Source: VietNamNet.vn
Dr. Vu Thanh Tu Anh, Director of the School of Public Policy and Management, Fulbright University Vietnam, shared with VietNamNet about the story of thinking in fighting the epidemic
Thinking foundation: When the epidemic has penetrated deeply and spread widely, "zero Covid" is impossible
Journalist Pham Huyen: Hello! The Covid-19 epidemic has appeared for 20 months, leading to health, socio-economic crises in many countries. We have also had confusion when implementing strategies and solutions to prevent the epidemic. Therefore, I would like to start by returning to the fundamental issues. In your opinion, what is the root of the thinking in fighting the epidemic?
- Dr. Vu Thanh Tu Anh: This is a very key question. To find the root of thinking, we need to look back at the recent context of fighting the epidemic.
When Vietnam began to receive the first cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection, people felt worried and scared, and this led to intensive isolation, tracing, and blockade. Now, when there are 1,000 cases every day, then 4,000-5,000 F0 cases like in Ho Chi Minh City and Binh Duong, everyone can see that we do not have enough strength and cannot isolate and trace like before.
The mindset of fighting the epidemic needs to change over time.
When the epidemic context has changed, we must learn to adapt, we cannot continue to use old measures for a new situation. Moreover, the tools to fight the epidemic have now changed, and at the same time our understanding of the epidemic is much more complete than before, so obviously, the mindset and policy framework for fighting the epidemic cannot be the same.
The most important change is the perspective on "Zero Covid".
From the point where we have persisted for the past ten months with the mindset of "Zero Covid", now we all understand that "Zero Covid" is not feasible, especially in the condition that the epidemic has penetrated deeply and spread widely like in many southern provinces.
In the world, even countries with the highest Covid-19 vaccination rates, even some countries that are steadfast in "Zero Covid", now have to admit that it is impossible. Singapore and Australia are two typical examples. These two countries are both islands, far superior to us in terms of resources and technology, but at this point they have to admit that "Zero Covid" cannot be maintained.
Why is that?
First and most importantly, it is due to the emergence of the Delta variant. With previous strains of the virus, the infection rate was slower, so the ability to trace could still keep up. Now, with the Delta strain, if we also race to trace and test, it is an unequal race, and the failure is often on the human side.
Second, completely different from a year ago, we now have a vaccine. That is, we have a certain level of protection against the epidemic.
Third, we have learned a lot more about the Covid-19 epidemic. Instead of the initial fear and confusion, we now know which groups are most at risk, what the infection and death rates are, and where the most effective interventions are.
For example, we know that the most at risk are the elderly, people with underlying diseases, and pregnant women. We also know that these groups account for over 80% of deaths, so if we can protect them, we will limit deaths and significantly reduce the burden on the health system.
Thanks to our better understanding, we have also learned to organize the health system more systematically, and have begun to have more effective treatment regimens, while just a few months ago, these tasks were still very confusing.
People and businesses, after more than a year and a half of fighting the pandemic, have also been mentally prepared, thanks to which they have managed and adapted better to the epidemic.
And finally, we have a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the issue of social distancing. It is a story related to social security, social psychology and people's mental health. The gains and losses, the major consequences of social distancing have been revealed.
From a practical perspective, we cannot maintain the current situation: distancing and then distancing again and not knowing when the distancing will last.
I think, all of these understandings and practices create a premise for awareness and change the foundation of thinking about epidemic prevention and it needs to be thoroughly resolved.
Epidemic prevention: Risk management principles
So, what principles should be used to build an anti-epidemic strategy in the current context?
- There are several basic principles as follows: First, from a policy perspective, epidemic prevention is a risk management problem. How to respond to risks is very important. It is recognized that risk is systematic but at the same time, risk is also individual.
For systemic risks, we must respond to them systematically. For example, when the epidemic has spread to all provinces and cities, in fact, the whole country is in a state of emergency and needs a common policy framework to fight the epidemic in a synchronous and consistent manner.
In addition, the epidemic situation is also uneven between localities, target groups and in different time periods. Thus, when the risks are different, there should be different ways of responding to them to be appropriate.
