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The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) 2011

Measuring citizens' experiences

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THE VIET NAM PROVINCIAL GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERFORMANCE INDEX (PAPI) 2011:

Measuring citizens' experiences

Centre for Community Support & Development Studies (CECODES)
The Front Review, Central Committee of Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF)
Commission on People's Petitions, Standing Committee of the National Assembly
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

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FOREWORD

The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) provides objective, evidence-based measures of provincial performance in governance, public administration, and public service delivery. It also sheds light on analytical issues that need policy consideration at the national level.

Given the increasing demand for objective information; improved transparency and accountability in policy making and implementation; and more equal access to corruption-free public services, non-state actors are encouraged to play a more active role in monitoring the performance of local governments. The philosophy behind PAPI is to consider citizens to be "public administrative services end-users," who are capable of monitoring and assessing governance and public administration in their localities. Based on the knowledge and experiences of citizens, PAPI provides a set of objective indicators that help assess the performance of governance and public administration, while at the same time providing an incentive for provinces to improve their performance over the long term.

PAPI also augments performance in the three components of the policy cycle, which includes policy making, policy implementation, and monitoring. Pursuing a multi-dimensional approach, PAPI looks at six dimensions: (i) participation at local levels, (ii) transparency, (iii) vertical accountability, (iv) control of corruption, (v) public administrative procedures, and (vi) public service delivery. PAPI can thus be seen as a combination of six different pieces in a larger puzzle of governance and public administration performance.

After two rounds of validation and fine-tuning the measures used in the study, first in three provinces in 2009 and then 30 provinces in 2010, in 2011 PAPI was conducted for the first time in all 63 provinces in Viet Nam. Lessons learnt from the pilots were invaluable for honing the methodology, particularly in terms of sampling and fieldwork. Because the previous pilots were used to refine our methodology, we consider the PAPI data collected in 2011 to be the baseline for tracking trends in provincial performance of governance and administration over time.

The PAPI results are grounded in the everyday experiences of 13,642 citizens, who were selected randomly in order to provide a representative sample of the different demographic groups across the country. The survey results will be an important diagnostic tool to convey social feedback about the performance of local governments and state agencies to policy makers and executive agencies at the central and provincial levels.

The scientific nature and orientation towards beneficiaries, as well as the validity of PAPI as a set of indicators measuring performance in governance and public administration are ensured thanks to the close and effective coordination between national partners – the Front Review of the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF) and the Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES) – and international partner, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The quality and validity of the study also benefit from the close coordination domestically between the central level (i.e. the Central Committee of VFF) and the provincial level (VFF committees from provincial to grass-roots levels).

The project also enjoyed strong, substantive support from the National Advisory Board. PAPI's Advisory Board is comprised of senior national experts with a wide range of expertise and knowledge from relevant state agencies and the research community. Since February 2012, the Commission on People's Petitions (CPP) under the National Assembly Standing Committee has become a crucial counterpart in the PAPI research process in its capacity as both a disseminator of the PAPI findings within the National Assembly and as a collaborator in implementing the research.

A key expectation of the study is that the findings and analysis in this PAPI 2011 report will contribute significantly towards ongoing efforts to improve performance in governance and public administration at the provincial level. As a rich source of objective data collected using state-of-the-art, scientific methods, this report will also serve as a useful reference for policy makers, civil servants, mass organisations, and academia in Viet Nam.

The Front Review, The Central Committee for the Viet Nam Fatherland Front	Commission on People's Petitions, The Standing Committee of the National Assembly of Viet Nam	Centre for Community Support and Development Studies	United Nations Development Programme in Viet Nam

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This report is authored by a team led by Jairo Acuña-Alfaro from UNDP, and including Đặng Ngọc Dinh and Đặng Hoàng Giang from CECODES; Edmund J. Malesky, UNDP international expert on governance measurement; and Đỗ Thanh Huyền from UNDP.

PAPI is led by a National Advisory Board that provides guidance and monitoring throughout the process. The Board, which contains diverse representation and renowned experts on governance and public sector performance, ensures that the information contained in the study is consistent and informative. In particular, participants in the National Advisory Board Meeting on March 2, 2012 in Ha Noi provided the drafting team with a great deal of insightful comments and invaluable advice.

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Note: The list is arranged in alphabetical order.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"People know, people discuss, people do and people verify" is a Vietnamese phrase that perhaps best summarizes the goals of the Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI). PAPI provides objective information about citizens' experiences and interactions with local authorities, thus "people know". It provides a means for the discussion and validation of findings at central and local levels in order for people to discuss. PAPI illuminates the collective experience of what citizens do, enabling policy makers to act in their interests, thereby fulfilling the precept that "people do". Finally, PAPI provides a tool to assess actual administrative performance allowing people to verify.

As Viet Nam achieves higher levels of development, **citizens' expectations about public services are also rising**. In addition there is an increase in the availability of public and private services, citizens also expect higher quality delivery. To encourage state agencies, elected deputies, state officials, and public employees to meet this demand, citizen mobilization becomes more important in order to improve participation and oversight. Understanding citizens' aspirations and experiences is of equal importance, and innovative tools to measure, monitor and discuss governance and public administration performance are becoming imperative to continue the transition towards more equitable and higher development levels. An important element in this transition will be the change from traditional approaches to people's mobilization towards alternative mechanisms, whereby citizens take proactive roles in different processes of governance and public service delivery for increased human development in Viet Nam.

PAPI measures the standards of governance and public administration drawn from citizens' experiences in their interactions with governmental authorities at different levels. As a tool to monitor performance, PAPI contributes to accelerating continued improvement in governance and public administration performance. In an environment reliant on "self-assessments" by government stakeholders to measure government performance, PAPI helps provide a bottom-up perspective, by studying people–centred experiences.

The design and survey methodology of PAPI has been validated through a step-by-step approach of piloting and iteration. In 2011, PAPI was further improved and implemented across all 63 provinces in the country. It captures **13,642 individual citizens' experiences in a groundbreaking effort to support a more evidence-based policy making process**. PAPI is the largest and first-ever survey of its kind in Viet Nam. In total, PAPI is a composition of 6 dimensions, 22 sub-dimensions and 92 different indicators. With numerous graphs and maps, PAPI provides an extensive analysis of aggregate national level governance and public administration performance. It also offers a comprehensive picture of the current state of affairs regarding citizens' experiences in 63 provinces. In addition, it renders a fully transparent process of computing 5,796 individually verifiable indicators, 1,368 sub-dimension scores and 378 dimension scores.

PAPI is a joint policy research implemented collaboratively between the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF), the Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES) under the Viet Nam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA), the Committee for People's Petitions (CPP) under the Standing Committee for the National Assembly (since February 2012), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Viet Nam.

Initial Reflections and Policy Usage of PAPI

In a context of increasing demand for the engagement of citizens in governance and public administration performance, PAPI has proven itself as an innovative way to inject objective and evidence-based measures into policy-making decisions. This pioneering effort to capture citizens' experiences in their interactions with local authorities is making its way into mainstream policy making, policy implementation, and policy monitoring processes.

While PAPI was still in its early stages, findings from the report have already been used by different government agencies, development partners, and non-state actors to track performance and design strategies to address governance issues and improve public administration performance.

At the central level, there is increasing recognition of the PAPI data's usefulness and credibility, which it derives from the research team's careful adherence to state-of-the-art methodological standards. For instance, the Government Inspectorate (GI) and the Office of the Steering Committee on Anti-Corruption (OSCAC), which are in charge of the anti-corruption work in the country, have taken the findings from PAPI to complement their reporting requirements under the governmental corruption monitoring and evaluation frameworks. Additionally, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), as a leading governmental agency in charge of the implementation of public administration reform (PAR), is looking at PAPI as a potential framework to guide and complement its upcoming set of PAR indicators at the central and local levels.

At the provincial level, PAPI is emerging as a critical reference tool as well. For the first time, evidence based on citizen's experiences with governance and public administration is available to be used by different actors. For instance, authorities from the Central Highlands province of Kon Tum, one of the poorest and lowest ranked provinces in 2010, have requested that its district level authorities and departments develop a detailed action plan to enhance strengths and improve weaknesses. Importantly, the action plan aims at improving the services provided to citizens by local level authorities. In Da Nang, the Department of Home Affairs informed provincial leaders about its performance levels in PAPI. The data and the methodology provided by PAPI are being used as a reference in their efforts to monitor the performance of city departments and agencies. In Ho Chi Minh City the results have been analysed and incorporated into the province's official policymaking process to further strengthen performance levels.

A Dashboard of Governance and Public Administration Performance

PAPI is a multidimensional metric system of mutually reinforcing processes that important for governance and public administration. PAPI looks at six different dimensions of provincial governance and public administration, including: (i) participation at local levels; (ii) transparency; (iii) vertical accountability; (iv) control of corruption; (v) public administrative procedures, and (vi) public service delivery. Each individual dimension is a combination of three to four sub-dimensions and these are grouped from indicators respectively.

PAPI is a single index that helps illustrate trends in the performance of governance and public administration. Nonetheless, PAPI is not an end in itself. It comprises a rigorous dashboard that captures the complexity of governance and public administration reform efforts from the point of view of a representative sample of the Vietnamese population. PAPI collects timely information about what happens at the aggregate levels of governance, but also cares about what is happening at the individualized levels of key public administration issues.

In the search for good performers and examples of best practices and performance improvements, provinces can be grouped according to their scores. A first striking feature is that provinces can excel in some dimensions but lag behind in others. For instance, Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh City and Thanh Hoa can be grouped in the top performer group (above the 75th percentile), but in different dimensions. Ha Noi performs well in terms of participation, transparency, and public service delivery, yet when it comes to control of corruption it falls into the group of low-average performers. Ho Chi Minh City performs well in transparency, control of corruption, and public service delivery, but trails behind in vertical accountability. Of the six most populated provinces with their population sizes from two million people, An Giang falls into the poor performing group (below the 25th percentile) in four categories: participation, transparency, accountability and administrative procedures. In addition, An Giang falls in the low average group regarding control of corruption while public service delivery seems to be its strongest area similar to the high average group.

Long An is the only province that systematically performs in the top or above the 75th percentile group in all six dimensions. At the other extreme, Long An's neighbour, Tra Vinh province, and Ha Giang in the North, systematically perform below the 25th percentile.

Dimension 1: Participation at local levels

The first dimension captures citizens' participation at the local level. It assesses the different opportunities for citizens to participate in governance and public administration. The main issues addressed include citizens' knowledge of their opportunities for participation, the quality of elections, satisfaction with elected village leaders, and citizens' contributions to the development of communes/wards' public works and projects.

In this dimension Son La is the province with the highest performance followed by Quang Binh, Hoa Binh, Lang Son and Ba Ria-Vung Tau. Aside from these, other provinces in the group of top performers (above the 75th percentile with their scores from 5.650 to 6.642 on a 1-10 scale) are Bac Ninh, Binh Dinh, Quang Tri, Ben Tre, Long An, Ha Noi, Tien Giang, Dak Nong, Can Tho, Hai Duong and Phu Tho.

At the other end of the scale is the group gaining the score of below 5.092. These include Binh Duong, Ninh Thuan, Quang Ngai, Hau Giang, Soc Trang, Ninh Binh, Ha Giang, An Giang, Dien Bien, Ca Mau, Phu Yen, Tra Vinh, Bac Lieu, Tay Ninh and Binh Thuan. In this group, Binh Thuan and Tay Ninh have the lowest means, which are between 4.3 and 4.5.

The remaining 32 provinces, including the municipalities of Hai Phong, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City, are between the 25th and 75th percentile, or with the scores ranging from 5.090 to 5.630, and represent the low and high average performing groups. The provinces in this group are tightly clustered, with only marginal differences in scores.

Dimension 2: Transparency

The second dimension of transparency assesses the flow of timely and reliable information about government services provision. In particular, this dimension focuses on citizens awareness and levels of information regarding social policies for the poor; legislation that affects citizens' everyday lives; budget and expenditures by communes/wards-level public administration agencies; and land-related issues.

The best performers seem to be concentrated more in the north and north central regions. Remarkably, most of the Mekong Delta and many of the southeast provinces are among the poorest performers. Among the municipalities, both Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City are in the best group, while Can Tho, Da Nang, and Hai Phong are found in the low average group.

Ba Ria-Vung Tau has the highest score at 6.850. It is followed by Ha Tinh, Nam Dinh, Son La, Lang Son, Quang Binh, Long An, Quang Tri, Yen Bai, Binh Phuoc, Ho Chi Minh City, Gia Lai, Ha Noi, Hoa Binh, Thanh Hoa and Thai Nguyen. The lowest score in the best performers group is 5.946.

At the other end of the range, Tra Vinh, Lam Dong, Tay Ninh, Ninh Thuan và Bac Lieu are in the low performing group. Other provinces, which belong to the poor performing group (below the 25th percentile, or below the score of 5.124), are: Kien Giang, Hau Giang, Ha Giang, Binh Thuan, Soc Trang, An Giang, Phu Yen, Phu Tho, Hung Yen and Vinh Long. The remaining 32 provinces belong to the average performing groups with the scores ranging from 5.085 to 5.938.

Dimension 3: Vertical Accountability

The third dimension covers vertical accountability issues and assesses the extent to which those who act on behalf of the government are answerable to citizens at grassroots level. This dimension assesses the level to which citizens contact public officials and civil servants at different levels to settle personal, household or village matters; the effectiveness and frequency of citizen complaints and denouncements; and citizens' mechanisms for keeping the local governments accountable regarding public investment projects (e.g. People's Inspection Boards and Community Investment Supervision Boards).

Quang Tri is the province with the highest score. It is followed by Quang Binh and Ha Tinh, two other provinces in central Viet Nam. Other provinces in the best performing group (the ones in the top 75th percentile) are Thai Binh, Nghe An, Nam Dinh, Hai Duong, Long An, Ha Nam, Hoa Binh, Binh Dinh, Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa, Dong Thap, Phu Tho and Lang Son.

Cao Bang, Hai Phong, and An Giang provinces have the lowest scores. Additionally, the poor performing group, which consists of provinces in the bottom 25th percentile includes: Phu Yen, Lai Chau, Tay Ninh, Ca Mau, Soc Trang, Hung Yen, Dong Nai, Ben Tre, Tra Vinh, Ninh Binh, Bac Lieu and Ha Giang.

The remaining half of the provinces, which includes Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Da Nang, are in the average performing group. It is remarkable that except for Binh Dinh in the south central region and Dong Thap and Long An in the Mekong Delta, all best performers are found in the Red River Delta and north central regions of the country. Furthermore, more than half of the poor performers are concentrated in the Mekong Delta, the other half are dotted in northern Viet Nam. None of the centrally-run municipalities belong to the best performing group.

Dimension 4: Control of Corruption

The fourth dimension focuses on corruption. It examines the current problem of corruption and the extent to which citizens are motivated to denounce corrupt activities. While corruption is a broad issue, for the purposes of this analysis, the focus is on diversion of state funds for personal benefit; bribery; use of public property for personal gain; nepotism; abuses in the handling public administrative procedures; bribery in the provision of health care and education; citizens' awareness of legislation on anticorruption; and perceptions of the effectiveness of anticorruption efforts by relevant state bodies.

Control of corruption sees a high degree of variation both across individuals and provinces. Long An is the top performer while Cao Bang is at the bottom. The difference in mean scores between the first and the last ranked provinces is 2.33 points. If mean scores are compared, Long An (7.269) is the top outlier while Cao Bang (4.944) is at the bottom.

The second best performing group includes Binh Duong, Ca Mau, Binh Dinh, Dong Thap, Soc Trang, Tien Giang, and Ba Ria-Vung Tau, which are all south central and southern provinces. Southern provinces dominate among the group in the top 75th percentile provinces in this dimension. The top 10 provinces and 12 of the top 15 provinces are south central and southern provinces.

Among the ten poorest performers are Quang Ninh, Tra Vinh, Hai Phong, Ha Giang, Bac Ninh, Tay Ninh, Ninh Binh, Ninh Thuan, and Lam Dong (a mixture of urban, mountainous, border, coastal, highland and lowland provinces).

Dimension 5: Public Administrative Procedures

The fifth dimension is about a selected group of public administrative procedures. This dimension evaluates the implementation and performance of selected but relevant public administrative procedures in terms of intensity of use and efficiency of services rendered. In particular, the dimension looks at citizens' experiences in accessing public administrative procedures when applying construction permits or obtaining land use rights certificates at the commune/wards and district levels. It is also based on questions about the quality of the public notary services and other procedures.

A high concentration of all 63 provinces is observed. The difference between the maximum and the minimum score is the smallest of all six dimensions. This suggests uniformity across provinces in terms of the performance in dealing with public administrative procedures in all four measured services. The low mean score also suggests that more needs to be done in all provinces to improve performance.

When provinces are grouped into quartiles there is a regional pattern. The best performers are more frequently found in the central and southern regions of Viet Nam. Bac Kan and Nam Dinh are the only two north provinces classified in the top performing provinces above the 75th percentile. Among the five centrally-governed municipalities, Da Nang is one of the best performers, while Ho Chi Minh City, Hai Phong, and Ha Noi are in the group of high average performers. Can Tho is in the low average performer group.

Dimension 6: Public Service Delivery

The sixth dimension relates to public service delivery. In this dimension, a selection of public services considered key in terms of improving citizens' well-being, such as health care, education, water supply, and crime are examined.

The best performers are mostly concentrated in the central region, with Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien- Hue, Da Nang, Quang Nam, and Binh Dinh above the 75th percentile. Meanwhile, the poorest performers are scattered in northern mountainous, central highlands, south central, and southern provinces.

Big cities tend to perform better in public service delivery. Except for Can Tho, the four other municipalities, including Da Nang, Hai Phong, Ha Noi, and Ho Chi Minh City, are among the top fifteen performers. Ha Noi remains behind the other three cities, but outperforms Can Tho.

An overall provincial level performance

PAPI's philosophy is to highlight dimension specific performance levels in order to identify provincial strengths and areas for further improvement. A rich amount of data and information is provided by each of the dimensions analyzed under PAPI. In addition to the dimensional level disaggregation, following the footsteps of PAPI 2010, and in an effort to facilitate overall comparisons among provinces, PAPI is also and aggregate index. That is, the six dimensions can also be aggregated into a composite index to assess overall provincial performance. A composite index can help to identify good performing provinces, and learn from their good practices. It also helps to inform poorer performers with similar socio-economic conditions of the good practices. Provincial comparisons may create competition among provinces to improve their performance.

To sum up, while the dimension-level analysis highlights varying degrees of performance, the following four tiers of provinces can be observed in the aggregate performance index using a scale from 6 to 60 points (a few provinces do not fit cleanly into these four categories because their confidence intervals are especially large):

- Top group of performers and above the 75th percentile with scores between 37.381 and 40.319: **Quang Binh, Ba Ria Vung Tau, Long An, Quang Tri, Ha Tinh, Son La, Nam Dinh, Lang Son, Binh Dinh, Hoa Binh, Tien Giang, Thanh Hoa, Hai Duong, Da Nang, Ha Noi and Dong Thap.**
- High Average group of performer with scores between 36.144 and 37.217: **Ben Tre, Ho Chi Minh City, Nghe An, Thai Binh, Binh Duong, Bac Kan, Binh Phuoc, Gia Lai, Vinh Phuc, Thai Nguyen, Quang Nam, Ha Nam, Dong Nai, Phu Tho, Yen Bai and Dak Nong.**
- Low Average group of performers with scores between 35.003 and 36.098: **Bac Ninh, Kon Tum, Can Tho, Vinh Long, Tuyen Quang, Dak Lak, Quang Ninh, Bac Giang, Lao Cai, Ca Mau, Thua Thien-Hue, Hai Phong, Khanh Hoa, Kien Giang, Soc Trang and Lam Dong.**
- Poor performers provinces below the 25th percentile with scores between 32.599 and 34.995: **Ninh Thuan, Dien Bien, Quang Ngai, Hau Giang, Hung Yen, Lai Chau, Bac Lieu, Ninh Binh, Binh Thuan, An Giang, Phu Yen, Cao Bang, Tay Ninh, Ha Giang and Tra Vinh.**

The provincial governance dividend in Viet Nam

The evidence provided by PAPI strongly suggests that good governance in terms of public administration and service delivery appears to go hand-in-hand with business environment and levels of human development at the provincial level in Viet Nam.

The relationships between PAPI and other development parameters (for instance, Gross Domestic Product–GDP, and Human Development Index–HDI) and the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) are positively correlated and statistically significant. This means that places that do well on the PAPI also tend to perform well in term of economic growth, development and on the business environment. Nevertheless, the relationships are not perfect. For instance, some locations significantly outperform their evaluation by businesses. These provinces stand out as locations where citizens give higher evaluations to local leaders than would be expected given their rankings. In other words, these local administrations tend to favour the perceptions of individuals over business elites. On the other hand, some provinces have lower scores than would be expected from their GDP, HDI or PCI scores. These are places where citizens are less satisfied with governance and public administration in areas of citizens' concerns.

For the most part, well-governed provinces tend to show up on top, regardless of the methodology used to gauge performance. On the other hand, there are differences regarding how businesses and citizens view governance performance, requiring different types of policies from local officials. Some locations manage the balancing act quite well, while others have yet to find the appropriate mix.

INTRODUCTION

The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) is a joint policy research implemented collaboratively between the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF), the Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES) under the Viet Nam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA), the Commission on People's Petitions (CPP) under the Standing Committee for the National Assembly (since February 2012), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Viet Nam.

PAPI systematically measures governance performance and public administration systems at the provincial level in Viet Nam. By capturing citizens' experiences regarding public administration and comparing and ranking provinces, provincial governments will have strong incentives to improve their performance. The index will also empower citizens to raise their voices about preferences, frustrations, and recommendations related to public service delivery and the implementation of administrative procedures in their provinces.

The research design and survey methodology of the PAPI study has been validated through a step-by-step approach.[1] In 2009, it was piloted in three provinces and key findings were presented to senior local government officials, Communist Party leaders, VFF representatives, government agencies, and the media from the involved provinces. Encouraged by the endorsement and useful feedback provided by these stakeholders, the methodology was further refined in order to make the study a rigorous and objective assessment. In 2010 it was rolled out to 30 provinces and captured the experiences of 5,568 citizens.[2] In 2011, PAPI was further improved and implemented across all 63 provinces in the country. It captures 13,642 individual citizens' experiences in a groundbreaking effort to support a more evidence-based policy making process (see Box 1). In an environment reliant on "self-assessments" by government officials to measure government performance, PAPI helps to "flip the coin" and look into people–centred experiences.

PAPI assesses three mutually reinforcing processes: (i) policy making, (ii) policy implementation, and (iii) the monitoring of policy implementation. The dimensions that are used to assess these provinces are specifically tailored to Viet Nam's national and local level contexts. By giving provincial administrators detailed information about citizens' experiences and ranking provinces against each other, VFF, CECODES, CPP, and UNDP aim to support improvements in transparency; stimulate reform; enlarge the 'space' for civil society involvement in policy planning, implementation, and monitoring; and significantly improve the quantity and quality of quantitative data available for policy formulation. PAPI is supported substantively and technically by a national advisory board and a group of international governance measurement experts.

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[1] See for instance Đặng Ngọc Dinh (2010).

[2] See full report at VFF, CECODES & UNDP (2011) and also summary by Hoàng Hải (2011).

This report follows the structure of the 2010 PAPI report.[3] The first chapter includes a discussion of PAPI's objective and rationales, the policy context in 2011 for Viet Nam, and the significant methodological changes applied to improve the survey instrument. The second chapter presents an overview of overall key patterns and findings at the aggregate/national level. Chapter Three presents the main findings of the PAPI 2011 survey by way of presenting and analyzing each of the individual dimensions that comprise PAPI and its dashboard.

Three appendixes are included in this Report. Appendix A includes a brief discussion about the methodology and the representativeness of the sample. Appendix B consists of a detailed set of tables with survey descriptive statistics and confidence intervals. Appendix C is a complete table of PAPI's 6 dimensions, 22 sub-dimensions, and 92 indicators. The report is also accompanied with an interactive web-site at www.papi.vn with further background documentation and detailed provincial level profiles and indicators.

BOX 1: WHAT IS PAPI?

The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) is a policy tool that monitors and measures the performance of governance and public administration (including public service delivery) of all 63 provinces in Viet Nam based on citizens' experiences and perceptions

Where	• In 2009: piloted in three provinces (Phu Tho, Da Nang and Dong Thap) • In 2010: expanded to 30 provinces (randomly selected by propensity score matching) • In 2011: All 63 provinces, covering 207 districts, 414 communes, 828 villages divided in two types: certainty units and probability proportion to size random selection
How	Public surveys (face-to-face) of citizens' experiences about governance and public administration performance in their localities (random selection)
Who	13,642 randomly selected citizens, with 7,225 female and 6,417 male, interviewed in 2011
What is assessed	1. Participation at Local Levels 2. Transparency 3. Vertical Accountability 4. Control of Corruption 5. Public Administrative procedures 6. Public Service Delivery
Implementing agencies	• Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES) • The Front Review (VFF Central Committee) and 63 provincial VFF Committees • Commission on People's Petitions (CPP) *(since February 2012)* • United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

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[3] See VFF, CECODES & UNDP (2011).

CHAPTER 1

RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES

1.1. PAPI'S RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES

"People know, people discuss, people do and people verify" is a well-known Vietnamese phrase that perhaps best summarizes what PAPI is and does. PAPI provides objective information about citizens' experiences and interactions with local authorities, thus "people know." It also provides a means for the discussion and validation of findings at central and local levels in order for people to discuss. PAPI illuminates experiences of what citizens do, which enables policy makers to act on their behalf and leads to realizing the precept that "people do." Lastly, it provides a tool to assess actual performance allowing people to verify.

PAPI is the largest and first-ever survey of its kind in Viet Nam. PAPI measures the standards of governance and public administration drawn from citizens' experiences in their interactions with governmental authorities at different levels. As a tool to monitor performance, PAPI contributes to accelerating continued improvement in governance and public administration performance.[4]

As Viet Nam achieves higher levels of development, citizens' expectations about public services also rise. Aside from an increase in the availability of public and private services, citizens also expect higher quality. In that sense, citizens' expectations shift towards higher levels of demand.[5] To encourage state agencies, elected deputies, state officials, and public employees to meet this demand, citizen mobilization becomes more important in order to improve participation and oversight. Understanding citizens' aspirations and experiences is of equal importance, and innovative tools to measure, monitor and discuss governance and public administration performance will become an imperative to continue the transition towards more equitable and higher development levels. An important element in this transition will be the change from traditional approaches to people's mobilization towards alternative forms and ways where citizens take proactive roles in different processes of governance and public service delivery for increased human development in Viet Nam.

By providing objective information on the sentiments and experiences of the population, PAPI can be considered one additional tool to enhance Vietnamese mobilization efforts. As reported in the previous reports in 2009 and 2010, in line with these shifting and changing expectations and motivations, PAPI measures governance and public administration performance from the perspective of citizens as end-users. PAPI highlights how citizens experience the outputs provided by public administrative agencies in their localities and compares them to those of citizens in other provinces.[6]

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[4] See Acuña-Alfaro, Jairo (2011)

[5] See UNDP (2011)

PAPI provides objective evidence regarding insights into how citizens experience governance and public administration issues. In doing so, it provides snapshots into what the public administration system in the country has been able to accomplish from an end-user perspective.

The aggregative nature of PAPI makes it a single index. However, PAPI is not an end in itself. Rather, PAPI is a rigorous dashboard that captures the complexity of governance and public administration reform efforts from the point of view of a representative sample of the Vietnamese population. PAPI collects timely information about what happens at the aggregate levels of governance, but also cares about what is happening at the individualized levels of key public administration issues.

The objective of PAPI therefore is to support Viet Nam's governance, public administration, and public service delivery reform efforts. It does so by way of presenting a set of metrics that captures how citizens interact with these reforms. Furthermore, PAPI uses an innovative approach to measuring these interactions by asking questions that relate to concrete experiences rather than relying solely on perceptions.

1.2. DASHBOARD OF GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERFORMANCE

In short, PAPI is a multidimensional metric system of mutually reinforcing processes important for governance and public administration. PAPI looks at six different dimensions of provincial governance and public administration, including: (i) participation at local levels; (ii) transparency; (iii) vertical accountability; (iv) control of corruption; (v) public administrative procedures, and (vi) public service delivery. Box 1.1 provides a snapshot of the main areas under assessment for each dimension.

The first dimension is about citizens' participation at the local level. It assesses the different mechanisms available to citizens to participate in governance and public administration. The main issues addressed include citizens' knowledge of their opportunities for participation, the quality of elections, satisfaction with elected village leaders, and citizens' contributions to the development of communes/wards' public works and projects.

The second dimension relates to transparency and assesses the flow of timely and reliable information about government services provision. In particular, this dimension focuses on citizens awareness and levels of information regarding social policies for the poor; legislation that affects citizens' everyday lives; budget and expenditures by communes/wards-level public administration agencies; and land-related issues.

The third dimension covers vertical accountability issues and assesses the extent to which those who act on behalf of the government are answerable to the grassroots level. This dimension assesses the level to which citizens contact public officials and civil servants at different levels to settle personal, household or village matters; the effectiveness and frequency of citizen complaints and denouncements; and citizens' mechanisms for keeping the local governments accountable regarding public investment projects (e.g. People's Inspection Boards and Community Investment Supervision Boards).

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[6] See Nguyễn Văn Căn (2011) as an example.

The fourth dimension focuses on corruption. It examines the current problem of corruption and the extent to which citizens are motivated to denounce corrupt activities. While corruption is a broad issue, for the purposes of this analysis, the focus is on diversion of state funds for personal benefit; bribery; use of public property for personal gain; nepotism; abuses in the handling public administrative procedures; bribery in the provision of health care and education; citizens' awareness of legislation on anticorruption; and perceptions of the effectiveness of anticorruption efforts by relevant state bodies.

The fifth dimension is about a selected group of public administrative procedures. This dimension evaluates the implementation and performance of selected but relevant public administrative procedures in terms of intensity of use and efficiency of services rendered. In particular, the dimension looks at citizens' experiences in accessing public administrative procedures when applying construction permits or obtaining land use rights certificates at the commune/wards and district levels. It is also based on questions about the quality of the public notary services and other procedures.

The sixth dimension relates to public service delivery. In this dimension, a selection of public services considered key in terms of improving citizens well-being, such as health care, education, water supply, and crime are examined.

BOX 1.1: COMPOSITION OF PAPI: 6 DIMENSIONS, 22 SUB-DIMENSIONS[7]

Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI)					
D1. Participation at Local Levels	**D2. Transparency**	**D3. Vertical Accounta-bility**	**D4. Control of Corruption**	**D5. Public Admin. Procedures**	**D6. Public Service Delivery**
1.1. Civil Knowledge 1.2. Opportunities for Participation 1.3. Quality of Elections 1.4. Contributions to Local Projects	2.1. Poverty Lists 2.2. Communal Budgets 2.3. Land-Use Plan / Pricing	3.1. Interactions with Local Officials 3.2. People's Inspections Boards 3.3. Community Investment Supervision Boards	4.1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption 4.2. Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery 4.3. Equity in Employment 4.4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	5.1. Certification Procedures 5.2. Construction Permits 5.3. Land Procedures 5.4. Personal Procedures	6.1. Public Health 6.2. Primary Education 6.3. Infrastructure 6.4. Law and Order

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[7] See Appendix C for a detailed list of indicators under each sub-dimension.

1.3. REFLECTIONS AND USAGE OF PAPI

In a context of increasing demand for the engagement of citizens in governance and public administration performance, PAPI has proven itself as an innovative way to inject objective and evidence-based measures into policy-making decisions. This pioneering effort to capture citizens' experiences in their interactions with local authorities is making its way into mainstream policy making, policy implementation, and policy monitoring processes.

After the PAPI 2010 report was launched in March 2011, the partners involved in the project embarked on a process of information dissemination. PAPI provided national and provincial policy makers with substantial, concrete evidence of the impact of their decisions and administrative performance. While the survey instrument was still in its early stages, findings from the report have already been used by different government agencies, development partners, and non-state actors to track performance and design strategies to address governance issues and improve public administration performance.

At the central level, there is increasing recognition of the PAPI data's usefulness and credibility, which it derives from the research team's careful adherence to state-of-the-art methodological standards. For instance, the Government Inspectorate (GI) and the Office of the Steering Committee on Anti-Corruption (OSCAC), which are in charge of the anti-corruption work in the country, have taken the findings from PAPI to complement their reporting requirements under the governmental corruption monitoring and evaluation frameworks.[8] Additionally, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), as a leading governmental agency in charge of the implementation of public administration reform (PAR), is looking at PAPI as a potential framework to guide and complement its upcoming set of PAR indicators at the central and local levels.

PAPI is emerging as a critical reference tool for provinces as well. For the first time, evidence based on citizen's experiences with governance and public administration is available to be used by different actors. Box 1.2 provides some encouraging examples of the initial impact of the data and uses of PAPI 2010 at the provincial level.

For instance, authorities from the Central Highlands province of Kon Tum, one of the nation's poorest and lowest ranked in 2010, have requested that its district level authorities and departments develop a detailed action plan to enhance strengths and improve weaknesses. Importantly, the action plan aims at improving the services provided to citizens by local level authorities.

