010).

FIGURE 2.7A: DASHBOARD OF SIX DIMENSIONS OF PAPIDASHBOARD OF SIX DIMENSIONS OF PAPI

It is important to remember that each branch of the stars in the dashboard above represent average scores drawn from multiple indicators in a survey of 5,568 individuals. Because these scores are being drawn from sample of about 200 individuals in each province and not a census of all Vietnamese citizens, caution about whether a separate sample of respondents from each province might have answered differently must be taken. However, confidence in representativeness is assured due to the fact that PAPI employs a sophisticated clustered sampling strategy that utilized probability proportion to size (PPS) samplings to draw representative locations at each level of the Vietnamese administrative hierarchy and random samplings of the final respondents from village lists (see Chapter 3 for more details). Nevertheless, any random sample, no matter how carefully designed, confronts issues of sampling error[132].

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132. Sampling error is a function of three factors: 1) the variance in the distribution of answers within the sample on a particular question; 2) the number of respondents in the sample; and 3) the probability of selection of those respondents in a particular location, so that we face a higher level of error in drawing 20 respondents from a village of 1000 people than a village of 100.

These problems are endemic to any survey exercise. Consequently, presenting just the average dimension scores, as done in Figure 2.7a, overstates the level of precision of the PAPI exercise. What can be said with a high degree of certainty is that the average scores represent the most likely score within a range of scores that are possible in repeated random sampling in Viet Nam. Figure 2.7b provides a different perspective, which displays the range of possible dimension scores possible for three different provinces: Ho Chi Minh City, which has the highest sum of the six dimensions, Kon Tum, the province with the minimum score, and Ha Nam, the location with the median score. Rather than presenting the average scores, the 90% CIs for the three provinces around each dimension are presented.

Viewing PAPI scores in this way is enlightening and particularly useful for policy makers. On three dimensions (Transparency, Accountability, and Control of Corruption), scores are significantly different between the three provinces. Thus, it can be said with a great deal of confidence (9 times out of 10) that in repeated samples, the ordering of these provinces (best, middle, and worst) would be retained. On two dimensions (Participation and Administrative Procedures), the CIs of Ho Chi Minh City and Ha Nam

overlap, indicating that their scores are not statistically distinguishable and could be reversed in repeated samples. Nevertheless, Ho Chi Minh City and Ha Nam are significantly superior to Kon Tum. Thus, while it might not be possible to differentiate the top half of provinces on these dimensions, it can be said that these locations can be distinguished in their quality from the lowest performing province. On the final indicator (Public Service Delivery), Ho Chi Minh City is significantly different from the median and minimum provinces, but their CIs overlap. Readers wishing to view CIs in addition to aggregate scores can download them from the PAPI website (www.papi.vn).

Why do some dimensions display wide gaps between CIs, while other dimensions overlap? The size of the provincial samples and the probability of respondent selection are exactly the same across dimensions, so they cannot be responsible. The critical determinant is the variance of responses on the indicators included within the dimensions. Variance affects the CIs in two ways. High variance among respondents within provinces tends to widen the CIs for those particular locations. In essence, citizens disagree on key aspects of governance and public administration, making it extremely difficult to derive a precise measure. When large CIs in a province are observed, it means that there is a great diversity of opinion within borders. On the other hand, high agreement among respondents within provinces, but wide variation across provinces, is helpful for clearly establishing tiers of governance and public administration. In other words, citizens within provinces agree on the level of performance of the public sector within their borders, but their answers are very different from citizens in other locations. A final contributor to the size of CIs is the number of respondents that chose not to answer a question because of lack of knowledge or sensitivity. Differences in the rates of non-response to particular questions decrease effective sample sizes and thereby lower the precision of the estimates. Thankfully, this problem was not severe in PAPI, because indicators from consideration that had low response rates were eliminated.

FIGURE 2.7B: PAPI DASHBOARD OF THREE PROVINCES (INCLUDING 90% CIS)

2.7.2. The Unweighted PAPI

A second approach to aggregation is to add up the scores for each dimension.[133] It is possible to derive an additive provincial index in two different ways. The first way, used by the PCI, is to calculate provincial scores for each indicator and then sum up provincial-level scores (the provincial aggregation method). Alternatively, it is possible to sum up indicators into dimensions at the respondent level, and then to calculate separate PAPI scores for each respondent in the survey. Once a final index is calculated, it is easy to then aggregate the PAPI to whatever level a researcher would like to analyze it by taking the average score at that level. This could be administrative levels (village, commune, district, provinces) or PAPI scores could be calculated for

different demographics (youth, gender, and ethnicity). This is called the individual aggregation approach.

The benefit of individual approach for PAPI is that it is easier to calculate CIs for aggregate scores, because the variance in the final score for each respondent is already obtained. Mathematically, the two approaches should yield exactly the same mean scores. Minor differences arise, however, when some respondents do not answer particular questions.

The aggregation of the six dimensions yields a theoretical PAPI score ranging from 6 to 60. In practice, no province consistently performs at the top or bottom of every indicator, so the actual range is 30.9 (Kon Tum) to 39.1 (Ho Chi Minh City). Much wider variance was displayed at the individual level, where the most negative individual provided a score of 22.96 for his/her province of (Quang Tri). The highest two respondent scores of 54.6 and 52.85 were found in Hau Giang and Ho Chi Minh City respectively.

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133. Using the formula: $PAPI = \sum_{i=1}^{n} Dimension_j$

FIGURE 2.7 C: UNWEIGHTED PAPI

Figure 2.7c shows the final unweighted performance levels for the 30 provinces, using the individual level aggregation method. The colours in each bar depict provincial scores on each one of the six dimensions. Just looking at the bar graph, Ho Chi Minh City stands out as a uniquely well-governed province, while Kon Tum is in a tier of its own at the bottom. Other differences are harder to observe in this depiction. Comparing these results with PCI, the placement of top provinces will not seem too surprising. Binh Dinh, Long An, and Thua Thien-Hue all score quite well in the annual PCI rankings too. Ha Tinh, in the North Central Coast, however, is a bit of a surprise in the number two slot for the unweighted PAPI. Ha Tinh's success in the PAPI illustrates why analyzing governance from the citizens' experience is essential. While Ha Tinh has a problematic business environment, due to the distortionary effect of a couple of dominant state owned enterprises (SOEs), citizens, who do not work in the business sector, appear to be quite satisfied with their local leadership and the performance of their governance and public administration system.

Just as in the dashboard above, however, a ranking of this nature can be misleading. Many provinces are tightly clustered in the middle of the distribution. Small changes in the survey methodology, the selection of indicators, or scaling, could lead to provinces jumping a few notches up or down the index. Consequently, highlighting the specific placement of a province in the bar graph above, conveys an artificial level of precision.

Figure 2.7d provides a more realistic depiction of the precision of the PAPI exercise, as we display 90% CIs along with the final PAPI scores. The graph also depicts the PAPI scores represented by provinces at or above the 75th percentile (or 35.92 score) and at or below the 25th percentile (or 33.20 score) (see Table A.8, Appendix A). Once again, large CIs for a province, most likely, indicate a high level of disagreement among its constituents. Such disagreements may be caused by differences between males and females, urban versus rural dwellers, or even different ethnicities. Looking at the graph this way, Ha Tinh's high score is somewhat illusory. In repeated sampling, it could rank anywhere between 2nd and 13th due to its large CI. On the other end, Lai Chau, currently second from the bottom, could rank as high as 19th.

FIGURE 2.7D: UNWEIGHTED PAPI (WITH 90% CIS)

This is why, earlier in the report, it was mentioned that the ranking is not meant to highlight which province is on top and which one is on the bottom, but rather look at aggregate patterns of similarities and differences. For instance, four tiers of provinces are evident. Top provinces are those that are significantly above the 75th percentile (Ho Chi Minh City, Ha Tinh, Da Nang Binh Dinh, and Thua Thien-Hue). The second tier represents the provinces that are not significantly different from the 75th percentile, but are significantly greater than the score of 35. The third tier corresponds to provinces that have a score significantly lower than 35, but significantly above the 25th percentile. And the fourth tier is provinces that are significantly below the 25th percentile (Yen Bai, and Kon Tum). A few provinces do not fit cleanly into these four categories, because their CIs are especially large. Once again, these are provinces for which internal variance, inexperience with governance and public administration, is high.

2.7.3. THE WEIGHTED PAPI

While an unweighted strategy seems innocuous, it actually is a quite severe and restrictive assumption. By choosing not to weight PAPI, a belief that all dimensions have the exact same effect on the outcome variables is essentially imposed. For instance, if the assumption is that the ultimate goal of public administration is to improve citizens' satisfaction of their needs, waiting periods for public administrative procedures and access to basic public services, such as education and health, do not perform equally.

To deal with this problem, we took a page from the PCI methodology, and adopted a regression-based approach. In a nutshell, relationships between key PAPI dimensions and citizen satisfaction with local governance, controlling for other factors that may also influence citizen satisfaction, is calculated. The specific dependent (outcome) variable for this exercise was drawn from question D408 (see Appendix C for exact wording), where citizens were invited to fill out a 100-point "feeling thermometer" of their total satisfaction with different levels of government.

Figure 2.7e depicts the average scores on the feeling thermometers (along with 95% CIs). One clear pattern is immediately apparent. The closer the level of government is to the citizens, the worse the average score it receives. National institutions (Government and National Assembly) are ranked higher than provinces and district governments, which in turns, are ranked higher than local institutions. Except for villages and communes, these are statistically significant differences. The bar in the graph presents the average performance, given by individuals, for the four sub-national local government offices. This measure is a critically important determinant of citizens' overall assessment of the work of their local leaders. And, as Figure 2.7f shows, it is strongly associated with the unweighted PAPI scores shown above, among the sample of 5,568 respondents.

The next step was to determine what contribution each of the PAPI dimensions made to citizens' final perceptions of local governance. To do this, a 100-points local governance thermometer was devised and it was regressed on the six PAPI dimensions. Because a bivariate regression would be subject to omitted variable bias, where other factors influenced both PAPI scores and local governance assessments, several respondent-level and provincial-level features were controlled for. Controlling for variables allows identifying the net effect of PAPI dimensions, once the other determinants of governance and public administration are removed.

FIGURE 2.7E: GOVERNMENT FEELING THERMOMETERS (WITH 95% CIS)

FIGURE 2.7F: ASSOCIATION BETWEEN UNWEIGHTED PAPI AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
THERMOMETER

At the respondent level, gender, age, education (measured by years of study), ethnicity (measured by whether the respondent was party of the majority Kinh (1) or not (0)), wealth of the respondent (measured by the number of important items their household possesses, question D618), and whether the respondent had ever served in government or was a party member were controlled for. The current career of the respondent was accounted for by running a series of dichotomous variables for each career category captured in question A009, as farmers and SOE employees may have very different assessment of local government quality. Running a set of dichotomous variables like this is known as a Fixed Effects regression, meaning we are comparing individuals within each career category rather than comparing across them.

At the provincial level, the controlled for variables were: the wealth of the province (measured by GDP per capita), because provincial resources may affect its capacity to meet citizen needs; population density, which has shown to be associated with crime, pollution, and contributes to capacity problems when multiple citizens demand the same service; and distance from Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City, as satisfaction could be a function of the location and information advantages that come from living near a large city.

The regression results are shown in Table 2.7a below. Four of the control variables prove statistically significant. Females demonstrate greater satisfaction for local governments than males, but minorities and more educated citizens tend to be more negative. Wealthier provinces also demonstrate greater levels of satisfaction with governance. Other control variables are not robustly correlated with satisfaction across specifications.

Turning now to the PAPI variables, the first model runs the unweighted PAPI. The coefficient is 0.556, implying that a one point improvement in the unweighted PAPI would generate slightly over one half of a percentage point improvement in satisfaction. The standard error, depicted in parentheses, is very small, indicating that this results are significantly different from zero at the .01 level (in other words, with a 99% CI). The next six models replace the unweighted PAPI with each individual dimension, so which aspects of public administration are driving the correlation can be determined. The six dimensions have very different effects. The size of the coefficient is highest for Public Service Delivery, where each one improvement in the score generates a 3.3 percentage point improvement in satisfaction. Transparency (2.8) and Control of Corruption (1.3) demonstrate the next strongest

relationships. Participation and Accountability are a bit weaker, accounting for about a half of a percentage point change in satisfaction.

The weakest relationship is Public Administrative Procedures, which is actually negatively associated with satisfaction. The reasons for the negative correlation are multi-faceted. First, Public Administrative Procedures has the lowest variance of all of the six dimensions at the provincial level, indicating that there are only marginal differences across provinces. Second, the survey results indicate that most citizens in Viet Nam rarely encounter the three procedures analyzed. While notary services are relatively common (53% of respondents used it in the past three years), applying for LURCs (24% of respondents) and construction permits (6.7%) are relatively rare activities that are most commonly performed by elites. Although PAR has made great efforts to improve these procedures through One-Stop-Shops, most citizens have simply not benefitted from the effort.[134]

Rather than using the regression coefficient to generate the weights, the t-statistic is used. Using the size of the t-statistic is superior because it includes the size of the substantive effect (measured by the regression coefficient) but standardized by the variance around that point prediction (as measured by the standard error). As a result, dimensions that receive higher weights are those that have large and statistically significant correlations with the three outcome variables.

Using t-values in this manner eliminates one possible concern. It is possible that a particular dimension may have a large coefficient that is not statistically significant because the standard error around the prediction is quite large. Large standard errors result from a variety of factors, including measurement error, outliers, and omitted variable bias. When a coefficient is big, but a standard error is also large, it is important to be careful about inferring too much from that regression result. The relationship may simply be accidental; repeated samples of citizens in Viet Nam would reveal vastly

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134. Other procedures, such as drivers' licenses and marriage certificates, are more common but most citizens only encounter the full application process once in their lifetimes. For our adult survey, most citizens completed the process many years ago and may not recall the details. Even if they could, it is probably unfair to rank provinces based on procedures that took place many years before. In addition, as mentioned earlier, previous studies suggest these three procedures continue to be the most problematic across the country (i.e. online survey by UNDP and VietnamNet in mid 2010).

different substantive effects. By using the t-value, the size of the coefficient net of the standard error is taken into account and, therefore, eliminates the possibility that accidental correlations drive weightings. Consequently, even though Public Service Delivery has a larger coefficient, its standard error is almost twice as large as that of Transparency. When the t-statistic is calculated by dividing the coefficient by the standard error, the implied weight for Public Service Delivery is lower than Transparency. This decision has the benefit of contributing to more stable weights over time, by ranking provinces by the governance factors that are most precisely estimated.

TABLE 2.7A: CORRELATION BETWEEN PAPI DIMENSIONS AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE QUALITY

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUALITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (D408)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Unweighted PAPI	0.556***						
	(0.055)						
Participation at the Local Level		0.429*					
		(0.216)					
Transparency			2.763***				
			(0.226)				
Vertical Accountability				0.575**			
				(0.230)			
Control of Corruption					1.273***		
					(0.146)		
Public Administrative Procedures						-0.648**	
						(0.270)	
Public Service Delivery							3.306***
							(0.469)
Female	1.632**	1.085*	1.407**	1.101*	1.178*	0.805	0.700
	(0.612)	(0.613)	(0.575)	(0.608)	(0.592)	(0.567)	(0.566)
Age	-0.001	0.022	0.001	0.029	0.021	0.035	0.021
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Years of Study	-0.225***	-0.150*	-0.201**	-0.148*	-0.191**	-0.110	-0.133
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.080)
Wealth (Possessions)	-0.185	-0.010	-0.203	-0.044	-0.036	0.042	-0.219
	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.129)	(0.136)	(0.135)
Kinh Majority	-2.051*	-1.752	-1.617	-1.754	-1.949	-1.550	-1.056
	(1.196)	(1.215)	(1.189)	(1.213)	(1.199)	(1.214)	(1.207)
Experience in Government	-1.072	0.801	-0.658	0.203	0.086	1.106	0.073
	(0.869)	(0.903)	(1.009)	(0.957)	(0.879)	(0.938)	(0.910)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUALITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (D408)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Party Member	3.812	5.205	3.444	4.635	4.992*	5.326	4.980
	(2.760)	(3.098)	(3.004)	(3.188)	(2.547)	(3.174)	(3.300)
GDP per Capita (ln)	3.626***	4.153***	4.062***	3.955***	3.867***	4.265***	4.248***
	(1.152)	(1.144)	(1.160)	(1.144)	(1.136)	(1.135)	(1.178)
Distance from Metopolis (km)	0.003	0.005**	0.003	0.004*	0.004*	0.005**	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Population Density	0.000	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Career Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	52.062***	62.678***	54.700***	62.666***	60.948***	66.815***	41.106***
	(3.799)	(3.844)	(3.788)	(3.882)	(3.841)	(4.462)	(4.596)
Observations R-squared	5,149	5,149	5,149	5,149	5,149	5,149	5,149
	0.087	0.065	0.104	0.067	0.082	0.065	0.088

Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The dependent variable local governance quality is the average of four questions, asking respondents to to assess the quality of: 1) The Villlage Head (D408A); 2) Commune People's Committee (D408B); 3) District People's Committee (D408C); and 4) Provincial People's Committee (D408D) on a 1-100 point feeling thermometer. The specific wording is as follows: "Now I would like to ask how satisfied you are with the performance of the following persons and institutions. Please kindly give a mark between 0% (very unsatisfied) to 100% (very satisfied) to show your degree of satisfaction...." All specifications include career fixed effects to account for the fact that those with different jobs, particularly those working in some capacity for local government, have different views of local governance.