If a mechanism and policy are applied uniformly, regardless of space, time and target, it will certainly not be effective. For example, in localities with very few infected cases, the strategy of testing, tracing, zoning and epidemic suppression may still be appropriate; However, for localities with thousands of F0 cases per day and lasting for several months such as Ho Chi Minh City or Binh Duong, this strategy requires a lot of resources but cannot "separate" all F0s from the community.
The second principle is that epidemic prevention must be flexible and adjusted to suit reality. This is a direct consequence of the first principle.
Since the beginning of the 4th epidemic, Ho Chi Minh City has relied on F0 data, indicators of treatment capacity, and social security care capacity to plan an anti-epidemic policy framework. But up to this point, to calculate the reopening roadmap, if Ho Chi Minh City still only bases on those indicators, it will no longer be suitable.
The main reason, as mentioned above, is that the epidemic context is now different and the context of vaccines, treatment and organization of our health system is also different. If we still rely mainly on the number of F0 cases to decide on the reopening roadmap, it is not good.
Imagine, the same 4,000 Covid-19 cases per day, but the time before and after the vaccine is completely different. With that many cases, when we have no prevention, the possibility of about 5-10% of them becoming severe will overload the health system, even collapse.
But also 4,000 cases at this time, when the vaccination rate in Ho Chi Minh City has reached over 93% for the first dose and 28% for the second dose for the group aged 18 and over, in which risk groups are given priority, the rate of infection, severe illness and death will be much lower than before.
On the contrary, in another locality without vaccination coverage and without a resilient health system like Ho Chi Minh City, but also applying the same anti-epidemic policy as Ho Chi Minh City, it will also collapse.
Therefore, epidemic prevention must be flexible, based on the specific conditions of each locality, including the characteristics of space, time and subjects to issue appropriate policies.
The third principle is that epidemic prevention must be based on scientific data.
Epidemic prevention should be based on reason, based on data. This also means that we should not set unchangeable timelines for decisions to relax social distancing in the usual planning way.
On the contrary, we need to think about the roadmap and scenarios for relaxation, based on the regularity and development of the epidemic, based on data to build a roadmap for the "escape from the epidemic". Only data can tell us when we can do what, and how to do it. In the actual conditions of Vietnam, even though the data may not be absolutely accurate, if it is constantly improved and used carefully, it will still be a necessary basis for providing important references, guiding decisions and strategies.
If we think in a "fixed" way, by this day, we will have to be this or that without relying on reliable data, the risk is very high. Such thinking is outdated compared to the epidemic.
The fourth principle is a multi-target approach, tentatively called multi-target thinking.
Previously, we only looked at the dual goals of health and economy. But let's ask, how many people are mentally ill compared to before, how many children have lost their parents and fallen into crisis, how many families have broken up due to prolonged lockdown, how many people have no food, how many entrepreneurs cannot recover because of this epidemic?
Of course, health and economy are important, but if we only look at these two factors to fight the epidemic, other important social factors in the anti-epidemic strategy will be overshadowed. At that time, frustrations and repressions will arise...
Therefore, I think we will have to balance health-economic goals, tentatively called "dual goals" with other important aspects of economic and social life such as social security, psychology, physical and mental health of the people and of the whole society.
The pandemic is like a great flood, it will sweep away many lives. We cannot live with a great flood but can live with a small flood - a certain state of the epidemic that the health system can withstand.
That state creates space and opportunity for us to restart life in a new context.
Changing our mindset, moving from "Zero Covid" to "living with Covid-19" and adhering to scientific principles in fighting the epidemic, I think we will be able to adapt. This is the only way for us to survive in this era of prolonged pandemic.
Vaccine strategy: Unable to distribute evenly
Applying those principles, to be able to live with Covid-19, I want to analyze in depth the pillars: vaccines, testing, F0 management, treatment, social security and opening up. First, could you talk about the hottest story right now, which is the vaccine strategy?
- Regarding the vaccine strategy, frankly speaking, we have been slow, even compared to neighboring countries. Now, the vaccine supply situation has improved, but looking at the regions and priority groups, the way vaccines are allocated in many places is still not consistent with the principle of allocation according to risk level.
Risky subjects, meaning those at risk of severe illness and high mortality, need to be given priority for vaccination. This is what the whole world is doing. These are the elderly, aged 50 and over, people with underlying diseases and pregnant women. Thanks to prioritising vaccination for these subjects, although the current Covid-19 infection rate is still high, the mortality rate is kept low, typically in the UK or Israel. Meanwhile, in our country, people over 65 years old and with underlying diseases who had been vaccinated before were screened and not vaccinated.