In Da Nang, the Department of Home Affairs informed provincial leaders about its performance levels in PAPI. The data and the methodology provided by PAPI are being used as a reference in their efforts to monitor the performance of city departments and agencies. In Ho Chi Minh City the results have been analysed and incorporated into the province's official policymaking process to further strengthen performance levels.

Additionally, in Dak Nong province, provincial authorities were informed of the PAPI data via the media and instructed different agencies to step up implementation of the public administration reform as well as improve the quality of public services to create a closer relationship between local government agencies and citizens to improve their satisfaction levels.[9]

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[8] In particular, see Circular No.11/2011/TT-TTCP of the Government Inspectorate dated 9 November 2011.

[9] See Dak Nong Electronic Newspaper (20/07/2011).

BOX 1.2: SOME EXAMPLES OF INITIAL PAPI 2010 IMPACT ON PROVINCES

Kon Tum: Initiation of Technical Proposal on Improving Provincial PAPI Scores

Two weeks after a discussion on the PAPI 2010 results with the province of Kon Tum on September 8, 2011 jointly facilitated and organised by the Ministry of Planning and Investment and UNICEF, the Provincial People's Committee of Kon Tum issued Official Document No. 1664/CTr-UBND to create a technical proposal focused on improving the PAPI score of the province in their 2011-2016 action plan. The task was delegated to the Department of Home Affairs to develop in consultation with the Provincial People's Committee. Both the Office of the Provincial People's Committee and the Department of Home Affairs have been in touch with the PAPI team to inquire for more data to formulate the technical proposal on how to improve the performance in governance and public administration using their provincial resources. In February 2012, the Provincial People's Committee finished the draft proposal on how to improve the scores for the period from 2012-2015 and invited the PAPI team to provide comments/feedback on a workshop chaired by the chairmen of the people's committee, the people's council and the provincial Fatherland Front.[10]

Da Nang: Strong Leadership Commitment to Retain High PAPI Score

Da Nang has been active in monitoring the performance of its departments and agencies. The Department of Home Affairs in particular has been conducting provincial assessments of the performance of local government agencies during the process of public administration reform. Recognizing some of the drawbacks of relying solely on self-assessments, the departments has used PAPI and the PCI as reliable external assessments of performance. After the central regional PAPI workshop in Hue on November 26, 2010, the Department of Home Affairs submitted an official letter to the Da Nang People's Committee informing them about the city's ranking in PAPI 2010 and suggested solutions to improve its score. These efforts fit with their overall willingness to enhance public administration reform and improve public services in order to retain high scores in the PCI and PAPI.[11]

Ho Chi Minh City: PAPI Needs to Be Repeated to Show Changes in Performance

After the launch of PAPI 2010, the People's Council of Ho Chi Minh City requested that the city Institute for Socio-economic Studies study the PAPI 2010 data in order to prepare a report for the city leadership. *Saigon Tiep Thi Newspaper* reported on April 27, 2011 that chairman of the City People's Committee Le Hoang Quan, upon hearing about the results from PAPI 2010, requested that local officials study the findings from PAPI 2010 and PCI 2010 to find ways to enhance administrative procedures reforms and increase responsibility within the local administrative apparatus. The Chairman also noted that although Ho Chi Minh City achieved the top ranking in the PAPI index, the survey needed to be repeated so that they could assess the change in their performance from year to year.[12]

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[10] See Kon Tum Provincial People's Committee Portal (09/02/2011).

[11] See Da Nang DoHA Website (10/05/2011).

[12] See Sai Gon Tiep Thi (27/04/2011).

During the initial pilot process in 2009, the PAPI team argued that "data available from such nation-wide undertaking will be a gold mine for social scientists to perform various related researches."[13] Since then the pool of data readily available increased and numerous reports and papers have been written using the data and information provided by PAPI.

For instance, a gender disaggregated analysis of PAPI 2010 data was carried out it 2011.[14] The paper observed that PAPI provides an unprecedented opportunity in Viet Nam to assess gender differences regarding experiences and access to public services, and to monitor the implementation of the National Strategy on Gender Equality. The Viet Nam Human Development Report in 2011 includes an extensive analysis of PAPI evidence and its linkages with development and social services outcomes.[15] Related to this, a background paper was written on measuring governance and public administration for human development.[16]

PAPI data was also used to analyse the needs for use of citizens' experiences in measuring public sector reform in Viet Nam in a joint publication with other ASEAN countries and South Korea.[17] In addition, PAPI's methodology, objectives and implementation were used as good practice and example on how to use public survey-based instruments to measure justice system performance in Asian countries.[18] More recently, PAPI data was used in a research paper by two senior researchers from the Viet Nam National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) and published on *Modern Economy*, an international academic journal.[19] The paper uses factor analysis and linear regression models to test the causality and linkages between PAPI and GDP indicators and test whether the dynamism of provincial leadership influences development outcomes for Vietnamese citizens.

In addition, the Front Review from the VFF has been publishing a number of articles about PAPI, ranging from the general introduction of the research, its philosophy and objectives,[20] an analytical summary of findings,[21] a provincial level discussion,[22] to how PAPI also support mobilization efforts for human development.[23]

Last, but not least, on 27 March 2012, the Government of Viet Nam and the United Nations system in Viet Nam signed the One Plan for the 2012-2016 period. This Plan is the framework for cooperation programmes of United Nations agencies in Viet Nam over the next five years to support Viet Nam in addressing its development priorities. The One Plan includes PAPI as a key policy tool to monitor the performance of government institutions and the delivery of basic public services.[24]

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[13] VFF, CECODES and UNDP (2010).

[14] Tran Thi Van Anh (2011), p.13. Tran Thi Van Anh is a researcher from the Institute of Gender and Family Affairs at the Viet Nam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS).

[15] See UNDP (2011).

[16] Acuña-Alfaro, Jairo, Giang Dang and Do Thanh Huyen (2010).

[17] Acuña-Alfaro, Jairo and Do Thanh Huyen (2011).

[18] See Booth, Nicholas (2011).

[19] Thai Thanh Ha and Le Thi Van Hanh (2012), pp. 11-15

[20] Đặng Ngọc Dinh (2010).

[21] Hoàng Hải (2011).

[22] Nguyễn Văn Căn (2011)).

[23] Acuña-Alfaro (2011).

[24] See Government of Viet Nam and United Nations (2012), in particular output 3.3.4 on pages 143-144.

1.4. THE CONTEXT IN 2011

The above examples demonstrate the PAPI has generated significant acceptance from local leaders and point to clear impact at the central and local levels in the past two years. Nevertheless, 2011 has been an exceptional year in Vietnam with significant changes regarding its governance and public administration structures. These changes are important to consider as PAPI seeks to use 2011 as a benchmark to judge the performance of governance and public administration against subsequent years. Without being exhaustive, included below is a brief discussion of key events that happened in 2011.

In January the Communist Party of Viet Nam (CPV) held the XI National Party Congress, where they elected new leadership, including a new General Secretary and many new faces on the Politburo and the Central Committee. Additionally, during the Party Congress several key governance reforms were introduced. In particular, the CPV affirmed its commitment to provide better safeguards against the abuse of power by state officials through its adoption of a new definition of rule of law based on the concept of 'limiting' state power. To this effect, the Congress resolved to create an amended Constitution by 2013, which will include the establishment of a constitutional review mechanism. Furthermore, policies that will shape the future of the country, such as the 2011-2020 Socio-Economic Development Strategy (SEDS), were also approved.

The Communist Party Congress was followed in May by national and local elections, which brought a change in the composition of the National Assembly and local legislatures; the appointment of new President, the re-election of Prime Minister, and the appointment of a new cabinet with 17 new members out of a total 26.

The new National Assembly consists of 500 members, with 130 fulltime members and 122 women. At the first session of the new National Assembly in July, the Party's SEDS was endorsed and the accompanying Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP) for the next five years was approved. In addition, the new members of parliament quickly asserted their roles as representatives, legislators, and monitors. The National Assembly immediately questioned the Government on many issues of national interest, confirming its recent shift to a more assertive body.

The government continued its efforts to improve public services and its public administration system. Within the Office of Government (OoG), the Department to Control Administrative Procedures was created in order to continue efforts to reduce and simplify administrative procedures. Furthermore, in November 2011, under the leadership of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Prime Minister promulgated the Master Programme on State Administration Reform in 2011-2020.[25] The new Resolution signals shifts in three key areas, each of which will benefit from the information provided by PAPI. First, the resolution attempts to more clearly define the objectives, roles, and responsibilities of line ministries and implementing agencies, which should lead to greater institutional accountability. Secondly, the Resolution emphasizes the development of civil servants, particularly in terms of how they interact with citizens. Thirdly, it aims to enhance public service delivery by focusing on organizations' and individuals' satisfaction with outputs rather than concentrating solely on processes and procedures.

The changes highlighted above come an opportune time for PAPI. The focus in the government on increasing accountability to end users dovetails perfectly with PAPI's objective of monitoring performance. Furthermore, the transition of the leadership provides a strong justification for setting 2011 as the baseline year.

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25. See Resolution No. 30c/2011/NQ-CP, Government of Viet Nam (8/11/2011).

1.5. METHODOLOGICAL CHANGES: 2011 AS THE BASELINE YEAR

The expansion of PAPI in 2011 to cover all 63 provinces presented a unique opportunity to incorporate key lessons learned from the previous phases, while setting 2011 as baseline year for future iterations and time-series comparisons.

Incorporating suggestions from National Advisory Board members on how to improve the reliability of PAPI, a number of changes were introduced. In no order of priority, the following main changes where incorporated into PAPI, which together make the 2011 aggregate results not comparable with the results from 2010.

Improvements to sampling strategy

In general, PAPI 2011 maintains the sampling strategy used in 2010 with improvements to sampling of bigger provinces. The main change takes into account the population sizes of provinces with more than two million people. In short, provinces were grouped in three main categories. The first group included 57 provinces with populations of less than 2 million inhabitants. The second group consisted of four provinces (Thanh Hoa, Nge Anh, Dong Nai, An Giang) with populations ranging from 2 to 5 million people. The third group included Viet Nam's two largest metropolises of Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City with populations of more than 5 million inhabitants. In the first group the sample size from 2010 was maintained, while in the medium sized group it was doubled, and in Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City it was tripled.

The probability of selection is based on measures of size in order to ensure that any two respondents who live in different clusters of a given sampling unit have the same chance of being selected into the study, regardless of the absolute population size of each village. Table 1.1 provides a snapshot of the results of this selection process. Appendix A provides more information about the sampling strategy.

TABLE 1.1: PAPI 2011 SAMPLING FRAME

	57 Small Size Provinces (*)	4 Medium Size Provinces (**)	2 Large Size Provinces(***)	Totals
Locations				
No. of districts	3	6	6	207
No. of communes	6	12	12	414
No. of villages	12	24	24	828
Citizens				
No. of targeted respondents per village	16	16	24	
No. of listed respondents per village (totals)	20	20	30	
Province totals	240	480	720	
	(13,680)	(1,920)	(1,440)	17,040

(*) Provinces with populations of less than 2 million people; (**) provinces with populations between 2 and 5 million people, and (***) provinces with populations greater than 5 million people.

Improvements to reliability and validity

In response to numerous comments to revise particular questions and create question wordings more tailored to Vietnamese local context, the PAPI team after extensive deliberations revised the questionnaire.[26] These changes were designed to improve the survey's reliability and validity, which are statistical terms for precision and accuracy.

Reliability and validity are important concepts when assessing the quality of a survey, but they are concepts that are not always immediately understood. To use a metaphor to explain what these terms mean, imagine a policeman attempting to assess the speed of a motorbike driver. Someone is driving a motorbike at a constant speed of 30 km/hour and the police uses a radar gun to measure how fast it is going. If the radar is used 10 times and gets readings of 15, 80, 60, 30, 120, etc, km/hour then the radar is not reliable, because although the average might be accurate, the results vary significantly from the true value of 30. If the radar consistently reads "60" then, it is reliable, but not valid. If the radar reads "30" each time, then it is both reliable and valid. Therefore, the dilemma faced by the PAPI research team is that reliability does not always imply validity.

In an effort to increase validity, the PAPI indicators have been more concrete and less perception-based. The validity of PAPI as a measurement tool suggests that each respondent understands the question in the same way and therefore is likely to give an answer that most truthfully reflects their experiences and feelings on the question.

In sum, a number of changes were made ranging from minor corrections of typos or grammatical mistakes in the structure of questions to the deletion and addition of questions. The types of changes and the frequency with which they occurred are summarized in Table 1.2.

TABLE 1.2: TYPOLOGY OF CHANGES IN INDICATORS

Typology	Type of change	Number of changes
Comparable	Questions used in 2010 and 2011	141
Non-comparable	Questions used in 2010 but not in 2011	67
	Questions used in 2011 but not in 2010	116
	Questions used in 2010 and 2011 but modified in terms of wording	110

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[26] An actual version of the questionnaire as applied is available at www.papi.vn.

Addition of one new sub-dimension

A new sub-dimension assessing the quality of administrative procedures related to personal documents, such as marriage licences, was added in the dimension on Public Administrative Procedures. In all, eight procedures were added to this sub-dimension. The additional sub-dimension responds to the request of several National Advisory Board members who called for improvement in this battery of questions. It also responds to common feedback that the previous dimension relied on too few administrative procedures to assess the overall quality of administrative procedures in a given province. In May 2011, the PAPI research team commissioned an external review of the battery of questions under this dimension.

The selection of these eight procedures is based on the rationale that citizens need to apply for them at one point in time, and that these procedures tend to be more commonly accessed in rural areas than land use rights certificates and construction permits, which were included in the previous dimension. The external review of PAPI 2010 questionnaire was useful in identifying the administrative procedures that both play important parts in citizens' everyday lives and help ensure some balance between urban and rural access to administrative procedures. Also, since these procedures are processed by Commune People's Committees, they are relevant for PAPI in terms of being able to assess the quality of this layer of government.

The change means that this dimension in particular is not comparable between PAPI 2010 and PAPI 2011. However, the trade-off in losing comparability is that the index will be more able to capture the performance of commune-level people's committees in processing important administrative procedures. The new sub-dimension will be used in subsequent years to ensure comparability.

Improved fieldwork organization for survey quality

The expansion from 30 provinces in 2010 to all 63 provinces in 2011 posed a significant challenge in terms of logistics and fieldwork preparation. The expansion meant doubling an already ambitious effort to collect citizens' experiences by increasing the number of citizens surveyed from 5,568 in 2010 to 13,642.

To meet the challenge of interviewing twice as many respondents while maintaining the same international standards in survey fieldwork, a system of three interlinked groups was developed. In the first group, and during the early stages of sample selections and preparation, the local VFF chapters in each province acted as coordinators. The second group included more than 50 CECODES collaborators as team leaders and field supervisors. Finally, the third group included nearly 600 final year students or recent graduates majoring in sociology, social work, or public administration, who supported the interview processes.[27]

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[27] An actual version of the questionnaire as applied is available at www.papi.vn.

2

CHAPTER 2

AN OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL TRENDS

2.1. INTRODUCTION

PAPI is portrayed and constructed as a provincial level policy monitoring tool. However, since PAPI uses a randomized sampling strategy to select respondents, it is also nationally representative. As such, it is perhaps the largest publicly available governance and public administration performance diagnostic tool ever made in Viet Nam. In addition to the richness of information it provides about provincial level performance issues, PAPI also conveys useful information regarding national level trends and experiences. This chapter provides an initial snapshot of some of those key national level patterns and findings from PAPI 2011, and when possible, it compares with key indicators from 2010.[28]

2.2. CITIZENS OPTIMISM ABOUT ECONOMIC SITUATION

Viet Nam's development gains and its transition to middle-income status have also brought with them a great deal of optimism about the current economic situation. Today, Vietnamese citizens have higher expectations of the public administration system, economic performance, and personal interactions with the government. PAPI 2011 has found that a great deal of citizens, irrespective of their gender or ethnicity, perceive their economic situation today as either the same or better than five years ago. More importantly, when asked about their current economic situation, 83.2% of Vietnamese citizens perceive their household economic situation from normal to very good (see Figure 2.1). This contrasts with 16.6% of citizens who think of their economic situations as poor or very poor. Ethnic minorities seem less positive, with only 6.3% answering good or very good compared to 13.48% for Kinh majority respondents.

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[28] The reader is reminded that comparisons are at the indicator levels, and not at the sub-dimension or dimension levels.

FIGURE 2.1: CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION IN 2011



In 2010, the economic outlook for many citizens was positive, with a large majority of citizens (64%) believing that their personal economic conditions would be better in the next five years. However, in 2011, those sharing this positive view fell to 58.7% of citizens (see Figure 2.2a). Furthermore, this fall in optimism was not confined to a specific group as all groups suffered a similar decline (Figure 2.2b).

FIGURE 2.2a: HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC SITUATION IN FUTURE 5 YEARS



FIGURE 2.2b: CHANGES IN PERCEPTION ABOUT FUTURE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN 2011 FROM 2010



2.3. CITIZENS' KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCES WITH GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY

As noted earlier, 2011 was an election year in Viet Nam. Despite the salience of elections during this year, knowledge of grassroots democracy issues remained relatively constant as compared to 2010. Figure 2.3 suggests that in 2011 on average the same number of Vietnamese citizens were aware of the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (GRDO), while there was a slight reduction in the awareness of the Vietnamese slogan "people know, people discuss, people do, people verify." The issue of citizen knowledge is important in terms of the quality of grassroots participation, which has been institutionalized in Viet Nam through the GRDO. Knowledge of formal regulations such as the decree or the more general principle of participation as embodied in the "people know" slogan may enhance accountability, improve grassroots monitoring of government agencies, and check potential abuses of power by local authorities. However, if citizens are not aware of their rights or role in participating then oversight of government agencies may suffer.

FIGURE 2.3: AWARENESS OF GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY



2.4. EXPERIENCES ABOUT LAND USE PLANS AND PROCESSES

In theory, the citizens' stable and relatively high awareness of their informal and formal rights and roles in grassroots democracy should translate into greater awareness in other areas of public life. However, this knowledge does not seem to transfer consistently into these other areas. For instance, Figure 2.4a confirms that citizens remain largely unaware of local level land use issues, with nearly 8 out of 10 citizens not aware of land use plans in their localities. This lack of knowledge provides fertile ground for venal public officials to abuse their authority and take advantage of the situation. The one bright spot in terms of information about land use plans is that in the cases where citizens are informed, they are receiving their information through official channels rather than having to resort to informal means.

FIGURE 2.4a: AWARENESS OF LAND USE PLANS AT THE LOCAL LEVELS



Another positive sign is that among those citizens who are aware, the opportunity to comment on the plans has improved (see Figure 2.4b). When asked whether they had a chance to comment on the land plans, 22% said yes while 17% said no. Furthermore, two out of five citizens who had an opportunity to provide comments said that their comments were taken into consideration. This suggests the importance to enhance mechanisms for citizens to take part in the processes related to land use allocation as a mechanism to enhance trust in local government and land related policy processes.

FIGURE 2.4b: OPPORTUNITIES TO COMMENT ON LAND USE PLANS 2010-2011



2.5. TRANSPARENCY OF POOR HOUSEHOLDS LISTS

In addition, awareness over the existence of poverty lists dropped. While in 2010 approximately two in three citizens were aware of such lists (65%), in 2011 it decreased to one in two (54%). At the same time, the number of respondents saying they are not aware of such lists in their communities increased from 11% to 17% (see Figure 2.5). That is, the number of respondents with awareness decreased by 11%, while the negative responses ("no" and "do not know") increased by 11%. Interestingly, when disaggregating the responses, it seems that in 2011 women were better informed than men, and Kinh citizens were better informed than other ethnicities about the poverty lists.

The process of producing the poverty lists requires that the officials create two copies of the list, one for the village authorities and one to be posted publicly. The commune lists are required to be posted publicly in order for citizens to have a chance to provide feedback. A lack of awareness of the existence of these lists could provide an opportunity for officials to place undeserving people on the list while excluding those who should be included without being held accountable.[29] Improving the transparency of the lists and awareness of citizens will not only help to reduce corrupt practices, but also will support the Government's efforts in improving living standards by ensuring that poor households receive proper subsidies to improve their living conditions.

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29. See VFF, CECODES & UNDP (2011), pp. 28-29.

FIGURE 2.5: AWARENESS OF POOR HOUSEHOLDS LISTS



2.6. CITIZENS' KNOWLEDGE OF CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION

The government's efforts to disseminate the 2005 Law on Anti-Corruption seem to have paid dividends as citizens knowledge of the law remains high (see Figure 2.6a). During the last two years, on average, at least one in every two citizens was aware of the law. The level of knowledge shows not only how much dissemination has been done to enhance awareness of the law, but also indicates how citizens form stronger opinions on corruption when they are aware of the law (see Figure 2.6b). This finding is also consistent with 2010 data.

FIGURE 2.6a: AWARENESS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW



FIGURE 2.6b: HOW SERIOUS IS THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH CORRUPTION?



Corruption has been recognized as a systemic problem in Viet Nam.[30] To gauge how endemic the problem is, PAPI asks citizens about their experiences with corruption and bribes in the public sector. The survey reveals that corruption remains a problem across several sectors.[31] When asked about corruption in the public sector, citizens largely agreed that bribes are required to receive medical care (31%)[32], to get a job in the public sector (29%), to apply for a land use right certificate (21%), for children to receive better treatment in schools (17%), and to apply for construction permits (16%). In addition, 13% of citizens agreed that state officials tend to divert public funds for personal benefit (see Figure 2.7).

FIGURE 2.7: CORRUPTION AND BRIBERY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR



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[30] See the official reference on the extent and nature of the problem of corruption in Viet Nam in Resolution 21/2009/NQ-CP on the Anti-Corruption Strategy towards 2020.

[31] See VFF, CECODES & UNDP (2011), especially the discussion on "Limits on Corruption in Public Service Delivery", pp. 47-54, and World Bank (2010), particularly chapter 6 on oversight.

[32] In 2010 by way of using a cutting edge survey technique known as the Unmatched Count Technique (UCT), it was identified that 28% of citizens have paid a bribe at a hospital. See VFF, CECODES & UNDP (2011), "Figure 2.4B Bribes at Notary and Hospitals", p. 46.

These findings are aggregated at the national level. They do not differ significantly when the five centrally-managed municipalities are excluded from the sample. This suggests that corruption and bribery are equally problematic in rural and urban areas. It also shows the systematic nature of corruption within Viet Nam.

But every cloud has a silver lining. There seems to be some positive signs that anti-corruption efforts are having small, but measurable effects. Figure 2.8 compares changes between 2011 and 2010 and shows that there are slightly fewer citizens who think that bribes are necessary to obtain construction permits and land use rights certificates. In terms of the other administrative procedures, the numbers have held steady at 2010 levels. Only education has become slightly worse (see Figure 2.14).

FIGURE 2.8: TRENDS IN CORRUPTION (BRIBES) IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, ACCORDING TO CITIZENS (2010-2011)



2.7. PEOPLE'S INSPECTION BOARDS AND COMMUNITY INVESTMENT SUPERVISION BOARDS

Two local-level institutions tasked with monitoring public sector performance and public investments at the local levels are the People's Inspection Boards (PIBs) and the Community Investment Supervision Boards (CISBs). These are intended to provide a channel for citizen oversight over grassroots and community level projects. However, citizens seem to be only dimly aware of their existence, although these boards have been in existence across the country.

In 2011, only 34% citizens knew PIBs exist (see Figure 2.9a). Yet, of those who are aware of them, eight out of ten confirmed the PIBs are effective (see Figure 2.9b). This pattern was also observed in 2010. Given that PIBs were first implemented six years ago and that there are 11,102 PIBs in 11,116 communes/wards,[33] the limited knowledge about them is troublesome.

The findings have two implications. First, they suggest that the PIBs are still relatively unknown despite the efforts of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front to enhance knowledge about them.[34] Second, where citizens are aware of the institutions they seem to view them favourably. Taken together, these findings suggest that the challenge lies in setting up and publicizing the impact of these boards.

FIGURE 2.9a: IS THERE A PIB IN YOUR LOCALITY?



FIGURE 2.9b: IS PIB EFFECTIVE?



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[33] Communist Party of Viet Nam Online Newspaper (13/12/2010).

[34] The exception could be in mountainous and ethnic minority regions where PIBs were seen to be proactive and effective (Hà Văn Núi, 2011).

A similar pattern is found regarding the CISBs. Figure 2.10a suggests that only 15% of citizens are aware of the existence of these monitoring boards in their localities. However, much like the PIBs, those who are aware of the CISBs also seem to view them as effective (see Figure 2.10b).

As with the case of the PIB, this evidence has several implications. But, the bottom line seems to be the importance to enhance awareness of the roles, mandates and responsibilities of the CISBs as a mechanism to enhance accountability, counter corruption and increase the quality of public services at the local levels, rather than their coverage.

FIGURE 2.10a: IS THERE A CISB IN YOUR LOCALITY?



FIGURE 2.10b: IS CISB EFFECTIVE?



2.8. CITIZENS' EXPERIENCES WITH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Equity in employment is considered an important element in improving the qualities and capacities of public officials and civil servants. Indeed, Resolution 30c/2010/NQ-CP on the Promulgation of the Public Administration Reform Master Programme for 2011 to 2020 highlights the importance of improving the quality of civil servants. Yet, while progress has been made since 2009 with the Law on Public Officials and Civil Servants and its subsequent guiding normative documents, citizens continue to feel that personal connections play an important role in obtaining state employment. Only 23% of citizens think connections are not important in order to work in a people's committee office as opposed to 50% who think connections are important. As observed in Figure 2.11, the trend is consistent with other positions, such as land registrar, primary school teacher, justice officer, and commune police officer. These trends were also found in PAPI 2010.

FIGURE 2.11: EQUITY IN EMPLOYMENT: IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL CONNECTIONS TO GET A JOB IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR



Another area focused on in Resolution 30c is the need to enhance public administrative procedures and the capacities of public officials and civil servants. A great deal of effort has been made regarding public administrative reforms, and it seems there are signs of progress in terms of clarifying and simplifying procedures. Overall, citizens seems to be satisfied with their experiences when dealing with different administrative procedures, in particular regarding certification procedures, personal documents, and construction permits. One procedure that clearly falls behind is regarding land use rights certificates (LURCs). As shown in Figure 2.12, obtaining a LURC is the procedure that systematically scores the lowest, not only in terms of overall satisfaction but also regarding the attitude of public officials and the number of requirements needed to complete the procedure. Women and ethnic minority groups seem to be the least satisfied.

PAPI also provides a snapshot of the overall level of satisfaction of citizens when interacting with civil servants. In this area, the aggregate national level data indicates a high level of satisfaction with the competence and respect displayed by civil servants. In particular, regarding the certification services, on average, 9 out of 10 citizens expressed their satisfaction. Among the four sets of administrative procedures assessed in PAPI 2011, LURCs again seem to receive the lowest level of satisfaction (see Figure 2.12).

FIGURE 2.12: SATISFACTION LEVELS WITH SELECTED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES



Satisfied with Overall Procedure Experience

Satisfied with Overall Procedure Experience

Officials Treat w/ Respect

Officials Competent

Clear Information about Procedure

Fees Displayed

Paperwork reasonable

Clear Deadline

2.9. CITIZENS' SATISFACTION WITH PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

PAPI also shows the citizens' levels of satisfaction with public district hospitals. Overall, the evidence presented by PAPI suggests that there is a great deal of work to be done to improve service in this area.[35] Out of nine different criteria used to assess hospital quality, citizens across all demographic groups saw clear deficiencies in areas such as sharing beds and dirty restrooms (see Figure 2.13). Also, one in two citizens confirmed that waiting periods were not reasonable and the same proportion suggested that after being treated, the disease or injury was not cured. These results call into question the quality of health care facilities and the services provided.

FIGURE 2.13: SATISFACTION LEVELS WITH SELECTED PUBLIC HOSPITAL SERVICES



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[35] A complementary analysis in terms of areas for further examination to understand these levels of satisfaction with public health services is the Viet Nam Human Development Report 2011 (see UNDP, 2011).

To capture the levels of satisfaction with public primary education facilities and services among citizens, PAPI asks those who have children in primary schools about their experiences with the schools. The findings reveal that respondents in all demographic groups feel that improvement is needed (see Figure 2.14).

For instance, nearly 45% of the respondents said that teachers favoured students who participated in extra classes, which suggests that paying extra money to the teacher improves quality. Furthermore, one in two citizens confirmed that they were not informed about the school budget, and the same proportion said there was no free drinking water and that the restrooms were not clean in the schools. On a positive side, most respondents confirmed schools are built with bricks, feedback is provided to parents, and teachers possess good qualifications.

FIGURE 2.14: SATISFACTION LEVELS WITH SELECTED PRIMARY EDUCATION SERVICES



These findings call for further exploration of the incentives system in place for education staff. As identified in previous research[36] and confirmed later at the sub-dimension level analysis, favourable treatment of fee-paying students and unregulated informal fees seem to be the common practices affecting the quality of education services.

2.10. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The key patterns and findings revealed in this chapter indicate areas of progress, but also expose gaps between policy and practice. Although citizens seem to be optimistic about national and household economic prospects, they lack information about institutions and transparency in local decision making remains poor. Furthermore, they demand more accountability from local authorities, better control of corruption in the public sector, and better quality administrative and public services.

Because PAPI draws a representative sample from every province, the national statistics provides us with valuable information about the country as a whole. However, looking only at this aggregate data overshadows a great deal of variation in provincial performance. Such variation can be substantial given the different endowments enjoyed by different provinces and regions as well as different relationships with the central government.

To gain an idea of the limitations of only thinking nationally, think for example of drawing an administrative map of Viet Nam in which all 63 provinces are painted with the same colour. Such a map will give the impression that all provinces have same governance and public administration characteristics. Therefore, the next section moves away from a monochromatic description and instead will detail provincial performance in each dimension and sub-dimension. In other words, it presents the variation in provincial governance and public administration performance. The disaggregation at the provincial level is useful as it helps identify not only good versus poor performers, but also good practices at the provincial level that other provinces, especially those with similar socio-economic and geographic characteristics, can learn from. Finally, highlighting provincial variation can provide an incentive for poor performers to improve performance and top-performers to maintain their already high standards.

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[36] See Government Inspectorate (2010) and UNDP (2011).

CHAPTER 3

2011 PROVINCIAL PERFORMANCE

Metrics and objective measurement tools are becoming more relevant and frequent in Viet Nam as various stakeholders in Viet Nam's governance demand more sophisticated empirical analysis of local government performance. To provide a theoretically grounded and empirically sophisticated measure of governance quality, PAPI builds a governance metric based on six dimensions, including: (i) participation at local levels; (ii) transparency; (iii) vertical accountability; (iv) control of corruption; (v) public administrative procedures; and (vi) public service delivery.

This chapter provides a detailed breakdown of the indicators that comprise each dimension as well as the range of outcomes among different provinces. Moreover, it discusses how the evidence can be used by different parties and stakeholders in a useful way. Dimensions can be disaggregated or taken as stand-alone measures. While the dimensions are presented separately for ease of assessment, for those more concerned with the broader picture of provincial governance quality, the dimensions can also be viewed as complementary.

Each dimension is comprised of several sub-dimensions, which are in turn based on several indicators. These individual indicators are essentially questions from the PAPI survey. To make the reported statistics as useful and transparent as possible, each indicator in the following chapter is grouped under the appropriate sub-dimensions. Indicators are selected to reflect the most appropriate measurements of key theoretical and practical concepts of governance and public administration. Although the indicators are presented in their raw form, to create the dimension scores they must be standardized. Therefore, it is useful to keep in mind that once an indicator are selected for each sub-dimension, they are standardized around a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means poor performance and 10 perfect performance.

After the indicators are normalized, the sub-dimension scores are calculated by taking the simple average of indicators. If a dimension contains multiple sub-dimensions, the average of the dimensions is used instead, so that the latter receives an equal weighting. Each dimension contains either three of four sub-dimensions. As the highest possible score for any given dimension as a whole is 10 and the lowest is 1, in a dimension with four sub-dimensions the highest possible score for each sub-dimension is 2.5 (one fourth of 10), and the lowest possible score is 0.25 for each of the four sub-dimensions. In a dimension with three sub-dimensions, the scale ranges from 0.33 to 3.33, respectively for each sub-dimension. The final composite of PAPI represents the sum of the six dimensions. As such, the scales range from 6 (lowest possible score) to 60 points (maximum possible score).