Table 2.7b demonstrates how PAPI takes the individual t-values for each dimension, sums them up, and calculated the share of statistically significant variance in citizen satisfaction accounted for by a one-unit change in each dimension. Because Transparency, Public Service Delivery, and Control of Corruption have the largest coefficients in the regressions and lowest standard errors in the regressions with citizen satisfaction, they account for the largest share. The Public Administrative Procedures Dimension, due to its negative correlation, receives the lowest weight. Finally, the average share of t-values for each regression is calculated and shown in column 4 labelled "weight". This number became the weight used to create the Weighted PAPI shown in Figure 2.7g below.

TABLE 2.7B: EXPLANATION OF APPROACH TO DIMENSION WEIGHTING

DIMENSION	QUALITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT			
	BETA (1)	SE (2)	T-STATISTIC (3)	WEIGHT (4)
1 Participation at local levels	0.429	0.216	1.99	5.97%
2 Transparency	2.763	0.226	12.24	36.76%
3 Vertical Accountability	0.575	0.23	2.50	7.50%
4 Control of Corruption	1.273	0.146	8.71	26.16%
5 Public Administrative Procedures*	-0.648	0.27	0.81	2.44%
6 Public Service Delivery	3.306	0.469	7.05	21.17%

Results from regressing "Perception of Local Government Quality" on each dimension, controlling for respondent age, gender, ethnicity, and career, as well as provincial wealth, population density, and distance from either Ha Noi or Ho Chi Minh City. The t-values from these regressions, which are calculated by dividing the coefficient by the standard error, were taken for each dimension (columns 1 to 3). Next, relative share each dimension was calculated and accounted for in the sum of t-values (column 4). This number became the weight for the final PAPI.

*Public Administrative Procedures is negative correlated with the dependent variable in multiple regression, we substituted the T-Value from its bivariate regression, so that it received a small, but positive weight.

FIGURE 2.7 G: WEIGHTED PAPI INDEX BY DIMENSION
(Colours by Dimension, Weighted by Impact on Local Governance Satisfaction)

As expected, the weighted and unweighted PAPI are highly correlated (0.95), but the new approach does generate some fluctuations in the overall performance. For instance, Ha Tinh province, which received its highest score in Public Administrative Procedures, slides backwards in the weighted index. On the other hand, Thua Thien-Hue receives a boost from the weighting procedure, because of its higher performance on the Transparency dimension.

The fluctuations, however small, reveal once again how important it is to pay attention to CIs around the final scores and not just the aggregate measures. These are plotted in Figure 2.7h. The four tiers of provinces discussed above are preserved. There are still localities above the 75th percentile (or 34.83 score), those below the 25th percentile (or 32.97 score), and two groups of provinces between the two percentiles (see Table A.9, Appendix A).

FIGURE 2.7H: WEIGHTED PAPI (WITH 90% CIS)

Correlation with other Parameters of Interest

Once the weighted index was constructed, a further question worth exploring is how well the PAPI correlates with other measures of local governance performance? This allows for understanding whether PAPI captures elements of governance that are conceptually distinct or whether there is an underlying determinant of good governance performance.

Figure 2.7i demonstrates the correlation with the 2009 PCI scores. As can be noted, there is a positive and statistically significant correlation of 0.45. This means that places that do well on the PAPI also tend to perform well on the PCI. Nevertheless, the relationship

is not perfect. Some locations significantly outperform or underperform their evaluation by businesses. Provinces like Ho Chi Minh City, Phu Yen, Ha Tinh and Binh Phuoc stand out as locations where citizens give higher evaluations to local leaders than would be expected given their PCI rankings. In other words, these local administrations tend to favor the perceptions of individuals over business elites. On the other hand, provinces like Kon Tum, Lai Chau, Dak Lak, Yen Bai, Kien Giang and Tien Giang have lower scores than would be expected from their PCI scores. These are places were citizens are less satisfied with governance than businesses.

The positive but imperfect relationship between the two metrics is important, as it indicates that for the most part, well-governed provinces tend to show up on top, regardless of the methodology used to gauge performance. On the other hand, it can be observed quite clearly that there are differences regarding how businesses and citizens view governance performance, requiring different types of policies from local officials. Some locations manage the balancing act quite well, while others have yet to find the appropriate mix.

FIGURE 2.7I: CORRELATION BETWEEN 2010 PAPI AND 2009 PCI

Table 2.7c takes the exercise even deeper by probing the bivariate correlations between sub-components of the two metrics. Significant relationships are shown in pink. Though it is premature to ask what is causing these associations, the strongest relationships appear to be between the PAPI measure of Public Service Delivery (Dimension six) and PCI sub-dimensions that evaluate similar government services, such as Labour Policy, Business Services, and Infrastructure. Another interesting relationship that deserves further exploration is the correlation between the PCI's measure of Proactivity of Local Officials and the Control of Corruption (Dimension four) in PAPI. Are dynamic and independent local leaders better at reigning in the activities of subordinates? Finally, researchers and policy makers might be curious about why PAPI participation scores are correlated with the reduction in bureaucratic costs and increased transparency for businesses. Do high quality elections actually make leaders more accountable to local businesses? It cannot be said for certain, but the relationship invites further study.

TABLE 2.7C: CORRELATION BETWEEN PAPI DIMENSIONS AND PCI SUB-INDICES

		PAPI1	PAPI2	PAPI3	PAPI4	PAPI5	PAPI6	PCI 1	PCI 2	PCI 3	PCI 4	PCI 5	PCI 6	PCI 7	PCI 8	PCI 9	PCI Intra
PAPI1	Participation	1															
PAPI2	Accountability	0.4908*	1														
PAPI3	Transparency	0.5055*	0.348	1													
PAPI4	Corruption	0.2708	0.3045	0.4619*	1												
PAPI5	Administration	0.3284	0.1701	0.2106	0.0541	1											
PAPI6	Public Services	0.4007*	0.5327*	0.2323	-0.09	0.2643	1										
PCI1	Entry Costs	-0.2323	-0.0155	0.1036	0.2145	-0.3256	-0.063	1									
PCI2	Land Access	-0.2218	-0.1973	-0.0641	0.1453	-0.3002	-0.4435*	0.3303	1								
PCI3	Transparency	0.3830*	0.1874	0.3218	0.3115	-0.0036	0.1529	0.2431	0.2808	1							
PCI4	Time Costs	0.5238*	0.3128	0.3198	0.3283	0.2396	0.2326	0.170	2 0.04	0.5176*	1						
PCI5	Informal Charges	-0.1967	-0.1734	-0.1102	0.302	-0.2981	-0.2684	0.3790*	0.6932*	0.4480*	0.2461	1					
PCI6	Proactivity	0.1759	0.1395	0.1551	0.4807*	0.0978	-0.1796	0.3926*	0.5056*	0.6473*	0.6414*	0.6997*	1				
PCI7	Business Support	0.1933	0.3106	0.1735	-0.2625	0.1184	0.5744*	-0.1958	-0.6840*	-0.0259	-0.1111	-0.5537*	-0.4126	*1.0000			
PCI8	Labor Policy	0.2961	0.5157*	0.2819	0.0635	0.1198	0.5954*	0.1309	-0.0975	0.3532	0.3448	0.1718	0.248	0.3859*	1		
PCI9	Legal Institution	0.0823	-0.1023	0.2817	0.2328	0.2182	-0.0869	0.2443	0.1472	0.219	0.2108	0.0887	0.2645	-0.0828	0.0235	1	
PCI Infra	Infrastructure	0.5644*	0.4805*	0.3722*	0.1423	0.2565	0.6109*	-0.1339	-0.2652	0.4784*	0.5359*	-0.0462	0.1322	0.3423	0.7128*	0.1043	1

Figure 2.7j further probes the very strong, positive relationship (r=0.54) between infrastructure in the PCI and PAPI. When the infrastructure sub-dimension of PAPI is broken out, the relationship is even stronger (r=0.73). This is a very compelling finding that despite the different approaches and

the problems of perception bias, which normally accompany surveys of this nature, both citizens and businesses agree on attributes of provinces that can be observed directly. This finding should give readers greater confidence in the reliability of these approaches.

FIGURE 2.7J: ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PCI INFRASTRUCTURE AND PAPI PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

Finally, the relationship between PAPI and GDP is studied in Figure 2.7k. It is also a strongly positively correlated relationship (r=0.60). This association is difficult to interpret, because it cannot be said for certain which direction the causality runs. First, it could be that better governed provinces grow faster and become wealthier, from a strong hypothesis in the development literature. Second, it could be that richer provinces have more money to invest in governance and higher capacity officials to hire. Third, it may simply be that wealthy citizens feel more comfortable and rate their governments more highly (although this does not appear to be the case in the regressions above). Finally, governance and wealth may be both caused by some deep-seated socio-cultural or historical factor. Thus, the two variables tend to move together, however, there is no direct relationship

between the two of them. Indeed, readers should be suspicious of this fourth factor, because of the high proportion of minority-rich provinces at the bottom of the performance levels. These provinces also tend to be the poorest in the country (each 10% change in the share of minorities leads to astounding half point decrease in the weighted PAPI measure in regression analysis).

However, the most likely scenario is that all of these four factors contribute somewhat to the relationship. Given the current data, the separate effects cannot be parsed out. But the 2010 PAPI is only the baseline measure. Over time, through iteration, it is expected to identify changes in governance in locations, which will allow for better understanding of how those changes in governance contribute to local wealth and welfare.

FIGURE 2.7K: ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PAPI AND GDP PER CAPITA

Moreover, the way PAPI was rolled out will allow testing of a treated group of provinces versus a control group, who have not received such detailed metrics on their public administration performance. It is expected that provinces, which benefited from PAPI 2010's iteration, should have a head start in improving local governance performance (see discussion on how provinces were sampled in Chapter 3). This exogenous source of variation in the quality of governance and public administration will provide additional leverage on the age-old and critical question of how governance relates to the welfare of citizens.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.1. AN OBJECTIVE, RIGOROUS AND SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY

A sound and robust methodology is fundamental so that the results are credible and accepted by different stakeholders and interested parties. The sampling procedure followed in the roll out phase of PAPI 2010, basically follows the methodology used in the pilot phase[135] but strengthened as it incorporated lessons learnt and further refinements. The sampling procedure sought to obtain information from a representative selection of ordinary citizens as individual users of public administrative services rather than from household-heads. This was done in an effort to learn about the perception from across the population, including gender, social, economic and age-differentiated groups.

This chapter presents the objective, rigorous and scientific methodology used for the study of PAPI and explains (i) how provinces were randomly selected using propensity matching scores; (ii) how districts; communes and villages were randomly selected using probabilities proportional to measures of size; including a discussion on how individual respondents were identified and interviewed; (iii) the comparison between PAPI 2010 sample and known census data, as well as estimation of designing effects (iv) how the fieldwork was conducted; and (iv) how the different 81 indicators were combined to produce 21 sub-dimensions, 6 dimensions and the overall Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI).

Sub-national indices ranking relative government performance have become increasingly popular, and a useful policy-making tool both in Viet Nam and in other countries. The underlying assumption about these indices is that, by providing objective information on governance and public administration, they provide an incentive for local leaders to improve policies and institutions within their jurisdictions. Different causal mechanisms have been offered to explain this incentive for improvement. First, sub-national indices improve accountability between local leaders and their constituents by providing information to citizens about how their province stacks up nationally and regionally. Using this information, citizens can demand targeted improvements. Second, indices increase upward accountability of central decision makers. For instance, if provincial leaders hope to be promoted to central leadership positions, they may want to demonstrate evidence of successful leadership within their localities. A high ranking on provincial indices provides this incentive. Third, the indices may impact competition for labour and capital among regions. Workers and businesses may choose to vote with their feet and move to regions that offer better governance and public service delivery. This should stimulate competition between provinces to improve public administration and retain or lure in these valuable stakeholders.

Each causal mechanism implies that creating and disseminating sub-national public administration indices should improve performance in subsequent years. Once local leaders know how they stack up against their peers and have clear information on their relative weaknesses, they can invest time and resources into improvements.

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135. See UNDP, VFF, CECODES (2010).

3.2. SELECTION OF PROVINCES

The PAPI roll-out in 30 selected provinces, and provides an ideal opportunity to test the utility of indices. Although the decision to limit the initial index to half the country was made for other reasons (budget, political sensitivity, time, incremental steps, local capacities), it provides an ideal opportunity to test the effectiveness of sub-national indices generally and PAPI as a tool for policy and decision-making specifically.

A key methodological challenge is selecting treatment provinces to provide the best possible test. Because Viet Nam has only 63 first-tier sub-national units (58 provinces and 5 centrally managed cities), random sampling of provinces may not result in treatment and control groups that are balanced, meaning that the two groups are similar in every way except for the announcement of their PAPI scores. Most importantly, provinces should be balanced in terms of factors that may have an independent influence on public administration provision. With such a small population, random sampling error may be quite large, leading to unbalanced measures on these key factors, between provinces that complicates inference.

To resolve this problem, the technique known as Propensity Score Matching (PSM)[136] was used. PSM

136. See Pearl (2009) and Ho et al (2007).

creates a score for each province, that is a composite measure of factors that may have an independent influence on public administration. Such factors include wealth, population size, urbanization, population density, education, infrastructure, distance from major cities and economic structure of the economy, and the wider region where the province is located. Using this composite score, the nearest twin for every province was identified, thus creating pairs consisting of one 'treated' province and one province assigned to the control group. One treated province (i.e. where PAPI 2010 was administered) was randomly selected from within each pair. This technique ensures balance between the two groups.

In sum, a rigorous five steps approach was implemented for the selection of the initial 30 provinces using propensity score matching. The five followed steps are explained as follows:

Step 1: Factor analysis revealed one relevant dimension which was used to identify twins. These results are revealed in Table 3.1. Using these weights, scores for each province were generated. Score in Table 3.1 is the factor score derived from the Factor Analysis procedure; it is analogous to a bivariate correlation between these variables and the latent variable identified by the procedure. This latent variable is the propensity used to match provinces. The uniqueness column provides the proportion of the common variance of the variable not associated with the underlying factor.

TABLE 3.1: MATCHING WEIGHTS

MATCHING FACTORS	SCORE	UNIQUENESS
Secondary School Graduates	0.6927	0.5201
GDP 2008	0.6787	0.5394
Population 2008	0.5815	0.6619
Unweighted Provincial Competitiveness Index	0.5021	0.7479
Asphalted Roads (%)	0.5	0.75
Telephone per Capita 2008	0.0664	0.9956
Distance from City	-0.4463	0.8008
Agricultural Share (%)	-0.6522	0.5747
Eigen Value	2.41	
Cumulative Variance Explained	30.10%	

Sources: Calculations using data from: Malesky, Edmund. 2009. "The Viet Nam Provincial Competitiveness Index: Measuring Economic Governance for Private Sector Development. 2009 Final Report." *Viet Nam Competitiveness Initiative Policy Paper #14.* Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and Industry and United States Agency for International Development: Ha Noi, Viet Nam; General Statistical Office 2010. *Statistical Handbook.* Ha Noi, Viet Nam (www.gso.gov.vn).

Step 2: Provinces were grouped by region in order to capture the influence of qualitative factors affecting public administration performance that are difficult to measure, such as history, culture (particularly the role of ethnic minorities), and influence from neighbouring countries, such as Cambodia, China, and Laos.

Step 3: Within each region, provinces were ordered by their propensity scores, identifying twins of provinces in each region. A province's twin is the province with the closest propensity score to it within each region. This exercise is shown in Table 3.2. A few provinces did not lend themselves easily to matching (Thanh Hoa, Quang Ninh, Lam Dong, Tay Ninh, and Bac Lieu). These provinces were left for analysis in the second phase. Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City did not receive propensity scores as they are the only natural match for each other.