Next, applying the principle of risk management, localities with strong outbreaks or high risk of outbreaks need to concentrate vaccines on that area, not evenly distributed among localities.
Finally, the vaccine policy must go hand in hand with the policy of distancing and opening up. We vaccinate so that people are protected from the epidemic, thereby being able to gradually restart normal life.
As far as I know, the Ministry of Health is flexibly adjusting in this direction, allowing some localities with high rates of first and second doses to gradually reopen to restore economic activities and social life, and this is a correct adjustment.
Mass testing: Depending on the time, depending on the place
The second pillar is testing. Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are both implementing mass testing. This is a controversial issue. In your opinion, how should effective testing be?
- Everyone sees that testing is necessary, but we must understand the nature and specific purpose of testing. For example, in localities with a small number of cases, testing to trace and isolate cases may still be appropriate and feasible.
In addition, in these localities, because it is impossible to have "Zero Covid", testing is to serve the management of F0, and to treat Covid-19 for severe cases in a more timely and effective manner. Therefore, in these localities, we should prioritize testing when symptoms appear.
Imagine that in the past, we had to find and destroy the seeds of the fire. But now, those seeds have flooded the whole city. If we continue to "find and destroy" like that, it will waste time, effort, and require huge human and financial resources. Therefore, the principle of testing should be to only go to the area and put out the fire when there is smoke.
It should also be added that when we focus too much on mass testing, sometimes safety standards will be compromised, and thus even increase the risk of infection from the testing sites themselves due to increased close contact.
I have consulted the perspectives of many epidemiologists and found that many people share this view. Instead of focusing on mass testing in places like Ho Chi Minh City or Binh Duong, we need to focus on other important and urgent tasks, such as improving the capacity of primary health care and treatment.
We can also implement testing methods in a diverse way, for example, allowing businesses and people to self-test; at the same time, allowing the import of test kits that have been recognized for use by G7/OECD countries. Doing so will help reduce the burden on medical staff, while reducing costs for both the budget and businesses.
F0 statistics to prepare for primary health care
There are too many F0s in the community in some localities. Many experts say that there is no need to count F0s anymore. So, how should we manage F0s at home to minimize deaths?
- Since July, Ho Chi Minh City has seen that with the rapid increase of F0, it is no longer possible to manage centralized F0 isolation. However, because of the "Zero Covid" viewpoint, F0 management must be absolutely strict, at that time, no agency issued documents regulating the care and treatment of F0 at home.
Nearly a month later, when F0 really had to stay at home (because the health system was overloaded), Ho Chi Minh City had instructions for the care and treatment of F0 at home because it had to wait for instructions from the Ministry of Health.
We have been a month behind the demands of reality. Many F0s stay at home without official guidance, they have to fend for themselves.
Not only that, because the health system is not well prepared, combined with the panic of the patients, monitoring F0s, providing emergency care and hospitalization for severe cases in the early stages is also very confusing. We all know that it is not that we do not have the capacity to treat, but once the patient comes to the hospital too late, it is difficult to save them.
Once again, when conditions change, the epidemic situation changes, but still applying the old measures will fail. This is a painful lesson that needs to be learned in the management of F0s, organizing grassroots health care and treatment levels.
Returning to the issue of counting F0, I think the issue here is not whether to count F0 or not because in reality we will always need data on F0 cases, but the issue is how we use information about F0. Depending on the time, each index will have different important meanings.
In the early stages, when the health system is not overloaded and "Zero Covid" is still feasible, we still have to use the index of the number of infections as a basis for managing F0. F0 statistics at that time are to trace, capture cases and treat them promptly, and at the same time provide early warnings to help the health system plan for bad scenarios.
But in a situation like Ho Chi Minh City now, the number of F0 is too much, capturing the number of F0 is not the basis for containing the epidemic by trying to bring the number of F0 to "zero". Because that is impossible.
The F0 data at this time is mainly to prepare for grassroots healthcare. With that many F0s, we must have that many medicine bags, that many doctors at the grassroots level, that many oxygen tanks, that many ambulances... This proactive capacity to care for and treat F0s is the premise to help limit severe progression and death.