3.1. DIMENSION 1: PARTICIPATION AT LOCAL LEVELS

MAP 3.1: PROVINCIAL PERFORMANCE IN PARTICIPATION BY QUARTILES


Dimension 1:
Participation at Local Levels 2011
Legend
Participation at Local Levels
🟦 Best Performers
🟩 High Average
🟨 Low Average
⬜ Poor Performers
HA GIANG
CAO BANG
LAO CAI
LAI CHAU
TUYEN QUANG
BAC KAN
DIEN BIEN
LANG SON
YEN BAI
THAI NGUYEN
SON LA
PHU THO
VINH PHUC
BAC GIANG
BAC NINH
QUANG NINH
HA NOI
HUNG YEN
HAI DUONG
HAI PHONG
HOA BINH
HA NAM
THAI BINH
NINH BINH
NAM DINH
THANH HOA
NGHE AN
HA TINH
QUANG BINH
QUANG TRI
TT-HUE
DA NANG
HOANG SA ISLANDS
QUANG NAM
QUANG NGAI
KON TUM
BINH DINH
GIA LAI
PHU YEN
DAK LAK
KHANH HOA
DAK NONG
BINH PHUOC
NINH THUAN
LAM DONG
TAY NINH
BINH DUONG
DONG NAI
BINH THUAN
DONG THAP
LONG AN
HCMC
AN GIANG
TIEN GIANG
BRVT
CAN THO
VINH LONG
BEN TRE
KIEN GIANG
PHU QUOC
HAU GIANG
TRA VINH
SOC TRANG
BAC LIEU
CA MAU
CON DAO ISLAND
TRUONG SA ISLANDS

In order to assess provincial-level performance in participation, PAPI breaks the concept down into four sub-dimensions: (i) civic knowledge, (ii) participation opportunities, (iii) quality of village elections, and (iv) voluntary contributions.[37]

The first sub-dimension deals with citizen's knowledge about political life and their participation rights. The second assesses the ability of citizens' to participate directly in elections at various levels. The third sub-dimension looks specifically at the quality of elections for village heads, which represents an important element of the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (GRDO). Finally, the fourth sub-dimension analyses the monitoring and management of voluntary contributions, which represent non-electoral forms of community participation.

Figure 3.1a shows the overall performance in participation for each province (the longer the bar, the better the province's performance). Each bar consists of four different colours representing each of the four different sub-dimensions. The highest possible score for the dimension as a whole is 10, while the highest possible score for each sub-dimension is 2.5 (one fourth of 10). The lowest possible score for the dimension is 1, and accordingly, 0.25 for each of the four sub-dimensions.

In the participation dimension, there is a relatively large gap between Son La, the province with the highest score of 6.64, and Tay Ninh and Binh Thuan, with scores under 4.5. The national mean is about 5.3, meaning that overall Viet Nam has significant room for improvement.

At the sub-dimension level, "opportunities for participation" is the sub-dimension with the best overall rating. The national mean for this sub-dimension is close to 1.88 (out of 2.5). The second-best sub-dimension from a national point of view is the "quality of village elections" with a national mean of 1.45, followed by "civic knowledge" with an average score of 1.11. Finally, the "voluntary contributions" sub-dimension has a national mean of only 0.88, making it the weakest area in the country of the four sub-dimensions.

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[37] For a detail description of how PAPI arrived at these four sub-dimensions as the operationalization of participation in Viet Nam, see PAPI Report 2010, pages 14-16.

FIGURE 3.1a: PARTICIPATION AT LOCAL LEVELS (DIMENSION 1)



In Figure 3.1b, the aggregated scores of the dimension are presented in a different way. The figure presents the mean values of the whole dimension without the detailed information about the sub-dimensions, but with the 95% confidence intervals around these point estimates. The confidence interval recognizes the fact that the scores are based on a sample of 13,642 citizens, not the entire population. The 95% confidence intervals means that there is only a 5% chance that the true score for the province lies outside of that range. When the confidence interval is wide, this reflects the fact that either many people in the province did not answer questions that were used to construct the dimension or that there were widely varying answers to the those questions within those provinces.

FIGURE 3.1b: PARTICIPATION AT LOCAL LEVELS (WITH 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS - CIS)



Son La is the province with the highest point estimate of 6.64, followed by Quang Binh, Hoa Binh, Lang Son and Ba Ria-Vung Tau. However, as the 95% confidence intervals (CIs) of the first dozen provinces overlap significantly, it is more meaningful to see them as the best performing group given that the point estimates are not precise. Aside from the five provinces mentioned, other provinces in the 75th percentile of top performers are Bac Ninh, Binh Dinh, Quang Tri, Ben Tre, Long An, Ha Noi, Tien Giang, Dak Nong, Can Tho, Hai Duong and Phu Tho.

At the other end of the scale is the group in the bottom 25th percentile, or below 5.092. These include Binh Duong, Ninh Thuan, Quang Ngai, Hau Giang, Soc Trang, Ninh Binh, Ha Giang, An Giang, Dien Bien, Ca Mau, Phu Yen, Tra Vinh, Bac Lieu, Tay Ninh and Binh Thuan. In this group, Binh Thuan and Tay Ninh have the lowest means, which are between 4.3 and 4.5.

The remaining 32 provinces, including the municipalities of Hai Phong, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City, are between the 25th and 75th percentile and represent the average performing groups. The provinces in this group are tightly clustered, with small differences in scores, ranging from 5.09 to 5.63.

Map 3.1 shows a visual presentation of the provinces in the dimension as classified into groups. The blue coloured provinces belong to the best performing group (75th percentile), the yellow ones are in the poorest performing group (25th percentile), and the green and orange coloured ones are the high average and low average groups, respectively.

Among the best performers, there seems to be no regional pattern, with provinces coming from the northern, central, and southern Viet Nam. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that Ha Noi is the only municipality in this group. On the other hand, the poor performing ones seem to be concentrated in the south, especially in the Mekong Delta.

Table 3.1 includes the complete list of indicators which are used to construct the participation dimension. The first column shows the name of the sub-dimensions. The second column contains the indicators of each sub-dimension, with the corresponding question number(s). For each indicator, the table provides the national mean with its 95% confidence interval, as well as the provinces with the maximum, median, and minimum scores nationally. Together, this table gives a specific and detailed picture about the different aspects of participation. It provides a sense of the best and worst performers in each sub-dimension and will be useful for those hoping to identify good practices. The median value will be used to measure improvement over time regarding this indicator.

TABLE 3.1: LIST OF INDICATORS USED IN DIMENSION 1 (PARTICIPATION AT LOCAL LEVELS)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean	National 95% CI		Provincial Scores		PROVINCES
			Min	Max		Low	High	Status	Scores	
Total Dimension	**Dimension 1: Participation at Local Levels**		**1**	**10**	**5.30**	**5.23**	**5.37**	**Minimum**	**4.32**	**Binh Thuan**
								Median	**5.33**	**Quang Nam**
								Maximum	**6.64**	**Son La**
Sub-Dimension 1	*Civic Knowledge*		0.25	2.5	1.11	1.09	1.14	*Minimum*	*0.82*	*Tay Ninh*
								Median	*1.14*	*Ha Tinh*
								Maximum	*1.49*	*Quang Binh*
Sub-Dimension 2	*Opportunities for Participation*		0.25	2.5	1.88	1.85	1.91	*Minimum*	*1.49*	*Ninh Binh*
								Median	*1.90*	*HCMC*
								Maximum	*2.28*	*Son La*
Sub-Dimension 3	*Quality of Elections*		0.25	2.5	1.45	1.43	1.48	*Minimum*	*1.22*	*Tay Ninh*
								Median	*1.48*	*BRVT*
								Maximum	*1.85*	*Son La*
Sub-Dimension 4	*Contributions*		0.25	2.5	0.85	0.83	0.87	*Minimum*	*0.42*	*Binh Thuan*
								Median	*0.81*	*Lam Dong*
								Maximum	*1.16*	*Dong Thap*
S1. Civic Knowledge	*Civic Knowledge*	d101a, d101b, d101d	0	3	1.76	1.72	1.81	Minimum	1.15	Tay Ninh
								Median	1.73	Thanh Hoa
								Maximum	2.30	Dong Nai
S1. Civic Knowledge	Knows Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (%)	d102a	0%	100%	34.14%	30.80%	37.48%	Minimum	11.75%	Soc Trang
								Median	34.85%	Ha Nam
								Maximum	63.62%	Quang Binh
S1. Civic Knowledge	Knows People Know, People Decide (%)	d102b	0%	100%	64.66%	60.70%	68.61%	Minimum	33.74%	Tra Vinh
								Median	70.66%	Bac Giang
								Maximum	93.74%	Ben Tre

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean	National 95% CI		Provincial Scores		PROVINCES
			Min	Max		Low	High	Status	Scores	
S1. Civic Knowledge	Correct Term Limit of 2.5 Years (%)	d108	0%	100%	6.97%	5.83%	8.12%	Minimum	0.23%	Quang Nam
								Median	6.05%	Kien Giang
								Maximum	29.75%	Son La
S2. Opportunities for Participation	Voted in Last Commune People's Council Election (%)	d101b1	0%	100%	70.57%	68.77%	72.37%	Minimum	46.32%	Ca Mau
								Median	70.73%	Lao Cai
								Maximum	92.06%	Son La
S2. Opportunities for Participation	Voted in Last National Assembly Election (%)	d101d1	0%	100%	65.94%	63.96%	67.92%	Minimum	44.43%	Tay Ninh
								Median	66.17%	TT-Hue
								Maximum	91.91%	Son La
S2. Opportunities for Participation	Village Chief Elected (%)	d103a	0%	100%	83.38%	81.24%	85.51%	Minimum	57.00%	Binh Thuan
								Median	85.71%	TT-Hue
								Maximum	98.65%	Son La
S2. Opportunities for Participation	Participated in Election (%)	d107	0%	100%	69.25%	66.45%	72.04%	Minimum	44.35%	Bac Giang
								Median	71.10%	Kon Tum
								Maximum	95.84%	Quang Ngai
S3. Quality of Elections	*More than 1 Candidate (%)*	d105	0%	100%	51.50%	48.19%	54.81%	Minimum	26.15%	Binh Thuan
								Median	52.72%	Yen Bai
								Maximum	91.33%	Quang Tri
S3. Quality of Elections	Invited to Participate (%)	d106	0%	100%	57.72%	54.09%	61.36%	Minimum	29.28%	Quang Ngai
								Median	59.20%	Yen Bai
								Maximum	95.05%	Quang Binh
S3. Quality of Elections	Paper ballot was Used (%)	d107a	0%	100%	86.47%	83.85%	89.09%	Minimum	17.07%	Da Nang
								Median	84.45%	Son La
								Maximum	99.97%	Binh Duong
S3. Quality of Elections	Votes were Counted Publicly (%)	d107d	0%	100%	60.28%	56.08%	64.48%	Minimum	10.83%	Binh Duong
								Median	75.18%	Ninh Thuan
								Maximum	98.24%	Ha Tinh
S3. Quality of Elections	Candidate was Suggested (%)	d107b	0%	100%	42.93%	36.16%	49.70%	Minimum	1.49%	Lao Cai
								Median	44.30%	An Giang
								Maximum	97.62%	Tra Vinh
S3. Quality of Elections	Voted for Winner	d107c	Min	Max	90.74%	89.01%	92.46%	Minimum	70.27%	Kien Giang
								Median	92.48%	Bac Ninh
								Maximum	99.90%	Thai Binh
S4. Contributions	Voluntary Contribution to Project (%)	d109ba	0%	100%	47.90%	45.02%	50.79%	Minimum	10.11%	Binh Thuan
								Median	44.80%	Quang Binh
								Maximum	86.14%	Dong Thap
S4. Contributions	Community Monitoring Board Monitors Contribution (%)	d109bb	0%	100%	10.97%	9.03%	12.91%	Minimum	0.02%	Ha Giang
								Median	6.16%	Quang Ninh
								Maximum	29.52%	Son La
S4. Contributions	Voluntary Contribution Recorded (%)	d109bc	0%	100%	69.94%	65.86%	74.03%	Minimum	18.87%	Binh Thuan
								Median	69.25%	Quang Ninh
								Maximum	97.37%	Son La
S4. Contributions	Participated in Decision Making to Start Project (%)	d109bd	0%	100%	34.42%	31.80%	37.05%	Minimum	3.28%	Tra Vinh
								Median	32.88%	Dak Nong
								Maximum	66.47%	Long An
S4. Contributions	Provided Input to Project Design (%)	d109be	0%	100%	21.91%	19.52%	24.31%	Minimum	2.43%	Tra Vinh
								Median	18.80%	Lam Dong
								Maximum	56.81%	Quang Binh

(*) Min=Sample Minimum; Max= Sample Maximum

Civic Knowledge

Compared to the 2010 questionnaire, the questions in this sub-dimension were changed slightly to achieve a better flow in the survey. Nevertheless, the essence of the questions remained.

Question d101 assesses people's understanding of their electoral opportunities and asks respondents to recall whether or not in the past five years elections to the following offices occurred: (i) Chairman of commune/ward People's Committee, (ii) Member of commune/ward People's Council and (iii) Provincial representatives to the National Assembly. The correct answers would be a "No" for the first option, and a "Yes" for the latter two. On national average, respondents were only able to give two correct answers out of three (1.76 out of 3 scores). The best province in this indicator is Dong Nai (2.3), while the lowest score is Tay Ninh (1.15). Thanh Hoa has the median score of 1.73.

The next indicator (d102a) assesses people's awareness about the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (GRDO), which is the official name of the framework containing all important aspects of people's participation at the local level. At the national level, 34.14% of respondents confirmed their knowledge of the decree, which is nearly the same as last year's result (33%). The maximum score was found in Quang Binh (63.62%), while in Soc Trang only 11.75% of citizens know about the decree. Both the maximum and minimum scores are somewhat lower than last years' results.

In an interesting comparison to the previous question, question d102b asks if people know the phrase "People know, people discuss, people do, people verify", which is a popular formulation of the content of the GRDO. On average, about two-thirds of respondents know the phrase, which is almost double the score for the previous question. In provinces such as Ben Tre almost all citizens (93.74%) are aware of the phrase. The divergence between the questions shows how important it is to find effective ways to package information to help

FIGURE 3.1c: CORRELATION BETWEEN CITIZENS' AWARENESS OF THE GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY ORDINANCE AND "PEOPLE KNOW..." SLOGAN



The last indicator of the sub-dimension (d108) investigates if respondents know the duration of the term for the village/residential group head, which is 2.5 years. At the national level a startlingly low number of less than 7% can give the correct answer. Even in Son La, the best province, only about 30% of respondents have the correct knowledge, while the number is close to zero in Quang Nam. This low levels of knowledge could expose citizens to manipulations in village head elections. On the other hand, it may signal that the position does not really have an impact on people's lives.

Overall, the performance level in this sub-dimension is relatively weak. The national mean is 1.11 out of possible 2.5. Quang Binh, the best performing province of the sub-dimension only has a score of 1.49, while low-performing Tay Ninh has a score of 0.82.

Opportunities for Participation

This sub-dimension has no significant changes in its construction compared to the PAPI 2010 questionnaire. It looks at how citizens use elections as opportunities for participation in Viet Nam. Question d101b1 asks if respondents personally voted in the commune's last People's Council election. Question d101d1 looks at the percentage of people who personally voted in the most recent National Assembly election. The third question in the module, d107, checks the percentage of people who took part in the last village head election.

At the national level, the rates of participation in the Peoples' Council and National Assembly elections are similar, at around 71% and 66%, respectively. Son La ranks highest with rates (in both cases around 92%) double that of the lowest performing provinces of Ca Mau (46.32% in the People's Council election) and Tay Ninh (44.43% in the National Assembly election). Notably, these rates are much lower than rates published in media reports.[38] In addition, it reflects the practice of proxy voting, where someone from the household would vote on behalf of other household members. This practice considerably lessens the quality of the elections. On the other hand, these rates are considerably higher than what was noted in PAPI 2010, probably because the latest elections occurred in early 2011 and thus are fresher in people's minds than compared to 2010.

On average for the nation, the rate of participation in the village head elections is almost the same range with a point estimate of 69.25%. Quang Ngai is the leading province with almost 96%, more than double Bac Giang, the province with the lowest level at 44.35%.

Finally, the fourth indicator (question d103a) asks respondents to confirm if the current village head was appointed through an election or by other means. (The question offers some other choices such as "appointed by the commune's People's Committee" or "appointed by the Party Committee"). Again, Son La has the top position with almost 100% of respondents giving the right answer, compared to the lowest level found in Binh Thuan with 57%. Nationwide more than 80% are aware of the proper mechanism to elect the village head, which is comparable with last year's result.

Overall, this sub-dimension sees the strongest performance out of the four that comprise the Participation Dimension. The national mean is 1.88 (out of 2.5), with Son La having the highest level (2.28) and very close to a perfect outcome. This certainly has an impact on Son La's overall ranking in the composite PAPI index. The lowest score is in Ninh Binh (1.49), while Ho Chi Minh City had the median score of 1.90.

Quality of Village Elections

This sub-dimension investigates various aspects of the quality of village head elections. In 2011, respondents were asked whether they personally attended the election. This was introduced in an effort to capture citizen's direct experiences with the elections. Other questions remain but were reordered to ensure a better flow.

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[38] See National Assembly XIII Plenum Election Council (18/07/2011).

In the country as a whole, only slightly more than half the households (57.72%) were invited to the last village head election, lower than last year's rate of 72% (d106). While in Quang Binh almost all households were invited, in Quang Ngai three in ten households were invited (29%). This is critical given that the village head elections are one of the key democratic opportunities for the people to participate.

In only about half of the elections (51.5%) was there more than one candidate, which is a requirement according to the GRDO (d105). This is lower than last year's result of 66%. Quang Tri, another centrally-located province, has the highest level with 91.33%. The lowest performing province is Binh Thuan with 26%. Based on anecdotes gathered on the ground, many villages have difficulties finding candidates for the election, as the job is seen just as an extended arm of the commune's leadership.

Regarding election procedures, the numbers look better. Nationwide, 87% of the respondents said paper ballots were used in village election, which is a better practice than using a show of hands. The rate in Da Nang is 17% (consistent with last year's number of 11%) as compared to 98% in Ha Tinh. On national average, 60% of the respondents saw votes were counted publicly. Again, there is a large difference between the provinces, ranging from 98% in Ha Tinh to 11% in Binh Duong.

Another critical factor is whether a specific candidate was suggested by the authorities (d107b), which was confirmed by 43% of respondents. This score is much higher than 25% last year. In Tra Vinh this happened to almost 100% of respondents, while it practically never occurred in Lao Cai (1.49%).

The final indicator, the percentage of people voting for the winner, gives insight into the competitiveness of the village head elections. On average for the country, 91% of the people said they voted for the winner, a number on par with last year's result (86%). This indicates that the elections are highly uncompetitive either because there is no opposition candidate or the second candidate is there just to meet formal requirements and is not a viable candidate. Even in Kien Giang, the province with the lowest winning percentage, 70% of respondents said they voted for the winner. The lack of competitiveness in village elections undermines the very purpose of the elections as it reduces the possibility of sanctioning poor performance of village leaders.

In summary, this sub-dimension paints a picture of low quality village head elections. There is only one candidate to vote as for 50% of respondents. A specific candidate is suggested by authorities according to more than 40% of respondents. A large majority say they vote for the winner, suggesting there is not a great deal of competition. This sub-dimension score is 1.45, suggesting a need to change and introduce measures to make the village head position more than just a formality and give it the influence it should have to make an impact on people's lives.

Voluntary Contributions

In addition to electoral participation, the participation sub-dimension looks into citizen contributions, either financial, labour, or in-kind, to public projects in their community. Compared to 2010, the questions in this module were significantly modified and improved to make the measurement more focused and comprehensive.

The first indicator (d109ba) investigates the proportion of citizens who in the last 12 months made a monetary, labour, or in-kind contribution to their village in a voluntary manner. In the country as a whole, only 47.9% said they contributed voluntarily, meaning that more than half of contributors did so due to pressure from local authorities or the village head. This form of informal taxation could represent a significant burden on people, especially poor households. In Binh Thuan, 90% of those contributing say they are pressured to do so. This is in contrast to Dong Thap where 86% of contributions are voluntary.

Nationally, 70% of respondents said their contributions are recorded by village or commune book keeping, which is a relatively good number. However, there are large differences between provinces. In Binh Thuan, again the lowest performing province, only 19% said their contributions were recorded, indicating nontransparent practices may be taking place in dealing with the money, while in Son La, close to 100% said their contributions are accounted for publicly.

Other aspects related to contributions are less positive. Only about one-third of the contributors participated in the decision making process to approve the public project they contributed to. In a participatory environment, deliberation over project choice should be the norm. This indicator also had substantial variation. While in Long An two-thirds of people were involved in the decision making, the lowest performer, Tra Vinh has only 3.28% of people taking part (question d109bd). Nationally, an estimated one-fifth of the population provides any input whatsoever to the project design. Quang Binh is the best performer in this area, with more than half of the contributors having a chance to be involved in the design process.

Finally, the sub-dimension looks at who should monitor the public project to make sure that the citizens' money is spent correctly and without waste. According to the GRDO, the Community Investment Supervision Boards or the People's Inspection Boards are the correct entities to monitor the use of people's contributions. However, only one-tenth of respondents confirm that this is the case. The vast majority cite either the village head, commune authorities, or "no one" as being in charge of monitoring the work. Even in Son La, the best performer, less than one-third confirmed that the boards were being used, and half the provinces are below 6%. This is a worrisome situation, as lack of proper supervision is fertile ground for corruption and mismanagement, which in turn will decrease people's willingness to contribute in the future.

Overall, this sub-dimension is the weakest. The country as a whole has only a mean score of 0.83 out of 2.5. The best performer, Dong Thap, scores 1.16, almost three times better than the worst performer Binh Thuan with 0.42.

3.2. DIMENSION 2: TRANSPARENCY

MAP 3.2: PROVINCIAL PERFORMANCE IN TRANSPARENCY BY QUARTILES


Dimension 2:
Transparency at Local Decision-making 2011
HA GIANG
CAO BANG
LAI CHAU
LAO CAI
BAC KAN
TUYEN QUANG
DIEN BIEN
YEN BAI
LANG SON
THAI NGUYEN
SON LA
PHU THO
VINH PHUC
BAC GIANG
QUANG NINH
BAC NINH
HA NOI
HUNG YEN
HAI DUONG
HAI PHONG
HOA BINH
HA NAM
THAI BINH
NINH BINH
NAM DINH
THANH HOA
NGHE AN
HA TINH
QUANG BINH
QUANG TRI
TT-HUE
DA NANG
HOANG SA ISLANDS
QUANG NAM
QUANG NGAI
KON TUM
BINH DINH
GIA LAI
PHU YEN
DAK LAK
KHANH HOA
DAK NONG
BINH PHUOC
LAM DONG
NINH THUAN
TAY NINH
BINH DUONG
DONG NAI
BINH THUAN
DONG THAP
LONG AN
HCMC
BRVT
AN GIANG
TIEN GIANG
CAN THO
VINH LONG
BEN TRE
KIEN GIANG
PHU QUOC
HAU GIANG
TRA VINH
SOC TRANG
BAC LIEU
CA MAU
TRUONG SA ISLANDS
Legend
Participation at Local Decision-making
Best Performers
High Average
Low Average
Poor Performers

Transparency, in the form of people's "right to know", is one of the key pillars of the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (GRDO). By regulation, decisions and resolutions of various levels of local government, state policies and legal instruments, communal annual budgets, and others need to be communicated quickly and clearly to the population. This forms the foundation for citizens to be involved in the policy making process as well as to monitor implementation.

PAPI operationalizes the concept of transparency in Viet Nam through three sub-dimensions. According to law, governments are required implement a number of policies in a transparent way. PAPI chose to assess the success of local government in providing transparency in three policies: (i) the publication of poor household lists; (ii) the annual communal budgets; and (iii) communal land use plans. This dimension was changed slightly from last year.

The overall performance of all provinces is shown in Figure 3.2a as a bar graph, where the longer the bar, the better the performance. The three sub-dimensions are displayed in three different colours. The highest possible score for the whole dimension is 10; the highest score of each sub-dimension is 3.33. The lowest score for the dimension as a whole is 1 and 0.33 for each of the three sub-dimensions.

It can be observed that the variance of the provinces in this dimension is similar to the previous dimension (Participation at Local Levels), with scores ranging from 4.44 (Tra Vinh) to 6.85 (Ba Ria - Vung Tau). Half of the country is below Khanh Hoa which has the median score of 5.53. The national mean is 5.47, indicating significant room for improvement.

As seen in Figure 3.2a, on average, the first sub-dimension has the longest bar, meaning that among the three sub-dimensions the provinces are most successful in publishing and disseminating the lists of poor households. This sub-dimension has a national mean of 2.15 (out of 3.33). In contrast, land use plans have the lowest level of transparency, with a national mean of just 1.56, or less than 50% of the maximum possible score of 3.33. This clearly fits in to the context of the problematic land use management situation the country is currently facing. The "Communal budget" sub-dimension has a somewhat higher national mean of 1.76, but it is still significantly below the level for the poor households sub-dimension.

FIGURE 3.2a: TRANSPARENCY (DIMENSION 2)



Figure 3.2b shows the aggregated scores of the dimension in the form of a scatter graph. The point estimates of the provinces are shown with 95% confidence intervals. The confidence intervals suggest that there is only a 5% chance that a different sample of respondents would result in a score outside that range.

Ba Ria-Vung Tau has the highest score with 6.85, followed by Ha Tinh, Nam Dinh, and Son La, all with scores above 6.5. As with other dimensions, due to overlapping confidence intervals, it is more meaningful to establish groups of different levels rather than focus on precise rankings. Aside from the four provinces mentioned above, the best performing group (provinces in the 75th percentile, or from 5.946 points) includes Lang Son, Quang Binh, Long An, Quang Tri, Yen Bai, Binh Phuoc, Ho Chi Minh City, Gia Lai, Ha Noi, Hoa Binh, Thanh Hoa and Thai Nguyen.

At the other end of the range, Tra Vinh, Lam Dong, Tay Ninh, Ninh Thuan, and Bac Lieu, and are in the low performing group with scores clustered around 4.5. Other provinces, which belong to the poor performing group (in the bottom 25th percentile, or below 5.124 points) are: Kien Giang, Hau Giang, Ha Giang, Binh Thuan, Soc Trang, An Giang, Phu Yen, Phu Tho, Hung Yen and Vinh Long. The remaining 32 provinces fall into the other two average performing groups with their scores ranging from 5.085 to 5.938.

FIGURE 3.2b: TRANSPARENCY (WITH 95% CIS)



Map 3.2 gives the overall picture of the performance of the provinces grouped into different levels of performance. Blue represents the best performing provinces, while yellow provinces are in the poorest performing group. The orange and green ones are the high average and low average provinces, respectively.

The best performers seem to be concentrated more in the north and north central regions. Remarkably, most of the Mekong Delta and many of the southeast provinces are among the poorest performers. Among the municipalities, both Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City are in the best group, while Can Tho, Da Nang, and Hai Phong are found in the low average bracket.

TABLE 3.2: LIST OF INDICATORS USED IN DIMENSION 2 (TRANSPARENCY)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		Survey Question	National 95% CI		Provincial Scores		PROVINCES
			Min	Max		Low	High	Status	Scores	
Total Dimension	**Dimension 2: Transparency**		1	10	**5.47**	**5.38**	**5.56**	**Minimum**	**4.44**	**Tra Vinh**
								Median	**5.53**	**Khanh Hoa**
								Maximum	**6.85**	**BRVT**
Sub-Dimension 1	Poverty Lists		*0.33*	*3.3*	*2.15*	*2.10*	*2.20*	*Minimum*	*1.58*	*Lam Dong*
								Median	*2.23*	*Quang Ninh*
								Maximum	*3.14*	*Son La*
Sub-Dimension 2	Communal Budgets		*0.33*	*3.3*	*1.76*	*1.72*	*1.79*	*Minimum*	*1.34*	*Vinh Long*
								Median	*1.80*	*Can Tho*
								Maximum	*2.30*	*BRVT*
Sub-Dimension 3	Land-Use Plan/Pricing		*0.34*	*3.4*	*1.56*	*1.54*	*1.58*	*Minimum*	*1.25*	*Hai Phong*
								Median	1.54	Ha Noi
								Maximum	1.90	Thai Binh
S1.Poverty Lists	Poverty List Published in Last 12 Months	d202	0%	100%	53.55%	50.22%	56.89%	Minimum	14.02%	Binh Duong
								Median	59%	Tien Giang
								Maximum	89%	Son La
S1.Poverty Lists	Type 1 Errors on Poverty List (% Agree)	d202a	0%	100%	39.85%	36.91%	42.79%	Minimum	3.24%	Son La
								Median	41%	Soc Trang
								Maximum	69%	Binh Thuan
S1.Poverty Lists	Type 2 Errors on Poverty List (% Agree)	d202b	0%	100%	34.66%	31.47%	37.86%	Minimum	3.52%	Son La
								Median	34.06%	Phu Tho
								Maximum	77.83%	Tra Vinh
S2. Communal Budgets	Communal Budget is Made Available (%)	d203	0%	100%	29.80%	27.19%	32.40%	Minimum	4.95%	Tra Vinh
								Median	31.14%	Binh Phuoc
								Maximum	66.50%	Thai Binh
S2. Communal Budgets	Respondent Read Communal Budget (%)	d203a	0%	100%	37.38%	33.85%	40.91%	Minimum	4.81%	Vinh Long
								Median	35.33%	Bac Kan
								Maximum	71.40%	HCMC
S2. Communal Budgets	Believe in Accuracy of Budget (%)	d203b	0%	100%	69.66%	66.61%	72.70%	Minimum	41.61%	Vinh Long
								Median	71.99%	Khanh Hoa
								Maximum	94.74%	Tien Giang
S3. Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Aware of Communal Land Plans (%)	d204	0%	100%	19.99%	17.89%	22.10%	Minimum	3.44%	Tra Vinh
								Median	19.27%	Dong Thap
								Maximum	56.40%	Thai Binh
S3. Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Comment on Communal Land Plans (%)	d205	0%	100%	6.19%	5.08%	7.30%	Minimum	0.35%	Bac Giang
								Median	5.09%	Gia Lai
								Maximum	19.02%	Nghe An
S3. Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Land Plan Acknowledges Your Concerns (%)	d205a	0%	100%	81.12%	74.96%	87.28%	Minimum	15.08%	Bac Lieu
								Median	94.04%	Thai Binh
								Maximum	100.00%	Gia Lai
S3. Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Impact of Land Plan on Your Families (3=Beneficial)	d206	1	3	2.05	2.01	2.09	Minimum	1.59	Bac Lieu
								Median	2.05	Tuyen Quang
								Maximum	2.88	Tra Vinh

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		Survey Question	National 95% CI		Provincial Scores		PROVINCES
			Min	Max		Low	High	Status	Scores	
S3. Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Did Not Lose Land as a Result of Land Plan	d207	0%	100%	71.38%	69.08%	73.68%	Minimum	25.52%	Son La
								Median	71.43%	Lao Cai
								Maximum	91.00%	Tra Vinh
S3. Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Compensation Close to Market value (%)	d207a	0%	100%	12.86%	8.86%	16.87%	Minimum	0.00%	Dak Lak
								Median	7.29%	Nghe An
								Maximum	52.70%	Ben Tre
S3. Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Informed of Land Usage (%)	d207c	0%	100%	93.12%	90.20%	96.04%	Minimum	36.81%	Ninh Thuan
								Median	95.76%	An Giang
								Maximum	100.00%	Bac Kan
S3. Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Land Used for Original Purpose (%)	d207d	0%	100%	85.40%	81.01%	89.78%	Minimum	24.91%	Soc Trang
								Median	92.38%	Ha Giang
								Maximum	100.00%	Gia Lai
S3. Land-Use Plan/Pricing	Know Where to Go to get Land Use Plan (%)	d208	0%	100%	38.25%	35.77%	40.73%	Minimum	9.13%	Tra Vinh
								Median	38.81%	Bac Ninh
								Maximum	71.65%	Hoa Binh

(*) Min=Sample Minimum; Max= Sample Maximum

Transparency in Lists of Poor Households

This sub-dimension investigates the transparency of the list of poor households. Poverty lists are an important welfare policy tool, especially in poorer regions, because households once recognized as poor, are entitled to receive a number of social benefits, such as access to micro-credit programs or free medical insurance.[39]

Compared to 2010, this sub-dimension has dropped one indicator asking respondents to confirm the poverty line, but kept the other three indicators intact, making a year-to-year comparison possible.[40] The first indicator (d202) asks respondents if they were aware of the poverty list published in the last 12 months, which is the timeframe required by the GRDO. Nationwide, just half of citizens (53.55%) confirmed the question, significantly lower than the 65% of last year's survey. The best performer, Son La, did very well with 89% of citizens being aware of the publication of the list. On the other end, in Binh Duong, the answer was confirmed by only one out of eight people (14%).

The next two indicators look into the quality of the list. Question d202a assesses the issue that sometimes genuinely poor households are left out of the list, either due to a mistake or intentionally in an attempt to misappropriate funds or improve statistics, and hence do not have access to the social support they deserve.[41] In the country as a whole, more than one-third of citizens (36.9%) say this type of error occurs in their commune. The number is consistent with last year's finding of 35%. Son La again tops the list with only 3.24% of its citizens saying this issue exists. On the low end, more than two-thirds of people in Binh Thuan confirm the inaccuracy. Half the provinces have a higher share than Soc Trang's 41%.

The other type of inaccuracy is when non-poor households find their way onto the list, often through personal contacts, in order to enjoy the social support. On average, about 34.66% of citizens across Viet Nam confirm that this issue exists, a level quite similar to last year's result of 28%. The problem is most prevalent in Tra Vinh with 77.83%. Son La consistently proves to be the best performer in this area, with only 3.52% of citizens saying they have seen the problem in their locality.