TABLE 3.2: PROVINCIAL MATCHES

PROVINCE	REGION	PROPENSITY SCORE	PAIR	SELECTED FOR 2010
Ha Nam	Red River Delta	0.4165346	24	Yes
Ninh Binh	Red River Delta	0.4732771	24	No
Hung Yen	Red River Delta	0.8578451	25	Yes
Thai Binh	Red River Delta	0.645959	25	No
Nam Dinh	Red River Delta	1.129089	26	Yes
Bac Ninh	Red River Delta	1.025823	26	No
Hai Duong	Red River Delta	1.475154	27	Yes
Vinh Phuc	Red River Delta	1.34222	27	No
Cao Bang	Northern Uplands	-1.649416	31	Yes
Bac Kan	Northern Uplands	-2.399042	31	No
Lai Chau	Northern Uplands	-1.572953	32	Yes
Son La	Northern Uplands	-1.360501	32	No
Dien Bien	Northern Uplands	-1.009308	41	Yes
Hoa Binh	Northern Uplands	-0.781302	41	No
Yen Bai	Northern Uplands	-0.7423785	42	Yes
Ha Giang	Northern Uplands	-0.5991037	42	No
Lang Son	Northern Uplands	-0.5781916	43	Yes
Tuyen Quang	Northern Uplands	-0.4127926	43	No
Phu Tho	Northern Uplands	-0.1902373	51	Yes
Lao Cai	Northern Uplands	-0.2219134	51	No
Bac Giang	Northern Uplands	0.3842239	52	Yes
Thai Nguyen	Northern Uplands	0.2334472	52	No
Quang Tri	North Central Coast	-1.018422	61	Yes
Quang Binh	North Central Coast	-0.5655094	61	No
Ha Tinh	North Central Coast	0.3299339	62	Yes
Nghe An	North Central Coast	0.3839523	62	No
Phu Yen	South Central Coast	-0.7898039	63	Yes
Quang Ngai	South Central Coast	-1.003734	63	No

PROVINCE	REGION	PROPENSITY SCORE	PAIR	SELECTED FOR 2010
Thua Thien-Hue	South Central Coast	0.0237215	71	Yes
Quang Nam	South Central Coast	-0.1886866	71	No
Binh Dinh	South Central Coast	0.368391	72	Yes
Khanh Hoa	South Central Coast	0.1321918	72	No
Kon Tum	Central Highlands	-1.371445	73	Yes
Dak Nong	Central Highlands	-1.705113	73	No
Dak Lak	Central Highlands	-0.8353297	74	Yes
Gia Lai	Central Highlands	-1.3059	74	No
Binh Phuoc	North Southeast	-1.078161	75	Yes
Ninh Thuan	North Southeast	-0.7659233	75	No
Long An	North Southeast	0.3576976	81	Yes
Binh Thuan	North Southeast	0.2362074	81	No
Dong Nai	North Southeast	1.980937	82	Yes
Binh Duong	North Southeast	1.259749	82	No
Hau Giang	Mekong Delta	-0.2808625		Yes
Tra Vinh	Mekong Delta	-0.4631774		No
Kien Giang	Mekong Delta	-0.0266796	.	Yes
Soc Trang	Mekong Delta	-0.2616384	.	No
Vinh Long	Mekong Delta	0.0738719	.	Yes
Dong Thap	Mekong Delta	0.0318117	.	No
Tien Giang	Mekong Delta	0.544087	.	Yes
Ben Tre	Mekong Delta	0.5684274		No
Ca Mau	Mekong Delta	0.5825623		Yes
An Giang	Mekong Delta	0.7772459		No
Da Nang	Metropolis	0.9814397		Yes
Can Tho	Metropolis	1.418144		No
Hai Phong	Metropolis	2.067052		Yes
Ba Ria-Vung Tau	Metropolis	1.751147		No
Ha Noi	Metropolis	.		Yes
Ho Chi Minh City	Metropolis	.		Yes
Bac Lieu	Unmatchable	-1.190099		No
Lam Dong	Unmatchable	-0.4223856		No
Tay Ninh	Unmatchable	0.1121307		No
Quang Ninh	Unmatchable	1.191718		No
Thanh Hoa	Unmatchable	1.634019		No

Note: Propensity scores based on authors' calculations from Table 3.1. Stata .do file available upon request. Source: Idem Table 3.1.

Step 4: After creating provincial twins, one province within each pair was randomly selected for inclusion into Phase 1 of the study. (Stata do files are available upon request).

Step 5: Finally, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide balance checks following this matching exercise. Table 3.3 displays the contrasts between provinces selected for Phase 1 (treated) and control provinces having similar measures on the key variables of interest. Table 3.3

shows the results for all 28 pairs of provinces (Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City are not used since they were purposively included). Table 3.4 drops all cities and Ba Ria-Vung Tau.[137]

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137. Ba Ria-Vung Tau is dropped, considering its high oil revenues inflate its GDP disproportionately to other provinces, complicating the ability to find a match for it.

TABLE 3.3: BALANCE CHECK - MATCH TO ALL 28 PROVINCES

VARIABLE	PHASE	OBS	MEAN	STD. DEV.	MIN	MAX
Agricultural Share (%)	1	28	34.44	13.06	4.26	60.65
Agricultural Share (%)	0	28	33.31	15.12	2.16	57.13
Asphalted Roads (%)	1	28	55%	25%	12%	100%
Asphalted Roads (%)	0	28	49%	26%	5%	100%
Distance from City	1	28	282.79	240.17	22.00	759.00
Distance from City	0	28	264.00	217.02	31.00	835.00
GDP 2008	1	28	8229.32	7116.22	901.80	29169.40
GDP 2008	0	28	8908.07	8239.39	997.10	34323.60
Population 2008	1	28	1184.13	531.39	335.30	2290.20
Population 2008	0	28	1157.55	567.51	308.90	3131.00
Secondary School Graduates	1	28	85.23	8.26	68.51	98.46
Secondary School Graduates	0	28	82.80	7.99	58.15	97.81
Telephone per Capita 2008	1	28	0.26	0.26	0.04	1.23
Telephone per Capita 2008	0	28	0.30	0.39	0.05	2.08
Unweighted PCI	1	28	53.74	4.84	41.64	65.93
Unweighted PCI	0	28	53.75	5.64	42.51	65.65

Source: Idem Table 3.1.

TABLE 3.4: BALANCE CHECK - MATCH TO ALL 26 PROVINCES

VARIABLE	PHASE	OBS	MEAN	STD. DEV.	MIN	MAX
Agricultural Share (%)	1	26	36.52	10.99	12.10	60.65
Agricultural Share (%)	0	26	35.30	13.68	6.37	57.13
Asphalted Roads (%)	1	26	52%	23%	12%	100%
Asphalted Roads (%)	0	26	51%	25%	5%	100%
Distance from City	1	26	271.46	227.53	22.00	667.00
Distance from City	0	26	275.31	220.88	31.00	835.00
GDP 2008	1	26	7768.68	6985.91	901.80	29169.40
GDP 2008	0	26	7037.32	4718.79	997.10	20624.80
Population 2008	1	26	1172.75	530.99	335.30	2290.20
Population 2008	0	26	1164.58	588.42	308.90	3131.00
Secondary School Graduates	1	26	84.69	8.26	68.51	98.46
Secondary School Graduates	0	26	82.54	8.16	58.15	97.81
Telephone per Capita 2008	1	26	0.21	0.15	0.04	0.61
Telephone per Capita 2008	0	26	0.24	0.19	0.05	0.85
Unweighted PCI	1	26	53.39	4.35	41.64	60.56
Unweighted PCI	0	26	53.50	5.75	42.51	65.65

Source: Idem Table 3.1.

3.3. SAMPLING STRATEGY

Having selected the 30 provinces, a sampling strategy that balances two primary considerations was devised. First, the survey needed to account for the nested hierarchy of administrative services and its inherent uneven spatial distribution. Provincial capitals concentrate many services that are not available elsewhere, as do district and commune seats in relation to other units. For example, a district that happens to be the capital of a province offers a wider range of administrative services than other districts in the same province. Similarly, residents of communes where district governments are located have easy access to a wider range of services than residents of peripheral communes.

Thus, in order to ensure that comparisons of PAPI results would be fair across all sampled provinces, three categories of certainty units were created. PAPI purposively included every district that serves as the provincial capital. In each district (whether purposively or randomly selected), the commune that serves as the district seat was purposively selected, while another

commune in the same district was randomly selected by PPS. Within each commune (or ward), the village (or residential group) that is the seat of the commune was purposively selected, while another village/residential group in the same commune/ward was randomly selected by PPS. Thus, this design ensured the acquisition of measures of administrative performance across the full range of possible situations within a province, ranging from urban residential groups located in the immediate vicinity of the provincial institutions all the way to ordinary villages located in ordinary communes under the jurisdiction of ordinary districts.

The second consideration was that, all residents of in any sampled cluster, would have the same probability of being selected into the study. The selection of units based on the probability of selection proportional to measures of size (PPS) ensures that any two respondents who live in different clusters of a given sampling unit (for instance, residents of different villages of the same commune) have the same chance of being selected into the study, regardless of the absolute size of each village.

3.3.1. PROBABILITY PROPORTION TO SIZE (PPS) SAMPLING APPROACH

Probability Proportion to Size (PPS) is especially important when the sampling units vary considerably in size, as is the case at each level of local government in Viet Nam. PPS ensures that respondents selected from larger units have the same probability of selection into the sample as those from smaller units. In other words, "sampling with probability proportionate to size is the preferred solution because it permits greater control over the ultimate sample size without introducing the need for stratification by size".[138] This procedure is necessary in multi-stage clustered designs that lead to the selection of primary sampling units (in PAPI, districts), secondary (communes) and tertiary units (villages) of varying size.

PPS ensures that, within a given stratum, individuals who are drawn from different sampling units each have the same probability of being selected, even if the size of the sampling units vary within that stratum. That is, if two certain provinces are comparable, and each of the provinces is further sampled with PPS to draw two random districts, one random commune and one random village (after selection of certain units), then the two provinces will be comparable. Considering the selection of sampling units in PAPI was consistently the same in all 30 provinces, there is reasonable confidence that provinces are comparable. In addition, given the available budget, timeframe, human resources and goals of the research, PPS sampling offered the most appropriate strategy to ensure reliable provincial samples, which assists comparison among and between provinces. Other sampling strategies may have led to other sets of problematic biases (e.g. sampling only the capital districts), been impossible to carry out efficiently (e.g. choosing a representative sample from each district, commune, and village in the province), or beenfinancially impossible (e.g. increasing the number of respondents).

It is important to note that when the sampling design calls for unequal probabilities of selection at specific stages of the selection process, probabilities of selection must always remain computable. These discrepancies require the use of sampling weights at the analysis stage. In PAPI 2010, these difference arise

between certainty units (e.g. capital districts, whose probability of selection (p) is one) and other units at the same administrative level (ordinary district). For instance, if a capital district amounts to 25% of its province population, the probability of selection of this certainty unit is four times larger than it should and all respondents are assigned a weight of $w=1/p=\frac{1}{4}$ that ensures that the odds are equal to those of respondents from districts selected by PPS in the same province. Similar adjustments are made at each level. The final weight W_f is computed based on the cumulative probability P_f of selecting a respondent over the entire nested hierarchy (district, commune and village) where each person is located: $W_f = 1/P_f$.

A rigorous multistage sampling approach was implemented for the selection of geographical units and the construction of a representative sample in each province (see Figure 3.1). The four followed steps are summarized as follows:

Stage 1: Selection of DISTRICTS. Besides the provincial capital, two districts in each province were selected at random, yielding a total of 90 districts (60 ordinary districts and 30 capitals). The first district was chosen purposefully as the provincial capital city, in order to capture services provided by provincial level authorities. The second and third districts were randomly selected using PPS.

Stage 2: Selection of COMMUNES. Two representative communes (or wards) were selected from each sampled district, yielding a total of 180 communes (30 provinces x 3 districts x 2 communes/wards). In each district, the first commune that serves as the district seat was selected with certainty, while a second commune was randomly selected by PPS.

Stage 3: Selection of VILLAGES. Two villages (or residential groups in urban areas) were selected from each selected commune, making a total of 360 villages/residential groups (30 provinces x 3 districts x 2 communes/wards x 2 villages/residential groups). Again, villages where commune headquarters are located were treated as certainty units, while another village (or residential area) was selected by PPS.

Stage 4: Selection of representative RESPONDENTS. Within villages or residential groups, respondents were selected randomly from

138. For a description of PPS sampling methods see United Nations (2008) .

systematic lists of all eligible households in the village. Lists were compiled with the assistance of the local VFF chapter. 20 households were randomly drawn from each list, along with a replacement list of 10 households. The targeted number of households in each province was set at 240 people (3 districts x 2 communes/wards x 2 villages/residential groups x 20 households). From each household, one adult between the ages of 18-65 and currently living in the selected province was selected randomly to become the final respondent.

In each village (or residential group), lists of potential respondents were compiled by CECODES, through close collaboration with the VFF at the local levels in May and June 2010. Since sampling and enumeration work took place before the 2009 Census data was released, CECODES collected population information at districts, communes, villages, and households' levels,

with the active support from local VFF officials. Measures of size are subject to error, yet these errors are attenuated through post-stratification weights that compensate for discrepancies between expected and actual size of the units. Just-released cross-tabulations of the population data (by gender and age group), that has now been released by the General Statistics Office of Viet Nam[139] for each province, were used in order to create a vector of post-stratification weights so that each group of actual respondents is matched to the number of people of the same gender and age category, in the province that they represent. Thus, the combination of sampling and post-stratification weights ensures that each provincial sample is representative of the unit it represents.

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139. See General Statistics Office of Viet Nam (2010).

FIGURE 3.1: A MULTISTAGE APPROACH TO SAMPLING IN PAPI 2010

As a result of these four stages, PAPI can be considered like a large scale survey that takes into account key demographic characteristics of Vietnamese population structure. The final number of randomly selected and interviewed respondents is 5,568 citizens (48% male, 52% female). The mean age of respondents is 41 years old (98.90% from 18–65; and 1.10% over 65); 85% are Kinh, and 15% from other ethnic groups. Regarding education levels, in a nutshell, 5% of respondents had no formal education, 10% incomplete primary, 7% complete primary, 16% incomplete secondary, 21% complete secondary, 6% incomplete high school, 21% complete high school, 2% incomplete university education, 11% complete university education. In addition, the selection of respondents also included a wide range of occupation, indeed 39% of respondents in the agriculture sector, 12% in government, 5% in the private industry, 3% in State Owned Enterprises, 20% in private services, 2% military, and 19% in other occupations. The demographic module in PAPI's questionnaire also asked respondents to identify their economic condition (see questions A011, A011a and A011b, Appendix C). From their answers, it can be said that 15% of respondents are self-perceived in bad economic conditions, 72% in average conditions and 12% in good economic conditions.

3.3.2. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PAPI 2010 AND 2009 CENSUS DATA

The reliability of the survey can be checked against the variables that have been made available since the release of Viet Nam's 2009 national population census. Given the breadth of the PAPI instrument, one can only verify how closely the survey results match the census data on a small set of common variables. Specifically, age, gender, and ethnicity data are available for each of the 30 provinces, as well as for each of the 180 communes that were selected in the PAPI sample.

As a further check against the risk of biased point-estimation, age-groups (18-19, and in 5 years increments for the population aged 20 and above) cross-tabulated by gender and province (using province-wide data) were used in the construction of post-stratification weights. While the use of probability and stratification weights is desirable to improve the precision of point estimation, large disparities in weights directly impact the standard errors of these estimates, and may thus impede a researchers' ability to conclude that observed differences between groups are indeed statistically significant given a chosen sampling design.

Table 3.5 compares the distribution of key demographic variables between the PAPI samples-both weighted and unweighted - and available census data, when available.

TABLE 3.5: COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTION OF KEY DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

ETHNICITY	UNWEIGHTED	WEIGHTED	2009 CENSUS
Kinh	84.91	91.12	85.73
Others	15.05	8.95	14.27
KB/DK	0.04	-0.07	0

FIGURE 3.2: ETHNICITY BY PROVINCE

Legend: ■ Unweighted % Kinh   ■ Weighted % Kinh   □ % Kinh in Census 2009

In addition, the impacts of weights on the composition of the sample by level of education and main occupation, are shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. Because age and gender are inherent components of post stratification weights, the weighted shares of age-group and gender mechanically match the distributions of the census data. More importantly, ethnicity, educational attainment, and employment—three variables that are not included in the construction of sampling weights—are largely unaffected by the weighting scheme.

FIGURE 3.3: LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF SURVEYED RESPONDENTS

Legend: ■ Unweighted   □ Weighted

FIGURE 3.4: TYPES OF OCCUPATION OF SURVEYED RESPONDENTS

Therefore, one may be reasonably confident that the survey is adequately representative of the underlying population, and that design effects (discussed below) are small enough to allow for meaningful comparisons across groups and across provinces.

3.3.3. ESTIMATION OF DESIGN EFFECTS

It is important to keep in mind that PAPI is a clustered multi-stage probability sample with purposive selection of administrative centres (certainty units). The merits of this strategy were discussed above, yet these choices carry some statistical penalties, in the sense that the design of PAPI differs from a hypothetical Simple Random Sample (SRS). In practice, it is almost never possible to draw SRS samples of large populations: such samples require exhaustive listings of the entire population of interest, from which one draws a subset at random. In Viet Nam-as in virtually every other country in the world-there is no such list of the entire population of each province. Therefore, SRS is only an ideal yardstick against which the relative efficiency of an alternative design-such as the PAPI survey-can be evaluated.

In this regard, two closely related measures of design effect have been proposed.[140] Each one captures the

relative (in)efficiency of a sample compared with a hypothetical SRS sample of identical size. DEFF is the ratio of the variance of an estimate from the non-SRS survey and the variance computed as if a SRS design had been conducted. In clustered samples such as PAPI, DEFF is almost always greater than 1, which implies that they are less efficient than an ideal SRS design. DEFT is the square root DEFF (adjusted for finite sample size), and is thus the ratio of the standard errors.

Table 3.6 presents point estimates for each dimension of PAPI as well as the overall weighted index computed for all respondents (N=5,568) clustered across 30 provinces, 90 districts, 180 communes/wards and 360 villages. Not surprisingly, measures of DEFT show that standard errors are between 2.83 and 4.26 larger than those that would be obtained by SRS. The magnitude of DEFT varies across dimensions, because the total variance of each dimension depends on the underlying variances of the factors that are included in each dimension, and well as the variance that is solely attributable to the design effect of the study. In relation to means (namely point estimates) of either individual dimensions of PAPI or the overall weighted index, PAPI standard errors are quite small, but the clustered sampling design leads to larger ones than an SRS survey of an identical size.