Finally, in localities where the epidemic has penetrated deeply and spread widely, the number and level of reduction of F0s should not be considered as the prerequisite criteria for loosening social distancing, but must be combined with two other important indicators: the epidemic status index in relation to the treatment capacity of the health system and the vaccination coverage index.
Regarding the epidemic status, the important indicators are the severity of the disease, hospitalization on floors 2 and 3, and the number of deaths and whether the health system can respond, for example, based on the rate of vacant hospital beds and ICUs.
If the rate of severe cases is low, the death rate is low, and the peak of the epidemic is below the treatment capacity of the grassroots health system, then that is a necessary condition for easing social distancing. In other words, when opening, the health system must still ensure care and treatment of F0 cases, even if there is an increase. That is very important.
The second indicator is vaccination coverage. We all know that even after 2 injections, we can still get Covid-19, but the probability of severe cases and death will be significantly reduced. Therefore, when the vaccination coverage is high, it means that the rate of severe cases and deaths will decrease and can be maintained below the treatment threshold of the health system.
In short, to decide whether to open or not to open and to what extent, we must look at the response threshold of the treatment system and the ability of people to be protected from the epidemic.
That is, we need to change our perspective on epidemic control, which is to keep the epidemic at a level that does not break down and does not exceed the treatment capacity of the health system. Controlling the epidemic does not mean reducing the number of F0s.
Recently, the number of deaths in Ho Chi Minh City has decreased significantly. What is your assessment of the role of treatment in this result?
- It is true that the number of deaths has decreased significantly from an average of about 300 cases/day in mid-August to 184 last week, and this is something that not only Ho Chi Minh City but the whole country has been waiting for for a long time. Besides treatment, the promotion of vaccination since the end of June as discussed above is a very important reason.
Returning to the treatment pillar, the decision to switch from a 5-tier system back to a 3-tier system is the right one, it helps to reduce confusion in the system and creates connectivity between the tiers. When looking at the mortality data, the mortality rate is highest on the third floor, but the largest number of deaths is on the second floor because this floor has more than 10 times more patients than the third floor.
When we look more closely at the statistics, we will see that an important cause of high mortality on these two floors is due to overload and late transfer to hospitals. This implies that our primary health care system has problems, namely being too thin and lacking both the capacity and resources needed to support the large and rapidly increasing number of F0 cases in the area.
Strengthening primary health care - for example through a network of companion doctors, community emergency models, and more recently, military medical forces and mobile health stations - plays a very important role in reducing deaths.
Medicine is an important factor in treatment. Although we do not have specific drugs, testing some "medicine bags" as they are now at the grassroots level, especially for F0 at home, has proven to be clearly effective. Of course, the use of these medicine bags must go hand in hand with the force of doctors and primary health care workers, because if the medicine is not used at the right time and in the right way, it can also be dangerous for patients.
The tighter and longer the distance, the more social security is needed
The last group of issues is social security during the period of social distancing. In your opinion, how should we solve this problem to minimize the negative impacts of the epidemic and distancing?
- Social security is closely related to social distancing and vaccines. A person in social distancing is a person whose needs for social security need to be met, especially when they are in risky areas, belong to vulnerable groups or lose their jobs. It is very simple: those who have to go out to earn a living must be fully subsidized during the period of social distancing.
Thus, social distancing goes hand in hand with social security. The tighter and longer the social distancing, the more social security there must be. On the contrary, opening up also goes hand in hand with social security. A person with a job is a person who is removed from the social security subsidy list. Therefore, the most sustainable and thorough social security policy is to quickly control the epidemic so that the economy can open up and workers can return to work.
The problem we need to solve is a multi-objective problem. Especially when those goals seriously conflict with each other, we must clearly perceive it to have a solution. If we only look at the sole purpose of reducing the epidemic, it will be one-sided, especially when the social distancing has been prolonged because the tolerance of people and businesses, no matter how large, still has a limit.
Ho Chi Minh City started social distancing with different levels from May 31 until now, more than 100 days. But the city cannot prolong the social distancing forever, people and businesses are very tired, the city budget is also exhausted, and the Central Government cannot support much more.