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[39] See for example Decree No. 167/2008/QĐ-TTg of the Prime Minister for housing support for poor households, and Decree No. 157/2007/QĐ-TTg for credit policies for students from poor households.

[40] Question d200 instead asks about respondents' awareness of the accute poverty threshold applicable in their locality. Only 3,176 out of 13,642 respondents felt confident to provide a number indicating the acute poverty threshold. However, the responses differ largely at the individual level, and the mean value of these observations is around 455,000VND. National acute poverty thresholds in 2011 were 400,000 VND in rural areas and 500,000 VND in urban areas, accordingly to Decision No. 09/2011/QD-TT of the Prime Minister defining acute and near poverty thresholds for the period from 2011-2015, and the thresholds may differ from one province to another.

[41] For a recent media coverage, see Dan Viet (9/1/2012).

Overall, this sub-dimension is the strongest of the three in the Transparency Dimension. The national mean is 2.10 (out of 3.33). Son La reaches a remarkable 3.14, very close to a perfect score, which is double the score of Lam Dong, the lowest performer (1.58).

Transparency in Communal Budgets

Both public access to the content of the communal budget and the quality of the information are necessary to make sure that public funds are not mismanaged. Except for a minor rewording, the questions on communal budgets remains unchanged compared to 2010, thus allowing a year-to-year comparison.

Question d203 investigates compliance with the GRDO requirement that commune leaders make their annual budget publicly available. A very low share of 29.8% confirmed they were aware of the publication of the budget, a level similar to the 29% in 2010. In Thai Binh, the best province, about two-thirds of people knew about the budget, while the number was below 5% in Tra Vinh, the poorest performer.

Of those citizens who were aware of the budget being publicised, in 2011 only about 37.38% actually read it compared to 51% in 2010. Only 5% of citizens in Vinh Long have informed themselves, compared to 71.4% in Ho Chi Minh City, the best performer. This is clear evidence about the need to move beyond the formality requested by the law in order to really distribute this important information to the people.

The last indicator, question d203b, looks into the quality of the published information and asks people who actually read the budget for their opinion about its accuracy. In the country as a whole, about two-thirds of people who read the budget found it to be accurate. This number is somewhat lower than last year's average of 77%. There is quite a large provincial gap, with Tien Giang leading in the high end (94.74%), and again Vinh Long at the bottom with 41.6%.

In summary, there is a slight decline in the performance of the country as a whole (in two out of three indicators). Overall, the country's average score is 1.79 out of 3.33, significantly lower than the poverty list sub-dimension. Ba Ria-Vung Tau, the best performer, has a score of 2.3, while the poorest performing province is Vinh Long with 1.34.

Transparency of Land Use Plans

Transparency in land management, specifically the process of land use planning, land recovery, and compensation is of great importance right now in Viet Nam. This is one of the areas recognized as being most prone to corruption and the cause of much tension between citizens and local governments.[42] Therefore, PAPI provides a great deal of detail in this area. The sub-dimension has nine indicators, making it the most extensive in the whole study. Compared to 2010, the existing indicators remained the same, except for the reformatting of one question. In addition, two new indicators were taken into account.

The first indicator, d204, asks citizens if they are aware of their commune's land use plan. According to the GRDO, the plan should be provided by the local government along with socio-economic development plan, policies, and laws. Almost one-fifth (20%) gave a positive answer, a decline from 24.5% last year. The number is close to zero (3.4%) in Tra Vinh, and even in Thai Binh, the best province, only half of citizens (56.4%) are aware of this information. Both the low and the high ends have similar ranges to the 2010 results.

As with many other democratic decision making processes, the GRDO requests that citizens are provided opportunities to make comments on the draft of the land use plan before it is approved. This requirement is investigated by the next indicator, question d205. Again, the results are disappointing: only 6.19% of people confirmed that they had a chance to comment, down from 8.4% in 2010. Nghe An is the best province in this matter, where 19% of its citizens had a chance to comment. At the other end of the range, 0.35% of people in Bac Giang had a chance to provide comments. This is an important shortfall as it appears that citizens are unable to voice their concerns in this area of vital, local importance.

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[42] World Bank, et al. (2010).

Among those who had an opportunity to provide a comment, the majority (81.12%) said their comments are acknowledged (d205a). In half of the provinces, the share is over 94%. The lowest score is in Bac Lieu with only 15%. However, as the numbers of people providing comments in individual provinces are small – sometimes below 10 people – these data need to be treated with caution, as they may have a high degree of instability.

The next indicator assesses the impact of land use plans on households (d206). The value "1" is assigned to respondents whose households had no impact, "2" to households with negative impacts, and "3" to households who benefit from the plan. The result for the country as a whole is a neutral 2.05, very consistent with the 2.04 of last year. Tra Vinh has the most positive impact, with a score of 2.88, while in Bac Lieu households were a little affected (1.59).

The impact on people's lives was also looked at from a different perspective: whether or not they lost land due to the land use plan (d207). Nationwide about 71.38% reported that they did not lose their land, a little higher than the level of last year (68%). The highest number is found in Tra Vinh (91%). At the other end of the spectrum, one-fourth of citizens in Son La said that they lost land as a result of the recent land use plan.

A more important fact is that among the 30% of the citizens who lost land, only a minority said the compensation they received was close to the market value (d207a). In Ben Tre, the best performer, about half of the citizens are positive. On the other side, all people in Dak Lak attested that their compensation level is lower than the market price. In the country as a whole, only 12.86% of people who lost land said that their compensation was close to the market value, worsening from 17% of last year. This complex issue has not yet been solved, which has fed widespread perceptions of corruption and has been a major source of dissatisfaction, land-related complaints, and reduced trust in the government.[43]

An area that has seemed to see improvement is in informing people whose land was revoked about the purpose of the future land use. Nationally, 93.12% say they are informed about what the land is going to be used for (d207c). Bac Kan has the perfect score of 100%, while the worst performer is Ninh Thuan with only 37%. Similarly positive, over 85.4% say the land is being used according to the original purpose (d207d). Gia Lai has the top position with 100% confirming the unchanged usage, while in Soc Trang, one-fourth of the people agreed.

The last indicator (d208) asks if respondents are confident that they know what to do in case they need to know the legal and official land price frame for their province. This indicator is important since when people do not know how to equip themselves with information, they could easily fall victim to manipulative and corrupt government officials. On average, 38.25% of citizens could provide an answer. In other words, two-thirds do not know where to go or what to do in order to access the official land prices. The situation is most critical in Tra Vinh, where more than 90% of the citizens are not confident about finding price information. In the best province, Hoa Binh, 30% are not sure.

As a whole, transparency in terms of land use plans is the weakest among the three sub-dimensions in the Transparency Dimension. Nationally, Viet Nam has an average score of only 1.56 out of 3.33.Thai Binh, the best performer, has a score of 1.90, while Hai Phong is at the bottom end with 1.25. This indicates a major lack of transparency in land management in this province. Whether or not there is a relationship between this finding and the land conflict between farmers and the local government happened in Tien Lang district in Hai Phong in early 2012 is an open question for further research.[44]

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[43] For instance, land related issues dominate the requests for legal aid services available in Ha Tinh province. Nearly every other case brought up by citizens (44.74%) from April and October of 2011 was related to compensation for land clearance or resettlement (data collected from fieldwork in late 2011 by VLA-UNDP Project "Strengthening the Capacity of the Vietnam Lawyers Association-VLA). In addition, see World Bank, et al (2010).

[44] See Office of Government (10/02/2012) for detailed conclusions by the Prime Minister on the case of land disputes in Tien Lang District, Hai Phong. The case occurred after the fieldwork in Hai Phong in 2011.

3.3. DIMENSION 3: VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

MAP 3.3: PROVINCIAL PERFORMANCE IN VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY BY QUARTILES


Dimension 3:
Vertical Accountability 2011
Legend
Vertica Accountability
🟦 Best Performers
🟩 High Average
🟧 Low Average
🟨 Poor Performers
HA GIANG
CAO BANG
LAI CHAU
LAO CAI
TUYEN QUANG
BAC KAN
DIEN BIEN
YEN BAI
LANG SON
THAI NGUYEN
SON LA
PHU THO
VINH PHUC
BAC GIANG
BAC NINH
QUANG NINH
HA NOI
HUNG YEN
HAI DUONG
HAI PHONG
HOA BINH
HA NAM
THAI BINH
NINH BINH
NAM DINH
THANH HOA
NGHE AN
HA TINH
QUANG BINH
QUANG TRI
TT-HUE
DA NANG
QUANG NAM
QUANG NGAI
KON TUM
BINH DINH
GIA LAI
PHU YEN
DAK LAK
KHANH HOA
DAK NONG
BINH PHUOC
LAM DONG
NINH THUAN
TAY NINH
BINH DUONG
DONG NAI
BINH THUAN
DONG THAP
LONG AN
HCMC
AN GIANG
TIEN GIANG
BRVT
CAN THO
VINH LONG
BEN TRE
PHU QUOC
KIEN GIANG
HAU GIANG
TRA VINH
SOC TRANG
BAC LIEU
CA MAU
CON DAO ISLAND
HOANG SA ISLANDS
TRUONG SA ISLANDS

Following in the footsteps of PAPI 2010, the concept of vertical accountability is operationalized through the same three sub-dimensions. These include (i) citizen's interactions with local authorities, (ii) People's Inspection Boards (PIBs) and (iii) Community Investment Supervision Boards (CISBs).

The first sub-dimension argues that if local governments are accountable and open to listening to concerns, citizens will be able to come to them with problems, whether they are of a private or administrative nature. The two other sub-dimensions investigate the levels of awareness, effectiveness, and efficiency of two key local level accountability institutions in Viet Nam, the PIBs and the CISBs. These, by design, are the two grassroots mechanisms allowing people to exercise their "right to verify" as manifested in the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (GRDO).

Figure 3.3a shows the aggregated performance of the provinces in form of a bar graph. Compared to the first two previous dimensions, the national average for this indicator is slightly better, with provinces occupying a range between 4.74 (An Giang) at the low end to 6.98 (Quang Tri) at the top. The national mean is 5.5 on the 1-10 scale.

On average, Viet Nam has similar levels of performance across the three sub-dimensions. With a national mean of 1.87, the first sub-dimension ("Interaction with local authorities") has the highest score by a small margin, followed by "PIBs" with 1.85. The third sub-dimension, "CISBs" is slightly weaker with a national mean score of 1.78.

FIGURE 3.3a: VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (DIMENSION 3)



Figure 3.Figure 3.3b shows the aggregated scores of the provinces as point estimates with 95% confidence intervals around them. Quang Tri is the province with the highest point estimate, close to 7.0. It is followed by Quang Binh and Ha Tinh, two other provinces in central Viet Nam. Other provinces in the best performing group (the ones in the top 75th percentile) are: Thai Binh, Nghe An, Nam Dinh, Hai Duong, Long An, Ha Nam, Hoa Binh, Binh Dinh, Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa, Dong Thap, Phu Tho and Lang Son. Cao Bang, Hai Phong, and An Giang provinces have the lowest point estimates, grouped below 4.8. Additionally, the poor performing group, which consists of provinces in the bottom 25th percentile (or below 5.256 points) includes: Phu Yen, Lai Chau, Tay Ninh, Ca Mau, Soc Trang, Hung Yen, Dong Nai, Ben Tre, Tra Vinh, Ninh Binh, Bac Lieu and Ha Giang.

The remaining half of the provinces, which includes Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Da Nang, are in the average performing groups, which is found in the range from 5.256 to below 5.856.

FIGURE 3.3b: VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (WITH 95% CIS)



An overview of different performance in terms of accountability is presented in Map 3.3. The blue colour represents the best performing group and the yellow colour indicates the poorest performers. The provinces between these two groups are again split into two: provinces in orange-red are the high/average and provinces in green are the low/average provinces.

It is remarkable that except for Binh Dinh in the south central region and Dong Thap and Long An in the Mekong Delta, all best performers are found in the Red River Delta and north central regions of the country. Furthermore, more than half of the poor performers are concentrated in the Mekong Delta, the other half are dotted in northern Viet Nam. A visual inspection of the map reveals that none of the centrally-run municipalities belong to the best performing group.

Table 3.3 shows the complete list of indicators used in the dimension, with the national mean and the 95% confidence intervals. The table also identifies the best, the median, and the poorest performing provinces to highlight provincial differences.

TABLE 3.3: LIST OF INDICATORS USED IN DIMENSION 3 (VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean	National 95% CI		Provincial Scores		PROVINCES
			Min	Max		Low	High	Status	Scores	
Total Dimension	**Dimension 3: Vertical Accountability**		**1**	**10**	**5.50**	**5.44**	**5.57**	**Minimum**	**4.74**	**An Giang**
								Median	**5.53**	**Dak Lak**
								Maximum	**6.98**	**Quang Tri**
Sub-Dimension 1	*Interactions With Local Authorities*		*0.33*	*3.3*	*1.87*	*1.85*	*1.90*	*Minimum*	*1.38*	*Hung Yen*
								Median	*1.92*	*Hai Duong*
								Maximum	*2.35*	*Quang Tri*
Sub-Dimension 2	People's Inspection Boards (PIBs)		*0.33*	*3.3*	*1.85*	*1.81*	*1.88*	*Minimum*	*1.41*	*An Giang*
								Median	*1.81*	*Gia Lai*
								Maximum	*2.36*	*Hai Duong*
Sub-Dimension 3	*Community Investment Supervision Boards (CISBs)*		*0.34*	*3.4*	*1.78*	*1.75*	*1.81*	*Minimum*	*1.40*	*Hai Phong*
								Median	*1.79*	*Dak Lak*
								Maximum	*2.40*	*Quang Tri*
S1. Interactions With Local Authorities	Contacted Village Head (%)	d301a1	0%	100%	18.54%	16.51%	20.57%	Minimum	2.62%	Bac Ninh
								Median	19.62%	Gia Lai
								Maximum	55.73%	Ninh Thuan
S1. Interactions With Local Authorities	Contacted Commune People's Committee (%)	d301b1	0%	100%	12.20%	10.72%	13.68%	Minimum	0.78%	Bac Giang
								Median	11.81%	Phu Yen
								Maximum	32.10%	Ninh Thuan
S1. Interactions With Local Authorities	Contact w/Village Head Successful (%)	d301a1	0%	100%	87.96%	84.53%	91.39%	Minimum	34.42%	Bac Ninh
								Median	91.09%	Vinh Phuc
								Maximum	100.00%	Binh Duong
S1. Interactions With Local Authorities	Contact w/Commune Successful (%)	d301b2	0%	100%	80.49%	74.61%	86.37%	Minimum	17.67%	Bac Ninh
								Median	81.55%	Quang Ngai
								Maximum	100.00%	Hoa Binh
S1. Interactions With Local Authorities	Made a Proposal to Authorities (%)	d302a1	0%	100%	23.36%	20.69%	26.03%	Minimum	7.90%	Dong Thap
								Median	26.25%	Thanh Hoa
								Maximum	62.19%	Quang Tri

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean	National 95% CI		Provincial Scores		PROVINCES
			Min	Max		Low	High	Status	Scores	
S1. Interactions With Local Authorities	Proposal Successful (%)	d302a2	0%	100%	87.28%	84.29%	90.28%	Minimum Median Maximum	68.50% 89.76% 100.00%	Quang Ngai HCMC Kon Tum
S2. People's Inspection Boards	Village has a PIB (%)	d303	0%	100%	33.84%	31.23%	36.44%	Minimum Median Maximum	12.65% 32.42% 71.71%	Can Tho Lai Chau Hai Duong
S2. People's Inspection Boards	PIB Selected by Vote (%)	d303a	0%	100%	43.54%	40.34%	46.75%	Minimum Median Maximum	15.70% 41.75% 70.13%	Ben Tre Soc Trang Dong Thap
S2. People's Inspection Boards	PIB Effective (%)	d303c	0%	100%	78.70%	76.16%	81.24%	Minimum Median Maximum	25.58% 77.92% 98.58%	Tra Vinh Hai Duong Tay Ninh
S3. Community Investment Boards	Commune has a CISB (%)	d304	0%	100%	14.48%	12.63%	16.33%	Minimum Median Maximum	3.09% 14.00% 48.44%	Khanh Hoa Phu Yen Quang Tri
S3. Community Investment Boards	CISB Effective (%)	d304b	0%	100%	81.65%	78.00%	85.30%	Minimum Median Maximum	49.53% 82.21% 99.64%	Dien Bien Hai Duong Hai Phong

(*) Min=Sample Minimum; Max= Sample Maximum

Interactions with Local Authorities

The first part of the sub-dimension looks into the interactions between citizens and local leaders when citizens seek help for problems, either of a private or administrative nature. The battery of questions remains largely unchanged from 2010, except for a minor change in the time frame used. Question d301a1 asks citizens whether in the last year they have contacted the village head to solve their problems. Nationally, 18.54% made a contact. This is significantly lower than last year's 29.3%, but can be explained by the narrower time window being considered. In the previous year the survey asked if they had visited a leader in the past three years, while in 2011 it only asked about their activity in the past year. There is a huge provincial gap. More than half of people in Ninh Thuan (55.73%) went to their village head to ask for help, while in Bac Ninh only 2.62% of the citizens made contact.

The village head seems to be the first place that people turn to. As a comparison, only 11% nationally contacted the commune's People Committee to address their issues (d301b1). Interactions with district and provincial officials drop even further to insignificant levels. Ninh Thuan has the most interaction with commune leadership (32.1%), while almost nobody in Bac Giang seemed to have contacted their commune people's committee.

It is remarkable that among those who contacted their village head, the majority found the meeting to useful (d301a1a). The national mean is 87.96%. Similarly, nearly 80.5% of those who contacted the commune PC saw it as helpful (d301b2). Bac Ninh had the bottom position on both counts. Only 34.42% of its people who interacted with the village head thought the contact as successful, compared to 17.67% at the commune level. Binh Duong has the perfect score in village head interactions, while Hoa Binh is the best performer at the commune level, both at 100%.

Next, PAPI looks at the rate of people making proposals to the authorities, which is seen as an indication of an open and friendly governance environment that encourages citizens to come forward with constructive suggestions (d302a1). On average, nationally about 23.36% of citizens made a proposal or suggestion to the government during the past year, a level quite consistent with last year's results of 19%. The rate is especially high in Quang Tri, where six out of 10 people engaged with the local authorities. At the low end, only 8% in Dong Thap bothered to make a proposal of any sort.

It is interesting to see that when people decided to make a proposal or suggestion, they mostly found their actions to be successful (d302a2). Some 87% of people nationwide found the meeting to be successful, and even in the lowest province, Quang Ngai, the number was close to 70%. A possible explanation of the high success rate is that the people who engage in these activities are more articulate, educated, and well-connected. Nevertheless, it is a significant finding that suggests that greater attention be paid to the level and degree of interaction between citizens and local authorities. A great deal of effort is constantly made in terms of "mobilizing" mass organizations and government agencies to support the implementation of policy processes at the central and local levels. Yet, as these findings suggests, much more could be achieved when citizens feel empowered to interact with local level authorities and make proposals. In other words, mobilization efforts *"have to transform and pay greater attention to consider citizens' as subjects of development"*.[45]

Overall, the national mean of the sub-dimension is 1.87 out of 3.33. Quang Tri, top performer in the whole dimension, also does best in this sub-dimension with a score of 2.35. In the bottom position is Hung Yen, at only 1.38.

People's Inspection Boards (PIBs)

This sub-dimension investigates the levels of awareness and quality of the PIBs, a grassroots level accountability mechanism that was first introduced in Viet Nam in 2004.[46] The questions used in this sub-dimension remain largely unchanged from last year.

In the country as a whole, 33.84% of citizens said they were aware of the existence of a PIB in their locality (d303). This is consistent with last year's level of 36.7%. There is a large provincial gap: the PIBs are most known in Hai Duong (close to 72%), while in Can Tho their existence is known by only close to 13% of the people.

Among the 33.84% of people who are aware of the PIBs in their commune, approximately 44% know the correct mechanism for the boards to be established, which is through a vote by the people (d303a). More than half believed the PIBs are formed by the commune's people's committee, commune's people council, or directly by the Viet Nam Fatherland Front. This score is higher than last year, which was 19%, but it still below the 50% mark. While Dong Thap has the highest level (70.13%), in Ben Tre, the province at the bottom end, only one out of six people know how PIBs are supposed to be created.

The last indicator (d303c) in the sub-dimension has more positive results: 78.7% of the people who knows about the existence of a PIB say it works effectively, compared to 75% last year. All people in Tay Ninh are positive about its performance, while in Tra Vinh, the lowest performer, one-fourth of citizens view the performance of PIBs positively.

Overall, performance on this sub-dimension is similar to the previous one. The national mean is 1.85 out of 3.33. Hai Duong is the best performer with a score of 2.36, almost double An Giang's level of 1.41.

Community Investment Supervision Boards (CISBs)

This sub-dimension deals with the CISBs. It consists of two indicators which remain unchanged from PAPI 2010. The first one asks respondents if they are aware of the existence of the CISBs in their locality (d304). Nationwide, about 14.5% of citizens say their commune has a CISB. This is somewhat lower than last year's level of 19.4% and just half the rate for PIBs. The difference is to be expected as anecdotes gathered on the ground suggest that in many localities it is a common practice to have PIBs take over the tasks of the CISBs. The province with the most citizens confirming the existence of CISBs is again Quang Tri with 48.5% compared to just 3% in Khanh Hoa at the bottom end.

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[45] See Acuña-Alfaro, Jairo (2011).

[46] See Article 11, Law on Inspection No. 2/2004/QH11, 2004.

Question d304b asks respondents who know of the CISB's existence about its effectiveness. In the country as a whole, 81.65% of citizens are positive that the CSIBs work effectively. In Hai Phong, 100% of the people confirmed the question, even at the bottom end, in Dien Bien, still half of the people are of the opinion that the boards are effective. In this case, the data are to be treated with caution, as the number of people answering this question can be quite small in some provinces.

Overall, performance on this sub-dimension is somewhat weaker compared to the previous two. The national mean score is 1.75 out of 3.33. Like in "Interaction with local authorities," Quang Tri is the top performer with 2.4. Hai Phong holds the lowest position with a score of 1.4.

Over the last few years, Viet Nam has invested much effort to push the concept of the PIBs and CISBs as key elements of vertical accountability. But, as suggested by citizens, the fact that many people are unaware of their existence indicates that it is difficult for these boards to go beyond being a formality, to have visibility, and to perform their tasks in ways that can have a real impact on local politics.

3.4. DIMENSION 4: CONTROL OF CORRUPTION

MAP 3.4: PROVINCIAL PERFORMANCE IN CONTROL OF CORRUPTION BY QUARTILES



Dimension 4:
Control of Corruption 2011

Legend
Control of Corruption
🟦 Best Performers
🟩 High Average
🟧 Low Average
🟨 Poor Performers
HÀ GIANG
CAO BẰNG
LAI CHÂU
LÀO CAI
TUYÊN QUANG
BẮC KẠN
ĐIỆN BIÊN
YÊN BÁI
THÁI NGUYÊN
LẠNG SƠN
PHÚ THỌ
VĨNH PHÚC
SƠN LA
BẮC GIANG
BẮC NINH
QUẢNG NINH
HÀ NỘI
HƯNG YÊN
HẢI DƯƠNG
HẢI PHÒNG
HÒA BÌNH
HÀ NAM
THÁI BÌNH
NINH BÌNH
NAM ĐỊNH
THANH HÓA
NGHỆ AN
HÀ TĨNH
QUẢNG BÌNH
QUẢNG TRỊ
TT-HUẾ
ĐÀ NẴNG
HOANG SA ISLANDS
QUẢNG NAM
QUẢNG NGÃI
KON TUM
BÌNH ĐỊNH
GIA LAI
PHÚ YÊN
ĐẮK LẮK
KHÁNH HÒA
ĐẮK NÔNG
BÌNH PHƯỚC
LÂM ĐỒNG
NINH THUẬN
TÂY NINH
BÌNH DƯƠNG
ĐỒNG NAI
BÌNH THUẬN
ĐỒNG THÁP
LONG AN
HCMC
AN GIANG
TIỀN GIANG
BRVT
CẦN THƠ
VĨNH LONG
BẾN TRE
KIÊN GIANG
PHU QUOC
HẬU GIANG
TRÀ VINH
SÓC TRĂNG
BẠC LIÊU
CÀ MAU
CON DAO ISLAND
TRUONG SA ISLANDS

This dimension looks into four types of corruption that are experienced and perceived directly by the citizens, including: (i) petty corruption by public servants; (ii) petty corruption in public service delivery; (iii) nepotism in public sector employment, and (iv) the willingness to fight corruption of provincial authorities. Data collected is then constructed into sub-dimensions that measure the performance in control of corruption.

A few changes were made to PAPI 2011 Questionnaire from 2010. Some questions that did not work in PAPI 2010 were removed (e.g. the experimental question d401), while a few more questions were added in an effort to quantify informal payments that citizens have to make in obtaining public administrative procedures and public services.[47] In addition, a few more indicators were introduced to measure the level of informal payments needed to access certification services,[48] construction permits, and commune-level administrative services.

The final ranking for Dimension 4 on Control of Corruption is shown in Figure 3.4a and Figure 3.4b below. The coloured bars represent the contribution of each sub-dimension to the final score.

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[47] For instance question d507fa on bribes in access to LURCs, d604e on bribes in access to district hospitals, and d606cc on bribes in primary education.

[48] In concrete, questions d503f, d505ff and d508d1f, respectively.

FIGURE 3.4a: CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (DIMENSION 4)



FIGURE 3.4b: CONTROL OF CORRUPTION (WITH 95% CIS)



A few observations are worth noting about Figures 3.4a and 3.4b. Control of Corruption sees the second highest variation (after Dimension 2 on Transparency), both across individuals and provinces. The difference in mean scores between the first and the last ranked provinces is 2.33 points. If mean scores are compared, Long An is the top outlier while Cao Bang is at the bottom. The second best performing group includes Binh Duong, Ca Mau, Binh Dinh, Dong Thap, Soc Trang, Tien Giang, and Ba Ria-Vung Tau, which are all south central and southern provinces. The next 54 provinces have smaller difference in scores, with the difference between Quang Nam and Quang Ninh being 1.10 points by mean values. Similar to the pattern found in PAPI 2010, southern provinces dominate among the group in the top 75th percentile provinces in this dimension. The top 10 provinces and 12 of the top 15 provinces are south central and southern provinces. Among the ten poorest performers are Quang Ninh, Tra Vinh, Hai Phong, Ha Giang, Bac Ninh, Tay Ninh, Ninh Binh, Ninh Thuan, and Lam Dong (a mixture of urban, mountainous, border, coastal, highland and lowland provinces). Map 3.4 portrays these regional patterns.

At the national level (see Table 3.4), in terms of limits on public sector corruption, 52.06% of respondents do not believe their top official diverts state funds, almost 49.74% do not believe it is necessary to pay bribes to obtain land use rights certificates, and 51.19% do not believe bribes are necessary to receive a construction permit. In terms of limits on corruption in service delivery, 46.52% do not believe bribes are needed for better care at public district hospitals, and 59.14% do not believe parents have to pay bribes to teachers for their children to receive more attention at school. A similar average percentage is found in equity in employment, where only 40.33% agree with that statement that in order to get a job in the governmental system, one has to pay a bribe.

The individual indicators comprising each sub-dimension are shown in Table 3.4, which also lists the questions from which they are drawn in the survey and descriptive statistics. In particular, the aggregate score for the entire nation and the minimum, median, and maximum provincial scores are included.

TABLE 3.4: LIST OF INDICATORS ON CONTROL OF CORRUPTION (DIMENSION 4)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean	National 95% CI		Provincial Scores		PROVINCES
			Min	Max		Low	High	Status	Scores	
Total Dimension	**Dimension 4: Control of Corruption**		**1**	**10**	**6.25**	**6.17**	**6.33**	**Minimum**	**4.94**	**Cao Bang**
								Median	**6.15**	**Da Nang**
								Maximum	**7.27**	**Long An**
Sub-Dimension 1	*Limits on Public Sector Corruption*		*0.25*	*2.5*	*1.71*	*1.68*	*1.74*	*Minimum*	*1.34*	*Quang Ninh*
								Median	*1.71*	*Ha Giang*
								Maximum	*2.20*	*Son La*
Sub-Dimension 2	*Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery*		*0.25*	*2.5*	*2.05*	*2.03*	*2.07*	*Minimum*	*1.80*	*Hai Phong*
								Median	*2.03*	*Lai Chau*
								Maximum	*2.29*	*Soc Trang*
Sub-Dimension 3	*Equity in Employment*		*0.25*	*2.5*	*0.94*	*0.90*	*0.99*	*Minimum*	*0.46*	*Cao Bang*
								Median	*0.85*	*Yen Bai*
								Maximum	*1.48*	*Tien Giang*
Sub-Dimension 4	*Willingness to Fight Corruption*		*0.25*	*2.5*	*1.55*	*1.52*	*1.58*	*Minimum*	*0.97*	*Tra Vinh*
								Median	*1.60*	*Yen Bai*
								Maximum	*1.88*	*Ha Noi*
S1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption	No Diverting of Public Funds (% agree)	d402a	0%	100%	52.06%	49.47%	54.64%	Minimum	23.55%	Cao Bang
								Median	52.52%	Can Tho
								Maximum	88.55%	Son La
S1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption	No Bribes for Land Title (% agree)	d402b	0%	100%	49.74%	47.26%	52.21%	Minimum	29.06%	Hung Yen
								Median	48.97%	Thai Binh
								Maximum	79.01%	Son La
S1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption	No Kickbacks on Construction (% agree)	d402e	0%	100%	51.19%	48.67%	53.70%	Minimum	22.07%	Cao Bang
								Median	51.50%	Thanh Hoa
								Maximum	85.39%	Son La
S1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption	Land Bribe Frequency (%)	d507f	0	Max	48.75%	41.09%	56.42%	Minimum	0.22%	Quang Ngai
								Median	43.14%	Bac Kan
								Maximum	100%	Quang Ninh
S1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption	Cost of Land Bribe VND	d507fa	0	Max	820,550	384,409	1,256,692	Minimum	0.00	Ha Giang
								Median	257,465	Bac Lieu
								Maximum	9,800,194	Hai Phong
S2. Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery	No Bribes at Hospital (% agree)	d402c	0%	100%	46.52%	43.79%	49.25%	Minimum	21.82%	Ninh Binh
								Median	43.73%	Khanh Hoa
								Maximum	84.64%	Soc Trang
S2. Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery	No Bribes for Teachers' Favouritism (% agree)	d402d	0%	100%	59.14%	56.68%	61.60%	Minimum	23.69%	Hai Phong
								Median	58.56%	Da Nang
								Maximum	84.42%	Soc Trang

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean	National 95% CI		Provincial Scores		PROVINCES
			Min	Max		Low	High	Status	Scores	
S2. Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery	Hospital Bribe Frequency (%)	d604e	0	Max	50.18%	44.96%	55.41%	Minimum	19.83%	Dak Nong
								Median	55.05%	Binh Phuoc
								Maximum	100%	Quang Ngai
S2. Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery	Cost of Hospital Bribe VND	d604e1	0	Max	2,626,524	773,247	4,479,801	Minimum	5,586	Dien Bien
								Median	648,746	Quang Nam
								Maximum	29,200,000	Ca Mau
S2. Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery	Education Bribe Cost VND	d606cc	0	Max	1,297,739	798,914	1,796,564	Minimum	0.00	Quang Ninh
								Median	713,153	Binh Duong
								Maximum	11,200,000	Hai Phong
S3. Equity in Employment	No Bribes for State Employment (% agree)	d402f	0%	100%	40.33%	37.29%	43.38%	Minimum	10.27%	Cao Bang
								Median	33.31%	Tuyen Quang
								Maximum	75.15%	Dong Thap
S3. Equity in Employment	Total No Relationship	d403a-d403e	0	5	1.06	0.98	1.15	Minimum	0.35	Bac Giang
								Median	0.96	BRVT
								Maximum	2.02	Tien Giang
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Corruption had no Effect on Respondent (%)	d405a	0%	100%	95.39%	94.52%	96.25%	Minimum	79.18%	Kien Giang
								Median	96.59%	Lam Dong
								Maximum	99.99%	Ben Tre
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Know Anti-Corruption Law (%)	d406	0%	100%	42.45%	39.87%	45.02%	Minimum	15.72%	Cao Bang
								Median	44.03%	Vinh Long
								Maximum	73.95%	Ha Tinh
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Province Serious About Combating Corruption (%)	d407	0%	100%	22.95%	20.80%	25.10%	Minimum	5.39%	Bac Lieu
								Median	21.41%	Nam Dinh
								Maximum	50.66%	Ha Noi
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Denunciation Price 1,000s VND (Imputed)	d404	0	150,000	5,523.26	4,976.73	6,069.78	Minimum	1,420.99	Kien Giang
								Median	5,079.88	Lai Chau
								Maximum	15,187.10	Thai Binh
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Victim Denounced Bribe Request (%)	d405a	100%	0%	13.27%	4.58%	21.95%	Minimum	0.00%	Bac Kan
								Median	0.83%	Phu Yen
								Maximum	100.00%	Vinh Long

(*) Min=Sample Minimum; Max= Sample Maximum

Limits on Public Sector Corruption

In this sub-dimension, citizens are asked first about their observation of some commonly perceived corruption incidences involving public officials and civil servants at the provincial level. In addition, citizens are asked about their actual experience with such incidences. Recognizing that questions about corruption can be seen as sensitive by respondents, the questions have been portrayed as perception-based in order to capture citizens experiences with these issues.[49]

As shown in Table 3.4, in this sub-dimension, the national mean score is 1.71, with Ha Giang as the median performing province. Son La gains the maximum score of 2.2 points (out of 2.5), while Quang Ninh scores the lowest at 1.34 points. This means that the citizens in Son La credit the efforts to control of corruption in public officials and civil servants by provincial leaders more highly than the citizens in Quang Ninh. At the indicator level, Son La has high scores in all three indicators comprising this sub-dimension, including no diversion of public funds, no bribes for land titles, and no kickbacks for construction permits. The frequency of land bribes is highest in Quang Ninh and least in Quang Ngai. On the reported size of bribes for land use rights certificates, Hai Phong sees the largest average amount at 9.8 million VND, while the number was almost zero in Ha Giang.