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140. See Kish (1965) and Park and Lee (2001).

TABLE 3.6: ESTIMATION OF DESIGN EFFECTS AT DIMENSION LEVELS

VARIABLE	MEAN	STD. ERR.	[95% CONF. INTERVAL]		DEFF	DEFT
Dimension1	5.43	0.06	5.31	5.55	11.90	3.29
Dimension2	5.20	0.07	5.05	5.35	19.53	4.22
Dimension3	5.20	0.08	5.03	5.36	19.94	4.26
Dimension4	4.98	0.06	4.85	5.11	8.83	2.83
Dimension5	6.35	0.05	6.25	6.45	14.41	3.62
Dimension6	7.25	0.03	7.19	7.32	12.09	3.32
PAPI_weighted	33.56	0.29	32.97	34.16	16.49	3.87

Note: These estimates make use of sampling weights, not exclude post-stratification weights which cannot be incorporated in the computation of design effects.

3.4. QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT AND THE SURVEY PROCESS

3.4.1. QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT

Questionnaire Refinement. Evolving from the 2009 pilot in three provinces (Phu Tho, Da Nang and Dong Thap), the questionnaire was refined and improved, through drawing lessons from the pilot and consulting with a wide range of stakeholders. The questionnaire was made more focused, shorter and simpler compared to the 2009 version.

Questionnaire Pre-testing. Several rounds of discussions and focus group interviews were held with experts and ordinary citizens from different demographic, educational and occupational backgrounds to consult the refined questionnaire in order to pre-test questions and treatments. Apart from internal discussions with experts, three focus groups selected on purpose were conducted in March 2010. The first focus group involved 10 urban citizens with better education and occupation from Hai Ba Trung District of Ha Noi, the second group involved 10 rural women from Long Bien District in the outskirts of Ha Noi, and the third group involved 10 rural citizens with Muong ethnicity background from Hoa Binh City, Hoa Binh province. Lessons from focus groups were withdrawn for questions refinement, and rewording to make them more comprehensible to different strata of population.[141]

Questionnaire Treatments. Treatments were used in the Questionnaire in order to test citizens' awareness of different angles of one particular policy, or to facilitate responses to difficult-to-answer-directly questions. As such, the Questionnaire was made into two versions, A and B, with different treatments being included.

Interviewer's Manual. The Interviewer's Manual was developed to ensure that all enumerators have the same level of understanding and undertaking when in the field. The Manual includes detailed explanation of the questionnaire, behaving patterns, Do's and Don'ts advice, and questions with show-cards, to facilitate the process of interviews. Interview strategies (including clothing, compliance with lists of interviewees, following strictly what is stated in the questionnaire, maintaining neutral attitude towards interviewees during the course of interviews, creating no pressure on interviewees in order to get work done, ensuring anonymity, confidentiality of respondents, and reporting any ad-hoc issues to the team after each survey day) were also included in the Manual.

3.4.2. SURVEY PROCESS

Training of Enumerators. Two training events were conducted in Ha Noi, with the participation of 25 key enumerators who were staff and collaborators of CECODES and VFF. The first training on March 20, 2010 aimed at having the enumerators' help in tightening loose ends in the questionnaire, and initially guiding

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141. Once focus groups were conducted, and feedback obtained, the questionnaire was refined. In an additional effort to ensure easy understanding of the questions and enhance phrasing to every-day conversation, two third-parties completely external and unaware of PAPI research, were contracted to translat the questionnaire, from Vietnamese into English, and from English to Vietnamese.

them on how to do fieldwork. The second training, in mid-May 2010, was to instruct enumerators through the questionnaire, the Interviewer's Manual, division of tasks between field supervisors and enumerators, and preliminary schedules for fieldwork in 30 provinces. Training of provincial enumerators was done one day before actual fieldwork took place in each province.

Survey Team Composition. Each team comprised of one field supervisor cum team leader, and five or seven enumerators, with two being either CECODES researchers, or central VFF staff or a mixture of staff from both organizations, and the rest being provincial VFF staff or hired students (like in the case of Ho Chi Minh City).

Survey Teams' Tasks. Tasks were divided among each team to ensure successful fieldwork. Each field supervisors cum team leader was tasked with coordinating with local VFF coordinator, in every province, to set up interview schedules and venues, and to invite selected respondents before the fieldwork was conducted.

The team leader checked the lists of interviewees, to make sure that the right persons were interviewed, he also supervised the whole field process and double-checked the answered questionnaires, immediately after each interview, in order to fill in any missed or skipped questions.

For enumerators, they were trained and instructed steps provided in the Interviewer's Manual, conducted interviews, raised any concern with the team leaders to address immediately (including concerns about whether the interviewees were the right one since each interviewer had a list of respondents to double-check respondents) and discussed with the team leaders on matters related to the questionnaire and respondents, at the end of the day of survey, for lessons learnt.

Fieldwork. Actual fieldwork for PAPI was conducted in thirty provinces from June 20 to October 18, 2010. Fifteen groups of enumerators, who came from CECODES and central VFF, were sent from Ha Noi to the fields, and worked there for seven to ten days in a row (except in Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City where enumerators had to come back to the fields in order to finish interviewing all sampled respondents that could not be met during actual fieldwork).

Neutral and friendly interview settings. Building neutral and friendly interview settings and environment, was stressed to be critical in the fieldwork, in order to obtain the best possible objective feedback from citizens. Prior request for interviews to be conducted at a neutral place like a communal/village, common house or "nhà văn hóa", or a primary school in the commune was made, to make sure that the invited respondents would feel comfortable and confidential enough when being asked sensitive questions. In whichever settings, interviews were conducted with minimal interference from local cadres, so that respondents felt at ease when they were asked questions about their perspectives of the performance of local cadres or local authorities.

Quality control

One of the most important undertakings during fieldwork was quality control in terms of right respondents and response rates. To ensure right attendance, field supervisors checked the lists of invited respondents carefully, prior to and after interviews, to make sure that those who came for the interviews, were on the main or on the replacement sampled lists. When someone was found to come for an interview on behalf of a listed invitee, he/she was sent back home without being interviewed. He/she was either convinced to call the person on the list, or was asked about the reasons of the absence of the listed person. It helped the research teams to identify causes for non-attendance.

No-show handling. For those respondents that could not be reached during the day of the fieldwork, direct visits to their homes, or rescheduling with respondents for shows at the communal houses were undertaken by the research teams, in order to reach the most of sampled and invited respondents. When respondents refused to come or to be visited at home, these cases were treated as not giving consents to be interviewed. These have been treated as non-responses.

Non-response handling. In many other cases in which the number of respondents in the main lists dropped to below 12 per village due to different reasons, (e.g. out-migration, phantoms in household lists, obsoleteness of

household registration information, or pure bureaucracy in population information collection by grass-roots level collaborators), replacement lists in sampled villages were used. These "new selected" respondents were treated equally like those on the original lists.

In some extreme cases, where the number of shows dropped below 10, even after both original and replacement lists were used (like in one residential group in Dak Lak and Ha Nam), additional random respondents were drawn from the households' lists of each village. This was done effectively thanks to good collaboration between field supervisors, and CECODES and UNDP teams in Ha Noi for technical issues, and with local village heads for additional invitations, as well as to computer facilities and capable research teams on the field.

Post-check of filled in questionnaire. Other critical steps taken in quality control during fieldwork included post-checks of filled in questionnaire, immediately with respondents, to make sure questions were not missed by mistakes made by interviewers, and signatures of both field supervisors, and interviewers certifying that they had done their tasks properly are not forgotten. The purpose of these processes was to bind the team with good work as well as to learn lessons for succeeding PAPI fieldwork.

Communication from the field. Field supervisors had to fill in templates summarizing key facts and figures from field trips to report to the team in Ha Noi, for later analysis of contributive factors such as reasons for no-shows, the number of actual interviews conducted, gender distribution and questionnaire distribution (i.e. between Version A and Version B). In addition, regular talks between Ha Noi and the field team were conducted to sort out problems arising on the spot (e.g. no-shows and low-response rates resulting in additional sampling on spot; or organizational and technical issues requiring central interference and advice from VFF, CECODES or UNDP).

3.5. CONSTRUCTION OF THE INDEX

PAPI follows the general methodology of sub-national indexing, that was pioneered in the Vietnamese PCI, but now has become standardized and applied in

countries around the world, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, El Salvador, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and now Kosovo and Malaysia.[142] Appendix B includes a comparative table of key methodological aspects between PAPI and PCI.

One key benefit of using a similar methodology of construction to the Vietnamese PCI, is that it facilitates comparisons between the relative priorities of governance for Vietnamese citizens and businesses. The similar index construction and scaling allows analysts to draw clear inferences about the way governance and public administration performance is viewed in the two populations.

3.5.1. THE THREE METHODOLOGICAL PILLARS OF PAPI INDEXING

Though details of the methodologies differ slightly in countries where indexes have been created, all sub-national governance indices involve the same core elements, which are referred to as the three Cs: Collection, Construction, and Calibration (Figure 3.5). *Collection* involves the selection of indicators most relevant to governance in sub-national entities within a given country, after a thorough review of the relevant theoretical, and country-specific literature, as well as a detailed conversations with experts and practitioners in each country. It is important that indicators reflect policy decisions and implementation choices made by sub-national leaders. Assessing localities based on national regulatory policies or institutions controlled by directly national bureaucracies is not only unfair, it provides little variance for measuring relative sub-national performance. It is also important that the indicators present actionable information for local leaders. For instance, a low mark for "burdensome administrative procedures," is not as immediately useful as a message that average waiting periods to receive LURC are twice the sample average.

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142. For a more detailed discussion of the approach, as well as the challenges of administering it in different contexts with different actors, see Malesky and Merchant-Vega (2010).

FIGURE 3.5: PAPI'S COLLECTION, CONSTRUCTION AND CALIBRATION METHODOLOGY

Secondly, sub-dimensions are constructed from baskets of indicators reflecting issues faced by citizens within Viet Nam. The selection of other sub-dimensions varies to reflect country-specific and contextual problems.

The final composite of PAPI represents the weighted sum of the six dimensions. This follows from the cornerstone of the PCI methodology. This calibration of dimensions is done through individual weights, so that the final score is a reflection of the relative importance of each dimension, using regression techniques that regressed measures of citizens satisfaction on each of the six dimensions. To calibrate the weighted PAPI, this approach was applied, with the key outcome variable of citizens' satisfaction with government performance, thought to be the best gauge of governance success available (see section 2.7 for more details).

3.5.2. CONSTRUCTION OF THE SUB-DIMENSIONS

Once the survey data was collect, the PAPI research team began the construction of the index. Unlike some other indexing approaches, indicators are not grouped according to statistical correlations. Indicators are selected to reflect the most appropriate measurements of key theoretical concepts of governance and public administration. The baskets of variables comprising the concepts become the dimensions. Sometimes baskets of indicators are too general to capture nuanced concepts. In these cases, dimensions were further divided into sub-dimensions. For example, Dimension four on Control of Corruption has four sub-dimensions: (i) limits to corruption by public sector officials; (ii) limits to corruption in public service delivery; (iii) inequality in employment; and (iv) willingness to fight corruption.

Individual indicators are then grouped under the appropriate sub-dimension. It is important to group indicators under such dimensions in order to keep them theoretically distinct. Figure 3.6 shows how this operates in the Dimension on control of corruption.

FIGURE 3.6: EXAMPLE OF PAPI'S CONTROL OF CORRUPTION (DIMENSION 4) CONSTRUCTION

3.5.3. DIAGNOSTICS TESTS

In addition to theoretical fit, indicators are only used in an index if they pass two additional tests. First, the standard errors around provincial aggregates must be small enough, so that scores of provinces at the 75th percentile of a particular indicator are significantly different from provinces at the 25th percentile. That is, the confidence intervals around those two scores should not overlap. This check is important, as it means that if an index were to be replicated on a hundred separate samples of citizens, ninety-five of those times, the same provinces would be at the top end and low ends of a particular score. In the initial creation of the PAPI, indicators that do not pass this test are eliminated. Of course, in future iterations of the index it is sometimes necessary to relax this rule so that indicators used in the construction are consistent over time. The commitment to only choosing statistically significant indicators is a key reason for the robustness of the rankings year after year in the Vietnamese PCI, as it eliminates the possibility that a new random sample could generate different provincial orderings.

Secondly, differences in sub-national responses could not be shown through regression analysis to be caused, primarily, by variation in demographics characteristics (gender, age, ethnicity, education concentrated in particular areas). This test helps ensure that rankings result from universally applicable governance factors and not as a result of attributes of particular individuals.

3.5.4. SCALING

Once indicators are selected for each sub-dimension, they are standardized around a ten-point scale. To re-scale, the following formula is used:

$$9* \left(\frac{(Province_i - Minimum)}{(Maximum - Minimum)} \right) +1$$

where Province_i is the individual provincial value, Minimum is the smallest provincial value observed in the country, and Maximum is the largest provincial value observed. An example of such an indicator would be the percentage of respondents who agreed their province was serious about combating corruption.

On some items, a larger number has negative interpretation. In these cases, the scale is reversed by subtracting the entire quantity from eleven. An example of such a negative indicator would be the percentage of respondents in a province who pay bribes at the Notary office, and it is re-scale applying the following formula:

$$11 - \left[\, 9* \left(\frac{(\,Province_i - Minimum\,)}{(\,Maximum - Minimum\,)} \right) +1 \right]$$

There are three principle reasons why PAPI uses normalized indicators. First, it allows researchers to transform indicators into a value that is based solely on each sub-national score, in comparison to other sub-national units. Second, the process of normalizing scores allows researchers to combine data from different indicators, which are often in different units, into one dimension. For example, it allows researchers to combine an indicator which is expressed in 'average number of days' with an indicator which is expressed in 'average number of respondents'. Third, normalizing the data facilitates a comparison of PAPI scores across years throughout successive iterations.

3.5.5. SUB-DIMENSION SCORE = SIMPLE AVERAGE OF SCALED INDICATORS

After the indicators are normalized, the dimension scores are calculated by taking the simple average of indicators. If a dimension contains multiple sub-dimensions, the average of the dimensions is used instead, so that the latter receive equal weight.

3.5.6. CALIBRATION OF THE DIMENSIONS TO REFLECT CONTRIBUTION OF CITIZENS SATISFACTION

Among the most important innovations of PAPI, is the care taken to make sure that the final scores offer the most policy relevant information to provincial officials. This is done through the weighting of the dimensions. Weights signal to local officials how to best prioritize their reform interventions for the biggest impact. The final PAPI is the weighted sum of the dimensions, where the weights represent the average contribution of each dimension to citizen satisfaction with local governance and public administration performance.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A: SURVEY DESCRIPTIVES AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS

TABLE A.1: PROVINCIAL GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS

ETHNICITY	FEMALE		MALE		TOTAL		RESPONSE RATE (%)
	N	%	n	%	n	%	
Bac Giang	94	51.09	90	48.91	184	100	76.67
Binh Dinh	102	53.4	89	46.6	191	100	79.58
Binh Phuoc	106	56.38	82	43.62	188	100	78.33
Ca Mau	93	50.82	90	49.18	183	100	76.25
Cao Bang	93	50	93	50	186	100	77.50
Da Nang	95	46.34	110	53.66	205	100	85.42
Dak Lak	81	45.51	97	54.49	178	100	74.17
Dien Bien	96	52.46	87	47.54	183	100	76.25
Dong Nai	85	44.04	108	55.96	193	100	80.42
Ha Nam	88	45.13	107	54.87	195	100	81.25
Ha Noi	80	41.67	112	58.33	192	100	80.00
Ha Tinh	94	47.72	103	52.28	197	100	82.08
Hai Duong	80	43.96	102	56.04	182	100	75.83
Hai Phong	70	44.87	86	55.13	156	100	65.00
Hau Giang	91	49.73	92	50.27	183	100	76.25
Hung Yen	97	49.24	100	50.76	197	100	82.08
Kien Giang	85	48.85	89	51.15	174	100	72.50

ETHNICITY	FEMALE		MALE		TOTAL		RESPONSE RATE (%)
	N	%	n	%	n	%	
Kon Tum	74	39.15	115	60.85	189	100	78.75
Lai Chau	96	50.79	93	49.21	189	100	78.75
Lang Son	105	49.76	106	50.24	211	100	87.92
Long An	98	52.13	90	47.87	188	100	78.33
Nam Dinh	61	33.7	120	66.3	181	100	75.42
Phu Tho	94	50.54	92	49.46	186	100	77.50
Phu Yen	93	51.38	88	48.62	181	100	75.42
Quang Tri	84	49.7	85	50.3	169	100	70.42
TP Ho Chi Minh	69	36.51	120	63.49	189	100	78.75
Thua Thien Hue	99	51.56	93	48.44	192	100	80.00
Tien Giang	78	45.35	94	54.65	172	100	71.67
Vinh Long	89	47.34	99	52.66	188	100	78.33
Yen Bai	78	46.99	88	53.01	166	100	69.17
Total	2,648	47.56	2,920	52.44	5,568	100	77.33

n = actual number of respondents

Note: The sample size is 20x12=240 citizens per province, with response rate of 77.3% including replacements (on average 185.6 per province).