In the context that Ho Chi Minh City has been vaccinated as it is now, continuing to prolong the social distancing will be the wrong decision. I supported increasing social distancing on July 9 and did not support easing social distancing in Ho Chi Minh City on August 15 because at that time the epidemic was breaking out, the vaccination rate was still low, especially not protecting high-risk groups. In that context, we must practice social distancing to "buy time for the vaccine". Now that the vaccine has been widely spread, it is unreasonable for us to still close.
Roadmap for opening: Pilot in low-risk areas
So, looking at the specific story of Hanoi after September 21, Ho Chi Minh City after September 30 loosened social distancing, do you have any recommendations on the roadmap for opening?
- First of all, we must control the epidemic. Controlling the epidemic here means that the level of the epidemic is below the threshold of the treatment capacity of the health system, under the condition that people have a certain level of protection from the vaccine.
Second, the level of opening must be compatible with the level of risk of the epidemic. In other words, to what extent is safe, we will open accordingly.
Therefore, in some areas that have begun to control this, we can open, of course cautiously. For example, District 7, Cu Chi, Can Gio can pilot opening in stages. Then, we monitor closely, draw lessons to expand to other places.
The third issue, once again, needs to be emphasized, is to rely on data. These data must be carefully and systematically monitored so that we know whether we are on the right track or off track. Are we playing with fire or controlling the fire? That is the basic principle of disease control.
Therefore, I think the appropriate policy for Ho Chi Minh City at this time is to apply 2 things: Controlled pilot in some localities, some areas, for example industrial parks; controlled pilot in some safer subjects, those who have been vaccinated with 2 doses after 2 weeks; those who have been vaccinated with 1 dose after 2 weeks as well as F0 who have finished quarantine after recovering from the disease and are tested periodically depending on the risk level of the job.
That is, when opening up, it is necessary to open first to the least risky areas, the least risky subjects and strictly monitor, not open wide, open widely. It must be clearly understood that this opening is intentional, controlled, to have new information, thereby drawing lessons to expand to other areas.
On the part of the people and businesses, it is necessary to realize that "living with SARS-CoV-2" will not only require 5K like the openings in the previous 3 epidemics, but must have new operating procedures, early warning systems and response plans... very different from previous relaxations and openings, which basically only required 5K. In other words, we need "multiple layers of defense" following the "Swiss cheese" model to be able to open successfully.
One of the other proposals is to bring private healthcare into the fight against the epidemic. Mobilizing external resources is very difficult, so where do we have to untie the knot?
- Considering the fight against the epidemic as a "people's war", it is inevitable to mobilize all resources of the private sector and society. In fact, from the beginning of the epidemic until now, these two sectors have made enormous contributions to the epidemic prevention work, from social security to medical protective equipment, from machinery and equipment to even field hospitals.
In the field of medical expertise, unfortunately, up to now, due to difficulties in the mechanism, the private health sector has only been able to participate in some stages such as vaccination, testing, or remote consultation, but has been almost left out of the treatment.
Covid-19 is a group A epidemic, so according to the law, the State will pay for hospital fees, so naturally the public health sector is almost taking on all the responsibility.
If private hospitals are opened to treat F0, there will be a situation where when F0 comes to ask for treatment, the hospital cannot refuse. But when being treated, Covid-19 patients do not have to pay hospital fees. So, private hospitals cannot refuse patients and have to provide free treatment, which creates an immediate conflict of interest. Therefore, there needs to be an appropriate financial mechanism to resolve this conflict.
One solution is to use insurance. If the patient has insurance, their hospital fees will be covered by the insurance. However, insurance has a limit on payment while the payment level in private hospitals is higher.
This conflict is not easy to resolve. Not only that, from the perspective of private health, it is not simply a matter of higher costs, but also legal risks, especially when a patient dies. Therefore, without an appropriate mechanism, it is difficult to encourage the private sector to participate in treatment.
In short, when we do not have a policy framework, private hospitals cannot participate. If they participate, they will have to bear legal risks and financial risks. Therefore, the bottleneck is not whether private hospitals can or want to participate, but the bottleneck is the legal framework.
In addition, private hospitals or clinics do not necessarily have to participate in treating Covid patients to be useful. It is important to remember that besides Covid-19, there are many other patients every day, such as stroke or cardiovascular disease, and they also need timely treatment. Private healthcare can certainly play a very important role in caring for patients other than Covid-19.