Figure 3.4c shows six indicators measuring the different types of corruption. The branches of the star represent the percentage of people who agree that the corresponding statements in the legend are true. Strikingly, no province is close to the perfect star graph displayed in the bottom-left corner. Southern provinces seem to be better at mitigating corruption in the public sector (Soc Trang, Tien Giang, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Long An, Binh Duong, and Dong Thap). Soc Trang's performance is the closest to perfect due to its consistent top scores on all six measures.

Regarding the diversion of funds and bribery for land use rights certificates and construction permits, 88.55% of respondents in Son La deny the occurrence of the diversion of public funds by local officials, while 79.01% and 85.39% deny the statements that citizens have to give bribes in order to process applications for land use rights certificates and construction permits. At the other end of the spectrum, Cao Bang citizens suggest that these practices occur more frequently. Only 23.55% of the respondents in this northern mountainous province deny observing the incidence of the diversion of funds, while 22.07% deny that bribery for construction permits is essential. More respondents in Hung Yen observe that kickbacks are required to apply for land use rights certificates in the province.

Some municipalities, such as Can Tho, Ho Chi Minh City, and Da Nang, are in the top 30 for these indicators while Ha Noi and Hai Phong are among the bottom 10 performers. In the case of Ha Noi, for instance, only 41.72% of the respondents disagree that local public officials divert public funds and only 36% believe they do not have pay bribes for land use rights certificates. Wrong-doing in these areas are observed more frequently by citizens in Ha Noi than in Ho Chi Minh City where 62.03% deny fund diversion by officials and 55.54% deny bribery for land certificates.

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49. Experience in administering PAPI 2009 and 2010 surveys show that citizens are more reluctant to provide personal experiences than giving their perceptions of the issues.

FIGURE 3.4C: TYPES OF CORRUPTION



Limits on Corruption in Public Service Delivery

This sub-dimension measures the level of corruption perceived and experienced by citizens when using public health care and public primary schools. It indicates the level of effort made by local governments to control these types of practices.

As shown in Table 3.4, the national mean score in this sub-dimension is 2.05 points. Lai Chau is the closest to the mean. Soc Trang has the maximum score of 2.29 points while Hai Phong scores the lowest at 1.80 points. At the national level, 46.52% of respondents agree with the notion that no bribes are needed at district hospitals in order to get better care and 59.14% of respondents claim that paying bribes to teachers for special treatment is not common. Meanwhile, 50.18% of those who visited district hospitals for health care services as patients or family members of patients experienced paying bribes to healthcare workers. The average bribe at the hospital was about 2.6 million VND. The national average for bribes for special treatment in schools is about 1.2 million dong.

At the indicator level, Soc Trang leads in two indicators including no bribes at public district hospitals and no bribes for special treatment from teachers at primary schools, with about 84% saying these practices did not occur. Ninh Binh was the lowest ranked in terms of public district hospital rankings, with only 21.82% agreeing that no such bribery occurs. Hai Phong performed poorly in bribery for teachers at primary schools, with only 23.69% saying this practice did not occur.

Once again, no province comes close to the perfect score of 100% (see Figure 4.3c). Soc Trang, Dong Thap, Binh Duong, and Tien Giang have the highest percentages of their respondents denying that people have to pay bribes when accessing health and education services. On the other hand, Ninh Binh, Hai Phong, Hung Yen, and Ha Noi have very few respondents denying that this occurs.

There is a large difference in citizens' experience with bribery at public district hospitals. The activity occurs the most often in Quang Ngai, with 100% of those who have gone for medical care at district hospitals having paid bribes, and the least often in Dak Nong with only 19.83%. Binh Phuoc is the closest to the national mean at 55.05%.

On the estimated cost of bribes in public district hospitals, the largest amount experienced by respondents is 29.2 million VND found in Ca Mau, while the smallest amount is found in Dien Bien at 5,000 VND. Yet, these findings confirm the existing practice of both informal payments and "gift-giving", whereas patients tend to offer "appreciation envelopes" to health officials following common informal norms. The problem is that the boundary between what is a polite gesture of only 5,000 VND gets confused and accepted as a normal practice that extends to even nearly 30 million VND. "Gift-giving" is thus confused with the "ask-give" mechanism and can lead to a vicious cycle of systemic corruption.

On bribe costs at public primary schools, the largest amount is reported at 11.2 million VND in Hai Phong, while it is almost zero in Quang Ninh. These are extreme compared with the median amount of 713,153 VND in Binh Duong and the national mean of 1.2 million VND.

Equity in Public Employment

This sub-dimension includes perception-based queries about citizens' views of equity in public sector employment opportunities. It is composed of two indicators, including (i) no bribes for state employment, and (ii) total number of jobs that do not require connections (i.e. nepotism).

Figure 4.3c suggests that bribes for jobs in the public sector seem to be prevalent across the country since the branch representing this indicator in each star graph is much shorter than ideal. At the national level, only 40.33% deny the need to pay bribes for public sector employment. At the provincial level, Dong Thap has the largest number of respondents denying the activity (75.15%), while Cao Bang has the smallest (10.27%). Bac Giang and Bac Ninh are close to Cao Bang in this indicator. Tuyen Quang is at the median position with 33.31% denying the activity.

As depicted in Figure 3.4d, personal relationships seem to play a very important role for those who wish to pursue careers in the public sector in all five posts measured. This is evident in the small variance across provinces and in the star graphs. In addition, this confirms the systemic nature of nepotism in public sector employment, even at the lowest level of governmental. Some regional patterns can be observed. While eight out of the 10 best are Mekong River Delta provinces, half of the bottom group includes northern provinces. This regional pattern was also observed in PAPI 2010.[50] Tien Giang seems to be the best province in terms of a low level of significance for personal relationships. The province scores 2.02 out 5 points, meaning that relationships are not important for two out of five jobs, compared with the national mean of 1.06 (see Table 3.4).[51] Bac Giang's point estimate of 0.35 differs hugely from Tien Giang's 2.02, meaning that relationships are important for almost all of the five jobs in Bac Giang.

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[50] See VFF, CECODES & UNDP 2011, p. 50

[51] Indicators in d403 in the Questionnaire were all converted to dichotomous variables: '1' means 'not important' and '0' means 'important'. A score of five means relationships are not important for any position.

FIGURE 3.4d: LEVELS OF NEPOTISM AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL



Willingness to Fight Corruption

This sub-dimension measures government efforts to combat corruption and engage citizens in fighting corruption in their jurisdictions. It comprises of both knowledge-based and experience-based indicators. The former indicators look at (i) whether or not respondents are aware of the Law on Anti-Corruption, (ii) whether provincial governments are serious about dealing with uncovered corruption cases, and (iii) the extent to which bribe requests are tolerated. Other experience-based indicators include (i) whether or not respondents have been affected by any act of corruption when dealing with local government officials or commune police, and (ii) the percentage of victims denying denunciating bribe requests.

On awareness of the Law on Anti-Corruption, at the national level, 42.45% of the total respondents know about it. This proportion is higher than the number of respondents aware of the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (34.14%). Ha Tinh has the most respondents aware of the law (73.95%), while the proportion in Cao Bang is lowest at 15.72%.

A much lower number of citizens believe their local officials were serious about controlling corruption. Only 22.95% of respondents in the national sample thought local officials were serious in dealing with exposed corruption cases, a remarkably low proportion. Agreement was highest in Ha Noi (50.66%), and lowest in Bac Lieu with only 5.39% answering that their officials were serious.

On the tolerance of bribe requests from either commune-level public officials or police nationally, the mean amount that would trigger denunciation against bribe requests for both posts is 5.5 million VND. Thai

Binh sees the largest tolerance, where respondents on average said they would denounce when the bribes cost 15.18 million VND. On the contrary, Kien Giang respondents on average would not tolerate amounts greater than 1.42 million VND.

When experience with corruption is questioned, respondents tend to be more reserved in telling their own stories. As such, the above perception-based indicators are important to indicate how citizens feel about corruption issues. When asked about whether or not they are affected by any act of corruption from a local public official or civil servant, as many as 95.39% of the national sample said that corruption had no effect on them. In Ben Tre, 99.99% of the respondents deny being impacted. Kien Giang has the lowest proportion of all 63 provinces at 79.18%.

Among 330 respondents that acknowledged being asked for bribes, at the national level only 13.27% made a formal denunciation. The reasons why the rest chose not to proceed with denunciation varies: 47.45% found it useless to denounce, 12.77% were scared of retaliation, 11.31% found the procedures too burdensome, 10.22% did not know how to denunciate, and the remainder gave different reasons or refused to answer. Interestingly, there is a large variance across provinces: 100% of the victims in Vinh Long made a denunciation, while none of those in Bac Kan did so. In most provinces, citizens opt not to denounce, as the median percentage is 0.83% in Phu Yen.

3.5. DIMENSION 5: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

MAP 3.5: PROVINCIAL PERFORMANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE BY QUARTILES


Dimension 5:
Public Administrative Procedures 2011
Legend
Public Administrative Procedures
Best Performers
High Average
Low Average
Poor Performers
HA GIANG
CAO BANG
LAO CAI
LAI CHAU
BAC KAN
TUYEN QUANG
DIEN BIEN
YEN BAI
LANG SON
THAI NGUYEN
PHU THO
VINH PHUC
SON LA
BAC GIANG
BAC NINH
QUANG NINH
HA NOI
HUNG YEN
HAI DUONG
HAI PHONG
HOA BINH
HA NAM
THAI BINH
NINH BINH
NAM DINH
THANH HOA
NGHE AN
HA TINH
QUANG BINH
QUANG TRI
TT-HUE
DA NANG
QUANG NAM
HOANG SA ISLANDS
QUANG NGAI
KON TUM
BINH DINH
GIA LAI
PHU YEN
DAK LAK
KHANH HOA
DAK NONG
BINH PHUOC
LAM DONG
NINH THUAN
TAY NINH
BINH DUONG
DONG NAI
BINH THUAN
DONG THAP
LONG AN
HCMC
AN GIANG
TIEN GIANG
BRVT
CAN THO
VINH LONG
BEN TRE
KIEN GIANG
PHU QUOC
HAU GIANG
TRA VINH
SOC TRANG
BAC LIEU
CA MAU
CON DAO ISLAND
TRUONG SA ISLANDS

This dimension examines the performance of a set of public administrative procedures that are considered important to citizens' lives, and how they are dealt with in local government agencies and one-stop shops (OSSs). As detailed in the 2010 report,[52] this dimension looks at citizens' direct experiences in interacting with local public administrators in obtaining certification services, land use rights certificates, civil construction permits, and other personal papers to fulfil their citizenship rights and obligations. The indicators used to construct this dimension help reveal the performance of local government agencies against six elements constituting a professional and responsive administrative service, including *convenience, security, reliability, personal attention and problem solving approaches, fairness and accountability*.[53]

Four sub-dimensions are used to analyze elements of public administrative provision. They include (i) certification services, (ii) application procedures for construction permits, (iii) application procedures for land use rights certificates (LURCs), and (iv) application procedures for personal documents. Compared with last year, the notary service sub-dimension is now replaced with certification services, while one sub-dimension is new and the other two are substantially changed.

The change from provincial public notary services to certification services provided at district and commune levels[54] resulted from findings in 2010 that citizens tend to go to local certification services more often than to provincial notaries. Also, citizens can easily confuse public and private notary offices when assessing their performance as they often do not recall which type they visited.[55] In addition, many certification tasks have been delegated to local and grassroots levels with an aim to make it easier for citizens to have access at district and commune OSSs.[56] Measuring certification services at the grassroots level make sense considering it focuses on interactions between citizens and district and commune local administrative agencies.

Questions regarding administrative procedures for LURCs and construction permits are increasingly important for citizens. Some additional questions were added to the PAPI 2011 questionnaire to more closely reflect what types of procedures people are using and how timely the response is from officials. Regarding LURCs, for instance, a question about the type of land transaction was added. Other added questions include whether or not citizens who have applied for LURCs over the past three years have received their certificate; if yes, where did they go to receive the final results and how long did it take? These additional questions are also replicated for construction permits. These questions help identify issues related to OSSs and their timeliness in the provision of services to applicants.

The fourth sub-dimension is constructed from a new battery of questions introduced in 2011 to cover an addition of eight types of administrative procedures provided by People's Committees in communes and wards.[56] The selection of these eight procedures was grounded in the rationale that citizens need to apply for one at some point in time, and that these procedures tend to be more common in rural areas than LURCs and construction permits. It also helps ensure some balance in measurement of urban and rural performance in administrative procedures. Since these procedures are processed by commune-level People's Committees, they are relevant for PAPI considering that communes are the lowest administrative units in the governmental structure. Questions about whether or not applicants have to use intermediaries to proceed with the paperwork, whether or not applicants have to go to different persons for the paperwork to be done, and about the total quality of the administrative service provided by commune-level People's Committees are also included.

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[52] See VFF, CECODES & UNDP, 2011 (pp. 54-56)

[53] See Acuña-Alfaro, Jairo & Do Thanh Huyen (2012) for an in-depth discussion on how PAPI data is used for analyzing the performance of public administrative services.

[54] See questions from d501-d503.

[55] These are also observations from other research conducted in May 2011. The PAPI team commissioned a small research project on how to improve the PAPI 2011 Questionnaire with the participation of three senior experts in the fields of administrative procedures and public service delivery. The research reflected opinions and recommendations from a few senior policy makers in the fields and different users of PAPI data that certification services are more commonly used than public notary services, and the dimension should not constrain to only construction permits and LURCs since these are more common in urban areas.

[56] A review of administrative procedures shows that most of the civic paperwork now can be certified at the district and commune levels (see MOHA (2011).

[57] The d508 battery.

Figure 3.5a shows the sub-dimensions where the colour comprising each bar represents a sub-dimension. Figure 3.5b presents the aggregate score of each province with the confidence interval at 95%. Table 3.5 portrays in a greater detail the individual indicators comprising each sub-dimension. As with other dimensions, it is normalized to a 1-10 scale, with '10' representing the best outcome, and '1' representing the worst outcome observed in a province. Each sub-dimension score represents the average score across the indicators. Finally, the four sub-dimensions were averaged into an aggregate measure of public administrative procedures, so that each sub-dimension represents one-fourth of the final score.

FIGURE 3.5a: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES (DIMENSION 5)



At the national level, Figures 3.5a and 3.5b show a high concentration of all 63 provinces around the mean score at 6.88. The difference between the maximum score of 7.74 and the minimum score of 6.35 is the smallest of all six dimensions. Similar to 2010 findings in this dimension, the low variance suggests the uniformity across provinces in terms of the performance in dealing with public administrative procedures in all four measured services. The low mean score also suggests that more needs to be done in all provinces to improve performance.

When provinces are grouped into quartiles (see Map 3.5), there is a regional pattern. The best performers are more frequently found in the central and southern regions of Viet Nam. Bac Kan and Nam Dinh are the only two northern provinces classified in the top performing provinces above the 75th percentile score of 7.11. Among the five centrally-governed municipalities, Da Nang is one of the best performers, while Ho Chi Minh City, Hai Phong, and Ha Noi are in the group of high average performers. Can Tho is in the low average performer group.

FIGURE 3.5b: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES (WITH 95% CIS)



At the national level, the use of these services is limited in comparison to public services discussed in Dimension 6. Of the 13,642 respondents, 38.82% used certification services at either the district or commune levels and 33.04% for selected personal procedures in the past year. Meanwhile, 10.64% applied for LURCs and only 4.89% applied for construction permits in the past three years.

The central province of Quang Binh stands out as the best performing province with a score of 7.74, while Can Tho is the lowest(see Table 3.5 below). When the 95% CIs are taken into account (see Figure 3.5b), Hai Phong is a peculiar case since the range of answers in the city varies greatly. This may suggest that Hai Phong citizens have divergent experiences with administrative procedures services provided at both the district and commune levels.

TABLE 3.5: LIST OF INDICATORS ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES (DIMENSION 5)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean	National 95% CI		Provincial Scores		PROVINCES
			Min	Max		Low	High	Status	Scores	
Total Dimension	**Dimension 5: Administrative Procedures**		**1**	**10**	**6.88**	**6.84**	**6.92**	**Minimum**	**6.35**	**Can Tho**
								Median	**6.86**	**Bac Lieu**
								Maximum	**7.74**	**Quang Binh**
Sub-Dimension 1	*Certification Procedures*		*0.25*	*2.5*	*1.68*	*1.66*	*1.71*	*Minimum*	*1.38*	*Soc Trang*
								Median	*1.67*	*Hung Yen*
								Maximum	*2.07*	*Gia Lai*
Sub-Dimension 2	*Construction Permit*		*0.25*	*2.5*	*1.77*	*1.76*	*1.78*	*Minimum*	*1.55*	*Quang Ngai*
								Median	*1.77*	*HCMC*
								Maximum	*1.92*	*Phu Tho*
Sub-Dimension 3	*Land Procedures*		*0.25*	*2.5*	*1.58*	*1.57*	*1.60*	*Minimum*	*1.28*	*Khanh Hoa*
								Median	*1.56*	*Phu Tho*
								Maximum	*1.92*	*Dong Thap*
Sub-Dimension 4	*Personal Procedures*		*0.25*	*2.5*	*1.84*	*1.82*	*1.86*	*Minimum*	*1.65*	*An Giang*
								Median	*1.86*	*Tuyen Quang*
								Maximum	*2.01*	*Ha Tinh*
S1. Certification Procedures	Applied for Certificate (%)	d501	Min	Max	38.82%	36.46%	41.18%	Minimum	17.01%	Tra Vinh
								Median	37.32%	Tien Giang
								Maximum	69.98%	Gia Lai
S1. Certification Procedures	Total Quality of Certification Procedures (8 Criteria)	d503a-e, d503g-i	0	8	7.10	6.97	7.24	Minimum	5.35	Hai Phong
								Median	7.14	Kien Giang
								Maximum	7.97	Dong Thap
S2. Construction Permit	Applied for Construction Permit (%)	d505	Min	Max	4.89%	3.90%	5.88%	Minimum	0.10%	Bac Giang
								Median	3.91%	Lao Cai
								Maximum	26.10%	Dien Bien
S2. Construction Permit	Did Not Use Many Windows for Construction Permit (%)	d505d	0%	100%	92.86%	89.59%	96.14%	Minimum	10.22%	Quang Ngai
								Median	96.84%	Thai Nguyen
								Maximum	100%	Quang Ninh
S2. Construction Permit	Received Construction Permit (%)	d505e	0%	100%	91.96%	87.60%	96.32%	Minimum	8.51%	Quang Ngai
								Median	99.53%	Ha Giang
								Maximum	100%	Quang Tri
S2. Construction Permit	Total Quality of Construction Procedures (8 Criteria)	d505fa-fe, d505fg-fi	0	8	6.82	6.46	7.18	Minimum	1.63	Lai Chau
								Median	7.15	Binh Dinh
								Maximum	8.0	Ninh Thuan
S3. Land Procedures	Applied for LURC (%)	d507	0%	100%	10.64%	9.18%	12.10%	Minimum	1.30%	Son La
								Median	8.22%	Thai Binh
								Maximum	33.04%	Dong Thap
S3. Land Procedures	Did Not Use Many Windows for LURC (%)	d507e	0%	100%	84.68%	80.90%	88.45%	Minimum	43.19%	Ninh Thuan
								Median	89.45%	Hai Duong
								Maximum	100%	Thanh Hoa
S3. Land Procedures	Received LURC(%)	d507g	0%	100%	82.48%	76.90%	88.06%	Minimum	2.97%	Bac Giang
								Median	79.35%	Son La
								Maximum	100%	Bac Lieu

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean	National 95% CI		Provincial Scores		PROVINCES
			Min	Max		Low	High	Status	Scores	
S3. Land Procedures	Total Quality of LURC Procedures (8 criteria)	d507ha-hh	0	8	5.05	4.58	5.51	Minimum	0.32	Quang Ngai
								Median	4.72	Ha Nam
								Maximum	7.79	Ha Noi
S4. Personal Procedures	Applied for Personal Administrative Document	d508a-d508k	Min	Max	33.04%	30.81%	35.26%	Minimum	9.52%	Hai Duong
								Median	35.58%	Ha Nam
								Maximum	59.27%	Lai Chau
S4. Personal Procedures	Total Quality of Personal Document Process (8 criteria)	d508d1a-d1e, d508d1g-d1i	0	8	6.79	6.64	6.95	Minimum	3.92	Dien Bien
								Median	6.85	Lao Cai
								Maximum	7.87	BRVT
S4. Personal Procedures	Did Not Use Many Windows for Personal Procedures (%)	d508c1	0%	100%	93.14%	91.21%	95.07%	Minimum	75.96%	Bac Giang
								Median	95.43%	Bac Kan
								Maximum	100%	An Giang

(*) Min=Sample Minimum; Max= Sample Maximum

Public Certification Services

PAPI looks into citizens' experiences in using certification services at the district and commune levels. Citizens have an opportunity to give their feedback about the services provided either at people's committees at the commune level, at the district justice divisions, or in other public premises. Respondents were asked concrete questions about the clarity of procedures, publicity of fees, behaviour of civil servants receiving them, competence of civil servants serving them, paperwork loads, notification of deadlines, receipt of results as appointed, and their overall satisfaction level with the provided service.[58]

Certification services were the most commonly used among the four services studied. Of the 13,642 respondents, 38.82% used certification services at both the district and commune levels, with 92% of those that used the service doing it at commune-level People's Committee, while only 5% had it done in the district-level justice departments. This in a way reflects the effect of increased delegation of certification tasks to the commune level, which makes the service more available and accessible to citizens.

This sub-dimension has a national mean score of 1.68 with the 95% confidence interval ranging from 1.66 and 1.71 (see Table 3.5). Gia Lai stands out as the best performer in providing certification service for citizens with a score of 2.07. Hung Yen has the median score of 1.67 and Soc Trang the minimum at 1.38.

Figure 3.5c shows the levels of agreement of respondents with statements about the quality of certification services. This indicator is scaled between 0 and 8, with 8 representing the sample maximum score aggregated from the 8 criteria queried. Generally, respondents are satisfied with the certification services. Still, there are criteria which provinces could improve upon, including transparency of procedures and fees, red tape in paperwork, and the attitude of civil servants. The national mean of this indicator is 7.10, which is close to the maximum score. Half of provinces score between 7.14 (Kien Giang) and 7.79 (Dong Thap), while a few provinces are at lower levels (e.g. Hai Phong, Lai Chau, Khanh Hoa, and Tay Ninh).

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[58] See questions d503a-d503h in the Questionnaire. The question d503f is used in Dimension 4.

At the provincial level, Hai Phong is perceived as performing poorly in all eight criteria. Citizens in Lai Chau, Tra Vinh, and Thua Thien-Hue wish to see certification fees publicly displayed. Respondents from Bac Giang complained about the competency of civil servants in charge. Respondents from Dong Nai and Can Tho complained about cumbersome paperwork. Thai Binh, although in the top 10 best performers in this indicator, needs to do more with improving the behaviour of civil servants towards citizens.

FIGURE 3.5c: MEASURED ASPECTS OF QUALITY OF CERTIFICATION SERVICES

(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100% agreement)



Application Procedures for Construction Permits

By the letter of the law,[59] construction permits are required for construction project owners to build new houses, expand, or remodel their houses in anything more than a basic way (with some exceptions for citizens in remote, unplanned areas). The battery of questions on the procedures was designed in a way that allows respondents to remember and reference concrete experiences rather than perceptions. Similar to the indicators on certification services, respondents were queried about their experiences with the clarity of procedures, publicity of fees, behaviour of civil servants receiving them, competence of civil servants serving them, paperwork loads, notification of deadlines, receipt of results as appointed, and their overall satisfaction level of the provided service.

Of 2,526 citizens that have built or remodelled their houses over the past three years, nearly 39% applied for construction permits as opposed to nearly 45% of those who said they did not need to apply and over 16% of those who said construction permits are not yet in place. Dien Bien sees the largest percentage of respondents (26.1%) applying for the permits over the past three years, an exceptionally high number compared with other provinces. Bac Giang has the lowest percentage of applicants at 0.10%, much lower than the national mean of 4.89%.

At the sub-dimension level, on the scale from 0.25-2.5 points, the national mean is 1.77, a little higher than the means in land procedures and certification service (see Table 3.5). There is small variation across 63 provinces in the provincial scores in this sub-dimension. Phu Tho seems to do best in this sub-dimension with a score of 1.92, while Quang Ngai attains the lowest score of 1.55.

Among applicants for the construction permits at the national level, 92.86% said they did not have to go to different doors or meet different people to get their paperwork done. Quang Ninh seems to be doing well in provision of the service to citizens at the OSS for construction permits with barely any of the applicants using many windows, while in Quang Ngai only 10.22% of the applicants said they did not have to visit more than one window. The disparity between the best and the worst performers on this indicator is the largest of all three services assessed in this dimension (construction permits, LURCs and personal procedures).

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[59] See the 2003 Law No. 16/2003/QH11 on Construction and Government and Decree No. 12/2009/ND-CP on Management of Construction Projects dated 12 February 2009. Exceptions for application for construction permits are housing construction projects in remote areas, in areas where no urbanization plans are in place, housing renovation that does not cause negative impact on overall architecture and structure of the entire building, and private houses in remote, sparsely populated and unplanned areas (Articles 19-21, Government Decree 12/2009/ND-CP on Management of Construction Projects.

FIGURE 3.5d: ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRUCTION PERMIT APPLICATION PROCEDURES

(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100% agreement)



Note: Provinces listed herein are those with more than 15 respondents in the total sample having applied for the construction permits.

The star graphs in Figure 3.5d show the levels of agreement of respondents with given statements designed for an examination of the total quality of the service. It only reveals findings for provinces where more than 15 respondents in the provinces' samples applied for construction permits. The star graphs depict an interesting difference across provinces. As opposed to Tien Giang, Bac Lieu, Nghe An, and Quang Binh, whose total quality scores are closest to perfect, Dak Nong and Binh Thuan are exceptionally poor. Vinh Phuc receives complaints from applicants about not publicizing application fees; Lang Son about deadlines; Dong Nai about information clarity, deadlines, and overall satisfaction; Binh Phuoc about paperwork; and HCMC about information clarity.

Application Procedures for Land Use Rights Certificates

The battery of questions on LURCs[60] has been improved in 2011 to better capture the types of LURCs-related procedures citizens often require. These include application procedures for new LURCs, LURC renewals, and transferring LURCs.

Among the 1,469 respondents (or 10.64% of the whole sample) whose households have applied for LURCs over the past three years, 29.61% applied for new LURCs, 12.2% for renewed LURCs, and 54.66% for transfer of their LURCs. Over 68% conducted the procedures at commune/ward People's Committees and 16% at district People's Committees. Similar to other batteries about administrative procedures, the indicators about LURCs include questions about the proportion of people that submit for LURCs, the availability of the OSS service, the simplicity and clarity of procedures, publicity of fees, the behaviour and competence of civil servants, deadlines for results, timeliness of results, and overall satisfaction with the service citizens received.

Table 3.5 shows that this sub-dimension sees the lowest score of all four types of administrative procedures measured at 1.58 points on the same scale from 0.25-2.5 points. Dong Thap earns the highest score of 1.92, Phu Tho the median score of 1.56, and Khanh Hoa the lowest score of 1.28.

In addition, Table 3.5 suggests that a majority of users of this service did not need to go to more than one office to get their LURC application done. At the national level, 84.68% said that they did not have to go to different offices (or call in many 'windows') to have their paperwork processed. The province that has the largest proportion of applicants not using many windows for LURCs is Thanh Hoa (100%), and the province with the smallest proportion is Ninh Thuan (43.19%). Half of 63 provinces fall between the range from 43.19% (Ninh Thuan) and 89.45% (Hai Duong).

About 82.5% of the applicants were successful with their applications, despite the fact that many did not go use OSS services. In Bac Lieu, 100% of applicants are successful, while in Bac Giang the proportion is barely 3%. Son La is the median province with 79.35%. In terms of the availability of the OSS service, 15.32% of the total LURC applicants still had to visit many agencies or call in many doors to get the service done. In Ninh Thuan, 56.8% of the applicants used many windows, while in Quang Ninh, the service seems available to all. On average, the applicants receive their final results after 44 days, while the length differs greatly at the individual level, ranging from 1 day to 720 days.

The total quality of LURC application processes (see the legend in Figure 3.5e) differs remarkably across provinces. The national mean is 5.05 on the scale from 0-8 points. Ha Noi seems to perform well in LURCs with a score of 7.79. Quang Ngai scores the lowest at 0.32.

The star graphs in Figure 3.5e present 52 provinces where more than 15 applicants responded about any of the three types of procedures queried. The poorest performers of these provinces are mostly northern provinces, with the exception of Hau Giang and Can Tho. Some provinces witness uneven performance levels in the eight criteria. In particular, there are complaints about Bac Giang's civil servants dealing with LURCs. Hai Phong is also in the lower group, with problems regarding timing and fees.

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[60] As introduced in the PAPI 2010 report, a land use rights certificate (LURC), according to the 2003 Land Law (No. 13/2003/QH11), is the certification that is issued by a competent state agency and granted to a land user in order to protect the legitimate rights and benefits of land users in the context of collective land ownership under uniform state management of land. Owners of LURCs have the right to sell, transfer, mortgage and succeed their land titles. More importantly, LURCs provide citizens with the comfort in knowing that their homes will not be taken from them without a legitimate public interest motivation, and without just compensation.

FIGURE 3.5e: ASSESSMENT OF LURCS APPLICATION PROCEDURES

(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect =100%)



Note: Provinces listed herein are those with more than 15 respondents in the total sample having applied for the construction permits.

Application Procedures for Personal Documents at Commune Level

This sub-dimension focuses on the performance of commune-level People's Committees in addressing applications for different types of personal documents that any citizen may apply for at any time in their life. It covers such administrative procedures as birth certificates, death notification, marriage certificates, ethnicity related procedures, residency registration, housing subsidies, and employment subsidies. As discussed earlier in this dimension, these eight types of personal papers were selected based on the list of administrative procedures that commune-level People's Committees are delegated to process for citizens.

Like others, this sub-dimension is constructed from indicators on the frequency of use, total quality of the service, and the availability of OSS services for the selected personal procedures. At the national level, 33.04% of the respondents applied for one or a few of the listed procedures over the course of one year to the date they were asked, with the 95% confidence interval being between 30.81% and 35.26%. In Lai Chau 59.27% of the respondents went through the service while in Hai Duong only 9.52% did so.

The national mean score for this sub-dimension (1.84) is the highest of all four types of procedures measured. The difference between the maximum and minimum score is also the smallest (2.01 in Ha Tinh versus 1.65 in An Giang). This suggests that citizens seem to be happy with the administrative service provided at the commune level.

Across the 63 provinces, there seems to be uniformity in commune level performance in handling these procedures. The national mean in the total quality indicator is 6.79 on a 0-8 scale. The difference between the maximum score of 7.87 (Ba Ria-Vung Tau) and the minimum score of 3.92 (Dien Bien) is narrower compared to the sub-dimensions on construction permits and LURCs.

Although there is a relatively high level of satisfaction with these services nationwide, there is still some variation, especially between the top and the bottom performers. Figure 3.5g shows that Dien Bien, Lai Chau, and Quang Ninh provinces perform lower than Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Hai Duong, Quang Binh, and Bac Ninh in all eight criteria measured. Ba Ria-Vung Tau's score is 7.87, the closest to the maximum score of 8 points. The median score is 6.85 (Lao Cai).