TABLE A.2: DIMENSION 1. PARTICIPATION AT LOCAL LEVELS (90% CONFIDENCE INTERVA)

PROVINCE		MEAN	SE	LOW	HIGH
Hai Duong	30	6.515733	0.190379	6.192609	6.838857
Binh Dinh	52	5.867794	0.260664	5.425379	6.310208
Ha Tinh	42	5.821619	0.104389	5.644443	5.998795
Ho Chi Minh City	79	5.816498	0.060433	5.713928	5.919068
Da Nang	48	5.727448	0.065121	5.616921	5.837975
Binh Phuoc	70	5.71228	0.095233	5.550645	5.873915
Dong Nai	75	5.709669	0.232716	5.314689	6.104648
Hai Phong	31	5.700616	0.035093	5.641055	5.760178
TT-Hue	46	5.643486	0.186637	5.326715	5.960257
Ha Nam	35	5.629661	0.088105	5.480124	5.779197
Dien Bien	11	5.522776	0.095691	5.360363	5.685188
Long An	80	5.498249	0.064973	5.387973	5.608525
Hung Yen	33	5.458049	0.046595	5.378966	5.537132
Nam Dinh	36	5.433404	0.081304	5.295409	5.571398
Phu Tho	25	5.408077	0.126164	5.193944	5.62221
Vinh Long	86	5.365724	0.112761	5.17434	5.557109
Bac Giang	24	5.328589	0.060168	5.226467	5.43071
Ca Mau	96	5.28167	0.070862	5.161399	5.401942
Ha Noi	1	5.26374	0.044256	5.188626	5.338854
Hau Giang	93	5.248628	0.071919	5.126562	5.370693
Cao Bang	4	5.162981	0.088074	5.013496	5.312465
Dak Lak	66	5.148195	0.0693	5.030575	5.265816
Yen Bai	15	5.10975	0.072369	4.986922	5.232579
Phu Yen	54	5.070026	0.346442	4.482024	5.658029
Kien Giang	91	5.058351	0.071623	4.936787	5.179915
Tien Giang	82	5.021655	0.134025	4.794179	5.24913
Quang Tri	45	4.916377	0.09607	4.753321	5.079433
Lai Chau	12	4.648265	0.209303	4.293023	5.003506
Kon Tum	62	4.636577	0.146279	4.388303	4.884852
Lang Son	20	4.444527	0.075058	4.317133	4.57192

se = standard error

75th percentile   5.686334
25th percentile   5.119361

TABLE A.3: DIMENSION 2. TRANSPARENCY (90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)

PROVINCE		MEAN	SE	LOW	HIGH
Ho Chi Minh City	79	6.339636	0.041939	6.268455	6.410817
Da Nang	48	6.002371	0.157137	5.735669	6.269074
Phu Yen	54	5.577871	0.337018	5.005863	6.149878
TT-Hue	46	5.822572	0.105684	5.643199	6.001944
Ha Tinh	42	5.467143	0.269994	5.008893	5.925393
Hai Duong	30	5.533367	0.207237	5.181632	5.885102
Lang Son	20	5.746846	0.049563	5.662724	5.830967
Ca Mau	96	5.569325	0.110547	5.381698	5.756953
Nam Dinh	36	5.477179	0.130411	5.255838	5.698521
Binh Phuoc	70	5.265634	0.23989	4.858478	5.67279
Long An	80	5.487334	0.091928	5.331309	5.64336
Bac Giang	24	5.478583	0.081432	5.340371	5.616794
Dien Bien	11	5.321977	0.145899	5.074349	5.569606
Dong Nai	75	5.420343	0.073729	5.295205	5.545481
Vinh Long	86	5.387606	0.075614	5.25927	5.515943
Cao Bang	4	5.349719	0.055632	5.255297	5.44414
Binh Dinh	52	5.354446	0.05118	5.26758	5.441312
Hau Giang	93	5.039278	0.230636	4.647829	5.430728
Hai Phong	31	5.341974	0.036468	5.280079	5.403869
Ha Noi	1	5.32104	0.041458	5.250674	5.391405
Yen Bai	15	5.244579	0.057487	5.147009	5.342149
Phu Tho	25	5.241524	0.053808	5.150198	5.33285
Tien Giang	82	5.217863	0.060968	5.114384	5.321342
Ha Nam	35	5.213786	0.061831	5.108843	5.318729
Dak Lak	66	4.884135	0.17058	4.594617	5.173653
Hung Yen	33	4.94855	0.115601	4.752345	5.144755
Kien Giang	91	4.897901	0.090322	4.744601	5.0512
Quang Tri	45	4.862635	0.053152	4.772422	4.952847
Lai Chau	12	4.614742	0.103282	4.439446	4.790038
Kon Tum	62	4.38336	0.063569	4.275466	4.491253

se = standard error

75th percentile   5.485146
25th percentile   5.214805

TABLE A.4: DIMENSION 3. VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)

PROVINCE		MEAN	SE	LOW	HIGH
Ha Tinh	42	6.365368	0.140285	6.127267	6.603469
Hai Duong	30	6.13675	0.264874	5.687189	6.586311
Ho Chi Minh City	79	6.059786	0.128914	5.840985	6.278586
Long An	80	5.833669	0.135555	5.603598	6.063741
Dong Nai	75	5.786196	0.119959	5.582594	5.989798
Da Nang	48	5.738777	0.299443	5.230545	6.247009
Hau Giang	93	5.736657	0.079144	5.60233	5.870984
Quang Tri	45	5.635133	0.083081	5.494123	5.776143
Ha Nam	35	5.484843	0.095563	5.322647	5.647039
Ca Mau	96	5.459277	0.214183	5.095753	5.822802
TT-Hue	46	5.451076	0.105859	5.271406	5.630747
Binh Dinh	52	5.414437	0.104619	5.236871	5.592003
Phu Yen	54	5.293012	0.270632	4.833678	5.752345
Hai Phong	31	5.266813	0.079683	5.13157	5.402056
Binh Phuoc	70	5.169978	0.184843	4.856252	5.483705
Vinh Long	86	5.052509	0.113868	4.859245	5.245773
Kon Tum	62	5.012252	0.116294	4.814872	5.209633
Hung Yen	33	4.975609	0.105456	4.796622	5.154595
Lai Chau	12	4.954267	0.153669	4.69345	5.215083
Bac Giang	24	4.951232	0.05781	4.853113	5.049351
Ha Noi	1	4.878282	0.077906	4.746055	5.010509
Dak Lak	66	4.750479	0.104145	4.573717	4.927241
Cao Bang	4	4.740685	0.045	4.664308	4.817063
Dien Bien	11	4.710428	0.106211	4.53016	4.890696
Phu Tho	25	4.706021	0.136087	4.475045	4.936997
Kien Giang	91	4.673573	0.06754	4.558939	4.788206
Tien Giang	82	4.63152	0.07551	4.50336	4.759679
Nam Dinh	36	4.54212	0.102341	4.368422	4.715819
Yen Bai	15	4.499183	0.072753	4.375702	4.622663
Lang Son	20	4.451227	0.059399	4.350411	4.552043

se = standard error

75th percentile   5.597561
25th percentile   4.743134

TABLE A.5: DIMENSION 4. CONTROL OF CORRUPTION (90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)

PROVINCE		MEAN	SE	LOW	HIGH
Ho Chi Minh City	79	6.414756	0.076919	6.284205	6.545308
Long An	80	6.108756	0.293064	5.61135	6.606161
Ca Mau	96	5.969227	0.130405	5.747895	6.190559
Binh Dinh	52	5.911708	0.199167	5.573669	6.249747
Hau Giang	93	5.89997	0.144918	5.654007	6.145933
Binh Phuoc	70	5.709434	0.402493	5.026299	6.392568
Kien Giang	91	5.563638	0.313442	5.031646	6.09563
Phu Yen	54	5.480109	0.261256	5.036689	5.92353
Phu Tho	25	5.402602	0.10947	5.216804	5.5884
Vinh Long	86	5.256448	0.092921	5.098737	5.41416
TT-Hue	46	5.19992	0.204998	4.851984	5.547856
Tien Giang	82	5.074494	0.14288	4.83199	5.316999
Bac Giang	24	4.93652	0.093815	4.777292	5.095749
Dong Nai	75	4.933243	0.102491	4.759289	5.107198
Lai Chau	12	4.869233	0.073498	4.744489	4.993977
Hung Yen	33	4.788143	0.155806	4.5237	5.052586
Dak Lak	66	4.71188	0.107443	4.529522	4.894238
Hai Duong	30	4.700613	0.420326	3.98721	5.414016
Ha Nam	35	4.698728	0.051945	4.610564	4.786892
Quang Tri	45	4.654959	0.12095	4.449676	4.860242
Ha Tinh	42	4.652472	0.329763	4.092778	5.212166
Hai Phong	31	4.568231	0.07623	4.438848	4.697614
Da Nang	48	4.485267	0.203002	4.140719	4.829815
Ha Noi	1	4.427072	0.039857	4.359424	4.49472
Cao Bang	4	4.405532	0.138412	4.170611	4.640453
Yen Bai	15	4.299806	0.187449	3.981657	4.617956
Lang Son	20	4.172734	0.187215	3.854981	4.490487
Dien Bien	11	4.071269	0.198391	3.734548	4.40799
Nam Dinh	36	4.059977	0.072658	3.936658	4.183297
Kon Tum	62	3.66442	0.077888	3.532223	3.796616

se = standard error

75th percentile 5.460732
25th percentile 4.506008

TABLE A.6: DIMENSION 5. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES (90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)

PROVINCE		MEAN	SE	LOW	HIGH
Binh Phuoc	70	7.133172	0.057714	7.035216	7.231127
Ha Tinh	42	6.718252	0.043861	6.643809	6.792695
Ha Noi	1	6.684172	0.050379	6.598667	6.769678
Dong Nai	75	6.654967	0.064007	6.546331	6.763603
Hau Giang	93	6.648616	0.100208	6.478538	6.818694
Tien Giang	82	6.605535	0.131319	6.382652	6.828418
Quang Tri	45	6.580558	0.056221	6.485137	6.675978
TT-Hue	46	6.573443	0.060069	6.47149	6.675395
Da Nang	48	6.518183	0.108597	6.333866	6.702501
Ho Chi Minh City	79	6.482542	0.105634	6.303253	6.661831
Hai Phong	31	6.476436	0.053361	6.385869	6.567004
Binh Dinh	52	6.447075	0.052165	6.358538	6.535612
Phu Yen	54	6.438559	0.078205	6.305825	6.571294
Yen Bai	15	6.417898	0.107058	6.236193	6.599604
Dak Lak	66	6.408	0.047444	6.327475	6.488526
Nam Dinh	36	6.376789	0.040018	6.308869	6.44471
Dien Bien	11	6.368046	0.101124	6.196412	6.53968
Hai Duong	30	6.366103	0.074475	6.2397	6.492506
Phu Tho	25	6.351245	0.090493	6.197655	6.504835
Ha Nam	35	6.324544	0.090667	6.170657	6.47843
Lai Chau	12	6.296542	0.237421	5.893577	6.699507
Hung Yen	33	6.295075	0.147761	6.044287	6.545864
Bac Giang	24	6.290011	0.047613	6.2092	6.370822
Lang Son	20	6.26208	0.048278	6.180139	6.344021
Cao Bang	4	6.208345	0.112821	6.016859	6.399831
Vinh Long	86	6.109087	0.100506	5.938503	6.279671
Long An	80	6.098648	0.029302	6.048915	6.148382
Kien Giang	91	6.050484	0.039616	5.983244	6.117723
Kon Tum	62	5.971556	0.047061	5.891681	6.05143
Ca Mau	96	5.842707	0.035475	5.782498	5.902917

se = standard error

75th percentile   6.559628
25th percentile   6.291277

TABLE A.7: DIMENSION 6. PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY (90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)

PROVINCE		MEAN	SE	LOW	HIGH
Hai Phong	31	8.055944	0.075915	7.927097	8.184791
Da Nang	48	7.99927	0.051009	7.912696	8.085845
Ho Chi Minh City	79	7.966575	0.03189	7.91245	8.0207
Nam Dinh	36	7.617643	0.050646	7.531683	7.703603
Binh Dinh	52	7.549356	0.113467	7.356773	7.741939
Ha Tinh	42	7.523602	0.022179	7.485959	7.561246
TT-Hue	46	7.471491	0.070033	7.352626	7.590356
Ha Noi	1	7.420906	0.065386	7.309929	7.531883
Dong Nai	75	7.405055	0.058473	7.305811	7.504298
Hung Yen	33	7.397522	0.096247	7.234165	7.560878
Lang Son	20	7.387405	0.037509	7.323744	7.451067
Phu Tho	25	7.325881	0.08551	7.180749	7.471013
Quang Tri	45	7.265135	0.078416	7.132042	7.398227
Kon Tum	62	7.249881	0.039121	7.183483	7.316279
Hai Duong	30	7.207548	0.026658	7.162303	7.252793
Cao Bang	4	7.1989	0.033437	7.142149	7.255651
Tien Giang	82	7.180248	0.127755	6.963415	7.397081
Bac Giang	24	7.155604	0.051009	7.069029	7.242179
Ha Nam	35	7.142853	0.055047	7.049424	7.236282
Vinh Long	86	7.118873	0.069519	7.00088	7.236865
Phu Yen	54	7.087694	0.043461	7.013928	7.161459
Long An	80	7.059689	0.233097	6.664062	7.455316
Hau Giang	93	7.013359	0.062236	6.907727	7.11899
Dak Lak	66	7.012952	0.055842	6.918173	7.107731
Yen Bai	15	6.997667	0.046729	6.918356	7.076978
Binh Phuoc	70	6.93893	0.066746	6.825644	7.052216
Kien Giang	91	6.861959	0.034661	6.80313	6.920788
Ca Mau	96	6.775418	0.053107	6.685281	6.865554
Dien Bien	11	6.765143	0.155251	6.501641	7.028645
Lai Chau	12	6.530381	0.151693	6.272919	6.787843

se = standard error

75th percentile   7.416943
25th percentile   7.024942

TABLE A.8: OVERALL UN-WEIGHTED PAPI (90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)

PROVINCE		MEAN	SE	LOW	HIGH
Ho Chi Minh City	79	39.93009	0.2260827	40.31382	39.54637
Binh Dinh	52	36.16058	0.2557867	36.59472	35.72645
Long An	80	36.14612	1.017771	37.87354	34.41869
Da Nang	48	36.02792	0.8268848	37.43136	34.62448
TT-Hue	46	35.93142	0.5245877	36.82178	35.04105
Ca Mau	96	35.46332	0.573513	36.43672	34.48992
Phu Yen	54	35.0478	1.37207	37.37656	32.71904
Ha Tinh	42	34.85067	1.18651	36.86449	32.83685
Binh Phuoc	70	34.80671	1.33059	37.06507	32.54835
Hai Duong	30	34.76495	1.319123	37.00385	32.52606
Dong Nai	75	34.72772	0.3213142	35.27308	34.18237
Hau Giang	93	34.71895	0.429961	35.44871	33.9892
Hai Phong	31	34.54567	0.2497087	34.96949	34.12185
Phu Tho	25	34.33114	0.1466965	34.58013	34.08216
Vinh Long	86	34.26612	0.2636307	34.71357	33.81867
Bac Giang	24	33.97888	0.2102768	34.33577	33.62198
Tien Giang	82	33.44429	0.2187769	33.81561	33.07297
Ha Nam	35	33.35833	0.2495573	33.7819	32.93477
Ha Noi	1	33.17046	0.1432024	33.41352	32.92741
Lang Son	20	33.12036	0.4122335	33.82003	32.42069
Nam Dinh	36	33.05297	0.4538585	33.82328	32.28265
Kien Giang	91	33.05286	0.7518786	34.32899	31.77672
Hung Yen	33	32.94239	0.6697021	34.07905	31.80573
Cao Bang	4	32.75016	0.3645777	33.36894	32.13138
Quang Tri	45	32.52019	0.3638008	33.13766	31.90273
Yen Bai	15	31.99972	0.4629683	32.7855	31.21394
Dak Lak	66	31.99642	0.60647	33.02576	30.96709
Dien Bien	11	31.75194	0.8671571	33.22373	30.28014
Lai Chau	12	30.93259	0.5869136	31.92874	29.93645
Kon Tum	62	29.41924	0.2320859	29.81315	29.02533

se = standard error

75th percentile   35.92444
25th percentile   33.2062

TABLE A.9: OVERALL WEIGHTED PAPI (90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)