Bottlenecks in the national governance system
From this, what lessons should we draw in the issue of governance at each level in the period of living with the pandemic and then reopening safely?
- The pandemic is like a hurricane, "dismantling the signs" as in Andersen's fairy tale, thereby helping us clearly see many shortcomings of the national governance system.
The first shortcoming is institutional fragmentation and division. At the central level, ministries lack coordination with each other; the same is true among local departments and branches.
Meanwhile, disease prevention does not only affect one field, nor does it have just one goal.
On the contrary, it is a multi-objective problem, affecting all aspects of economic, social and political life. Ministries, branches and localities cannot cooperate with each other, the central and local levels lack connection, so how can we fight the epidemic systematically and consistently?
Second, for a long time, we have lacked a strategic command, a command to plan strategies and operate the fight against the epidemic. Recently, the Prime Minister had to directly command.
Third, the national governance system is a decentralized management system within a unified policy framework. Therefore, it is necessary to decentralize to localities in developing appropriate anti-epidemic plans, based on their actual anti-epidemic situation, human resources, finance, health care, and treatment systems in the area, but within a common policy framework to avoid the situation where the top says one thing and the bottom does another. At the same time, it is necessary to avoid the opposite extreme, in which subordinates passively wait and rigidly follow orders from superiors.
The fourth issue in terms of national governance is the regional approach. If Ho Chi Minh City only cares about itself, while Binh Duong, Dong Nai and the Mekong Delta provinces each care about themselves, our supply chain will be cut off. Because the SARS-CoV-2 virus does not know the concept of administrative boundaries, and Ho Chi Minh City is not the only place affected by the epidemic. Even if the city can control the epidemic, if Binh Duong and Dong Nai cannot control it, the epidemic will still return.
Therefore, there must still be a regional approach, it cannot be a local approach, and each locality must not approach a district or county but the whole province and the whole city.
These are four important issues in national governance that need to be adjusted and changed. The local division, institutional fragmentation, and weak decentralization have all been exposed during the epidemic period. We have regional councils and key economic zones, but basically it is still a situation where everyone does their own thing.
2021 Goal: Prioritize epidemic control, temporarily put aside growth targets
What do you think about the dual goals for 2021 and the premise for 2022?
- We must have a different perspective on the dual goals compared to 1 year ago.
In terms of health, we must control the epidemic level below the treatment threshold of the health system, not eliminate or completely destroy F0. This mindset needs to change.
In terms of the economy, let's temporarily put aside growth targets. What we need now is to protect workers, businesses and households, thereby nurturing the vitality of the economy. Do not let the economy fall into a state of exhaustion to the point where it cannot be restored.
In that sense, we need to have a suitable opening roadmap, corresponding to the epidemic situation and vaccine coverage, and have different roadmaps for different regions and localities. In addition, there must be measures to support businesses, workers and people in a substantial way.
A number of recent surveys by chambers of commerce and industry, both domestic and foreign, have shown the fact that almost all businesses, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, in Ho Chi Minh City have not received any support.
We talk but have not done anything, so we need more direct and fundamental measures to go straight to supporting people and businesses, instead of creating such a large gap in policy and implementation.
In order of priority, what do you think we need to do at this time?
First, we must change our thinking about anti-epidemic strategies, allowing flexibility to suit specific contexts and differences between regions, provinces and cities.
Second, we must immediately resolve the fragmentation, institutional division, and separatism to have a general staff to develop a consistent policy framework. On that basis, localities rely on the decentralization mechanism and their practical situation to have appropriate strategies at each specific time.
Third, protect - both medically, physically and mentally - the force of doctors and medical staff who are already too stressed and tired after more than 100 days of fighting the 4th wave of the epidemic.
Fourth, we must concentrate on vaccinating, especially the most vulnerable groups and areas: people aged 50+, underlying diseases, pregnant women, and localities and areas with tense epidemics.
Fifth, during the period of social distancing, we must take care of social security. If social security is not taken care of, people cannot rest assured to accompany the government in fighting the epidemic.
Sixth, how not to exceed the threshold that businesses and people can bear because then it will not only be an economic collapse but also a loss of confidence and a social crisis.
Those are the six most important points.
Thank you!
- Pham Huyen
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