FIGURE 3.5g: ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNE-LEVEL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect =100%)



3.6. DIMENSION 6: PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

MAP 3.6: PROVINCIAL PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY BY QUARTILES


Dimension 6:
Public Service Delivery 2011
Legend
Public Service Delivery
🟦 Best Performers
🟩 High Average
🟧 Low Average
🟨 Poor Performers
HA GIANG
CAO BANG
LAI CHAU
LAO CAI
TUYEN QUANG
BAC KAN
DIEN BIEN
YEN BAI
LANG SON
THAI NGUYEN
PHU THO
VINH PHUC
SON LA
BAC GIANG
BAC NINH
QUANG NINH
HA NOI
HUNG YEN
HAI DUONG
HAI PHONG
HOA BINH
HA NAM
THAI BINH
NINH BINH
NAM DINH
THANH HOA
NGHE AN
HA TINH
QUANG BINH
QUANG TRI
TT-HUE
DA NANG
HOANG SA ISLANDS
QUANG NAM
QUANG NGAI
KON TUM
BINH DINH
GIA LAI
PHU YEN
DAK LAK
KHANH HOA
DAK NONG
BINH PHUOC
NINH THUAN
LAM DONG
TAY NINH
BINH DUONG
DONG NAI
BINH THUAN
DONG THAP
LONG AN
HCMC
AN GIANG
BRVT
TIEN GIANG
CAN THO
VINH LONG
BEN TRE
PHU QUOC
KIEN GIANG
HAU GIANG
TRA VINH
SOC TRANG
BAC LIEU
CA MAU
CON DAO ISLAND
TRUONG SA ISLANDS

Similar to PAPI 2010,[61] this year's report evaluates public service delivery through four key public services: (i) public health care, (ii) public primary education, (iii) basic infrastructure, and (iv) residential law and order. These four areas constitute the four corresponding sub-dimensions in this dimension. Respondents were asked about their direct experiences with the accessibility and availability of basic public services in their home communes/wards, districts, and provinces. Their experiences in return reflect the impact of the national policy frameworks governing these services in provinces. They also help PAPI measure how local authorities are responsive to the basic needs and demands of citizen, and, perhaps most importantly, the usage and efficiency of public investments in these areas.

The performance of 63 provinces in the dimension and sub-dimensions is depicted in Map 3.6, and Figures 3.6a and 3.6b. Map 3.6 shows the performance levels of provinces by quartiles as in previous dimensions. Figure 3.6a details the performance of the four measured sub-dimensions. Figure 3.6b reveals variation in experiences of respondents with the 95% confidence intervals. In addition, Table 3.6 presents and defines indicators used to construct this dimension, and the ranges of scores at the national, provincial, and indicator levels.

Map 3.6 shows interesting findings in this dimension. When grouped into quartiles, regional patterns are visible. The best performers are mostly concentrated in the central region, with Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien-Hue, Da Nang, Quang Nam, and Binh Dinh above the 75th percentile with mean point estimates ranging from 7.149 to 7.478. Meanwhile, the poorest performers are scattered in northern mountainous, central highlands, south central, and southern provinces with their point estimates ranging from 6.406 to 6.745. Similar to findings from PAPI 2010, big cities tend to perform better in public service delivery. Except for Can Tho, the four other municipalities, including Da Nang, Hai Phong, Ha Noi, and Ho Chi Minh City, are among the top fifteen performers. Ha Noi remains behind the other three cities, but outperforms Can Tho.

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[61] See VFF, CECODES & UNDP (2011), pp. 63-70.

FIGURE 3.6a: PUBLIC SERVICES DELIVERY (DIMENSION 6)



As depicted in Figure 3.6a, at the national level, the difference in aggregate point totals between provinces is small at 1.749 points, the second smallest degree of variation among the six dimensions measured (after dimension 5 on administrative procedures). The national mean is 6.75 on the scale from 1 to 10 points, with Da Nang gaining the highest score at 7.43 and Dak Nong the lowest at 5.6 (see Table 3.6). These findings are consistent with the findings in PAPI 2010.[62]

Among the four sub-dimensions, the sub-dimension on basic infrastructure sees the largest variation across provinces. The poor quality of roads, the lack of access to tap water, the unavailability of electricity, and the distribution of garbage collection services are problematic in the mountainous provinces of Cao Bang, Lao Cai, Yen Bai, Dien Bien, and Gia Lai. Law and order is the second sub-dimension that provinces, especially Dak Nong, need attention.

FIGURE 3.6c: PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY (WITH 95% CIS)



When the 95% confidence intervals are taken into account (see Figure 3.6b), larger variation in experience with the four services is found at the individual level in provinces like Kien Giang, Hoa Binh, Lao Cai, Bac Kan, Ninh Binh, Binh Phuoc, and Dien Bien. Different experiences with the services in urban and rural areas may attribute to the large intervals. Meanwhile, in Binh Dinh, Ben Tre, Phu Tho, and Hung Yen, for example, respondents tend to have similar experiences with quality of the services.

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[62] See VFF, CECODES & UNDP (2011), p. 66.

TABLE 3.6: LIST OF INDICATORS ON PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY (DIMENSION 6)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean	National 95% CI		Provincial Scores		PROVINCES
			Min	Max		Low	High	Status	Scores	
Total Dimension	**Dimension 6: Public Service Delivery**		**1**	**10**	**6.75**	**6.69**	**6.80**	**Minimum**	**5.68**	**Dak Nong**
								Median	**6.66**	**Dong Nai**
								Maximum	**7.43**	**Da Nang**
Sub-Dimension 1	*Public Health*		*0.25*	*2.5*	*1.75*	*1.72*	*1.77*	*Minimum*	*1.47*	*Lam Dong*
								Median	*1.77*	*BRVT*
								Maximum	*2.10*	*Quang Nam*
Sub-Dimension 2	*Primary Education*		*0.25*	*2.5*	*1.65*	*1.64*	*1.66*	*Minimum*	*0.94*	*Dak Nong*
								Median	*1.65*	*Lam Dong*
								Maximum	*2.06*	*Long An*
Sub-Dimension 3	*Infrastructure*		*0.25*	*2.5*	*1.75*	*1.70*	*1.80*	*Minimum*	*1.20*	*Cao Bang*
								Median	*1.63*	*Dong Thap*
								Maximum	*2.46*	*Hai Phong*
Sub-Dimension 4	*Law and Order*		*0.25*	*2.5*	*1.60*	*1.58*	*1.61*	*Minimum*	*1.22*	*Binh Thuan*
								Median	*1.60*	*Lai Chau*
								Maximum	*1.72*	*Son La*
S1. Public Health	Share with Health Insurance (%)	d601	0%	100%	53.95%	50.31%	57.59%	Minimum	18.65%	Nam Dinh
								Median	56.65%	Nghe An
								Maximum	94.55%	Lai Chau
S1. Public Health	Quality of Health Insurance (1=totally useless, 4=very useful)	d601b	1	4	3.30	3.26	3.34	Minimum	2.90	Ha Nam
								Median	3.33	Phu Yen
								Maximum	3.69	Soc Trang
S1. Public Health	Quality of Free Medical Care for Kids (1=very poor; 5=very good)	d603c	1	5	3.85	3.79	3.92	Minimum	3.32	Ha Nam
								Median	3.90	Vinh Long
								Maximum	4.45	Da Nang
S1. Public Health	Poor Households are Subsidized (%)	d602	0%	100%	72.21%	69.56%	74.86%	Minimum	45.41%	Ha Giang
								Median	73.89%	Ha Nam
								Maximum	94.70%	Quang Nam
S1. Public Health	Checks for Children are Free (%)	d603a	0%	100%	69.55%	65.46%	73.65%	Minimum	32.60%	Ha Giang
								Median	71.28%	Quang Ninh
								Maximum	99.07%	Quang Nam
S1. Public Health	Total Hospital Quality (10 criteria)	d604da-d604dk	0	10	5.49	5.21	5.77	Minimum	2.44	Cao Bang
								Median	5.66	Tien Giang
								Maximum	8.58	Son La
S2. Primary Education	Kilometer Walk to School (provincial median)	d606ca	Min	Max	0.99	0.98	1.00	Minimum	0.60	Thanh Hoa
								Median	1.00	Multiple
								Maximum	2.00	Binh Phuoc
S2. Primary Education	Minutes to School (provincial median)	d606cb	Min	Max	10.06	9.95	10.17	Minimum	5.00	Vinh Phuc
								Median	10.00	Multiple
								Maximum	15.00	Quang Ngai
S2. Primary Education	Rating of Primary School (1=very poor; 5=very good)	d606ce	1	5	3.86	3.81	3.92	Minimum	3.07	Bac Kan
								Median	3.87	Quang Ngai
								Maximum	4.27	Kien Giang

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean	National 95% CI		Provincial Scores		PROVINCES
			Min	Max		Low	High	Status	Scores	
S2. Primary Education	Total School Quality (9 criteria)	d606cda-cdi	0	9	4.43	4.22	4.65	Minimum	2.84	Dien Bien
								Median	4.36	Hai Duong
								Maximum	6.08	Ha Tinh
S3. Infrastructure	Households with Electricity (%)	d607	0%	100%	97.04%	96.09%	97.99%	Minimum	55.76%	Dien Bien
								Median	98.90%	Son La
								Maximum	100%	Bac Giang
S3. Infrastructure	Quality of Road (1=All Dirt; 4=All Asphalt)	d608	1	4	2.80	2.72	2.88	Minimum	1.42	Yen Bai
								Median	2.76	Tien Giang
								Maximum	3.86	Hai Phong
S3. Infrastructure	Frequency of Garbage Pick-up (0=Never; 4=Everyday)	d609	0	4	1.92	1.71	2.12	Minimum	0.16	Ca Mau
								Median	1.29	Binh Phuoc
								Maximum	3.93	Da Nang
S3. Infrastructure	Share Drinking Tap Water (%)	d610=5 or 6	0%	100%	34.80%	29.35%	40.26%	Minimum	0.66%	Gia Lai
								Median	23.95%	Binh Dinh
								Maximum	99.59%	Hai Phong
S3. Infrastructure	Share Drinking Unclean Water (%)	d610=1 or 2	0%	100%	6.45%	5.37%	7.54%	Minimum	0.00%	Multiple
								Median	0.93%	Hoa Binh
								Maximum	76.98%	Tien Giang
S4. Law and Order	How Safe is Your Locality (0=Very Unsafe; 3=Very Safe)	d510a	0	3	1.97	1.94	2.01	Minimum	1.16	Binh Thuan
								Median	1.98	Quang Ngai
								Maximum	2.36	Son La
S4. Law and Order	Change in Safety Over Time	d510a-d510b	Min	Max	8.09%	4.89%	11.29%	Minimum	-75.38%	Binh Thuan
								Median	6.68%	Tay Ninh
								Maximum	29.15%	Hau Giang
S4. Law and Order	Crime Rate in Locality (% Victim of Crime)	d511a-d511d	0%	100%	18.26%	15.63%	20.90%	Minimum	1.21%	Lao Cai
								Median	15.05%	Nam Dinh
								Maximum	60.15%	Binh Thuan

(*) Min=Sample Minimum; Max= Sample Maximum

Public Health Care

Public health care is an essential basic service that any state provides to their citizens. Instead of looking into what the state invests in public health to fulfil its mandate, PAPI measures citizens' actual experiences with core public services from the state. This sub-dimension studies how effective public health insurance is for users, given that it has been one of the areas receiving the most complaints in public health.[63] This sub-dimension also provides a snapshot of the availability and effect of free medical checks for children under six years old, and free health care for the poor. The largest component in this sub-dimension is about the overall quality of public hospitals at the district level.[64]

Questions regarding health insurance were further refined this year to help identify citizens' assessments of the usage rates and performance of different types of government-issued health insurance. The questions in PAPI 2011 relate to three types of health insurance, including compulsory, voluntary, and free public health insurance.

Another change is the stronger emphasis on the experiences of citizens who have been patients or have had their family members hospitalized in their districts since 2005. This approach, instead of an evaluation by those who have not recently been to hospitals, helps to more precisely estimate the performance of health care services being provided at the provincial level. Citizens were also asked about where they would go to instead of district hospitals to measure patterns of hospital usage and to hypothesize some possibilities for citizens not to opt for district hospitals but for other premises for medical care (d604f).

On the total quality of district hospitals, apart from the seven 'best practice' criteria measured in PAPI 2010 (including patients not sharing beds, electric fans made available in rooms, clean restrooms, regular check-ups, patients treated with respect, reasonable expenses, and reasonable waiting periods), in 2011, citizens were also asked to make assessments about three more criteria. These new criteria include patients' free choice of pharmaceutical outlets, recovery upon return from treatment, and patients' satisfaction with the service provided at the district hospitals they visited.

Table 3.6 presents the main findings of these indicators. On the 0.25-2.5 point scale, the national mean is at 1.75, lower than for primary education, and the median score is 1.77 points, meaning that the public is reasonably satisfied with public health. The highest provincial score is 2.10 points (Quang Nam) and the lowest is 1.47 points (Lam Dong).

On health insurance, at the national level, 53.95% of the respondents hold health insurance cards. There is a large difference between the maximum and minimum proportions of health insurance card holders at the provincial level, with 94.55% in Lai Chau and 18.65% in Nam Dinh. Nghe An is at the median level with 56.65%, meaning that many provinces do not provide health insurance for more than half their citizens. Among those holding health insurance cards, 44.66% have free health insurance provided by the state, 39.18% have voluntary health insurance, and 15.63% have compulsory health insurance. When asked about the quality of health insurance, the national mean score is 3.30 points on a 1-4 point scale, meaning that most of the users find health insurance useful in their most recent health checks and treatments. Users in Soc Trang rated quality the highest, with a score of 3.69 while users in Ha Nam were not very satisfied with a score of 2.9.

Poor households in particular are entitled to health insurance subsidies. Findings from PAPI 2011 provide a mixed picture. The poor mountainous province of Ha Giang has the lowest percentage of the poor with access to this subsidy, while the central province of

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[63] See Vian et al (2012), Ministry of Health (2011) and Acuña-Alfaro (2009).

[64] Centrally-run and provincial hospitals are not subject to study since PAPI aims to facilitate a rethinking of the role of district hospitals in addressing existing burdens on higher-up hospitals.

Quang Binh has the largest percentage. One good sign from this indicator is that half of the provinces have more than 73.89% of the poor getting access to the subsidy.

The quality of free medical care for children under six years of age is rated as relatively good on a 1-5 scale, with the national mean being 3.85 points. Da Nang performs very well with the highest score at 4.45 points, while Ha Nam is the lowest at 3.32. This bodes well for the effectiveness of the free health care for children under six in all provinces. Quang Nam has the largest number of respondents agreeing that health checks for children are free (99.07%) while Ha Giang has the lowest at 32.6%. Despite the large difference between the lowest and highest percentages, the national mean in terms of access to free health care for children under six years old is at nearly 70%, meaning more provinces are concentrated in the above average group.

The star graphs in Figure 3.6c reveal how much respondents agree with the 10 'best practice' criteria[65] based on direct experiences at district/ward public hospitals. It should be noted that of those who have used a medical care facility since 2005, 76.93% used district hospitals, 32.94% used private hospitals, 17.2% used centrally-governed hospitals located in their provinces, and 41.36% went to provincial hospitals.

FIGURE 3.6c: CITIZENS' ASSESSMENT OF DISTRICT PUBLIC HOSPITALS

(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect =100%)



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[65] See the question d604d for details about the criteria.

Provinces score differently in the 10 'best practices' criteria, meaning that they have different strengths and weaknesses regarding quality of district hospitals. On a 0-10 point scale, the national mean is 5.49 points. Son La scores the highest at 8.58 and Cao Bang the lowest at 2.44. Tien Giang has the median score of 5.66 points, meaning that half of provinces need improvements in their performance in half of the criteria measured. Respondents are most critical of the problems of patients sharing beds at district hospitals and long waiting periods.

It is worth noting that poorer provinces (e.g. Son La, Quang Ngai, Tra Vinh, Ca Mau, and Kon Tum) are among the top 15 best performers. However, some poor provinces like Cao Bang, Soc Trang, Ha Giang, and Dak Nong are among the 15 poorest performers. Looking at centrally-managed municipalities, Can Tho and Ho Chi Minh City are among the top 15, Ha Noi and Da Nang are in the low average group, while Hai Phong is among the bottom 15.

To summarize the findings on public health care, more needs to be done to improve the quality of district hospitals in all provinces. Once users have more confidence in district hospitals, they will use them more often as district hospitals are easier to access and less expensive for patients. This will in return reduce congestion in provincially-managed and centrally-managed hospitals. PAPI data points to some areas for provincial authorities to focus on in order to improve the quality of the services they provide.

Public Primary Education

The 1991 Law on Expansion of Access to Primary Education sets the framework for this sub-dimension.[66] Primary education is intended to be a universal service provided to all children from the age of six. The focus of PAPI is on primary school education, as not every commune/ward has its own lower-secondary school and in some localities lower secondary schools are shared by separate commune/ward units.[67] In addition, the quality of primary schools is measured against some of the standard criteria provided in Decision No. 04/2008/QD-BGD-DT on benchmarks for primary schools that meet national standards.[68]

This sub-dimension is constructed from four indicators, including: (i) distance from home to schools in kilometres, (ii) length of time required for school children to go to school in minutes, (iii) total quality of primary schools based on nine criteria, and (iv) rating of primary school quality on a 1-5 point scale. The key addition to this sub-dimension compared with last year is about informal payments that households may spend in order for children to receive more attention. This question (d604e), which uses a novel unmatched list question to avoid direct sensitive questions to citizens, helps capture frequency and amount of informal payments at primary schools. In addition, a few more questions about the quality of primary schools were added to the total quality indicator, including access to safe drinking water at school, regular feedback from teachers on performance of children, and transparency in schools' revenues and expenditure. A new battery on the overall quality of primary schools was also added to measure how satisfied citizens are with schools and whether or not they intend to send their children to lower secondary schools.

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[66] Law on Universalisation of Primary Education in 1991 regulates that primary education for all children between the ages of 6 and 14. Under this Law, children attending public primary schools do not have to pay tuitions (Article 13). Children at the age of primary education set forth above attend primary schools or classes in their residential groups or wherever convenient to them.

[67] Circular No. 17/2003/TT-BGDĐT dated 28 April 2003 giving guidance on Articles 3, 7 and 8 of Decree No. 88/2001/NĐ-CP with definition of who are the subjects to universal lower secondary education.

[68] Decision No. 04/2008/QD-BGD-DT dated 04 February 2008 of the Minister of Education and Training on benchmarks to recognise primary schools that meet national standards. This Decision has been succeeded by Circular 67/2011/TT-BGDDT dated 30 December 2011 and effective from 14 February 2012. The new Circular fails to provide concrete criteria for monitoring in many aspects of primary school quality.

When compared with the national mean at 2.01 points on the 0.25-2.5 point scale, most provinces perform relatively well in the overall sub-dimension score (see Table 3.6). The difference between the best performer (Long An at 2.06) and the poorest performer (Dak Nong at 0.94) is the narrowest among the four sub-dimensions.

Figure 3.6d consists of star graphs showing how provinces perform in the total quality as well as by criterion. The national mean in the total quality is 4.43 on a scale from 0 to 9 'best practice' criteria. It means that overall, public primary schools across the country failed in half of the criteria measured in 2011. Ha Tinh primary schools seem to meet more of the selected criteria than other provinces (6.08), while Dien Bien (2.84) needs to double its effort to reach Ha Tinh's level. Half of provinces fall below the median score of 4.36.

By criteria, as the star graphs depict, provinces have different strengths and weaknesses with public primary schools. Top 10 provinces are from different economic development backgrounds (e.g. Da Nang, Ha Tinh, Thai Binh, and Yen Bai). The most complained about aspects are the lack of fresh drinking water for school children, crowded classes, teacher bias towards school children taking extra classes, and lack of transparency in school revenue.

FIGURE 3.6d: CITIZENS' ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOLS

(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect =100%)



The national median distance from home to the nearest primary schools is 0.99km and the median length in time is 10.06 minutes, reasonable distances and times for primary school children to walk to class. The average distance is farthest in Binh Phuoc with a provincial median of 2km. In Quang Ngai, it normally takes school children 15 minutes to school, while the median time required for children to go to primary schools in Vinh Phuc is just five minutes. Infrastructure and geographical conditions may contribute to variations across provinces regarding these indicators.

In general, most respondents with children in primary schools find the overall quality of primary education between average and good, evident in the national mean score of 3.86 on the scale from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good). The rating in Kien Giang is remarkably high at 4.27 or between 'good' and 'very good.' Bac Kan respondents rated education as only average. A follow-up question asks whether or not users of public primary education would send their children on to lower secondary education. Among the users, 95.92% said they would while 2.2% said they were not sure about their intentions.

Basic Infrastructure

This sub-dimension looks at household access to electricity, the quality of roads nearest to the house, the frequency of garbage pick-ups in residential groups, and the quality of drinking water. It aims to measure how such basic infrastructure is considered by local governments.

In this sub-dimension, Hai Phong performs outstandingly with a score of 2.46 points, which is the closest to the maximum score of 2.5, and much higher than the national mean of 1.75 points. On the contrary, the mountainous province of Cao Bang performs poorly in this sub-dimension, with its score at only 1.20.

Table 3.6 shows large variances on these indicators. On access to electricity, although some provinces score as high as 97.04% of the households with access to electricity, the difference between the best performing province (Bac Giang with 100%) and the poorest performing province (Dien Bien with 55.76%) is still large. It should be noted that over half of all provinces have above 97% electrification rates. Son La, a northern mountainous province neighbouring Dien Bien, is at the median level of almost 99%.

The quality of roads nearest to houses shows some difference between urban and rural provinces. In Yen Bai, there are more dirt and gravel roads, while in Hai Phong, respondents use exclusively paved roads. In Tien Giang, citizens have more access to concrete and gravel roads, in a way reflecting the nature of roads in the Mekong River Delta.

On garbage collection frequency, Da Nang is the best performer with respondents confirming that garbage is collected on a daily basis. From all provinces, the frequency of garbage collection is lowest in Ca Mau. This finding coincides with PAPI 2010.

Regarding drinking water, 34.8% of the respondents said they get access to tap water in home as primary source of drinking water, as opposed to 6.45% to untreated water from rivers, streams, lake, or rainwater. Hai Phong has the largest population (99.59%) having access to tap water, while barely 1% of respondents in Gia Lai use tap water. Binh Dinh is at the median position on this indicator, meaning that tap water is very limited in half of 63 provinces.

Law and Order

Law and order at the residential level measures the level of safety that citizens experience in everyday life. In this sub-dimension, three indicators are presented: (i) the level of safety in localities, (ii) change of safety over time, and (iii) victims of one or all of four types of crime including vehicle theft, robbery, break-ins, and physical violence.

Table 3.6 indicates that half of provinces are below the national mean at 1.60 points, while the ideal score for this sub-dimension is 2.5. Son La seems to be a relatively safe place to live while Binh Thuan lags behind. Citizens in Binh Thuan saw safety in their localities decline, with 75.38% observing this negative trend. Citizens in Hau Giang seem to have seen improvement in residential safety in their province, with 29.15% of the respondents observing the positive trend. At the national level, the change is slightly positive with the percentage of respondents agreeing it was getting safer in their localities at almost 8.1%.

The lack of safety as experienced by respondents in the past year is worrisome. As many as 18.26% of the respondents reported being victims of one of the four types of crimes. As many as 60.15% of respondents in Binh Thuan were victims over the course of 12 months before the survey, as opposed to barely 1.21% in Lao Cai. Unsafe living environments are reported in almost all provinces at significant levels. The most common form of crime is home break-ins and vehicle theft and can be found in a wide range of provinces.

Figure 3.6e illustrates how safe provinces are when considering the rates of respondents that were victims of any of the four types of crime. The longer the bars are the more victims are reported. Among the five municipalities, Ha Noi seems to have the fewest victims. Da Nang has the most reported victims, followed by HCMC, Can Tho, and Hai Phong. Victims of house break-ins are more common than other types, followed by vehicle thefts.

FIGURE 3.6e: RESPONDENTS WHO WERE VICTIMS OF A TYPE OF CRIMES



3.7. AGGREGATION OF DIMENSIONS INTO COMPOSITE PAPI

PAPI's philosophy is to highlight dimension specific performance levels in order to identify provincial strengths and areas for further improvement. Nevertheless, following the footsteps of PAPI 2010, and in an effort to facilitate overall comparisons among provinces, this section presents three different aggregation approaches. The objective is to allow readers to select the approach they deem to be most beneficial according to their needs.

Furthermore, even if the PAPI team did not assemble the rankings into composites, it is likely that someone else would, perhaps by utilizing an approach to aggregation which might be deemed misleading. These factors provide an incentive to build a final composite PAPI dashboard. However, such aggregation must be well explained and the final scores properly interpreted because the aim is not to generate a "horse race type" competition to point at good or bad performers.[69]

Firstly, a dashboard of the six dimensions of governance and public administration is presented. Secondly, the unweighted composite scores are presented, taking care to calculate confidence intervals (CIs) around those rankings. That way policy makers and readers can ascertain where there are statistically significant differences across provinces. Thirdly, a weighted PAPI ranking that derives the weights from a regression analysis of citizens' satisfaction in local governance (with question d305 about citizen's satisfaction with local governance as a dependent variable) is built. The six dimensions are weighted based on the strength of their correlation with how PAPI respondents judged the overall performance of their authorities through question d305. Consequently, the weight represents the net association between governance and satisfaction after removing other individual and provincial factors that may be associated with citizens' satisfaction (including gender, age, government employment, economic situation and wealth/possessions).

The PAPI Dashboard

Figure 3.7a illustrates the dashboard approach to aggregation. Each dimension is ordered on a 1 to 10-point scale, with 1 representing a province receiving the worst score on every indicator within a dimension and 10 representing a province receiving the top score on all indicators in that dimension. All provinces had the possibility of receiving a score of 10 on each dimension, which is reflected in the "Perfect" star in the bottom corner of the chart. Each branch of the star represents progress toward the perfect score of 10.

The benefit of the dashboard is that it helps us identify weaknesses even in high-performing provinces, which are obscured in an additive index. For instance, Ba Ria-Vung Tau (BRVT), while the most consistently high-performing province, has room for improvement in accountability. Long An, another top-performing province, demonstrates weakness in the area of participation at the local levels. By contrast, the lowest performing location, Ha Giang, scores relatively well on public administrative procedures.

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[69] Recall discussion on page 71 on VFF, CECODES & UNDP (2011).

FIGURE 3.7a: DASHBOARD OF SIX DIMENSIONS OF PAPI



Each branch of the stars in the dashboard represents average scores drawn from multiple indicators in a survey of representative samples from each province. Because these scores are drawn from samples of about 200 (in ordinary provinces with fewer than two million people) to nearly 600 individuals (in big cities with more than five million inhabitants) in each province and not a census of all Vietnamese citizens, caution about whether a separate sample of respondents from each province might have answered differently must be taken into account. However, confidence in representativeness is bolstered by the fact that PAPI employs a sophisticated clustered sampling strategy that utilized probability proportion to size (PPS) sampling to draw representative locations at each level of the Vietnamese administrative hierarchy and random sampling of the final respondents from village lists (see Appendix A for more details). Nevertheless, any random sample, no matter how carefully designed, confronts issues of sampling error.[70] These problems are endemic to any survey exercise. Consequently, presenting just the average dimension scores, as done in Figure 3.7a, overstates the level of precision of the PAPI exercise. What can be said with a high degree of certainty is the average scores represent the most likely score within a range of scores that are possible in repeated random sampling in Viet Nam. Figure 3.7b provides a different perspective, which displays the range of possible dimension scores possible for three different provinces: BRVT, which has the highest sum of the six dimensions, Ha Giang the province with the minimum score, and Thua Thien-Hue, the location with the median score. Rather than presenting the average scores, the 90% CIs for the three provinces around each dimension are presented.

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70. Sampling error is a function of three factors: 1) the variance in the distribution of answers within the sample on a particular question; 2) the number of respondents in the sample; and 3) the probability of selection of those respondents in a particular location, so that we face a higher level of error in drawing 20 respondents from a village of 1000 people than a village of 100.

FIGURE 3.7b: PAPI DASHBOARD OF THREE PROVINCES (INCLUDING 90% CIS)



Viewing PAPI scores in this way is enlightening and particularly useful for policy makers. On three dimensions (Transparency, Control of Corruption and Public Service Delivery), scores are significantly different between the three provinces. Thus, it can be said with a great deal of confidence (9 times out of 10) that in repeated samples, the ordering of these provinces (best, middle, and worst) would be retained. On two dimensions (Public Service Delivery and Vertical Accountability), the confidence intervals (CIs) of BRVT and Thua Thien-Hue overlap, indicating that their scores are not statistically distinguishable and could be reversed in repeated samples. Nevertheless, BRVT is significantly superior to Ha Giang. Thus, while it might not be possible to differentiate the top half of provinces on these indicators, it can be said that these locations can be distinguished in their quality from the lowest performing province. Policy-makers and interested readers wishing to view CIs in addition to aggregate scores can download them from the PAPI website (www.papi.vn).

Why do some dimensions display wide gaps between CIs, while other dimensions overlap? The size of the provincial samples and the probability of respondent selection are exactly the same across dimensions, so they cannot be responsible. The critical determinant is the variance of responses on the indicators included within the dimensions. Variance affects the CIs in two ways. High variance among respondents within provinces tends to widen the CIs for those particular locations. In essence, citizens disagree on key aspects of governance and public administration, making it extremely difficult to derive a precise measure. When large CIs in a province are observed, it means that there is a great diversity of opinion within borders. On the other hand, high agreement among respondents within provinces, but wide variation across provinces is helpful for clearly distinguishing between tiers of governance and public administration. This means, in other words, citizens within provinces agree on the level of performance of the public sector within their borders, but their answers are very different from citizens in other locations.

A final contributor to the size of CIs is the number of respondents that chose not to answer a question because of lack of knowledge or sensitivity. Differences in the rates of non-response to particular questions decrease effective sample sizes and thereby lowering the precision of the estimates. Thankfully, this problem was not severe in PAPI because indicators that had low response rates were eliminated from consideration.

Another way to look at these performance levels is by way of presenting a "control panel" approach as in Table 3.7. Using the same colour codes of the provincial maps presented in Chapter 3, it can be observed that provinces can excel in some dimensions but lag behind in others. Table 3.7 includes the six most populous provinces in Viet Nam and three exceptional cases as examples. It can be noted for instance that Ha Noi, HCMC, and Thanh Hoa can be grouped in the top performer group (above the 75th percentile), but in different dimensions. Ha Noi performs well in terms of participation, transparency, and public service delivery, yet when it comes to control of corruption it falls in the same group of low average performers. HCMC performs well in transparency, control of corruption, and public service delivery, but trails behind in vertical accountability. From the six largest provinces An Giang falls into the poor performing group (below 25th percentile) in four categories: participation, transparency, accountability and administrative procedures. In addition, An Giang falls in the low average group regarding control of corruption while public service delivery seems to be its strongest area similar to the high average group.

Table 3.7 also includes three additional provinces that stand out for their performance levels. On the one hand, Long An is the only province that systematically performs in the top or above the 75th percentile group in all six dimensions (blue coloured group). While, at the other extreme, Tra Vinh province in the South and Ha Giang in the North, systematically perform below the 25th percentile (poor performing group in yellow).

TABLE 3.7: CONTROL PANEL OF PAPI DIMENSION PERFORMANCE IN SOME PROVINCES

Province	D1. Participation at Local Levels	D2. Transparency	D3. Vertical Accountability	D4. Control of Corruption	D5. Public Admin. Procedures	D6. Public Service Delivery
An Giang	🟨 4.870	🟨 4.959	🟨 4.735	🟧 6.049	🟨 6.468	🟩 6.805
Dong Nai	🟩 5.458	🟧 5.387	🟨 5.144	🟦 6.423	🟦 7.145	🟩 6.660
Ha Noi	🟦 5.762	🟦 5.994	🟩 5.729	🟧 6.032	🟩 6.864	🟦 7.057
HCMC	🟧 5.143	🟦 6.006	🟧 5.240	🟦 6.574	🟩 7.081	🟦 7.148
Nghe An	🟩 5.405	🟩 5.938	🟦 6.318	🟩 6.149	🟧 6.837	🟧 6.414
Thanh Hoa	🟩 5.543	🟦 5.965	🟦 5.943	🟧 6.094	🟦 7.260	🟩 6.782
Long An	🟦 5.770	🟦 6.149	🟦 6.257	🟦 7.269	🟦 7.185	🟦 7.116
Tra Vinh	🟨 4.688	🟨 4.435	🟨 5.111	🟨 5.596	🟨 6.360	🟨 6.410
Ha Giang	🟨 4.876	🟨 4.829	🟨 5.007	🟨 5.673	🟨 6.449	🟨 5.871

Colour codes:

Best Performer	🟦
High Average	🟩
Low Average	🟧
Poor Performer	🟨

The Unweighted PAPI

MAP 3.7a: THE UNWEIGHTED PAPI BY QUARTILES


Un-weighted PAPI 2011
Legend
Un-weighted PAPI
🟦 Best Performers
🟩 High Average
🟧 Low Average
🟨 Poor Performers
HA GIANG
CAO BANG
LAI CHAU
LAO CAI
TUYEN QUANG
BAC KAN
DIEN BIEN
YEN BAI
LANG SON
THAI NGUYEN
SON LA
PHU THO
VINH PHUC
BAC GIANG
BAC NINH
QUANG NINH
HA NOI
HUNG YEN
HAI DUONG
HAI PHONG
HOA BINH
HA NAM
THAI BINH
NINH BINH
NAM DINH
THANH HOA
NGHE AN
HA TINH
QUANG BINH
QUANG TRI
TT-HUE
DA NANG
QUANG NAM
QUANG NGAI
KON TUM
BINH DINH
GIA LAI
PHU YEN
DAK LAK
KHANH HOA
DAK NONG
BINH PHUOC
NINH THUAN
LAM DONG
TAY NINH
BINH DUONG
DONG NAI
BINH THUAN
DONG THAP
LONG AN
HCMC
AN GIANG
TIEN GIANG
BRVT
CAN THO
VINH LONG
BEN TRE
PHU QUOC
KIEN GIANG
HAU GIANG
TRA VINH
SOC TRANG
BAC LIEU
CA MAU
CON DAO ISLAND
HOANG SA ISLANDS
TRUONG SA ISLANDS

A second approach to aggregation is to add up the scores for each dimension.[71] It is possible to derive an additive provincial index in two different ways. The first way, used by the PCI, is to calculate provincial scores for each indicator and then sum up provincial-level scores (the provincial aggregation method). Alternatively, it is possible to sum up indicators into dimensions at the respondent level, and then to calculate separate PAPI scores for each respondent in the survey. Once a final index is calculated, it is easy to then aggregate the PAPI to whatever level a researcher would like to analyze it by taking the average score at that level. This could be based on administrative levels (village, commune, district, provinces) or PAPI scores could be calculated for different demographics (youth, gender, and ethnicity). This is called the individual aggregation approach.