PROVINCE		MEAN	SE	LOW	HIGH
Ho Chi Minh City	79	39.07979	0.172601	39.37274	38.78684
Ha Tinh	42	36.54846	0.808046	37.91992	35.17699
Binh Dinh	52	36.54482	0.199173	36.88286	36.20677
Da Nang	48	36.47132	0.612184	37.51035	35.43228
Hai Duong	30	36.46011	1.148956	38.41019	34.51004
TT-Hue	46	36.16199	0.219442	36.53444	35.78954
Long An	80	36.08635	0.790582	37.42817	34.74452
Binh Phuoc	70	35.92943	0.978201	37.58969	34.26916
Dong Nai	75	35.90947	0.347285	36.49891	35.32004
Hau Giang	93	35.58651	0.258877	36.02589	35.14713
Hai Phong	31	35.41002	0.174733	35.70658	35.11345
Phu Yen	54	34.94727	1.254296	37.07614	32.8184
Ca Mau	96	34.89763	0.513481	35.76914	34.02611
Ha Nam	35	34.49441	0.200852	34.83531	34.15352
Phu Tho	25	34.43535	0.168227	34.72087	34.14983
Vinh Long	86	34.29025	0.225083	34.67227	33.90822
Bac Giang	24	34.14054	0.197707	34.4761	33.80498
Ha Noi	1	33.99521	0.078645	34.12869	33.86173
Quang Tri	45	33.9148	0.339645	34.49126	33.33833
Hung Yen	33	33.86295	0.617867	34.91163	32.81427
Tien Giang	82	33.73131	0.328295	34.28852	33.17411
Nam Dinh	36	33.50711	0.363126	34.12343	32.89079
Kien Giang	91	33.1059	0.528364	34.00268	32.20913
Cao Bang	4	33.06616	0.385316	33.72014	32.41218
Dak Lak	66	32.91564	0.428457	33.64284	32.18844
Dien Bien	11	32.75964	0.724244	33.98887	31.53041
Yen Bai	15	32.56888	0.291949	33.0644	32.07337
Lang Son	20	32.46482	0.345705	33.05157	31.87807
Lai Chau	12	31.91343	0.817833	33.3015	30.52535
Kon Tum	62	30.91805	0.230392	31.30908	30.52701

se = standard error

75th percentile   34.83968
25th percentile   32.9700075

APPENDIX B: PAPI AND PCI IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: SIMILAR METHODOLOGIES, DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES

ETHNICITY	PAPI	PCI
	Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index	**Provincial Competitiveness Index**
Objective	PAPI and PCI both assess provincial governments based on their performance in terms of governance and public administration to facilitate healthy competition among provinces	
Respondents	• 5,568 **citizens** in 2010 • *Expected to increase to 13,500 from 2011 onwards*	• 8,000-9,000 **businesses**
Form of survey	• Field-trip survey, face-to-face interviews	• Mail-out survey

Scope of survey	• 30 provinces in 2010
	  o 90 districts
	  o 180 communes/wards
	  o 360 villages/residential areas
	
	• *63 provinces tentatively in 2011*
		• 63 provinces annually since 2006

Implementing Agencies	• Centre for Community Support Development Studies (CECODES) • Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF) • United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	• Viet Nam National Competiveness Initiative (VNCI) • Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) • United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Construction of the Composite Index	• Similar general methodology of sub-national indexing, facilitating comparisons between the relative priorities of governance for Vietnamese citizens and businesses • Similar index construction and scaling • Three steps in index construction: Collection, Construction and Calibration	

	• Survey data only
	
	• 6 Dimensions
	  o 21 Sub-Dimensions
	    ▪ 82 Indicators
		• Combines survey with hard-data
		
		• 9 Sub-indices
		  o 79 indicators

Dimensions	1. Participation at Local Level 2. Transparency 3. Vertical Accountability 4. Control of Corruption 5. Public Administrative Procedures 6. Public Service d\Delivery	1. Transparency and Access to Information 2. Pro-activity of Provincial Leadership 3. Legal Institutions 4. Informal Charges 5. Time Costs of Regulatory Compliance 6. Access to Land 7. Business Support Service 8. Entry Costs 9. Labour training 10.* Infrastructure (not included in index)
	www.papi.vn	www.pcivietnam.org

APPENDIX C: THE PAPI QUESTIONNAIRE

8	8	8	8

Serial number of the questionnaire
(To be filled in by PAPI Project Office)

9	9	9	9	9	9	9	A/B
Province/City		District	Commune	Village	Interviewee's ID as per assigned numeric order in the list of interviewees		
(To be filled in by PAPI Project Office)					*(To be filled in by the field supervisor)*		

Interviewee's code

Interview location [ALL FIELDS REQUIRED]:

Province: ....District: ....

Commune: ....

Village: ....

Interview date: ..../….. /2010

Interview length: ....minutes

Time spent checking questionnaire: ....minutes

Interviewer Name & Code: ....*Interviewer Signature:* ....

Inspector Signature:...Inspection date: …. /….. /2010

Data Entry Person signature: .... Data entry date: …. /….. /2010

QUESTIONNAIRE
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERFORMANCE STUDY

A or B

Centre for Theory Work (Vietnam Fatherland Front)
Centre for Community Support Development Studies (CECODES)
United Nations Development Programme Vietnam (UNDP Vietnam)

2010

Thời gian □□.□□

INTRODUCTION

Hi, my name is …………………… I work for Center for Community Support and Development Studies (CEDODES). We are conducting a study to understand the quality of public administration in your locality and we appreciate your views in order to help make further improvement to the public administration. We will not note down your name on this questionnaire. We are very thankful for your cooperation. Do not feel obligated to answer any question that you are not comfortable with and do not hesitate to ask me for a clarification if you think that a question is a bit difficult or unclear. Cam on! Now, let's get started.

[Note to the Interviewer:

1.. *Don't read aloud options "Don't Know" or DK and "Reluctant to Answer" or RA. Mark either option based on the actual response from the interviewees that he/she doesn't know the answer, or the hesistance to respond from face reading.*

2. *Expressions/statements in bold and italic within the punctuation [...] are those for interviewers only. It means that you will perform those requests by yourself.*

3. *Expressions/statements in bold but not in italic are those that interviewers have to read aloud to lead or to transit the interview.]*

………

A.

[Interviewer] **First, let me ask some initial questions about yourself and your familiy…**

A001. *[Interviewer to mark gender of respondent]:*

    □   1. Male   □   2. Female

A002. How old are you?.. □   888. [DK]

    A002a. What sign are you?............... .... □   888. [DK]

    [Interviewer's age estimate:…….]

A003. How long have you lived in this commune/ward?............. year .... □   888. [DK]

A004. How long have you lived in this province.......... year.. □   888. [DK]

A005. What is your ethnicity?

         □   1. Kinh   □   7. Other (please specify):

                               □   ***888.[DK]***   □   ***999.[RA]***

A006. What is your highest level of education?

     □   01.No formal education

     □   02.Incomplete primary   □   03.Complete primary

     □   04.Incomplete secondary   □   05.Complete secondary

     □   06.Incomplete high school   □   07.Complete high school

☐   08.Some university education   ☐   09.University education completed

☐   10. Post-graduate degree   ☐   *888. [DK]*   ☐   *999. [RA]*

A005a. How long did you take vocational training?:.. months

A005b.   How many years of formal education have you received? (including general education, collage/university and/or vocational education; excluding kindergarten)?...........................year

☐   *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA]*

A007.   How many family members live in your house (including you, not counting employees)?

A008.   What is your occupation? ....

[Interviewer: WRITE ANSWER and USE TABLE BELOW]

A009. In which sector is your current primary occupation [was your last job if retired]?

01   ☐   Agriculture

21   ☐   Industry (Private)

22   ☐   Industry (State-owned)

23   ☐   Industry (Foreign/Joint venture)

31   ☐   Services (Private)

32   ☐   Services (State-owned)

33   ☐   Services (Foreign/Joint venture)

04   ☐   Government

41   ☐   Military

07   ☐   Other:...................................

888   ☐   *[DK] 999* ☐   *[RA]*

A010. Are you the head of your household?

☐ 1. Yes   ☐ 0. No   ☐   888.[DK]   ☐   999. [RA]

A010a. If NO: What is the primary occupation of the household head

[Interviewer: WRITE ANSWER and USE TABLE BELOW] ....

[Relevant codes in the following table will be inserted back office, after the interview]	A008 Respondent's occupation	A010a Household head occupation
Professional / Technical (incl. military, police, security)	11	11
Managers / Supervisors	12	12
Clerical / Administrative / Sales (Office)	13	13
Non-agricultural, skilled (non-office)	14	14
Non-agricultural, unskilled (laborers)	15	15
Agricultural (include fishing, forestry)	16	16
Household entrepreneur	19	19
Company owner (joint-stock, limited liability, etc.)	20	20
Rentals from agricultural properties	31	31
Rentals from non-agricultural properties	32	32
Dividends from managing financial assets	33	33
Unpaid family worker	40	40
Housewife/homemaker (with no additional work)	51	51
Student (with no additional work)	52	52
Retired (with no additional work	53	53
Other..	-77	-77
Unemployed	00	00

A011. As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today? Is it …?

☐ 4. Very good   ☐ 3. Good   ☐ 2. Neither good nor bad

☐ 1. Bad   ☐ 0. Very bad   ☐ *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA]*

A011a. How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was 5 years ago? Is it ....

☐ 4. Much better now   ☐ 3. A little better now

☐ 2. About the same   ☐ 1. A little worse now

☐ 0. Much worse now   ☐ *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA]*

A011b. What do you think the economic situation of your family will be 5 years from now? Will it be …?

☐ 4. Much better than now   ☐ 3. A little better than now

☐ 2. About the same   ☐ 1. A little worse than now

☐ 0. Much worse than now   ☐ *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA]*

A012. Yesterday, did you read/watch/listen to news about national affairs and the government?

☐ 1. Yes ☐ 0. No

A013. What is your source of information about national affairs and government? *[Allow multiple responses]*

☐ 01. Television ☐ 05. Personal contact (including friends)

☐ 02. Newspapers/Magazines ☐ 06. Meetings

☐ 03. Radio ☐ 07. Other (Please specify):_____

☐ 04. Internet ☐ 08. Cell phone short message

A014. During the most recent National Assembly Query Session, how often did you watch the proceedings on television?

☐2. Every day ☐ 1. Sometimes ☐ 0. Never ☐ *888. [DK]* ☐ *999. [RA]*

A015. Please tell me the name of:

1. The chairman of the Commune PC:...☐ *888. [DK]*

2. Chairman of the Province PC:...☐ *888. [DK]*

3. Your Provincial Party Secretary:..☐ *888. [DK]*

4. The Prime Minister:...☐ *888. [DK]*

5. One member of the National Assembly elected from your province...........................☐ *888. [DK]*

A016. Are you a member of the Party, Mass Organizations, professional associations, cultural or social groups (for example, dance club, opera, sports team)? IF YES: Please tell me about organizations or in which you play an active role. If NO, please simply say you do not belong to any of the organizations.

[Interviewer: if necessary, please show Showcard # A016 at Page 11 in the Interviewers' Manual to support the respondent]

1 ....☐

2: ....☐

3: ....☐

4 ....☐

5: ....☐

[Relevant codes in the following table will be inserted back office, after the interview]

[Coding table]

The Party...01

Residential & community association...02

Religious group 03

Sports/recreational club...04

Culture organization...05

Charities...06

Public interest group (exc.) 07

Labor union	08
Farmer union or agricultural association	09
Professional organization	10
Business association	11
Parent-Teacher Association	12
Producer cooperative	13
Consumer cooperative .	14
Alumni association .	15
Candidate support organization	16
Volunteer organizations	18
Women's Union	19
Youth Union	20

Not a member of any organization or group ....-99

A017a. Did you work as a cadre or civil servant in the People's Committee (either village, commune, district or provincial PC)?

1.☐   Yes (please specify)…………………….. ☐   0. No

A017b. Are you currently working as a cadre or civil servant in the People's Committee (either village, commune, district, or provincial PC)?

1.☐   Yes (please specify)…………………….. ☐   0. No

A017c. Were you in the past in the leadership of the local Party organisation?

1.☐   Yes please specify …………………….. ☐   0. No

A017d. Are you currently in the leadership of the local Party organisation?

1.☐   Yes, please specify………………………☐   0. No

A017e. Were you in the past in the leadership of the local Vietnam Fatherland Front or a mass organisation (such as Women's Union, Farmer Association, War Veteran Association, etc.)

1. ☐   Yes, please specify………………………☐   0. No

A017f. Are you currently in the leadership of the local Vietnam Fatherland Front or a mass organisation (such as Women's Union, Farmer Association, War Veteran Association, etc.)

1. ☐   Yes, please specify……………………… ☐   0. No

A017g. Any other important position (e.g. member of National Assembly):………………

1. ☐   Yes, please specify………………………☐   0. No

D1.

D101. Has election for following officials recently [Treatment A]/in the past two years [Treatment B] been held in your locality/? *[Interviewer: please circle corresponding answers in the following table]*

		No	Yes	*[DK]*	*[RA]*	D101a. If YES, did you vote in the most recent election?		*[RA]*
a.	Chairman of commune/ward People's Committee	0	1	888	999	1 yes	0 no	999
b.	Members of commune/ward People's Council	0	1	888	999	1 yes	0 no	999
c.	Village/Residential group head	0	1	888	999	1 yes	0 no	999
d.	Provincial representatives to the National Assembly	0	1	888	999	1 yes	0 no	999

[Interviewer]: **In the past couple of years, the government has been implementing various administrative reforms at the local level. One of these initiatives concerns the rights of citizens in villages and communes to obtain information and provide input on local decisions.**

D102.

2- ☐ **Treatment A**	1-☐ **Treatment B**
Have you heard of "The Ordinance on Implementation of Grass-root Democracy at the commune level", also called the "Grass-roots Democracy Regulations"?	Have you heard of the phrase "People Know, People Discuss, People Do, People Verify"?
☐1. Yes ☐ 0. No ☐ *999- [RA]*	☐1. Yes ☐ 0. No ☐ *999- [RA]*

[Interviewer] **Now I would like to discuss how your village/residential group head is selected.**

D103. Can you please tell me know how your current village/residential group head came to his/her position?

☐ 4. Appointed by the commune/ward People's Committee

☐ 3. Appointed by the commune/ward Party Committee

☐ 2. Appointed by the commune/ward Fatherland Front

☐ 1. Voted by people in the village/residential group

☐ 7. Other (Please specify): ....

☐ *888. [DK]* ☐ *999. [RA]*

D104. Was there an election of the village/residential group head?

☐ 1. Yes *[Go to D108]* ☐ 0. No *[Go to D108]*

☐ *888. [DK] [Go to D108]* ☐ *999. [RA] [Go to D108]*

D105. Were there more than two candidates?

☐ 1.Yes   ☐ 0. No   ☐ *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA]*

D106. Was your household invited to participate in the election?

☐ 1.Yes   ☐ 0. No   ☐ *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA]*

D107. If YES, did you attend personally?

☐ 1. Yes   ☐ 0. No *[Go to D108]]*   ☐ 999. 999. *[RA] [Go to D108]*

    D107a. If YES, which method of voting was used?

      ☐ 2. Show of hands   ☐ 1. Paper ballot

      ☐ 0. There was no formal voting procedure

      ☐ 7. Other......................   ☐*888 [KB]*   ☐ *999. [KMTL]*

    D107b. Did the local authorities suggest that you vote for a specific candidate?

      ☐ 1. Yes   ☐0. No   ☐*888. [DK*]   ☐ *999. [RA]*

    D107c. Did you vote for the winner of the election?

      ☐ 1. Yes   ☐0. No   ☐*999. [RA]*

    D107d. Was the counting of the votes done publicly?

      ☐1. Yes   ☐0. No   ☐ *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA]*

D108. Do you know how long the full term of a village/residential group head is?

………… Year   ☐ 777. There is no limit   ☐ *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA]*

D109. Has your household financially contributed to build or fix a public work in your commune/ward (such as a playground, kindergarten, cultural house, a road, etc.) in the last two years?

☐ 1. Yes *[Go to 109a]* ☐ 0. No [*Go to D201]*

      ☐ *888. [DK] [Go to D201]* ☐ 999. [RA] [Go to D201]

If yes, please think of one public work in the last two years where you made the biggest financial contributions.

D109a. Please specify the nature of the construction/renovation project: ……………….............

☐ **888. [DK] [Go to D201]**   ☐ **999. [RA] [Go to D201]**

D109aa. Did you contribute voluntarily?	**D109ab.** Who decided the amount?	**D109ac.** Who was in charge of monitoring this project' implementation?
1. ☐ Yes	1. ☐ Myself	1. ☐ We, the contributors
2. ☐ No, I was pressured by the local authorities	2. ☐ Local authorities	2. ☐ Village/Residential group head
3. ☐ No, I was pressured by others	3. ☐ Neighbours	3. ☐ Commune//Ward authorities
	7. ☐ Others:.........	4. ☐ Community Monitoring Board
☐ *888. [DK]* ☐ *99. [RA]*	☐ *888. [DK]* ☐ *999. [RA]*	5. ☐ Other………………..
		0. ☐ No one
		☐ *888. [DK]* ☐ *999. [RA]*

D2.

[Interviewer] **Now I would like to talk about social policies designed by to assist the poor.**

D201. In your commune/ward, are households with income lower than 360,000 VND / person / month are entitled to receive government support?

☐ 1. Yes   ☐ 0. No   ☐ *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA]*

D202. Has the list of poor households of your village / residential group been published within the last12 months?

☐ 1. Yes   ☐ 0. No   ☐ *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA]*

D202a. Are there households in your village / residential group who are missing from the list of poor households eligible for special subsidies?

☐ 0. None   ☐ 1. A few   ☐ 2. Many   ☐ *888. [DK*]   ☐ *999. [RA*]

D202b. Are there households who are not poor in reality are nevertheless on the list?

☐ 0. None   ☐ 1. A few   ☐ 2. Many   ☐ *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA*]

[Interviewer] **We have discussed about village issues. Now I would like to discuss with you about the publicity of budget and public expenditure information in your commune.**

D203. In the past 12 months, was the public budget and expenditures of your commune/ward published?

☐ 1. Yes *[Go to D203a]*   ☐ 0. No *[Go to D204]*

☐ *888. [DK] [Go to D204]*

☐ *999. [RA][Go to D204]*

D203a. If YES, have you read it?

☐ 1. Yes   ☐ 0. No   ☐ *999. [RA]*

D203b. Do you believe in the adequacy of the budget information in this comume?

☐ 4. Completely believe   ☐ 3. Believe somewhat

☐ 2. Do not believe   ☐ 1. Do not believe at all

☐ *888 [DK]*   ☐ *999 [RA]*

[Interviewer]: **Now, let's think about public information about land use in your locality.**

D204. Were you informed about the local government's plan for land use in your commune/ward?

☐ 2. Yes, from the local government

☐ 1. Yes, but not from the local government

☐ 0. No, I was not informed   ☐ *999. [RA]*

D205. Did you have an opportunity to comment on the plan during its drafting process (before it was released)?

☐ 1. Yes *[Go to D205a]*   ☐ 0. No *[Go to D206]* ☐ 888. *[DK]*   ☐ 999. *[RA]*

D205a. If YES, does the current plan acknowledge your concerns?

☐ 3. Very much so   ☐ 2. Somewhat   ☐ 1. Not really   ☐ 0. Not at all

☐ *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA]*

D206. Does this plan…

☐ 2. Benefit your family   ☐ 1. Have no impact on your family

☐ 0. Hurt your family   ☐ *999. [RA]*

D207. Have you or people in your community lost land as a result of the latest land-use plan?

☐ 2. My family *[Go to D207a]*

☐ 1. Others in the community *[Go to D207b]*

☐ 0. No one *[Go to D208]*   ☐ *888. [DK] [Go to D208]*

D207a. Was your compensation …

☐ 3. Close to fair market value   ☐ 2. Below fair market value

☐ 1. Far below fair market value   ☐ 0. There was no compensation

☐ *888. [DK] [Go to D208]*   ☐ *999. [RA] [Go to D208]*

D207b. Was their compensation …

☐ 3. Close to fair market value   ☐ 2. Below fair market value

☐ 1. Far below fair market valué   ☐ 0. There was no compensation

☐ *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA]*

D208. Suppose that you needed to know the official and legal land price frame (that is, the price for land seizure compensation) in this province, can you tell how you would proceed in order to find out?

☐ 4. I would (please specify) ....

☐ 3. The government does not release this information

☐ 2. I would not know where to go

☐ 1. I know where to go but I cannot get access to this information

☐ *888. [DK]*   ☐ *999. [RA]*

D209. By law, your province is obligated to publish all rules and regulations regularly. Please tell me the name of this publication?

....   □   *888. [DK]*

D3.

D301. In the past three (3) years, have you ever done the following because of personal, family, or neighborhood problems, or problems with government officials and policies?

[Interviewer: Please show Showcard # D301 at Page 14 in the Manual to the respondent and circle corresponding answers in the following table]

		No	Yes	[DK]	[RA]	**D301a.** If YES, was this meeting helpful in any way?		[RA]
a.	Contacted village/ residential group head	0	1	888	999	1 yes	0 no	999
b.	Contacted commune/ward officials	0	1	888	999	1 yes	0 no	999
c.	Contacted district officials	0	1	888	999	1 yes	0 no	999
d.	Contacted provincial officials	0	1	888	999	1 yes	0 no	999
e.	Contacted a representative of the National Assembly	0	1	888	999	1 yes	0 no	999
f.	Contacted a representative of mass organizations	0	1	888	999	1 yes	0 no	999
g.	Contacted traditional leaders / knowledgeable people	0	1	888	999	1 yes	0 no	999
h.	Contacted religious leaders	0	1	888	999	1 yes	0 no	999
i.	Contacted other influential people.	0	1	888	999	1 yes	0 no	999

D302. Here are actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year.

[Interviewer: please circle corresponding answers in the following table]

		No	Yes	**D302a** If YES, was this action helpful in any way?		[RA]
a.	Make a proposal or suggestion to the authorities	0	1	1. Yes	0. No	999
b.	Lodge a complaint against a government agency	0	1	1. Yes	0. No	999
c.	Lodge a denunciation against a government agency	0	1	1. Yes	0. No	999
d.	Get together with other people to sign a petition	0	1	1. Yes	0. No	999

D303. In many areas, committees called "People's Inspection Board" are established. These boards are a mechanism through which citizens can monitor the implementation of policies, the processing of complaints and the implementation of grass-root democracy in their locality. This is a formal institution established in communes/wards. It is different from local neighborhood watch groups. Is there any PIB established in your commune/ward?

☐   1. Yes *[Go to D303a]*   ☐   0. No *[Go to D304]*

☐   *888 [DK] [Go to D304]*   ☐   *999 [RA] [Go to D304]*

D303a. If YES, how was the PIB set up?

☐   4- People vote in a meeting

☐   3- Commune's/Ward People's Committee set it up

☐   2- Commune's/Ward People's Council set it up

☐   1- District's People's Committee set it up

☐   *888- [DK]*   ☐   *999- [RA]*

D303b. In practice, what does the PIB in your commune/ward? *[Multiple responses allowed]*

☐   4- To monitor policy implementation in the commune/ward

☐   3- To ensure that complaints and denounces are addressed

☐   2- To monitor the implementation of Grassroots Democracy Ordinance

☐   0- Nothing   ☐   7. Other (please specify): ………………………………

☐   *888- [DK]*   ☐   *999- [RA]*

D303c. How would you estimate the effectiveness of its work?

☐   1- Yes   ☐   0- No   ☐   *888- [DK]*   ☐   *999- [RA]*

[Interviewer] **The government encourages people to supervise investment projects in their community, in order to detect wrong-doing, prevent corruption and material loss. The supervision is done through the work of the Community Investment Supervision Board.**

D304. Do you know if there is a Community Investment Supervision Board in your commune/ward?

☐   1-Yes *[Go to D304a]*   ☐   0-No *[Go to D305]*

☐   *888-[DK] [Go to D305]*   ☐   *999-[RA] [Go to D305]*

D304a. I am going to read you a list of activities, please tell me what you believe to be the responsibilities of the CISB in your commune/ward…

☐   1-Monitors to ensure the transpency of investment plans

☐   2-Monitor the implementation of state-funded projects

☐   3-The CSIB is expected to levy fees in order to finance commune/ward's investment projects

☐   4-monitors and checks the execution of the regulations on compensation, land clearance and resettlement

☐   *888- [DK]*   ☐   *999- [RA]*

D304b. In your opinion, is the CSIB functioning effectively?

☐   1- Yes   ☐   0- No   ☐   *888- [DK]*   ☐   *999- [RA]*

D305. Do you know any case where a person in your commune/ward filed an administrative complaint against an official or a government agency?

☐ 1- Yes *[Go to D305a]*   ☐ 0- Không *[Go to D306]*

☐ *888- [DK] [Go to D306]*   ☐ *999-[RA] [Go to D306]*

D305a. If YES, please try to remember and tell me about the most recent complaint. Do you recall what it is about ....

☐ *888- [DK] [Go to D306]*   ☐ *999-[RA] [Go to D306]*

D305b. Do you know whether the plaintiff obtained a satisfactory response?

☐ 1- Yes   ☐ 0- No   ☐ *888- [DK]*   ☐ *999- [RA]*

[Interviewer] **Let's step back thing more broadly about your general perception of institutions.**

D306. I am now going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me whether you are confident that these institutions work in the interest of citizens? Are you very confident, quite confident, not very confident or not confident at all?

[Interviewer: Please show Showcard # D306 at Page 16 in the Manual to the respondent and circle the corresponding answers in the table below.]

		A great deal of confidence	Quite a lot of confidence	Not much confidence	No confidence at all	[DK]	[RA]
a.	The Party	4	2	1	0	888	999
b.	The National Assembly	4	2	1	0	888	999
c.	The national government	4	2	1	0	888	999
d.	The provincial government	4	2	1	0	888	999
e.	The district government	4	2	1	0	888	999
f.	The commune/ward government	4	2	1	0	888	999
g.	Media	4	2	1	0	888	999
h.	Police	4	2	1	0	888	999
j.	The commune/ward Fatherland Front	4	2	1	0	888	999
k.	The Court	4	2	1	0	888	999
l.	Provincial Anti-Corruption Board	4	2	1	0	888	999

D4.

D401. *[Interviewer]* **I am going to read you a list of common actions that Commune administrative cadres participate in. Please tell me how many of these activities you believe that officials in your commune/ward engage in. Do not tell me which ones you think officials engage, but the number of actions (from 1 to 4 for version A) (from 1 to 5 for version B).**

[Interviewer, please show Showcard # 401 at [Page 18 - Version A OR Page 19 - Version B] in the Manual to the respondent, and then note down the figure the respondent tells you - no suggestion]:. ....

2- ☐ **Version A**	1-☐ **Version B**
- Develop public infrastructure - Go to meetings - Attend cultural events - Adress citizens's complaints	- Develop public infrastructure - Go to meetings - Attend cultural events - Receive bribes from citizens - Adress citizens's complaints
☐ *999- [RA]*	☐ *999- [RA]*

D402. *[Interviewer]* I am going to read several statements about events that occur sometimes. When I read them to you, please think about your own experience and tell me how much you agree with each statement. That is to say, you agree completely, you agree somewhat, you disagree or you disagree *completely. [Interviewer: please circle corresponding answers in the following table]*

	Agree completely	Somewhat agree	Disagree	Completely disagree	[DK]	[RA]
D402a In my commune/ward, officials divert funds from the state budget for their personal benefit.	3	2	1	0	888	999
D402b People have to pay bribes in order to obtain a land title	3	2	1	0	888	999
D402c. People like me have to bribe to receive medical treatment in the district's hospitals.	3	2	1	0	888	999
D402d. Parents have to pay bribes to teachers for their children to be better attended at the primary school nearest to my house.	3	2	1	0	888	999
D402e. In my commune/ward, officials receive kickbacks in exchange of approval of construction permits.	3	2	1	0	888	999
D402f. In order to get a job in the government, people have to pay a bribe						

D403. In your commune/ward, how important are personal connections if someone wants to get one of the following jobs?

[Interviewer: please circle corresponding answers in the following table]

	Very important	Some-what important	Not important	Not important at all	[DK]	[RA]
Land registrar	3	2	1	0	888	999
Commune Justice Officer	3	2	1	0	888	999
Policeman at commune level	3	2	1	0	888	999
A teacher at the local public school	3	2	1	0	888	999
Public official of the People's Committee	3	2	1	0	888	999

D404. I recognize that requests for informal charges occur quite often and that in many cases the cost of the fee may not be enough to do anything about. On some occasions, however, the corrupt act may have caused enough damage to make you consider the formal denunciation process. If you found yourself the victim of a corrupt action by a [TREATMENT A or B], how big would the informal charge have to be to make you file a denunciation with the local inspectorate? I am going show you a series of prices, please show me the one that would cause you to take formal action.

[Interviewer: please show Showcard # D404 at [Page 21 for Version A OR Page 22 for Version B] in the Manual to the respondent and circle the letter picked by the respondent in the following list]

☐ 10,000 VND   ☐ 50,000 VND

☐ 100,000 VND   ☐ 500,000 VND

☐ 1,000,000 VND   ☐ 5,000,000 VND

☐ 10,000,000 VND   ☐ 50,000,000 VND

☐ 100,000,000 VND

2- ☐ **Treatment A**	1- ☐ **Treatment B**
POLICEMAN	MEMBER OF THE COMMUNE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE
☐ *999- [RA]*	☐ *999- [RA]*

D405. Have you or anyone in your household been affected by an act of corruption or bribe-taking by a government official in the past year. IF YES: Were you personally affected or was a family member affected? Consider all types of corruption ranging from giving a small bribe to a traffic official to giving a commission in order to get a government contract.

☐ 2- Personally affected *[Go toD405a]*

☐ 1- Other family member affected *[Go toD405a]*

☐ 0- Not affected *[Go toD406]*

☐ *888- [DK] [Go toD406]*   ☐ *999- [RA] [Go toD406]*

D405a. *[If D402 = 1 or 2]* Did you attempt to denounce this act of corruption?

☐ 1- No *[Go to D405b]*   ☐ 0- Yes *[Go to D406]*

☐ *999-[RA] [Go to D406]*

D405b. *[If NO]*, why not?

☐ 3. It is useless to denounce corruption

☐ 2. The process of denouncing corruption is too burdensome.

☐ 1. I was scared about retaliation

☐ 0. I don't know how to go about denouncing corruption

☐ 7. Other.....................................   ☐ *999-[RA]*

D406. Have you heard about the Law on Corruption Prevention – Anti Corruption?

☐ 1- Yes   ☐ 0- No   ☐ *888- [DK]*   ☐ *999- [RA]*

D407. When there is a corruption case going on in your province, how serious do you think the provincial government is in dealing with the case?

☐ 2. Serious

☐ 1. Not serious

☐ *888- [DK]*   ☐ *999- [RA]*

D408. Now I would like to ask how satisfied you are with the performance of the following persons and institutions. Please kindly give a mark between 0% (very unsatisfied) to 100% (very satisfied) to show your degree of satisfaction.

[Interviewer: Please note don a figure between the range of 0% — 100% correspding to the figure the interviewee tells you for each of the persons/institutions listed below.]

		0% (very unsatisfied) ------- 100% (very satisfied)	[DK]	[RA]
a.	Current village head/ head of the residential group	....	888	999
			888	999
b.	Commune/Ward People's Committee	....	888	999
c.	District People's Committee	....	888	999
d.	Provincial People's Committee	....	888	999
e.	The Government	....	888	999
f.	The National Assembly	....	888	999

D5.

Thank you. Now I would like to ask you some questions your personal experiences in in dealing with public administrative services.

D501.   Have you ever used public notary services? *[Interviewer, please explain to the interviewee if reading from his/her face that he/she was confused:* **the notary service is the service that facilitates the copying of an original version of a document, and that copied version is certified and stamped by a local authorised agency]**

☐   1- Yes *[Go to D502]*   ☐   0- No *[Go to D504]*

☐   *888 [DK] [Go to D504]*   ☐   *999-[RA] [Go to D504]*

D502.   If YES, thinking about your last visit to the public notary, can you tell where you went?

☐   1- Same as commune /ward of residence

☐   2- Other ward/commune: (Specify location name) ....

☐   *888- [DK]*   ☐   *999- [RA]*

D502a. Did you hire a middle man / facilitator in order to obtain this service for you?

☐   1- Yes   ☐   0- No   ☐   *888- [DK]*   ☐   *999- [RA]*

D503.   Please think back to the last time you used the pubic notary. I am now going to ask you a list of questions about your experience with the notary on that occassion. Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding your most recent experience the notary.

 [Interviewer: please circle corresponding answers in the following table]

	Agree comp-letely	Some-what agree	Dis-agree	Comp-letely disagree	[DK]	[RA]
a. Clear information about the procedures was available.	3	2	1	0	888	999
b. The amount I would have to pay in fees for the service was publicly displayed.	3	2	1	0	888	999
c. The officials were competent.	3	2	1	0	888	999
d. The officials treated me with respect	3	2	1	0	888	999
e. The procedure required too much paperwork.	3	2	1	0	888	999
f. I was provided with a clear deadline by which the service would be performed.	3	2	1	0	888	999
g. The service was performed within the stated deadline.	3	2	1	0	888	999
h. I am satisfied with the service I received.	3	2	1	0	888	999

D503b.   Here is a list of typicial activities that take place when people visit the public notary. Please tell me how many of these activities you engaged in during your last visit to the public notary: **Do not tell me which activities, but the number of actions (from 1 to 4 for version A) (from 1 to 3 for version B).**

[Interviewer: Please show Showcard # D503b at [Page 23 for Verion A OR Page 24 for Version B] in the Manual and note down the number the respondent tells you — no suggestion] …………

2- ☐ **Treatment A**	1-☐ **Treatment B**
- Read about procedures on the notary bulletin board	- Read about procedures on the notary bulletin board
- Make photocopies of documents	- Make photocopies of documents
- Pay a bribe in order to receive the service.	- Ask a question to an employee
- Ask a question to an employee	
☐ *999- [RA]*	☐ *999- [RA]*

D504. Did you build or improve (cai tao) a house or a building in the last 3 years?

☐   1- Yes   ☐   0- No   ☐   *888- [DK]*   ☐   *999- [RA]*

D505. Did you or someone in your household ever apply for a civil construction permit in the last 3 years?

☐   1- Yes *[Go toD505a]*   ☐   1- No *[Go toD505e]*

☐   *888. [DK] [Go toD507]*   ☐   *999. [RA] [Go toD507]*

D505a. [If YES] When did you last apply for civil construction permit?

Year ……………   ☐   *888- [DK]*   ☐   *999- [RA]*

D505b. [If YES], where did you apply for it?

☐   2. Commune/Ward One-stop Shop

☐   1. District One-stop Shop

☐   7. Other (please specify)……………

☐   888. [DK]

D505c. Did you hire a middle man / facilitator in order to obtain this service??

☐   1-Yes   ☐   2- No   ☐   *999. [RA]*

D505d. Did you have to go to many state agencies (call in many windows) to obtain the permit?