The benefit of the individual approach for PAPI is that it is easier to calculate CIs for aggregate scores, because the variance in the final score for each respondent is already obtained. Mathematically, the two approaches should yield exactly the same mean scores. Minor differences arise, however, when some respondents do not answer particular questions.

The aggregation of the six dimensions yields a theoretical PAPI score ranging from 6 to 60. In practice, no province consistently performs at the top or bottom of every indicator, so the actual range is 32.5 (Tra Vinh) to 40.3 (Quang Binh). Much wider variance was displayed at the individual level, where the most negative individual provided a score of 23.13 for his/her province of Lai Chau. The highest two respondent scores of 53.9 and 52.5 were found in Bac Giang and Dong Thap respectively.

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[71] Using the formula: PAPI= $\sum_{(i=1)}^{n}$ Dimension$_j$.

FIGURE 3.7c: UNWEIGHTED PAPI



Figure 3.7c shows the final unweighted performance levels for the 63 provinces, using the individual level aggregation method. The colours in each bar depict provincial scores on each one of the six dimensions

Just as in the dashboard above, however, a ranking of this nature can be misleading. Many provinces are tightly clustered in the middle of the distribution. Small changes in survey methodology, selection of indicators, or scaling, could lead to provinces jumping a few notches up or down the index. Consequently, highlighting the specific placement of a province in the bar graph above conveys an artificial level of precision.

Figure 3.7d provides a more realistic depiction of the precision of the PAPI exercise, as it displays 95% CIs along with the final PAPI score. The graph also depicts the PAPI scores represented by provinces at the 75th and 25th percentile (see Table B8, Annex B). Once again, large CIs for a province most likely indicate a high level of disagreement among its constituents. Such disagreements may be caused by differences between males and females, urban versus rural dwellers, or even different ethnicities. Looking at the graph this way, Nam Dinh's high score is somewhat illusory. In repeated sampling, it could rank anywhere between 1st and 43rd due to its large CI.

FIGURE 3.7d: UNWEIGHTED PAPI (WITH 95% CIS)



This is why earlier it was mentioned that the ranking is not meant to highlight which province is on top and which one is on the bottom, but rather look at aggregate patterns of similarities and differences. For instance, four groups of provinces can be created in an effort to separate performance levels according to Map 3.7a. Top provinces are those that are above the 75th percentile, or higher than or equal 37.299 points (blue). The second group and third groups include the average scoring provinces (green and orange). The fourth group includes provinces below the 25th percentile, or below 35.046 points (yellow). A few provinces do not fit cleanly into these four categories because their CIs are especially large. Once again, these are provinces for which internal variance in experience with governance and public administration is high.

The Weighted PAPI

MAP 3.7b: THE WEIGHTED PAPI BY QUARTILES


Weighted PAPI 2011
HA GIANG
CAO BANG
LAI CHAU
LAO CAI
TUYEN QUANG
BAC KAN
DIEN BIEN
YEN BAI
THAI NGUYEN
LANG SON
SON LA
PHU THO
VINH PHUC
BAC GIANG
BAC NINH
QUANG NINH
HA NOI
HUNG YEN
HAI DUONG
HAI PHONG
HOA BINH
HA NAM
THAI BINH
NINH BINH
NAM DINH
THANH HOA
NGHE AN
HA TINH
QUANG BINH
QUANG TRI
TT-HUE
DA NANG
HOANG SA ISLANDS
QUANG NAM
QUANG NGAI
KON TUM
BINH DINH
GIA LAI
PHU YEN
DAK LAK
KHANH HOA
DAK NONG
BINH PHUOC
LAM DONG
NINH THUAN
TAY NINH
BINH DUONG
DONG NAI
BINH THUAN
DONG THAP
LONG AN
HCMC
AN GIANG
TIEN GIANG
BRVT
CAN THO
VINH LONG
BEN TRE
PHU QUOC
KIEN GIANG
HAU GIANG
TRA VINH
SOC TRANG
BAC LIEU
CA MAU
CON DAO ISLAND
TRUONG SA ISLANDS
Legend
Weighted PAPI
Best Performers
High Average
Low Average
Poor Performers

While an unweighted strategy seems innocuous, it actually based on a restrictive assumption. By choosing not to weight, a belief that all dimensions of the PAPI have the exact same effect on the outcome variables is essentially imposed. This assumes, for instance, that administrative procedures are as important for citizens' views on good governance as public service delivery or the control of corruption. However, if some factors are more important than others, such an method will give us faulty results.

To deal with this problem, PAPI adopts a regression-based approach. In a nutshell, the relationship between key PAPI dimensions and citizen satisfaction with local governance is calculated, controlling for other factors that may also influence citizen satisfaction. The specific dependent (outcome) variable for this exercise was drawn from question D305, where citizens were invited to fill out a 100-point "feeling thermometer" of their total satisfaction with different levels of government.

Figure 3.7e depicts the average scores on the feeling thermometers (along with 95% CIs). One clear pattern is immediately apparent. The closer the level of government is to the citizens, the worse the average score it receives. National institutions (Government and National Assembly) are ranked higher than provinces and district governments, which in turn are ranked higher than local institutions. Except for village and commune, these are statistically significant differences. The bar in the graph represents the average performance, given by individuals, for the four sub-national local government offices. This measure is a critically important determinant of citizens' overall assessment of the work of their local leaders. The next step was to determine what contribution each of the PAPI dimensions made to citizens' final perceptions of local governance. To do this, the 100-point local governance thermometer was used and regressed it on the six PAPI dimensions. Because a bivariate regression would be subject to omitted variable bias, where other factors influenced both the PAPI score and local governance assessments, several respondent-level and provincial-level features were controlled for. Controlling for variables allows for the identification of the net effect of the PAPI dimensions, once the other determinants of governance and public administration are removed.

FIGURE 3.7e: GOVERNMENT FEELING THERMOMETERS (WITH 95% CIS)



At the respondent level, gender, age, education (measured by years of study), ethnicity (measured by whether the respondent was party of the majority Kinh (1) or not (0)), wealth of the respondent (measured by the number of important items their household possesses, question d615), and whether the respondent had ever served in government or was a party member were controlled for. The current career of the respondent was accounted for by running a series of dichotomous variables for each career category captured in question a009, as farmers and SOE employees may have very different assessment of local government quality. Running a set of dichotomous variables like this is known as a Fixed Effects regression, meaning individuals are being compared within each career category rather than comparing across them.

The regression results are shown in Table 3.7a below. Four of the control variables prove statistically significant. Females demonstrate greater satisfaction for local governments than males, but minorities and more educated citizens tend to be more negative. Wealthier provinces also demonstrate greater levels of satisfaction with governance. Other control variables are not robustly correlated with satisfaction across specifications.

Turning now to the PAPI variables, the first model runs the unweighted PAPI. The coefficient is 0.983 implying that a one point improvement in the unweighted PAPI would generate slightly less than a percentage point improvement in satisfaction. The standard error, depicted in parentheses, is very small, indicating that this results is significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (in other words, with a 95% CI). The next six models replace the unweighted PAPI with each individual dimension, so aspects of public administration driving the correlation can be determined. The six dimensions have very different effects. The size of the coefficient is highest for public service delivery, where each one improvement in the score generates a 4.2 percentage point improvement in satisfaction. Transparency (2.8) and control of corruption (2.0) demonstrate the next strongest relationships. Participation and accountability are a bit weaker, accounting for about a half of a percentage point change in satisfaction.

The weakest relationship is public administrative procedures. The reasons for the low correlation are multi-faceted. First, administrative procedures has the lowest variance of all of six dimensions at the provincial level, indicating that there are only marginal differences across provinces. Second, the survey results indicate that most citizens in Viet Nam rarely encounter the procedures analysed (for instance land and construction), or encounter them only once in their lifetimes (i.e. marriage certificates) Although Public Administration Reform has made great efforts to improve these procedures through One-Stop-Shops, most citizens have simply not benefitted from the effort.

Rather than using the regression coefficient to generate the weights, the t-statistic is used. Using the size of the t-statistic is superior because it includes the size of the substantive effect (measured by the regression coefficient) but standardized by the variance around that point prediction (as measured by the standard error). As a result, dimensions that receive higher weights are those that have large and statistically significant correlations with the three outcome variables.

Using t-values in this manner eliminates one possible concern. It is possible that a particular dimension may have a large coefficient that is not statistically significant because the standard error around the prediction is quite large. Large standard errors result from a variety of factors, including measurement error, outliers, and omitted variable bias. When a coefficient is big, but a standard error is also large, it is important to be careful about inferring too much from that regression result. The relationship may simply be accidental; repeated samples of citizens in Viet Nam would reveal vastly different substantive effects. By using the t-value, the size of the coefficient net of the standard error is taken into account and, therefore, eliminates the possibility that accidental correlations drive weightings. Consequently, even though public service delivery has a larger coefficient, its standard error is 1.5 times as large as that of transparency. When the t-statistic is calculated by dividing the coefficient by the standard error, the implied weight for public service delivery is lower than transparency. This decision has the benefit of contributing to more stable weights over time, by ranking provinces by the governance factors that are most precisely estimated.

TABLE 3.7a: CORRELATION BETWEEN PAPI DIMENSIONS AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE QUALITY

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUALITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (D305)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Unweighted PAPI	0.983***							
	(0.049)							
D1. Participation at local levels		1.468***						0.595
		(0.184)						(0.454)
D2. Transparency			2.806***					2.389***
			(0.132)					(0.327)
D3. Vertical Accountability				1.654***				0.368
				(0.110)				(0.352)
D4. Corruption Control					2.017***			1.702***
					(0.148)			(0.327)
D5. Administrative Procedures						1.111***		1.251*
						(0.203)		(0.631)
D6. Public Service Delivery							4.172***	6.303***
							(0.320)	(0.589)
Female	3.220***	2.954***	2.432***	2.688***	2.763***	2.465***	2.065***	3.430***
	(0.325)	(0.338)	(0.335)	(0.357)	(0.331)	(0.355)	(0.344)	(0.849)
Age	-0.013	-0.008	-0.010	-0.004	0.003	0.004	-0.010	0.029
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.027)
Government Employee	-0.004	-0.003	-0.005	-0.003	-0.000	-0.003	-0.004	-0.062***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.022)
Current Economic Situation	-0.004	-0.005	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	-0.035***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Wealth (Possessions)	-0.256***	0.097	-0.132*	0.094	0.084	0.129	-0.119	-0.651***
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.189)
Career Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	12,719	12,719	12,719	12,719	12,719	12,719	12,719	12,719
R-squared	0.067	0.017	0.064	0.022	0.034	0.009	0.035	0.095
rmse	16.26	16.69	16.28	16.64	16.54	16.75	16.54	13.12

Robust standard errors in parentheses.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0. The dependent variable local governance quality is the average of four questions, asking respondents to assess the quality of: 1) The Village Head; 2) Commune People's Committee; 3) District People's Committee; and 4) Provincial People's Committee on a 0-100 point feeling thermometer. All specifications include career fixed effects to account for the fact that those with different jobs, particularly those working in some capacity for local government, have different views of local governance.

Table 3.7b demonstrates how PAPI takes the individual t-values for each dimension, summed them up, and calculated the share of statistically significant variance in citizen satisfaction accounted for by a one-unit change in each dimension. Because public service delivery, transparency, and control of corruption have the largest coefficients in the regressions and lowest standard errors in the regressions with citizen satisfaction, they account for the largest share (with their weights being 35.38%, 24.17%, and 17.22% respectively). The Public Administrative Procedures Dimension, due to its negative correlation, receives the lowest weight (6.56%). Finally, the average share of t-values for each regression is calculated and shown in column (4) labelled "weight". This number became the weight used to create the Weighted PAPI shown in Figure 3.7g below.

TABLE 3.7b: EXPLANATION OF APPROACH TO DIMENSION WEIGHTING

DIMENSION		QUALITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT			
		BETA (1)	SE (2)	T-STATISTIC (3)	WEIGHT (4)
1	Participation at local levels	0.595	0.45	2.20	7.29%
1	Transparency	2.39	0.33	7.31	24.17%
2	Vertical Accountability	0.368	0.35	2.84	9.40%
3	Control of Corruption	1.70	0.33	5.20	17.22%
4	Public Administrative Procedures	1.25	0.63	1.98	6.56%
5	Public Service Delivery	6.30	0.59	10.70	35.38%

Results from regressing "Perception of Local Government Quality" on each dimension, controlling for respondent age, gender, ethnicity, and career. The t-values from these regressions, which are calculated by dividing the coefficient by the standard error, were taken for each dimension (columns 1 to 3). Next, relative share each dimension was calculated and accounted for in the sum of t-values (column 4). This number became the weight for the final PAPI.

FIGURE 3.7g: WEIGHTED PAPI INDEX BY DIMENSION

(Colours by Dimension, Weighted by Impact on Local Governance Satisfaction)



As expected, the weighted and unweighted PAPI are highly correlated (0.95), but the new approach does generate some fluctuations in the overall performance. For instance, Hoa Binh, Tien Giang and Dong Thap, which are in the top 75th percentile group in the unweighted index, slide backwards in the weighted index. Consequently, Ben Tre, HCMC and Binh Duong move upwards in weighted index. At the other end of the scale, Dien Bien and Bac Lieu, which are in the poorest performing group in the unweighted index, move upwards to the low average group in the weighted index. Dak Nong moves from the high average group in the unweighted index to the poorest performing group in the weighted index.

The fluctuations, however small, reveal once again how important it is to pay attention to CIs around the final scores and not just the aggregate measures. These are plotted in Figure 3.7h. The four groups of provinces discussed above are preserved (see also Map 3.7b). There are still localities above the 75th percentile (or above 38.222), those below the 25th percentile (or below 36.022), and two groups of provinces between the two red lines (see Table B9, Annex B).

FIGURE 3.7h: WEIGHTED PAPI (WITH 95% CIS)



Stability over Time

Figure 3.7i provides a scatter plot of the 2011 and 2010 PAPI Indexes. The two scores have a correlation coefficient of .37, which is significant at the 90% level. This indicates that PAPI is relatively stable over time, although it is not fixed, allowing provinces to improve and alter their performance over time. Another reason for the lower than expected correlation are the changes in methodology and the addition of new provinces as explained in Chapter 1.

FIGURE 3.7i: CORRELATION BETWEEN THE 2010 AND 2011 INDICES



Correlation with other Parameters of Interest

Once the weighted index was constructed, a further question worth exploring is how well the PAPI correlates with other measures of local governance performance? This allows understanding whether PAPI captures elements of governance that are conceptually distinct or whether there is underlying determinant of good governance performance.

Figure 3.7k demonstrates the correlation with the 2011 PCI scores.[72] There is a positive and statistically significant correlation of .23. This means that places that do well on the PAPI also tend to perform well on the PCI. Nevertheless, the relationship is not perfect. Some locations significantly outperform their evaluation by businesses. These provinces stand out as locations where citizens give higher evaluations to local leaders than would be expected given their PCI rankings. In other words, these local administrations tend to favour the perceptions of individuals over business elites. On the other hand, some provinces have lower scores than would be expected from their PCI scores. These are places were citizens are less satisfied with governance than businesses.

The positive but imperfect relationship between the two metrics is important, as it indicates that for the most part, well-governed provinces tend to show up on top, regardless of the methodology used to gauge performance. On the other hand, it can be observed quite clearly that there are differences regarding how businesses and citizens view governance performance, requiring different types of policies from local officials. Some locations manage the balancing act quite well, while others have yet to find the appropriate mix.

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[72] See Malesky, Edmund (2011).

FIGURE 3.7k: CORRELATION BETWEEN PAPI 2011 AND PCI 2011



Finally, the relationship between PAPI and GDP is studied in Figure 3.7l, while PAPI and Human Development Index (HDI) is studied in Figure 3.7m. Both relationships are also positively correlated. Nevertheless, these associations are difficult to interpret, because it cannot be said for certain which direction the causality runs. First, it could be that better governed provinces grow faster and become wealthier, from a strong hypothesis in the development literature. Second, it could be that richer provinces have more money to invest in governance and higher capacity officials to hire. Third, it may simply be that wealthy citizens feel more comfortable and rate their governments more highly (although this does not appear to be the case in the regressions above). Finally, governance and development may be both caused by some deep-seated socio-cultural or historical factor. Thus, the variables tend to move together, however, there is no direct relationship between them. Indeed, readers should be suspicious of this fourth factor, because of the high proportion of minority-rich provinces at the bottom of the performance levels. These provinces also tend to be the poorest in the country (each 10% change in the share of minorities leads to half point decrease in the weighted PAPI measure in regression analysis).

Nonetheless, this provides evidence that good governance in terms of public administration and service delivery appears to go hand-in-hand with higher levels of human development at the provincial level in Viet Nam.[73]

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[73] See UNDP (2011) in particular chapter 6 on "Availability, Quality and Governance of Social Services".

FIGURE 3.7l: ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PAPI 2011 AND GDP PER CAPITA 2010



FIGURE 3.7m: ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PAPI 2011 AND HDI 2008



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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A. OBJECTIVE, RIGOROUS AND SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY

PAPI 2010 prided itself of being designed, built, and implemented following a sound and robust methodology. Its methodology is indeed a stepping stone for results to be credible and accepted by different stakeholders and interested parties. The same methodological consideration is undertaken in PAPI 2011 for the nationwide extension with a few adjustment to enhance its reliability and stability.[74]

Sampling Strategy

The sampling procedure sought to obtain information from a representative selection of Vietnamese citizens from the age of 18 years old. PAPI does not target household-heads, but uses state-of-the-art statistical software to comply with international standards for sample selection. This was done in an effort to learn about the experiences and perception from across the population, including gender, social, economic, age-differentiated and ethnic groups.

Furthermore, the sampling strategy balances three primary considerations. The first two were also applied in 2010, while the third was incorporated to enhance the representativeness and comparability of provinces according to their main characteristics.

First, the sampling strategy accounts for the nested hierarchy of administrative services and its inherent uneven spatial distribution. Thus, in order to ensure that comparisons of PAPI results would be fair across all provinces, certainty units were created. That is PAPI purposively included every district that serves as the provincial capital. In this district, the commune that serves as the district seat was purposively selected and within each commune (or ward), the village (or residential group) that is the seat of the commune was purposively selected. All other geographical units were randomly selected based on the probability of selection proportional to measures of size (PPS). This design ensured the acquisition of measures of administrative performance across the full range of possible situations within a province, ranging from urban residential groups located in the immediate vicinity of the provincial institutions all the way to ordinary villages located in ordinary communes under the jurisdiction of ordinary districts.

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[74] Interested readers are encouraged to look for the detailed methodology in Chapter 3 of the PAPI 2010 Report at VFF, CECODES & UNDP (2011), especially pp. 93-104.

The second consideration was that, all residents of in any sampled cluster, would have the same probability of being selected into the study. The selection of units based on PPS ensures that any two respondents who live in different clusters of a given sampling unit (for instance, residents of different villages of the same commune) have the same chance of being selected into the study, regardless of the absolute size of each village.

The third consideration was to divide provinces according to their total population size. In that regards, three groups of provinces were designed. For a detailed discussion, see discussion in Chapter 1 and Tables 1.1 and 1.2.

A rigorous multistage sampling approach was again implemented for the selection of geographical units and the construction of a representative sample in each province. Selection was done using PPS strategy, with the following four steps regarding selection of (i) districts, (ii) communes, (iii) villages, and (iv) representativeness of respondents.

Comparison between PAPI 2011 and Census Data for 2009

As in PAPI 2010, the reliability of the survey can be checked against the variables that have been made available since the release of national population census. Given the breadth of the PAPI instrument, readers can verify how closely the survey results match the census data on a small set of common variables.

Table A1 compares the distribution of key demographic variables between the PAPI and available census data and confirms the closeness of the sample to the actual demographic characteristics of the Vietnamese population.

TABLE A,1: COMPARISON OF KEY DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES (PERCENTAGES)

		PAPI 2011	CENSUS 2009
Gender			
	Male	47.04	49.41
	Female	52.96	50.59
Ethnicity			
	Kinh	84.5	85.73
	Others	15.5	14.27

In addition, the impact of weights on the composition of the sample by ethnicity is shown in Figure A1, while Figure A2 presents the age distribution of the PAPI 2011 sample and the national census of 2009.

FIGURE A1: PAPI 2011 KINH ETHNICITY COMPOSITION VS. NATIONAL CENSUS 2009



FIGURE A2: AGE DISTRIBUTION OF PAPI 2011 SAMPLE AND NATIONAL CENSUS 2009

(excluding respondents aged 70 or above in PAPI sample)



Two further tests to ensure the representativeness of the PAPI 2011 sample with the national population is by way of comparing the occupation and educational levels of respondents and their relationship with the post-stratification weights applied. This is shown in Figures A3 and A4 for occupational and educational levels respectively. Therefore, as in the PAPI 2010, readers can be reasonably confident that the survey is adequately representative of the underlying population to allow for meaningful comparisons across provinces and across groups.

FIGURE A3: OCCUPATION OF PAPI 2011 RESPONDENTS



FIGURE A4: EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF PAPI 2011 RESPONDENTS (%)



The survey implementation process

Questionnaire improvement[75]: Evolving from the 2009 pilot and 2010 implementation and as discussed in Chapter 1, the questionnaire was refined and improved by drawing lessons from the pilot and consulting with a wide range of stakeholders. The questionnaire was made more focused, shorter, and simpler compared to the 2009 and 2010 versions. It is expected to be the baseline to ensure future comparability.

As explained in the PAPI 2010 methodology discussion, the questionnaire development process involved several steps, including, (i) questionnaire refinement; (ii) questionnaire pre-testing, (iii) questionnaire treatments; (iv) interviewer's manual; and (v) training of enumerators.[76]

Survey Process: The survey process started with the training of enumerators cum field controllers, who led and supervised data collection teams in 63 provinces. Training was conducted in Ha Noi in May 2011 with the participation of over 60 key enumerators who were staff and collaborators of CECODES[77] and VFF. In addition, a series of technical trainings for the enumerators were followed up on to ensure that enumerators were well-trained and had the same understanding of technical requirements for the tasks assigned.

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[75] Full questionnaire is available at www.papi.vn.

[76] See VFF, CECODES & UNDP (2011), chapter 3 on Methodology, especially pages 99-101.

In provinces, enumerators and field controllers provided training to interviewers recruited from regional or provincial universities and colleges and used both the Interviewer's Manual and the Questionnaire to ensure same understanding and flow of questions for all interviewers. The interviewers were final year students or graduates with majors in sociology or social work. Nearly 600 students were carefully screened by the Live & Learn Organization, a local NGO working in the area of youth development in Viet Nam. This helped strengthen the objectivity and independence of the fieldwork. Each team of interviewers had to go through a one-day training, with an overall introduction to the PAPI interview processes, requirements, and detailed guidance of the Questionnaire in one session, and interviewers practicing and testing interviews being checked by the enumerators in another session.

Post-checks of completed questionnaires was conducted by UNDP at the end of fieldwork and in Ha Noi. Enumerator retraining was followed up immediately to tie up any loose ends found from filled-in questionnaires before the enumerators were sent on to another province. The three-tiered training process (the first overall training in May 2011, the second technical training before each enumerator was sent to provinces, and retraining when needed) helped ensure that experienced and inexperienced enumerators had the same level of understanding of technical requirements and skills needed before fieldwork in a certain province was undertaken.

Fieldwork. Actual fieldwork for PAPI was conducted from August 8 to December 21, 2011. Sixty-three teams of enumerators/field controllers were sent from Ha Noi to the field (with two teams in each province led by two enumerators/field controllers), and worked with the recruited interviewers on location four days (in 57 regular provinces) and seven days (in larger provinces). In Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh City, and some provinces like Thanh Hoa, the enumerators and interviewers had to stay longer and/or come back to the field in order to finish interviewing all sampled respondents that could not be met during the initial fieldwork.

To address this challenge and maintain the same levels of high international standards in survey fieldwork a system of three interlinked groups was developed. In the first group, and during the early stages of sample selection and preparation, the local VFF chapters in each province acted as coordinators. A second group included over fifty CECODES collaborators as team leaders and field supervisors. And thirdly, nearly 600 final year students or graduates majoring in sociology, social work, and administration supported the interview processes. Figure A5 depicts these three groups in visual form.

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[77] The Viet Nam Network of Local NGOs Working in Governance and Public Administration Reforms Areas (GPAR) and the Viet Nam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS) shared qualified researchers with CECODES in 2011, helping improve the quality of enumerators

FIGURE A5: AN INTERLINKED NETWORK FOR FIELDWORK IMPLEMENTATION


Group 2. Over fifty senior collaborators, team leaders ,and field supervisors
Group 1. CECODES in coordination with local VFF chapters in each province acted as coordinators
Group 3. Approximately 600 final year students or recent graduates majoring in sociology, social work, and administration supported the interview processes

APPENDIX B. MAIN DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY PROVINCES

TABLE B1: GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY PROVINCE

NAME	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
An Giang	196	50.26	194	49.74	390	100
Ba Ria Vung Tau	91	48.15	98	51.85	189	100
Bac Giang	85	44.97	104	55.03	189	100
Bac Kan	83	43.68	107	56.32	190	100
Bac Lieu	89	46.35	103	53.65	192	100
Bac Ninh	86	44.79	106	55.21	192	100
Ben Tre	82	43.16	108	56.84	190	100
Binh Dinh	95	48.22	102	51.78	197	100
Binh Duong	94	48.70	99	51.30	193	100
Binh Phuoc	110	57.89	80	42.11	190	100
Binh Thuan	86	48.04	93	51.96	179	100
Ca Mau	93	48.69	98	51.31	191	100
Can Tho	88	48.09	95	51.91	183	100
Cao Bang	93	48.19	100	51.81	193	100
Da Nang	83	42.78	111	57.22	194	100
Dak Lak	97	50.00	97	50.00	194	100
Dak Nong	76	39.79	115	60.21	191	100
Dien Bien	76	40.86	110	59.14	186	100
Dong Nai	186	47.09	209	52.91	395	100
Dong Thap	93	48.44	99	51.56	192	100
Gia Lai	85	44.50	106	55.50	191	100
Ha Giang	114	57.58	84	42.42	198	100
Ha Nam	87	45.08	106	54.92	193	100
Ha Noi	275	47.50	304	52.50	579	100
Ha Tinh	92	47.92	100	52.08	192	100
Hai Duong	95	48.22	102	51.78	197	100
Hai Phong	90	49.45	92	50.55	182	100
Hau Giang	86	44.79	106	55.21	192	100
Hoa Binh	92	47.67	101	52.33	193	100
Hung Yen	96	49.74	97	50.26	193	100
Khanh Hoa	84	43.30	110	56.70	194	100

NAME	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Kien Giang	97	49.74	98	50.26	195	100
Kon Tum	91	45.27	110	54.73	201	100
Lai Chau	82	49.10	85	50.90	167	100
Lam Dong	103	50.99	99	49.01	202	100
Lang Son	99	50.25	98	49.75	197	100
Lao Cai	97	50.52	95	49.48	192	100
Long An	102	53.13	90	46.88	192	100
Nam Dinh	88	44.44	110	55.56	198	100
Nghe An	198	51.56	186	48.44	384	100
Ninh Binh	87	43.72	112	56.28	199	100
Ninh Thuan	82	39.42	126	60.58	208	100
Phu Tho	82	45.81	97	54.19	179	100
Phu Yen	84	44.21	106	55.79	190	100
Quang Binh	84	43.75	108	56.25	192	100
Quang Nam	94	48.96	98	51.04	192	100
Quang Ngai	74	37.76	122	62.24	196	100
Quang Ninh	88	45.60	105	54.40	193	100
Quang Tri	94	48.96	98	51.04	192	100
Soc Trang	98	49.25	101	50.75	199	100
Son La	82	43.16	108	56.84	190	100
HCMC	274	48.75	288	51.25	562	100
Tay Ninh	96	50.26	95	49.74	191	100
Thai Binh	83	43.46	108	56.54	191	100
Thai Nguyen	88	45.60	105	54.40	193	100
Thanh Hoa	184	47.06	207	52.94	391	100
Thua Thien Hue	100	51.55	94	48.45	194	100
Tien Giang	80	41.45	113	58.55	193	100
Tra Vinh	93	48.69	98	51.31	191	100
Tuyen Quang	71	37.37	119	62.63	190	100
Vinh Long	96	49.74	97	50.26	193	100
Vinh Phuc	90	46.39	104	53.61	194	100
Yen Bai	78	41.71	109	58.29	187	100
Total	**6,417**	**47.04**	**7,225**	**52.96**	**13,642**	**100**

TABLE B2: DIMENSION 1. PARTICIPATION AT LOCAL LEVELS (WITH 95% CIS)

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Son La	0.467	5.712	7.572	6.642
Quang Binh	0.248	5.800	6.787	6.293
Hoa Binh	0.145	5.860	6.439	6.149
Lang Son	0.222	5.564	6.446	6.005
Ba Ria-Vung Tau	0.136	5.693	6.234	5.963
Bac Ninh	0.224	5.499	6.392	5.945
Binh Dinh	0.122	5.642	6.127	5.884
Quang Tri	0.321	5.244	6.522	5.883
Ben Tre	0.082	5.624	5.950	5.787
Long An	0.071	5.628	5.911	5.770
Ha Noi	0.197	5.372	6.153	5.762
Tien Giang	0.124	5.487	5.981	5.734
Dak Nong	0.137	5.453	5.999	5.726
Can Tho	0.146	5.426	6.008	5.717
Hai Duong	0.118	5.445	5.916	5.680
Phu Tho	0.125	5.423	5.919	5.671
Ha Tinh	0.133	5.364	5.894	5.629
Bac Giang	0.135	5.359	5.896	5.628
Bac Kan	0.078	5.447	5.757	5.602
Lao Cai	0.113	5.321	5.771	5.546
Thanh Hoa	0.171	5.203	5.884	5.543
Quang Ninh	0.316	4.877	6.136	5.507
Gia Lai	0.298	4.880	6.068	5.474
Vinh Phuc	0.304	4.855	6.064	5.459
Dong Nai	0.129	5.202	5.714	5.458
Binh Phuoc	0.114	5.207	5.661	5.434
Nghe An	0.213	4.982	5.828	5.405
Nam Dinh	0.077	5.225	5.533	5.379
Khanh Hoa	0.094	5.167	5.541	5.354
Ha Nam	0.118	5.119	5.587	5.353
Thai Binh	0.178	4.980	5.688	5.334

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Quang Nam	0.164	5.003	5.656	5.329
Cao Bang	0.210	4.892	5.726	5.309
Thai Nguyen	0.109	5.071	5.502	5.286
Da Nang	0.102	5.075	5.482	5.278
Thua Thien-Hue	0.155	4.969	5.584	5.277
Kon Tum	0.081	5.100	5.420	5.260
Lam Dong	0.084	5.083	5.419	5.251
Vinh Long	0.244	4.757	5.728	5.243
Tuyen Quang	0.308	4.614	5.842	5.228
Dong Thap	0.081	5.022	5.344	5.183
Hai Phong	0.155	4.869	5.488	5.179
Lai Chau	0.251	4.668	5.665	5.166
Yen Bai	0.133	4.892	5.422	5.157
HCMC	0.146	4.852	5.434	5.143
Hung Yen	0.181	4.747	5.468	5.107
Dak Lak	0.079	4.941	5.255	5.098
Kien Giang	0.226	4.642	5.542	5.092
Binh Duong	0.170	4.746	5.421	5.084
Ninh Thuan	0.193	4.678	5.447	5.062
Quang Ngai	0.396	4.261	5.836	5.049
Hau Giang	0.118	4.735	5.205	4.970
Soc Trang	0.098	4.705	5.095	4.900
Ninh Binh	0.374	4.137	5.627	4.882
Ha Giang	0.185	4.507	5.245	4.876
An Giang se = standard error	0.171	4.529	5.210	4.870
Dien Bien	0.427	3.984	5.685	4.835
Ca Mau	0.152	4.510	5.115	4.812
Phu Yen	0.308	4.149	5.376	4.763
Tra Vinh	0.170	4.350	5.025	4.688
Bac Lieu	0.149	4.341	4.934	4.637
Tay Ninh	0.087	4.229	4.577	4.403
Binh Thuan	0.484	3.358	5.284	4.321

75th percentile = 5.650; 50th percentile = 5.329; 25th percentile = 5.095

TABLE B3: DIMENSION 2. TRANSPARENCY (WITH 95% CIS)

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Ba Ria-Vung Tau	0.136	6.578	7.121	6.849
Ha Tinh	0.229	6.229	7.140	6.685
Nam Dinh	0.216	6.221	7.082	6.652
Son La	0.200	6.138	6.935	6.536
Lang Son	0.368	5.648	7.113	6.380
Quang Binh	0.508	5.341	7.361	6.351
Long An	0.091	5.967	6.331	6.149
Quang Tri	0.436	5.228	6.963	6.096
Yen Bai	0.166	5.719	6.381	6.050
Binh Phuoc	0.249	5.526	6.515	6.021
HCMC	0.167	5.673	6.338	6.006
Gia Lai	0.076	5.851	6.153	6.002
Ha Noi	0.138	5.719	6.268	5.994
Hoa Binh	0.162	5.665	6.310	5.987
Thanh Hoa	0.079	5.807	6.122	5.965
Thai Nguyen	0.219	5.519	6.391	5.955
Nghe An	0.234	5.473	6.402	5.938
Ben Tre	0.190	5.552	6.310	5.931
Hai Duong	0.164	5.567	6.219	5.893
Dak Nong	0.295	5.306	6.479	5.892
Tien Giang	0.183	5.525	6.252	5.888
Thai Binh	0.210	5.427	6.263	5.845
Lao Cai	0.362	5.111	6.550	5.831
Dak Lak	0.093	5.617	5.987	5.802
Bac Kan	0.279	5.218	6.328	5.773
Dien Bien	0.081	5.567	5.890	5.729
Quang Nam	0.055	5.608	5.825	5.717
Binh Dinh	0.257	5.170	6.193	5.682
Ha Nam	0.196	5.181	5.960	5.570
Quang Ninh	0.134	5.298	5.830	5.564
Tuyen Quang	0.137	5.268	5.815	5.542

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Khanh Hoa	0.072	5.390	5.676	5.533
Cao Bang	0.131	5.257	5.776	5.516
Can Tho	0.197	5.098	5.883	5.491
Bac Giang	0.156	5.178	5.799	5.489
Dong Thap	0.203	5.072	5.880	5.476
Binh Duong	0.199	5.080	5.871	5.476
Ca Mau	0.209	5.040	5.872	5.456
Da Nang	0.116	5.225	5.687	5.456
Dong Nai	0.103	5.182	5.593	5.387
Vinh Phuc	0.208	4.964	5.790	5.377
Thua Thien-Hue	0.090	5.175	5.534	5.354
Hai Phong	0.086	5.136	5.478	5.307
Quang Ngai	0.178	4.952	5.659	5.306
Bac Ninh	0.252	4.799	5.801	5.300
Ninh Binh	0.465	4.307	6.156	5.231
Kon Tum	0.129	4.908	5.419	5.164
Lai Chau	0.181	4.725	5.444	5.085
Vinh Long	0.077	4.927	5.235	5.081
Hung Yen	0.124	4.784	5.279	5.031
Phu Tho	0.089	4.848	5.202	5.025
Phu Yen	0.086	4.848	5.191	5.019
An Giang	0.110	4.741	5.177	4.959
Soc Trang	0.162	4.600	5.244	4.922
Binh Thuan	0.343	4.198	5.565	4.882
Ha Giang	0.117	4.596	5.063	4.829
Hau Giang	0.154	4.484	5.095	4.790
Kien Giang	0.125	4.519	5.015	4.767
Bac Lieu	0.146	4.383	4.966	4.675
Ninh Thuan	0.289	4.067	5.216	4.641
Tay Ninh	0.160	4.309	4.945	4.627
Lam Dong	0.084	4.437	4.771	4.604
Tra Vinh	0.074	4.289	4.582	4.435

75th percentile = 5.946; 50th percentile = 5.533; 25th percentile = 5.124

TABLE B4: DIMENSION 3. VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (WITH 95% CIS)

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Quang Tri	0.100	6.786	7.183	6.984
Quang Binh	0.120	6.331	6.810	6.571
Ha Tinh	0.331	5.852	7.171	6.511
Thai Binh	0.113	6.197	6.647	6.422
Nghe An	0.134	6.051	6.585	6.318
Nam Dinh	0.496	5.310	7.282	6.296
Hai Duong	0.106	6.059	6.483	6.271
Long An	0.112	6.034	6.481	6.257
Ha Nam	0.294	5.665	6.833	6.249
Hoa Binh	0.070	5.915	6.193	6.054
Binh Dinh	0.106	5.793	6.216	6.005
Quang Ninh	0.109	5.764	6.200	5.982
Thanh Hoa	0.071	5.801	6.085	5.943
Dong Thap	0.259	5.426	6.457	5.941
Phu Tho	0.211	5.446	6.286	5.866
Lang Son	0.482	4.906	6.823	5.864
Binh Phuoc	0.183	5.485	6.211	5.848
Son La	0.104	5.636	6.050	5.843
Da Nang	0.159	5.475	6.106	5.790
Tien Giang	0.198	5.396	6.183	5.790
Ha Noi	0.310	5.111	6.346	5.729
Bac Kan	0.084	5.557	5.893	5.725
Yen Bai	0.131	5.436	5.956	5.696
Vinh Phuc	0.466	4.736	6.589	5.662
Kon Tum	0.105	5.424	5.843	5.633
Quang Ngai	0.167	5.245	5.911	5.578
Lao Cai	0.078	5.419	5.728	5.573
Dak Nong	0.087	5.380	5.726	5.553
Can Tho	0.060	5.427	5.667	5.547
Bac Ninh	0.327	4.886	6.187	5.537
Thai Nguyen	0.235	5.068	6.003	5.535

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Dak Lak	0.069	5.395	5.670	5.533
Ba Ria-Vung Tau	0.083	5.366	5.697	5.531
Lam Dong	0.105	5.321	5.741	5.531
Ninh Thuan	0.127	5.269	5.775	5.522
Dien Bien	0.084	5.295	5.630	5.462
Bac Giang	0.106	5.233	5.657	5.445
Binh Thuan	0.205	5.030	5.844	5.437
Gia Lai	0.399	4.640	6.230	5.435
Quang Nam	0.045	5.319	5.499	5.409
Vinh Long	0.068	5.261	5.530	5.395
Binh Duong	0.107	5.172	5.599	5.386
Tuyen Quang	0.125	5.123	5.621	5.372
Thua Thien-Hue	0.111	5.110	5.551	5.331
Kien Giang	0.052	5.187	5.394	5.290
Khanh Hoa	0.051	5.177	5.378	5.278
Hau Giang	0.107	5.057	5.485	5.271
HCMC	0.111	5.019	5.462	5.240
Phu Yen	0.069	5.074	5.349	5.212
Lai Chau	0.352	4.497	5.900	5.199
Tay Ninh	0.110	4.970	5.409	5.189
Ca Mau	0.219	4.744	5.616	5.180
Soc Trang	0.048	5.056	5.249	5.152
Hung Yen	0.096	4.955	5.335	5.145
Dong Nai	0.088	4.970	5.319	5.144
Ben Tre	0.114	4.896	5.348	5.122
Tra Vinh	0.118	4.875	5.346	5.111
Ninh Binh	0.140	4.799	5.358	5.079
Bac Lieu	0.094	4.876	5.251	5.063
Ha Giang	0.166	4.677	5.337	5.007
Cao Bang	0.098	4.604	4.994	4.799
Hai Phong	0.161	4.453	5.093	4.773
An Giang	0.091	4.554	4.917	4.735

75th percentile = 5.856; 50th percentile = 5.533; 25th percentile = 5.255

TABLE B5: DIMENSION 4. CONTROL OF CORRUPTION (WITH 95% CIS)

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Long An	0.079	7.112	7.425	7.269
Binh Duong	0.238	6.580	7.527	7.053
Ca Mau	0.242	6.543	7.506	7.025
Binh Dinh	0.125	6.727	7.223	6.975
Dong Thap	0.196	6.531	7.310	6.920
Soc Trang	0.090	6.728	7.085	6.907
Tien Giang	0.201	6.487	7.287	6.887
Ba Ria-Vung Tau	0.152	6.573	7.179	6.876
Quang Nam	0.080	6.463	6.782	6.623
Ben Tre	0.132	6.356	6.881	6.619
Lang Son	0.336	5.923	7.259	6.591
HCMC	0.083	6.408	6.739	6.574
Son La	0.139	6.269	6.823	6.546
Bac Lieu	0.165	6.146	6.803	6.474
Tuyen Quang	0.149	6.155	6.748	6.451
Dong Nai	0.171	6.083	6.762	6.423
Quang Binh	0.232	5.958	6.880	6.419
Can Tho	0.140	6.096	6.651	6.374
Thai Nguyen	0.095	6.176	6.553	6.364
Binh Thuan	0.479	5.403	7.309	6.356
Quang Tri	0.254	5.836	6.848	6.342
Ha Tinh	0.165	5.996	6.652	6.324
Vinh Phuc	0.085	6.085	6.422	6.254
Hoa Binh	0.071	6.098	6.382	6.240
Binh Phuoc	0.369	5.490	6.958	6.224
Vinh Long	0.091	6.035	6.398	6.217
Gia Lai	0.192	5.825	6.588	6.207
Yen Bai	0.345	5.491	6.864	6.177
Kien Giang	0.132	5.899	6.425	6.162
Da Nang	0.353	5.454	6.858	6.156
Nam Dinh	0.313	5.531	6.779	6.155

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Nghe An	0.128	5.894	6.404	6.149
Lao Cai	0.531	5.073	7.185	6.129
Ha Nam	0.122	5.886	6.371	6.129
Phu Tho	0.096	5.926	6.308	6.117
Kon Tum	0.214	5.678	6.529	6.103
Hai Duong	0.111	5.873	6.314	6.094
Thanh Hoa	0.163	5.770	6.417	6.094
Dak Nong	0.126	5.841	6.344	6.093
An Giang	0.213	5.625	6.474	6.049
Ha Noi	0.198	5.638	6.426	6.032
Hau Giang	0.134	5.756	6.288	6.022
Quang Ngai	0.181	5.655	6.374	6.014
Khanh Hoa	0.149	5.684	6.279	5.981
Thai Binh	0.144	5.693	6.266	5.980
Hung Yen	0.118	5.718	6.187	5.953
Phu Yen	0.069	5.780	6.054	5.917
Bac Kan	0.329	5.261	6.571	5.916
Dien Bien	0.331	5.249	6.565	5.907
Dak Lak	0.347	5.199	6.581	5.890
Bac Giang	0.088	5.708	6.059	5.883
Lai Chau	0.192	5.455	6.219	5.837
Thua Thien-Hue	0.276	5.272	6.370	5.821
Lam Dong	0.108	5.596	6.025	5.811
Ninh Thuan	0.206	5.373	6.193	5.783
Ninh Binh	0.131	5.501	6.023	5.762
Tay Ninh	0.208	5.331	6.158	5.744
Bac Ninh	0.129	5.454	5.967	5.711
Ha Giang	0.419	4.839	6.507	5.673
Hai Phong	0.110	5.432	5.869	5.651
Tra Vinh	0.125	5.347	5.844	5.596
Quang Ninh	0.205	5.110	5.926	5.518
Cao Bang	0.436	4.076	5.812	4.944

75th percentile = 6.421; 50th percentile = 6.149; 25th percentile = 5.916

TABLE B6: DIMENSION 5. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES (WITH 95% CIS)

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Quang Binh	0.167	7.133	7.798	7.466
Ba Ria-Vung Tau	0.088	7.253	7.602	7.428
Nam Dinh	0.118	7.138	7.610	7.374
Da Nang	0.081	7.171	7.493	7.332
Quang Tri	0.140	7.034	7.590	7.312
Thanh Hoa	0.112	7.038	7.482	7.260
Dak Nong	0.062	7.076	7.322	7.199
Bac Kan	0.162	6.875	7.520	7.198
Dong Thap	0.103	6.988	7.400	7.194
Long An	0.050	7.085	7.285	7.185
Lam Dong	0.077	7.022	7.327	7.175
Ha Tinh	0.117	6.918	7.385	7.151
Kon Tum	0.064	7.020	7.276	7.148
Binh Duong	0.121	6.907	7.386	7.146
Dong Nai	0.119	6.908	7.381	7.145
Binh Phuoc	0.074	6.982	7.278	7.130
Yen Bai	0.145	6.801	7.377	7.089
Gia Lai	0.071	6.943	7.226	7.085
Ho Chi Minh City	0.056	6.970	7.191	7.081
Vinh Long	0.062	6.952	7.199	7.075
Ninh Thuan	0.172	6.720	7.406	7.063
Ninh Binh	0.137	6.744	7.290	7.017
Hai Phong	0.401	6.213	7.808	7.010
Dak Lak	0.067	6.874	7.142	7.008
Thai Nguyen	0.057	6.850	7.076	6.963
Tien Giang	0.072	6.781	7.068	6.925
Phu Tho	0.089	6.725	7.080	6.903
Binh Dinh	0.064	6.776	7.029	6.902
Bac Ninh	0.061	6.753	6.994	6.873
Kien Giang	0.109	6.649	7.084	6.867
Ha Noi	0.063	6.739	6.990	6.864

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Bac Lieu	0.051	6.758	6.960	6.859
Ca Mau	0.085	6.680	7.016	6.848
Bac Giang	0.067	6.709	6.977	6.843
Nghe An	0.141	6.555	7.118	6.837
Thai Binh	0.068	6.677	6.947	6.812
Hung Yen	0.073	6.666	6.955	6.811
Ben Tre	0.109	6.585	7.019	6.802
Hau Giang	0.100	6.588	6.986	6.787
Lang Son	0.052	6.649	6.854	6.751
Vinh Phuc	0.133	6.464	6.993	6.728
Tuyen Quang	0.059	6.607	6.843	6.725
Tay Ninh	0.090	6.536	6.895	6.716
Dien Bien	0.178	6.355	7.063	6.709
Ha Nam	0.072	6.560	6.846	6.703
Son La	0.082	6.522	6.847	6.685
Hoa Binh	0.043	6.592	6.763	6.678
Lai Chau	0.081	6.514	6.836	6.675
Binh Thuan	0.152	6.355	6.960	6.658
Thua Thien-Hue	0.062	6.522	6.767	6.644
Quang Ninh	0.094	6.409	6.782	6.596
Cao Bang	0.068	6.453	6.725	6.589
Phu Yen	0.048	6.483	6.675	6.579
Soc Trang	0.082	6.412	6.739	6.575
Hai Duong	0.136	6.263	6.803	6.533
An Giang	0.093	6.283	6.652	6.468
Lao Cai	0.078	6.294	6.606	6.450
Ha Giang	0.104	6.241	6.656	6.449
Quang Nam	0.041	6.366	6.529	6.447
Khanh Hoa	0.048	6.339	6.529	6.434
Quang Ngai	0.052	6.305	6.513	6.409
Tra Vinh	0.051	6.259	6.460	6.360
Can Tho	0.070	6.215	6.492	6.353

75th percentile = 7.109; 50th percentile = 6.858; 25th percentile = 6.676

TABLE B7: DIMENSION 6. PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY (WITH 95% CIS)

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Da Nang	0.090	7.251	7.609	7.430
Hai Phong	0.166	7.003	7.662	7.332
Ba Ria-Vung Tau	0.180	6.935	7.650	7.293
Quang Binh	0.144	6.933	7.507	7.220
Ho Chi Minh City	0.113	6.924	7.372	7.148
Long An	0.049	7.019	7.214	7.116
Ha Noi	0.148	6.763	7.351	7.057
Quang Tri	0.074	6.894	7.187	7.041
Lang Son	0.134	6.752	7.287	7.020
Hai Duong	0.121	6.773	7.255	7.014
Binh Dinh	0.027	6.960	7.067	7.013
Vinh Long	0.063	6.887	7.139	7.013
Kien Giang	0.282	6.432	7.556	6.994
Thua Thien-Hue	0.060	6.851	7.091	6.971
Ben Tre	0.046	6.863	7.047	6.955
Vinh Phuc	0.086	6.758	7.101	6.930
Ninh Thuan	0.154	6.618	7.228	6.923
Binh Duong	0.111	6.633	7.076	6.854
Ha Tinh	0.125	6.606	7.103	6.854
Quang Nam	0.107	6.626	7.050	6.838
Son La	0.087	6.655	7.002	6.828
An Giang	0.096	6.615	6.996	6.805
Thanh Hoa	0.200	6.384	7.180	6.782
Nam Dinh	0.062	6.647	6.894	6.770
Bac Lieu	0.210	6.326	7.163	6.745
Kon Tum	0.072	6.595	6.880	6.738
Bac Ninh	0.173	6.387	7.076	6.732
Hau Giang	0.098	6.521	6.911	6.716
Quang Ninh	0.056	6.568	6.789	6.679
Dong Thap	0.048	6.572	6.761	6.666
Khanh Hoa	0.052	6.560	6.768	6.664

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Dong Nai	0.065	6.531	6.790	6.660
Hoa Binh	0.299	6.053	7.242	6.647
Soc Trang	0.203	6.231	7.040	6.635
Lam Dong	0.159	6.314	6.947	6.631
Thai Binh	0.182	6.268	6.992	6.630
Tuyen Quang	0.070	6.457	6.737	6.597
Phu Tho	0.032	6.514	6.643	6.578
Dak Lak	0.043	6.488	6.657	6.572
Can Tho	0.075	6.401	6.700	6.550
Bac Giang	0.039	6.445	6.600	6.522
Lai Chau	0.049	6.398	6.594	6.496
Binh Thuan	0.139	6.207	6.759	6.483
Bac Kan	0.215	6.053	6.908	6.480
Hung Yen	0.039	6.383	6.540	6.461
Tien Giang	0.088	6.284	6.635	6.459
Ninh Binh	0.327	5.808	7.110	6.459
Nghe An	0.086	6.243	6.584	6.414
Tra Vinh	0.042	6.325	6.494	6.410
Tay Ninh	0.069	6.229	6.503	6.366
Dien Bien	0.298	5.751	6.937	6.344
Ca Mau	0.185	5.953	6.688	6.320
Gia Lai	0.264	5.793	6.842	6.317
Quang Ngai	0.139	6.030	6.583	6.306
Thai Nguyen	0.052	6.191	6.399	6.295
Phu Yen	0.170	5.927	6.602	6.264
Cao Bang	0.224	5.810	6.702	6.256
Lao Cai	0.254	5.724	6.733	6.229
Ha Nam	0.049	6.119	6.314	6.216
Yen Bai	0.190	5.604	6.362	5.983
Binh Phuoc	0.316	5.289	6.549	5.919
Ha Giang	0.077	5.718	6.024	5.871
Dak Nong	0.222	5.239	6.123	5.681

75th percentile = 6.926; 50th percentile = 6.660; 25th percentile = 6.436

TABLE B8: COMPOSITE PAPI 2011—UN-WEIGHTED (WITH 95% CIS)

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Quang Binh	0.977	38.375	42.263	40.319
Ba Ria-Vung Tau	0.382	39.181	40.699	39.940
Long An	0.276	39.197	40.296	39.746
Quang Tri	0.774	38.118	41.197	39.657
Ha Tinh	1.040	37.085	41.224	39.155
Son La	0.716	37.657	40.504	39.081
Nam Dinh	0.959	36.719	40.534	38.626
Lang Son	1.488	35.652	41.571	38.612
Binh Dinh	0.309	37.845	39.077	38.461
Hoa Binh	0.652	36.458	39.053	37.755
Tien Giang	0.396	36.896	38.470	37.683
Thanh Hoa	0.547	36.499	38.675	37.587
Hai Duong	0.555	36.381	38.589	37.485
Da Nang	0.382	36.684	38.202	37.443
Ha Noi	0.962	35.524	39.351	37.438
Dong Thap	0.771	35.847	38.916	37.381
Ben Tre	0.507	36.208	38.225	37.217
Ho Chi Minh City	0.472	36.252	38.131	37.191
Nghe An	0.750	35.567	38.553	37.060
Thai Binh	0.373	36.282	37.765	37.023
Binh Duong	0.384	36.234	37.764	36.999
Bac Kan	0.993	34.717	38.670	36.694
Binh Phuoc	1.108	34.370	38.780	36.575
Gia Lai	0.661	35.205	37.836	36.520
Vinh Phuc	1.012	34.396	38.425	36.410
Thai Nguyen	0.560	35.286	37.513	36.399
Quang Nam	0.159	36.046	36.681	36.364
Ha Nam	0.601	35.024	37.417	36.220
Dong Nai	0.432	35.358	37.077	36.217
Phu Tho	0.446	35.272	37.048	36.160
Yen Bai	0.682	34.796	37.510	36.153

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Dak Nong	0.560	35.030	37.259	36.144
Bac Ninh	1.099	33.912	38.284	36.098
Kon Tum	0.220	35.609	36.484	36.047
Can Tho	0.596	34.847	37.218	36.032
Vinh Long	0.303	35.420	36.627	36.024
Tuyen Quang	0.402	35.115	36.715	35.915
Dak Lak	0.302	35.302	36.505	35.903
Quang Ninh	0.797	34.260	37.429	35.844
Bac Giang	0.434	34.946	36.673	35.810
Lao Cai	1.292	33.187	38.329	35.758
Ca Mau	0.999	33.653	37.629	35.641
Thua Thien-Hue	0.402	34.598	36.199	35.398
Hai Phong	0.278	34.699	35.805	35.252
Khanh Hoa	0.329	34.590	35.898	35.244
Kien Giang	0.326	34.525	35.821	35.173
Soc Trang	0.223	34.647	35.536	35.091
Lam Dong	0.369	34.269	35.736	35.003
Ninh Thuan	1.076	32.855	37.135	34.995
Dien Bien	1.220	32.557	37.414	34.985
Quang Ngai	1.055	32.564	36.761	34.662
Hau Giang	0.282	33.995	35.116	34.556
Hung Yen	0.387	33.738	35.279	34.509
Lai Chau	0.874	32.719	36.196	34.458
Bac Lieu	0.727	33.007	35.900	34.453
Ninh Binh	1.492	31.463	37.399	34.431
Binh Thuan	1.502	31.148	37.123	34.136
An Giang	0.573	32.746	35.026	33.886
Phu Yen	0.223	33.311	34.196	33.753
Cao Bang	1.106	31.213	35.614	33.414
Tay Ninh	0.534	31.982	34.109	33.046
Ha Giang	0.833	31.047	34.363	32.705
Tra Vinh	0.278	32.045	33.153	32.599

75th percentile = 37.299; 50th percentile = 36.144; 25th percentile = 35.046

TABLE B9: COMPOSITE PAPI 2011—WEIGHTED (WITH 95% CIS)

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Ba Ria-Vung Tau	0.710	40.444	43.267	41.856
Long An	0.222	40.338	41.221	40.780
Quang Binh	1.380	37.977	43.467	40.722
Ha Tinh	0.960	38.044	41.866	39.955
Lang Son	1.419	37.122	42.768	39.945
Son La	0.405	39.040	40.652	39.846
Quang Tri	0.846	38.039	41.404	39.721
Nam Dinh	0.884	37.732	41.251	39.492
Ho Chi Minh City	0.526	38.336	40.429	39.382
Binh Dinh	0.388	38.544	40.088	39.316
Da Nang	0.515	37.940	39.988	38.964
Ben Tre	0.426	38.056	39.749	38.903
Ha Noi	0.839	37.062	40.403	38.732
Hai Duong	0.658	37.190	39.807	38.498
Binh Duong	0.304	37.838	39.046	38.442
Thanh Hoa	0.663	36.954	39.591	38.272
Tien Giang	0.673	36.832	39.512	38.172
Hoa Binh	1.013	36.091	40.124	38.108
Quang Nam	0.211	37.654	38.494	38.074
Dong Thap	0.704	36.628	39.431	38.030
Vinh Phuc	0.455	36.640	38.449	37.544
Hai Phong	0.434	36.664	38.392	37.528
Thai Binh	0.629	36.205	38.706	37.455
Nghe An	0.686	35.931	38.662	37.296
Vinh Long	0.220	36.814	37.689	37.252
Dong Nai	0.421	36.350	38.023	37.186
Gia Lai	0.354	36.463	37.871	37.167
Thai Nguyen	0.452	36.236	38.033	37.135
Tuyen Quang	0.355	36.415	37.827	37.121
Bac Kan	1.369	34.279	39.728	37.003
Dak Lak	0.383	36.203	37.726	36.965

PROVINCE	STANDARD ERROR	LOW	HIGH	MEAN
Thua Thien-Hue	0.513	35.931	37.970	36.950
Ca Mau	1.100	34.693	39.069	36.881
Can Tho	0.669	35.532	38.193	36.863
Kon Tum	0.264	36.179	37.231	36.705
Khanh Hoa	0.339	35.946	37.295	36.620
Soc Trang	0.349	35.837	37.226	36.531
Bac Ninh	1.067	34.396	38.641	36.519
Kien Giang	0.745	35.008	37.973	36.490
Quang Ninh	0.656	35.147	37.757	36.452
Bac Giang	0.352	35.702	37.102	36.402
Yen Bai	0.375	35.655	37.147	36.401
Binh Phuoc	1.574	33.258	39.522	36.390
Lao Cai	1.805	32.785	39.969	36.377
Phu Tho	0.296	35.604	36.780	36.192
Ha Nam	0.463	35.220	37.062	36.141
Dien Bien	1.291	33.545	38.684	36.115
Bac Lieu	0.929	34.081	37.778	35.930
An Giang	0.537	34.797	36.933	35.865
Ninh Thuan	1.164	33.507	38.140	35.823
Hau Giang	0.288	35.072	36.218	35.645
Dak Nong	1.051	33.437	37.618	35.528
Ninh Binh	1.783	31.940	39.033	35.486
Quang Ngai	0.940	33.563	37.303	35.433
Binh Thuan	1.033	33.368	37.478	35.423
Lai Chau	0.607	34.176	36.591	35.383
Hung Yen	0.243	34.896	35.862	35.379
Lam Dong	0.443	34.337	36.100	35.218
Phu Yen	0.420	33.840	35.513	34.676
Cao Bang	1.290	31.847	36.982	34.414
Tay Ninh	0.439	33.171	34.919	34.045
Tra Vinh	0.288	33.009	34.156	33.583
Ha Giang	0.568	31.981	34.242	33.112

75th percentile = 38.222; 50th percentile = 36.950; 25th percentile = 36.022

APPENDIX C: COMPOSITION OF PAPI 2011

TABLE C1: COMPOSITION OF PAPI: 6 DIMENSIONS, 22 SUB-DIMENSIONS, AND 92 INDICATORS

DIMENSION	SUB-DIMENSION	INDICATORS
1. Participation at Local Levels	1.1 Civic Knowledge	- Knows Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (%) - Knows People Know, People Decide (%) - Correct Term Limit of 2.5 Years (%)
	1.2 Opportunities for Participation	- Voted in Last Commune People's Council Election (%) - Voted in Last National Assembly Election (%) - Village Chief Elected (%) - Participated in Election (%)
	1.3 Quality of Elections	- More than 1 Candidate (%) - Invited to Participate (%) - Paper Ballot was Used (%) - Votes were Counted Publicly (%) - Candidate Was Suggested (%) - Voted for Winner (%)
	1.4 Voluntary Contributions	- Voluntary Contribution to Project (%) - Community Monitoring Board Monitors Contribution (%) - Voluntary Contribution Recorded (%) - Participated in Decision Making to Start Project (%) - Provided input to Design (%)
2. Transparency	2.1 Poverty Lists	- Poverty List Published in Last 12 Months - Type 1 Errors on Poverty List (% Agree) - Type 2 Errors on Poverty List (% Agree)
	2. 2 Communal Budgets	- Communal Budget is Made Available (%) - Respondent Read Communal Budget (%) - Believe in Accuracy of Budget (%)
	2. 3. Land-Use Plan/Pricing	- Aware of Communal Land Plans (%) - Comment on Communal Land Plans (%) - Land Plan Acknowledges Your Concerns (%) - Impact of Land Plan on Your Families (1=No impact, 2=Negative; 3=Beneficial) - Did Not Lose Land as a Result of Land Plan (%) - Compensation Close to Market Value (%) - Informed of Land Usage (%) - Land used for Original Purpose (%) - Know Where to Go to Get Land (%)

DIMENSION	SUB-DIMENSION	INDICATORS
3. Vertical Accountability	3.1. Interactions With Local Authorities	- Contacted Village Head (%) - Contacted Commune PCOM (%) - Contact w/Village Head Successful (%) - Contact w/Commune Successful (%) - Made a Proposal to Authorities (%) - Proposal Successful (%)
	3.2. People's Inspection Boards	- Village has a PIB (%) - PIB Selected by Vote (%) - PIB Effective (%)
	3.3. Community Investment Boards	- Commune has a CISB (%) - CISB Effective (%)
4. Control of Corruption in Public Sector	4.1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption	- No Diverting of Public Funds (%) - No Bribes for Land Title (%) - No Kickbacks on Construction (%) - Land Bribe Frequency (%) - Cost of Land Bribe VND
	4.2. Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery	- No Bribes at Hospital (%) - No Bribes for Teachers' Favouritism (%) - Hospital Bribe Frequency (%) - Cost of Hospital Bribe VND - Education Bribe Cost VND
	4.3. Equity in Employment	- No Bribes for State Employment (%) - Total No Relationship
	4.4 Willingness to Fight Corruption	- Corruption had No Effect on Respondent (%) - Know Anti-Corruption Law (%) - Province Serious about Combating Corruption (%) - Denunciation Price '000s VND (Imputed) - Victim Denounced Bribe Request (%)
5. Public Administrative Procedures	5.1. Certification Procedures	- Applied for Certificate (%) - Total Quality of Certification Procedures (8 criteria)
	5.2. Construction Permit	- Applied for Construction Permit (%) - Did Not Use Many Windows for Construction Permit - Received Construction Permit (%) - Total Quality of Construction Procedures (8 criteria)

DIMENSION	SUB-DIMENSION	INDICATORS
	5.3. Land Procedures	- Took Part in Land Procedures (%) - Did Not Use Many Windows for Land (%) - Received Land Title (%) - Total Quality of Land Procedures
	5.4. Personal Procedures	- Took Part in Personal Administrative Procedures - Total Quality of Personal Procedures (8 criteria) - Did Not Use Many Windows for Personal Procedures (%)
6. Public Service Delivery	6.1. Public Health	- Share with Health Insurance - Quality of Health Insurance (4 pt scale) - Quality of Free Medical Care for Children (1=very poor; 5=very good) - Poor Households are Subsidized (%) - Checks for Children are Free (%) - Total Hospital Quality (10 criteria)
	6.2. Public Primary Education	- Kilometer Walk to School (Median) - Minutes to School (Median) - Rating of Primary School (1=very poor; 5=very good) - Total School Quality (9 criteria)
	6.3. Infrastructure	- Houses with Electricity (%) - Quality of Road (1=All Dirt; 4=All Asphalt) - Frequency of Garbage Pick-up (0=None; 4=Everyday) - Share Drinking Tap Water (%) (5=Shared tap water; 6=Tap water to home) - Share Drinking Rain Water (%) (1=Rain water; 2=River/stream/lake water)
	6.4. Law and Order	- How Safe is Your Locality (0=Very unsafe; 3=Very safe) - Change in Safety Over 3 Years - Rate of Victims of Crimes (%)

Implementing Partners

Centre for Community Support & Development Studies (CECODES)

Established by the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) from 2007, CECODES is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation specialised in development research and community support. The overall function of CECODES is to carry out evidence-based research to assess policy impact and to implement solutions to strengthening capacity of communities. CECODES works towards contributing to the improvement of governance performance, focusing on facilitating the interactions between the State, the Market, and the Civil Society.

The Front Review, Central Committee for the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (FR)

The Front Review (FR) is a theoretical and political agency under the Central Committee for the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF). The Front Review has the mandates in: publishing monthly review issues and thematic issues; collaborating in research in and disseminating knowledge of matters relating to the VFF at central, provincial, district and commune levels, to other VFF associated members and the great national solidarity block; undertaking economic activities in the media sector; and, participating in social works and undertaking oversight activities and providing feedback.

Commission on People's Petitions, Standing Committee for the National Assembly of Viet Nam (CPP)

The Commission on People's Petitions (CPP) of the Standing Committee for the National Assembly of Viet Nam has the key mandates in: receiving citizens that come to lodge complaints, denunciations and/or petitions to different committees and units under the National Assembly of Viet Nam; receiving, categorizing and handling written complaints and petitions sent by citizens to the National Assembly of Viet Nam; gathering, categorizing and passing on opinions and recommendations from voters to related authorities for further handling as well as supervising and consolidating petitions handling results; organizing overseeing delegations to oversee the implementation of legislation on petitions and denunciation; studying people's petitions and making recommendations thereafter to the Standing Committee for the National Assembly of Viet Nam regarding matters on policies and legislation issued by the Communist Party of Viet Nam and the State.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

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