☐   1-Yes   ☐   2- No   ☐   *999. [RA] [Go toD507]*

D505e. *[If NO]* Why did you not apply for a permit?

☐   3- I do not need to get a permit *[Go to D507]*

☐   2- The procedures were too burdensome *[Go to D507]*

☐   1- It not possible to obtain a buidling permit in this area *[Go to D507]*

☐   7 Other (please explain):……………… *[Go to D507]*

☐   *999- [RA] [Go toD507]*

D506. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about your most recent experience with the construction permit application process.

[Interviewer: please circle corresponding answers in the following table]

	Agree comp-letely	Some-what agree	Dis-agree	Comp-letely disagree	[DK]	[RA]
a. Clear information about the procedures was available.	3	2	1	0	888	999
b. The amount I would have to pay in fees for the service was publicly displayed.	3	2	1	0	888	999
c. The officials were competent.	3	2	1	0	888	999
d. The officials treated me with respect	3	2	1	0	888	999
e. The procedure required too much paperwork.	3	2	1	0	888	999
f. I was provided with a clear deadline by which the service would be performed.	3	2	1	0	888	999
g. The service was performed within the stated deadline.	3	2	1	0	888	999
h. I am satisfied with the service I received.	3	2	1	0	888	999

D507. Now, let's talk about application procedures for land use right.s Have you or another member of your household ever applied for (or transfered/sold) a land use rights certificate or land use right transfer in the past 3 years?

☐ 1-Yes *[Go to D507a]*   ☐ 0-No *[Go to D507d]*

☐ *888-[DK] [Go to D509]*   ☐ *999-[RA] [Go to D509]*

D507a. *[If YES]* what year did you or a member of household last apply for a land use right?

Year 20.............   ☐ *888- [DK]*   ☐ *999- [RA]*

D507b. Did you hire a middle man / facilitator in order to obtain this service?

☐ 1-Yes *[Go to D507c]*   ☐ 2- No *[Go to D507c]*

☐ *999. [RA] [Go to D508]*

D507c. Did you have to go to many state agencies (call in many windows) to obtain the permit?

☐ 1-Yes **[Go to D508]**   ☐ 2- No *[Go to D508]*

☐ *999. [RA] [Go to D508]*

D507d. *[If NO]* Why did you not apply for a land use right certificate?

☐ 3. I do not need to get a land use right certificate *[Go to D509]*

☐ 2. The procedures were too burdensome *[Go to D509]*

☐ 1. It is not possible to obtain a land use right certificate in this area *[Go to D509]*

☐ 7. Other :.......................... *[Go to D509]*

☐ *999. [RA] [Go toD509]*

D508. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about your most recent experience with the land use right certificate permit application process.

[Interviewer: please circle corresponding answers in the following table]

	Agree comp-letely	Some-what agree	Dis-agree	Comp-letely disagree	[DK]	[RA]
a. Clear information about the procedures was available.	3	2	1	0	888	999
b. The amount I would have to pay in fees for the service was publicly displayed.	3	2	1	0	888	999
c. The officials were competent.	3	2	1	0	888	999
d. The officials treated me with respect	3	2	1	0	888	999
e. The procedure required too much paperwork.	3	2	1	0	888	999
f. I was provided with a clear deadline by which the service would be performed.	3	2	1	0	888	999
g. The service was performed within the stated deadline.	3	2	1	0	888	999
h. I am satisfied with the service I received.	3	2	1	0	888	999

D509. In general, how is the overall quality of administrative procedures for land use right certificates now compared to 3 years ago?

☐ 4. Much simpler, easier to handle   ☐ 3. Somewhat simpler, easier to handle

☐ 2. The same   ☐ 1. Much more complicated and burdonsome

☐ *888- [KB]*   ☐ *999- [KMTL]*

D510. Now I would like to ask you some questions about security in your locality

	Very safe	Safe	Unsafe	Very unsafe	[DK]	[RA]
D510. Generally speaking, how safe is living in this city/ town/ village?	3	2	1	0	888	999
D510a. How safe was living in this city/ town/ village 3 years ago?	3	2	1	0	888	999

D511. In the past 12 months, have you or any member of your family been a victim of…

D511a. Vehicle theft (car, motorcycle or bicycle)	1 - ☐ Yes 0-☐ No
	6 - ☐ Don't own any vehicle
	888- [KB] ☐ *999- [KMTL]*
D511b. Pick pocketing / robbery of personal property?	1- ☐ Yes 0-☐ No
	888- [KB] ☐ *999- [KMTL]*
D511c. Break-in at your home?	1- ☐ Yes 0-☐ No
	888- [KB] ☐ *999- [KMTL]*
D511d. Physical violence? (i.e. attacked by a stranger)	1- ☐ Yes 0-☐ No
	888- [KB] ☐ *999- [KMTL]*

D511da. [If D511d = YES], where would you go to report about the incidence to get protection?

☐   4. Commune/ward police   ☐   3. The legal aid service

☐   2. Village head/ head of the residential group   ☐   1. Mass organisations

☐   0. Will not report to anyone *[Go toD511db]*

☐   *888 - [KB]*   ☐   *999 - [KMTL]*

D511db. If not reporting to anyone, why?

☐   3. It is useless to report crime

☐   2. The process of reporting crime is too burdensome.

☐   1. I was scared about retaliation

☐   0. I don't know how to go about reporting crime

☐   7. Other.....................................   ☐   *999-[RA]*

D6.

[Interviewer] Now let's talk about public services in your locality. First, it is about health insurance.

D601. Do you have health insurance?

2- ☐ **Yes**	2- ☐ **No**	☐ **888-[DK]**
D601a. *[If YES]* How did you get it?	**D601b.** Why not (multiple)?	☐ *999- [RA]*
1 - ☐ I bought it voluntarily	1 - ☐ Don't know how to get it	*[Go to D602]*
2 - ☐ I am covered through my employer	2 - ☐ It's too expensive	
3 - ☐ The local authorities pressured me to buy it	3 - ☐ It's not helpful anyway	
4 - ☐ Family members bought it for me	4 - ☐ Other..................................	
7 - ☐ Other:		
☐ *999- [RA]*	☐ *999- [RA]*	

D602. Do local authorities in your commune/ward subsidize poor households to buy health insurance?

☐ 1 - Yes ☐ 0- No ☐ *888- [DK]* ☐ *999- [RA]*

D603. In your commune/ward, are medical checks and treatment for children under 6 free?

☐ 1 - Yes ☐ 0- No ☐ *888- [DK]* ☐ *999- [RA]*

D604. When did you or members of your household last use a public/state-run hospital in your province?

Year............. ☐ 0- Never *[Go to D606]*

☐ *888- [DK] [Go to D606]* ☐ *999- [RA] [Go to D606]*

D604a. Who used it (who was the patient – you or a family member of yours)?

☐ 2- Self ☐ 1- Family member (please specify)…………………………

☐ *888- [DK]* ☐ *999- [RA]*

D604b. What did you/this person use it for?

.... ☐ *999- [RA]*

D604c. What type of room did you/this person use in the hospital?

☐ 2- Normal room

☐ 1- Serviced room

☐ 0- I/he/she was an out-patient

☐ *888- [DK]* ☐ *999- [RA]*

D605. As I read you the following statements about that hospital, please tell me whether you agree or disagree with them. Specifically, do you agree completely, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree completely?

[Interviewer: please circle corresponding answers in the following table]

	Yes	No	[DK]	[RA]
a. Patients had to share beds	3	2	888	999
b. The was an electric fan in the room	3	2	888	999
c. The restroom was clean	3	2	888	999
d. Health care workers pay regular visits	3	2	888	999
e. Patients were treated with respect	3	2	888	999
f. Expenses for the received treatment were reasonable	3	2	888	999
g. The waiting period between entering the clinic and the time you received the treatment was reasonable	3	2	888	999

D606. I am going to read you a list of common activities that take place in a district hospital. Please tell me how many of these activities you engaged in during your last visit to the hospital. Do not tell me which activities, but the number of actions (from 1 to 3 for version A) (from 1 to 4 for version B).

[Interviewer: Please show Showcard # D606 at [Page 26 for Verion A OR Page 27 for Version B] in the Manual and note down the number the respondent tells you — no suggestion] ....

2- ☐ **Treatment A**	1-☐ **Treatment B**
- Bought food in the hospital cafeteria - Spent the night in the hospital - Purchased medicines from the hospital pharmacy	- Bought food in the hospital cafeteria - Spent the night in the hospital - Paid a bribe in order to ensure better service - Purchased medicines from the hospital pharmacy
☐ *999- [RA]*	☐ *999- [RA]*

[Interviewer] **Now, I would like to discuss with you about primary education in your commune/ward**

D607. I am going to read you a series of statements about the public primary school in your commune. Please tell me whether you agree with them or not.

[Interviewer: please circle corresponding answers in the following table]

	Yes	No	[DK]	[RA]
a. School walls are made of bricks	2	1	888	999
b. There are clean toilets	2	1	888	999
b. Classrooms have more than 40 students	2	1	888	999
c. The school has three shifts	2	1	888	999
d. There are other informal payments apart from regulated fees and payments	2	1	888	999
e. Parents have to pay bribes to teachers or school administrators	2	1	888	999
f. Teachers favor students who attend after-school study sessions in performance evaluations	2	1	888	999
g. Teachers are well-qualified	2	1	888	999

D608. In your commune/ward, public primary school is supposed to be free of tuition (excluding other contributions like school renovation)?

☐ 1- Yes ☐ 0- No ☐ *888- [DK]* ☐ *999- [RA]*

D609. How many children between 6 and 14 do currently live with you?

☐ 2. Boys:……. ☐ 1. Girls:………

☐ *888- [DK] [Go to D610]* ☐ *999- [RA] [Go to D610]*

D609a. [If D610aa or 610ab > 0] How many of them were enrolled in school in spring 2010?

☐ 2. Boys:……. ☐ 1. Girls:………

☐ *888- [DK] [Go to D610]* ☐ *999- [RA] [Go to D610]*

D609b. [If they have children in primary school] On average, how far do children in your neighbourhood travel to their public primary school?

…..… km ☐ *888- [DK]* ☐ *999- [RA]*

D610. Do you have electricity in your house?

☐ 1- Yes ☐ 0- No ☐ *888- [DK]* ☐ *999- RA]*

D611. Is the road closest to your house…

☐ 4- Paved ☐ 3-Concrete ☐ 2-Gravel ☐ 1-Dirt

☐ *888- [DK]* ☐ *999- [RA]*

D612. How often is the garbage picked up by the public works agency in your village/neighborhood?

☐ 2. Yes,

☐ a-Every day

☐ b-Once a week

☐ c-Once a month

☐ d-Once a year

☐ e-Never

☐ 1- No, because (please specify the reason) …………………………………

☐ *888- [DK*] ☐ *999- [RA]*

D613. What source of water do you use for drinking?

☐ 6- Water tap to home ☐ 5- Shared water tap at a commune place

☐ 4- Open water well ☐ 4- Drilled water well

☐ 3- River/Lake water ☐ 2- Rain water

☐ 7- Other (please specify):....................................

☐ *888- [DK]* ☐ *999- [RA]*

D614. Please kindly tell me your household's average monthly income, counting all sources (including wages, salaries, pensions, dividends and other incomes):

. ...millionVND/ month ☐ *888- [DK]* ☐ *999- [RA]*

D615. Does the total income of your household allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? I will read out few statements about your income. Please tell me, which of the following statement is closest to your situation?

☐ 4-Our income covers the needs well, we can save.

☐ 3-Our income covers the needs all right, without much difficulty.

☐ 2-Our income does not cover the needs, there are difficulties.

☐ 1-Our income does not cover the needs, there are great difficulties

☐ *888- [DK]* ☐ *999- [RA]*

D616. Do you or your family own the following?	Yes	No	[DK]	[RA]
a. Car/Truck/Van	1	0	888	999
b. TV	1	0	888	999
c. Cable TV	1	0	888	999
d. Scooter/ Motorcycle / Moped	1	0	888	999
e. Telephone	1	0	888	999
f. Mobile Telephone	1	0	888	999
g. Electric fan	1	0	888	999
h. Air-conditioner	1	0	888	999
i. Bicycle	1	0	888	999
j. Radio	1	0	888	999
k. Pumping set	1	0	888	999
l. Fridge	1	0	888	999
m. Camera	1	0	888	999
n. Cows/Buffalo	1	0	888	999
o. Computer	1	0	888	999

D617. Finally, for the purpose of quality control, would you mind giving me a phone number where you can be contacted by our staff. We will not use it or share it for any other reason.

Home phone:………….………............. ☐ *999- [RA]*

Mobile: …………....................… ☐ *999- [RA]*

[Interviewer: Thank you very much!]

Time. ☐☐.☐☐ *[use 24 h system]*

POST-INTERVIEW DEBRIEFING

[To be filled by the interviewer after interview, but not in the presence of the respondent]

Z1.   Respondent's level of cooperation:

1-[ ] Excellent   2-[ ] Good   3-[ ] Average   4-[ ] Poor   5-[ ] Very poor

Z1a.   If poor, please explain briefly:…...

Z2.   Respondent's level of comprehension:

1-[ ] Very high   2-[ ] Above average   3-[ ] Average

4-[ ] Below average   5-[ ] Very low

Z2a.   If below average, please explain ....

Z3.   Respondent's level of anxiety about the survey before the Respondent began:

1-[ ] No anxiety   3-[ ] Some anxiety   5-[ ] Lots of anxiety

Z3a.   If lots of anxiety, please explain…...

Z4.   Level of reliability in respondent's responses:

1-[ ] Completely reliable   3-[ ] Somewhat reliable   5-[ ] Not reliable

Z3a.   If not reliable, please explain…...

Z5.   Respondent's level of interest in the interview in general:

1-[ ] Very high   2-[ ] Above average   3-[ ] Average

4-[ ] Below average   5-[ ] Very low

Z6.   Was the interview conducted at respondent's home?

1. Yes [   ];   2. No [   ]

Z6a.   If YES, based on your impression of the respondent's household, estimate the financial standing of the household in that locality:

    1. Low income   2. Middle income

    3. Upper-middle income   5. High income

Z7.   Were there other people present during the interview?

1- [ ] Yes   5- [ ] No

Z7a.   Who was present? ....

Z7b.   Did they affect the quality of the interview?... ....

Z8.   Other points that need to be reported:…...

"Findings from the PAPI research are a reference source that complements assessments from the Government. The Justice Committee of the National Assembly wishes to receive annually the results from PAPI as inputs for discussion at the National Assembly sessions and for reference to the Annual Report of the National Assembly. The findings from this research can be used as sources of evidence to assess the performance of provincial government leadership."

*Mdme. **Lê Thị Nga***
Vice Chairwoman of the Justice Committee of the National Assembly,
at the PAPI National Advisory Group Meeting, November 16, 2010

"PAPI findings provide an important channel of evidence drawn from citizens' experiences that contribute to reflecting the performance of public administration at the provincial level. In parallel with annual government assessment of the Public Administration Reform Master Programme conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and provincial Departments of Home Affairs, I hope PAPI research will be conducted on an annual basis, so as to contribute to effective implementation of the Public Administration Reform Master Programme for the period from 2011-2020."

*Mr. **Nguyễn Tiến Dĩnh***
Vice Minister of the Ministry of Home Affairs,
at National Validation Workshop on PAPI findings in Ha Noi, December 14, 2010

"The assessments and findings from the PAPI research regarding Hau Giang province's performance are very valid. They will help us in public administration reform efforts. The Report helps to understand better our provincial problems in order to find solutions. We will take the findings seriously as they reflect the reality of the province."

*Mr. **Võ Minh Tâm***
Standing Member of the Provincial Party Committee,
Head of Office of Hau Giang Provincial People's Committee
at Validation Workshop on PAPI Findings with southern provinces in Vinh Long, December 3, 2010

"Candid feedback from citizens and businesses can be of great value to a government that wishes to improve its transparency, accountability and the quality of public services to its people. PAPI, which provides feedback on provincial governance and public administration performance based on citizen experiences, and PCI, which is based on surveys of business enterprises, are valuable and complementary indices that support Vietnam's improved governance, economic competitiveness and prosperity."

*Mr. **Jim Packard Winkler***
Project Director, USAID's Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative
at consultation workshop with international development partners, UNDP Office, Hanoi, January 26, 2011

"I request that, with the support from UNDP, the PAPI research team and the Standing Committee of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front in provinces organize discussions with provincial governments and concerned agencies about the PAPI survey findings and their reality. In coming years, we will need to work closer with one another to conduct the survey in all 63 provinces and municipalities to contribute to facilitating more efficiency from the public administration reforms."

*Mr. **Nguyễn Văn Pha***
Vice Chairperson of the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front,
at National Validation Workshop on PAPI Findings in Hanoi, December 12, 2010

UNDP

CECODES

United Nations Development Programme
25 - 29 Phan Boi Chau,
Ha Noi - Viet Nam
Tel: (84 4) 3942 1495
Fax: (84 4) 3942 2267
E-mail: registry.vn@undp.org

www.undp.org.vn

Centre for Community Support
& Development Studies
No. 16, 34/23 Alley, Nguyen Hong St.
Dong Da Dist., Ha Noi, Viet Nam
Tel: (84 04) 3 573 8496
Fax: (84 04) 3 573 8497

www.cecodes.org